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Abstract 
A key aim underpinning the regeneration of the Thames Gateway in the 1990s and 2000s 
was to ensure that the region’s existing ex-industrial communities were able to derive 
tangible social, economic and infrastructural benefits from the new development taking place 
on brownfield sites. A more inclusive and socially aware form of regeneration that learned 
the lessons from the property led regeneration that took place in the London Docklands in 
the early 1980s was promised.  
This study examines the extent to which this ambition has been achieved in Kent 
Thameside, one of the key ‘growth areas’ identified by the Government in the Thames 
Gateway. Using evidence from extended interviews with residents living in three existing 
Kent Thameside communities and key regeneration officials, as well as detailed observation 
of events and developments in Kent Thameside, this study examines the impact of the 
principal regeneration objectives relating to the area’s existing communities.  
It looks first at the extent to which new developments and existing communities have been 
integrated both physically and socially. It then considers the impact of policies which were 
designed to empower existing residents by enabling them to participate in the design and 
delivery of programmes relating to the area’s physical and economic regeneration. This 
study uses this analysis to examine whether the Kent Thameside regeneration model, which 
is predicated on the private sector led redevelopment of large, brownfield sites outside the 
existing residential footprint, is best placed to achieve to the regeneration objectives relating 
to existing communities. This study also considers what lessons can be drawn from the case 
study of Kent Thameside to inform our understanding of the policy and practice of 
regeneration in the wider Thames Gateway and the UK.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction to this study 
1.1 Introduction 
The Thames Gateway is one of the most important UK urban regeneration projects of the 
last thirty years. Once labelled as the largest regeneration area in Europe (National Audit 
Office, 2007) the Thames Gateway region today stretches over forty miles from the edge of 
the City of London to the mouth of the Thames Estuary in the eastern reaches of Essex and 
Kent and covers sixteen local authority areas (see map 1.1).  
Map 1.1  Map of the Thames Gateway 
 
It is a physically and economically diverse region of around 1.5 million people which 
encompasses both densely occupied inner city London boroughs such as Newham and 
Tower Hamlets, with high levels of deprivation and large ethnic minority populations, and the 
remote, thinly populated Essex and Kent marshes. It also includes the Medway towns, which 
were built around the naval and defence industries, the post war new town of Basildon, the 
seaside town of Southend and the former cement and paper making communities of North 
Kent. At its fringes in Castle Point in Essex and Swale in Kent there are also prosperous 
villages with older, overwhelmingly white populations.  
Material removed for copy right reasons  
See www.eukn.org/dsresource?objectid=149585  (page 13) 
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This study examines the impact of regeneration in the Thames Gateway in the 1990s and 
2000s on the area’s existing communities. The purpose of this introductory chapter is to 
consider the social, economic and political context in which this regeneration took place and 
to introduce some of the theories that have been used to explain the key characteristics of 
this regeneration. It also sets out the key aim of this study and discusses what this study will 
add to our understanding of urban regeneration in the UK.  
This chapter will begin by describing the economic changes and policies that underpinned 
the regeneration of the Thames Gateway from the 1980s onwards before introducing the key 
aim of this study and the approach used to achieve this aim. We will then move on to 
examine the wider social and political context in which this regeneration occurred. This 
chapter will then set out the rationale for this study and describe its overall structure and 
specific aims.  
1.2 De-industrialisation and the urban regeneration of the Thames Gateway: From 
 the London Docklands Development Corporation to the Sustainable 
 Communities Plan 
The regeneration of the Thames Gateway began in the early 1980s in the London Docklands 
around the Isle of Dogs, Surrey Quays and the Royal Docks in Newham. In 1981 the 
Conservative government set up an Urban Development Corporation to revive the area’s 
moribund economy and property market through the redevelopment of its redundant 
docklands (Foster, 1999, Brownill, 1999, Imrie, Thomas, 1999). The London docks had been 
undermined by the shift towards the containerisation of goods and the emergence of oil as 
the primary sea-borne community and had been in terminal decline since the 1950s. By the 
time the West India and Millwall docks on the Isle of Dogs closed in 1980, the number of 
people employed in the London docks had fallen from 31,000 in 1955 to just over 4,000 
(Foster, 1999). In the 1970s alone, unemployment in the area had trebled from 5 to 16 per 
cent (Foster, 1999).  
The experience of the London Docklands in the 1970s and 1980s was not unique. Many 
other traditional centres of industry in the UK such as Manchester, Liverpool, Sheffield, 
Birmingham and Glasgow underwent similar contractions. A general failure to invest in its 
plant, production processes in the post war period, coupled with rising fuel and business 
costs following the oil shock of 1973 and poor labour relations, had left many of the UK’s 
manufacturing centres unable to compete in an increasingly globalised market (Hall, 2006). 
The government’s disavowal of Keynesian demand management policies in favour of a more 
monetarist approach aimed primarily at controlling inflation rather than tackling 
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unemployment or maintaining growth, together in the 1980s with a reluctance to intervene in 
support of struggling industries, had added to the pressure on UK manufacturing. As a result 
of these economic and political changes, the UK overall lost a third of its manufacturing jobs 
between 1971 and 1983 (Hall, 1985) while between 1971 and 2001 the UK’s twenty largest 
cities lost 2.8 million manufacturing jobs (Moore, Begg, 2004). 
The Urban Development Corporations (UDCs), of which the London Docklands and 
Merseyside UDCs were the first examples, and a new programme of ‘Enterprise Zones’, 
were key elements of the Conservative government’s strategy to revitalise these declining 
industrial areas (Tallon, 2010). Armed with its own planning powers and chaired by the head 
of the Trafalgar House property conglomerate, the London Docklands UDC viewed the 
revival of the local private property market as a central element of its regeneration strategy 
(Foster, 1999). It saw itself primarily as a promoter and enabler of private sector investment 
in the Docklands, responsible for selling the Docklands to a sceptical market and removing 
any practical obstacles to development (Foster, 1999). The creation of an Isle of Dogs 
Enterprise Zone in 1982, which gave new investors significant tax incentives and a ten year 
rate free period, strengthened their negotiating position.  
The type of entrepreneurial, ‘property led’ regeneration pursued by the London Docklands 
UDC in the 1980s proved successful in levering in significant private investment in the area 
in shape of new housing and new businesses. By the time it eventually closed in 1998, some 
24,000 new homes and 60,000 new jobs had been created in the docklands and over 2,000 
acres of derelict land had been redeveloped (Brownill, 2008). Yet, it was also criticised for its 
perceived failure to address the regeneration needs of the existing communities 
neighbouring the new developments, many of whom were areas of high unemployment with 
poor education and health outcomes. It was accused by the House of Commons 
Employment Select Committee of ‘bypassing’ the local community (Imrie, Thomas, 1999, 23) 
while Brownill (1999) complained that its entrepreneurial governance style had left the 
docklands redeveloped but not regenerated. 
Under the new Conservative government of John Major in 1990s, there was a conscious 
shift towards a more inclusive and partnership based form of regeneration. The City 
Challenge of 1991 and the Single Regeneration Budget of 1994 required the public and 
private sectors to work in partnership in order to win government funding. There was also an 
expectation that successful partnerships would focus on improving local education, health, 
employment and housing outcomes as well promoting the physical regeneration of their 
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areas (Cullingworth, Nadin, 2006, Tallon, 2010). It is this change in policy emphasis in which 
this study takes a close interest.  
These principles were reflected in the government’s approach to the regeneration of the 
wider Thames Gateway beyond the London Docklands, which was first identified as a 
national regeneration priority in 1991. The Thames Gateway Planning Framework launched 
in 1995 still saw the market and property led redevelopment as the principal driver of 
regeneration in the region. Yet the framework also focused on the need to address “the 
broader regeneration issues facing established communities” and, importantly for this study, 
the “integration of new and existing areas of community and commerce” (DoE, 1995). It also 
expressed an interest in “encouraging a sustainable pattern of development” which 
optimised the use of existing redundant brownfield sites within the urban footprint.  
The primary aim of the framework was to generate the jobs, training, transport, infrastructure 
and housing deemed necessary to enable the Gateway to match the economic success of 
the M4 corridor west of London linking Heathrow and Reading (DoE, 1995, Church, Frost, 
1995). Plans for a high speed international rail link were also launched, which the 
government hoped would lend some gloss to the Gateway’s image, which was synonymous 
with industrial decay and dereliction (Llewelyn Davies, Roger Tym & Partners, 1993). Peter 
Hall, an urban planner who played a key role in shaping the government’s vision for the 
Thames Gateway, envisaged that the Gateway would become a linear city region composed 
of a series of discrete, self-sustaining communities linked, like ‘beads on a string’ by the high 
speed rail link (Hall, 1989). In Hall’s blueprint, the international financial businesses in the 
City of London and the Isle of Dogs would be complemented by residential and commercial 
hubs in Greater London, Kent and Essex, which would fulfil routine production and back 
office functions (Hall, 1989). 
The Labour government which came to power in 1997 shared its predecessor’s commitment 
to the regeneration of the Thames Gateway. It saw the Gateway, with its acres of redundant 
brownfield sites close to London’s commercial centres, as the ideal place to provide the 
housing needed to absorb London’s growing population and bring some stability to the 
property market (HC Deb, 2000, ODPM, 2003a, 2003b, Barker, 2004).  
In 2003 the government launched the Sustainable Communities Plan which included a 
commitment to create 120,000 new homes in the Thames Gateway by 2016 - a target later 
raised to 160,000 homes. These homes were to be built in line with the sustainable 
development principles set out in the Urban Task Force’s final report, Towards an Urban 
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Renaissance (Urban Task Force, 1999). This influential report, commissioned by the 
government, had called for “well designed, compact and connected cities supporting a 
diverse range of uses – where people live, work and enjoy leisure time at close quarters” in 
order to “alleviate the increasing global ecological pressure” (Urban Task Force, 1999). In 
keeping with this aspiration, the Sustainable Communities Plan announced that the 
regeneration of the Gateway would lead to the creation of communities of “sufficient size, 
scale and density to support basic amenities in the neighbourhood and minimise use of 
resources”.  
The other significant aspect of the Sustainable Communities Plan, as far as this study is 
concerned, was that its remit included existing communities in the Gateway as well as the 
new brownfield based developments. The regeneration of the Gateway, it said, should be a 
“broad based project” that tackles the “urban renewal” of existing communities along with 
“brownfield development, economic growth and environmental improvement” in “an 
integrated way”. Furthermore, all local people, the plan stated, should be able to “participate 
in the planning, design and long-term stewardship of their community” (ODPM, 2003a).  
To achieve this vision, the government made £446 million available to support land 
assembly, site preparation, affordable housing, urban renaissance and the neighbourhood 
renewal of the Gateway’s existing communities (ODPM, 2003a). Nine new delivery vehicles 
were also created to deliver these targets in each sub-area of the Gateway. Two of them, the 
Thurrock Thames Gateway Development Corporation and the London Thames Gateway 
Development Corporation had similar strategic and planning powers as the former London 
Docklands UDC. Others such as the Kent Thameside Regeneration Board and the Medway 
Renaissance Partnership were looser, non-statutory partnerships that had few powers of 
their own and existed primarily to co-ordinate delivery.  
1.3 Key aim of this study 
It is the move towards a more socially inclusive, participative and broad based form of 
regeneration articulated first in the Thames Gateway Planning Framework and then, and 
with more emphasis, in the Sustainable Communities Plan, that provides the primary focus 
of this study. The key question which this study seeks to answer is whether the regeneration 
model followed in the Thames Gateway in the 1990s and 2000s – which was still 
underpinned by the same market driven, property led approach pursued by the London 
Docklands UDC in the early 1980s – has been able to meet the regeneration objectives 
relating to the Gateway’s existing communities set out in these two strategies.   
  19 
 
There are two particular aspects of this more inclusive regeneration approach on which this 
study will focus. Firstly, it considers whether a regeneration model predicated on the physical 
redevelopment of large-scale, discrete brownfield sites in the Gateway by private developers 
is capable of achieving the physical and social integration of new and existing communities. 
Secondly, it examines whether the necessary resources and capacity existed and were 
made available to enable existing residents to play an active role in shaping in the 
regeneration of their communities and the long-term management of their assets. Given that 
the delivery of these regeneration ambitions was heavily dependent on the ability of private 
sector developers to deliver large volumes of new houses and offices within a narrow 
timeframe, this second question is an important one to ask given the slowdown in 
construction after the banking crisis of 2008 (Granger, 2010).  
To answer these questions this study will examine the regeneration experience of Kent 
Thameside, a ‘strategic growth location’ in the Thames Gateway regeneration area (ODPM, 
2003b) that incorporates the urban areas of the Kent boroughs of Dartford and Gravesham 
north of the A2 highway and south of the river Thames (Map 1.2).  Stretching from the 
borders of Greater London in the west to the edge of the Medway Towns twelve miles to the 
east, it is home to around 150,000 people, or approximately 1 in 10 of the population of the 
Thames Gateway. It consists of the towns of Dartford and Gravesend, each of which has a 
population of around 60,000, and a number of small urban villages which grew up in the 
Victorian era around the cement and paper making industries and were hit hard 
economically by the loss of these industries in the 1970s and 1980s.  
Map 1.2 Map of Kent Thameside 
 
Source: Kent Thameside Delivery Board (2005) 
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Kent Thameside is now the location of Ebbsfleet International Station, which provides direct 
high speed rail services to London and international services to Paris and Brussels. The 
surrounding Ebbsfleet Valley, meanwhile, has been identified as one of the Gateway’s key 
housing and commercial development hubs (see Map 1.3). In the 1990s it was anticipated 
that by the end of the 2020s a total of 25,000 new homes and some 50,000 new jobs would 
have been created in Kent Thameside, much of it around Ebbsfleet (Kent Thameside 
Association, 1995, 1997, 1999). While the banking crisis of 2008 has delayed some of this 
development and led to some projects being scaled back, Kent Thameside remains an 
important regeneration centre in the Gateway.  
As well as being a key growth area in the Gateway, Kent Thameside is also seen as an as 
an exemplar of social regeneration in the Thames Gateway (Nelson, Quan, Forrester, 
Pound, 2005, Oxford Brookes, 2006). The government commissioned Thames Gateway 
evidence review, for example, identified Kent Thameside as one of the few key growth areas 
where social regeneration has been pursued with the same vigour as physical regeneration 
(Oxford Brookes, 2006). Ensuring that the existing residents of the former cement and paper 
making communities “reap the benefits” of regeneration and that new and existing 
communities are properly integrated have been key objectives since the early 1990s when 
the Kent Thameside Association, a regeneration partnership between the local authorities 
and Blue Circle, the principal local landowner, was set up (Kent Thameside Association, 
1995).  
Map 1.3 Map of the key regeneration sites in Kent Thameside  
 
Source: Kent Thameside Delivery Board (2005) 
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Kent Thameside’s importance as growth area and its focus on the regeneration of its existing 
communities means that it is well qualified to help us understand the capability of the 
Thames Gateway regeneration model to achieve its objectives relating to existing 
communities. It will enable us to examine whether the regeneration model pursued in the 
Thames Gateway in the 1990s and 2000s is a realistic strategy with sufficient resources to 
meet a demanding set of social and physical regeneration goals or is, instead,  an example 
of the kind of ‘irrational exuberance’ displayed by the financial markets during the dot-com 
bubble of the late 1990s (Shiller, 2000): a phenomenon whereby a community’s collective 
confidence in a particular idea is not justified by the fundamentals underpinning it.   
1.4  The socio-economic and political context for urban regeneration from the 
 1980s to 2000s 
If we are to understand the emergence and development of urban regeneration in the 
Thames Gateway then we need to consider the social, economic and political events that 
gave rise to the emergence of property led regeneration in the 1980s and its subsequent, 
ostensibly more inclusive forms of the 1990s and 2000s. It is also important to consider the 
academic theories that have emerged to explain these events.  
In the previous sections we touched on the decline of the UK’s traditional industrial base in 
the 1970s and 1980s and the economic and political factors behind it. The collapse of these 
labour intensive, mechanised industries and the emergence in its place of an information 
technology driven service economy focused on finance, the law, retail, hospitality and 
education is seen as emblematic of a paradigm shift in the economy, society and politics of 
the UK and other western liberal democracies.  
Our understanding of this change has been strongly influenced by the regulation school: a 
group of theorists influenced by Marxist analysis of capital accumulation, who argue that 
capitalism is characterised by emergence and breakdown of a series of modes of 
production, each regulated by a distinctive set of social and political institutions. In the eyes 
of the regulation theorists such as Aglietta (1979), Lipietz (1987) and Jessop (1990), the 
1970s marked the transition between one ‘regime of accumulation’, ‘Fordism’, and another 
‘Post-Fordism’.   
‘Fordist’ economies, which existed in Western Europe and the US from the 1940s to the 
1970s, were based on the mass production and mass consumption of standardised goods 
by a largely male workforce. To maintain a steady demand for these products, nation state 
governments, working in close partnership with industry, labour and capital, intervened to 
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maintain full employment and the purchasing power of consumers and to provide social 
protection payments to those unable to work (Heffernan, 2000).  
Post-Fordism, on the other hand is seen as synonymous with the increasingly globalised 
service sector economy of the 1980s which was underpinned by a more feminised workforce 
and less job security (Jessop, 1990). The state, meanwhile, reflecting the rise of neo-liberal 
politics, saw the control of inflation and the promotion of economic competitiveness and 
growth rather than the maintenance of full employment and social protection as its primary 
responsibility (Cairncross, 1990, Brenner 1999).  During this period of ‘rolled back neo-
liberalism’, the restructured Post-Fordist state became less protectionist in spirit and 
concentrated its efforts on removing any perceived regulatory, legislative and structural 
barriers to economic growth (Peck, Tickell, 2006). In the UK in the 1980s, for example, the 
Conservative government sought to curb the power of organised labour and to reduce the 
employment and regulatory costs faced by private enterprise. In keeping with this neo-liberal 
ethos it also deregulated the financial markets and privatised many of the UK’s public utilities 
and assets.  
The emergence in the 1980s of the entrepreneurial city, which competed on a global stage 
for investment in its property and financial markets by promoting its locational, fiscal and 
infrastructural advantages, is closely associated with this shift from a Fordist to a Post-
Fordist economy (Tallon, 2010, Boddy, Parkinson, 2004). ‘City regions’ such as London and 
New York, orientated around dense clusters of global banking and financial institutions and 
supported by an interdependent network of flexible service industries, are seen as the 
engine and ‘territorial platforms’ for much of the Post-Fordist economy (Scott, 2001). The 
governance of these entrepreneurial cities, meanwhile, was provided by public-private 
partnerships dedicated to attracting private capital to fund the infrastructure and other supply 
side initiatives once provided by the nation state (Harvey, 1989). Powerful ‘place 
entrepreneurs’ in the property and construction sectors, together with education, transport 
and utility providers, combined to form ‘growth machines’, according to Logan and Molotch 
(1987) in order to create a pro-growth, pro-development culture within cities. The property 
based approach to regeneration seen in the London Docklands, which sought to market the 
area to business and property investors and affluent new residents, is seen as emblematic of 
this new urban entrepreneurialism (Tallon, 2010).  
Yet while the urban entrepreneurialism of the 1980s brought new investment and 
development to many of the UK’s industrial heartlands, it was unable to compensate for the 
loss of these cities’ manufacturing bases. Many of the people who worked in these industries 
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either failed to re-enter employment or ended up working on the insecure, low wage, low skill 
margins of the economy (Hamnett, 2003). In a bid to reconcile the contradictions created by 
the ‘rolled back neo-liberalism’ of the 1980s, which brought new wealth and prestige to 
places such as the deregulated City of London but left cities in the north, the midlands and 
parts of East London facing high levels of unemployment, a more nuanced, ‘rolled out neo-
liberalism’ emerged under the Conservative and Labour governments that followed the 
Thatcher administration. These administrations had the same neo-liberal distaste for 
regulatory interference in functioning of the free market but undertook a series of supply side 
measures aimed at enabling previously excluded communities to participate fully in the 
economy (Jessop, 1990, 1995, 2002, Peck, Theodore, 2000, 2001). The Labour government 
which came to power in 1997, for example, adopted a series of ‘workfare’ policies to tackle 
the financial and educational barriers to employment and to equip people with the skills 
necessary to exist in a flexible neo-liberal economy characterised by job insecurity (Levitas, 
2005).  
Labour’s ‘workfare’ policies and its emphasis on community participation in its urban renewal 
programmes such as the New Deal for Communities and the Neighbourhood Renewal 
Strategy were part of a wider policy agenda geared towards enabling excluded communities 
to increase their levels of ‘social capital’ (Imrie, Lees, Raco, 2009, Tiesdell, Allmendinger, 
2001). These policies were influenced by Putnam’s (1993) ideas about social capital and 
Etzioni’s communitarianism (1995). Putnam saw ‘social capital’, or the social networks and 
associations that bind individuals together, as a community asset that was essential to the 
successful pursuit of shared objectives. Etzioni, meanwhile, argued that the shared values, 
rights and responsibilities of communities were the key drivers of a successful and cohesive 
society. 
 Higher levels of social capital were associated by the government with improved 
educational, employment and health outcomes and seen as a means of tackling the sense of 
powerlessness, physical and social exclusion and low esteem that was, in part, preventing 
communities at the margins of society from achieving their potential (Kearns, 2003). The 
Sustainable Communities Plan (2003a), which highlighted the importance of community 
participation in the planning and delivery of regeneration as a means of building sustainable 
communities of engaged citizens, reflects Labour’s pre-occupation with improving levels of 
social capital through greater civic participation. Under Labour property developers were 
encouraged to “adopt the language of social inclusion, partnership and community focus” 
while there was “much onus on the development industry” to ensure that existing 
communities are “core” to the regeneration process (Imrie, 2009, 98).  
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The debate about social and physical exclusion took place in the context of a significant 
social re-structuring of the UK’s urban landscape. It has been argued that since the 1970s 
that has been a gradual spatial polarisation of income groups in the UK, with rising house 
prices reducing the freedom of low and medium income households to find a home in an 
area of their choice (Dorling, 2011). London, for example, has seen a sharp growth in the 
proportion of middle class professional households in the last thirty years, with many of them 
living in now desirable, high cost areas vacated during the post war boom by white working 
class households who took advantage of rising wages and career opportunities to move out 
to the edge of London and the Home Counties (Hamnett, 2003, Dench, Gavron, Young, 
2006). Some low income households can still be found in these areas but they are almost 
entirely restricted to the social housing sector. Indeed, the property market in much of 
London is now wholly inaccessible to anyone with a low or medium income. 
The Labour government’s support for ‘mixed communities’ containing homes of different 
types and tenures to meet the needs of a range of income and age groups, which is a key 
policy objective of the Sustainable Communities Plan (2003a), was in part a response to this 
affordability issue. Without affordable homes for service workers in places like the Thames 
Gateway, London would not, the government believed, be able to compete effectively on a 
global stage (Rose, 2004). However, the support for mixed communities also reflects a belief 
that they can facilitate ‘creative trickle down’ between different social and income groups and 
act as vehicle for empowerment (Peck 2005). 
Another significant influence on urban regeneration policy and practice in the 1990s and 
2000s was the growth in interest in sustainable development and the ‘future proofing’ of 
cities in response to challenge posed by climate change and rising sea levels (Girardet, 
2008). The rapid increase in the consumption by cities of power, water, raw materials and 
land, which was highlighted in UN’s Earth Summit in Rio in 1992, was described by Rogers 
and Power (2000), members of the government’s influential Urban Task Force, as being 
among the biggest environmental threats facing the world. This interest in more sustainable 
development led to a focus within regeneration policy on the ‘compact city’ with 
developments of sufficient density to enable residents to access services by foot rather than 
by car built on previously developed ‘brownfield sites’ rather than virgin greenfields (Urban 
Task Force, 1999, DETR, 2000a).  
As well as shaping the principles behind the regeneration of the Thames Gateway (DoE, 
1995, ODPM, 2003a) this focus on the compact city helped to inspire a revival in inner city 
living in many of the UK’s major ex-industrial cities. After decades of decline, Manchester’s 
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inner city population, for example, grew from just 200 in 1993 to over 15,000 in 2003 as the 
city’s redundant warehouses and factories were replaced by new high density apartment 
blocks, shops and cultural facilities (Tallon, 2010). These gentrified inner city enclaves aimed 
at affluent, usually childless, urban professionals became a defining feature of urban 
regeneration in the UK during the 1990s and 2000s; an example of the shift in the urban 
economy from the Fordist mass production of standardised goods to a service economy 
driven by property, retail, finance and cultural and sporting industries (Boddy, 2007).      
1.5 Methodology and rationale of this study 
As stated above the key question which this study seeks to answer is whether the 
regeneration model followed in the Thames Gateway in the 1990s and 2000s has been able 
to meet the regeneration objectives relating to the Gateway’s existing communities set out in 
the Thames Gateway Regeneration Framework (DoE, 1995) and the Sustainable 
Communities Plan (ODPM, 2003).   
To answer this question this study will focus on the case study of Kent Thameside and 
examine the impact of the regeneration policies relating to the area’s existing communities 
pursued by the members of the Kent Thameside Association in the 1990s and its successor 
the Kent Thameside Delivery Board in the 2000s. Broadly speaking, these policies fall into 
two, overlapping categories. First, there are the policies which are designed to empower 
residents by enabling them to participate in the design and delivery of programmes relating 
to the area’s physical and economic regeneration. Among these programmes are urban 
renewal schemes designed to improve the fabric and infrastructure of existing communities, 
in which residents were supposed to be closely involved, (Dartford Borough Council, 2003e)  
and schemes aimed at giving existing residents the chance to help shape the regeneration 
priorities of Kent Thameside (Dartford Borough Council, 2003g).  
The second category consists of policies that seek to promote the physical and social 
integration of existing communities and the new brownfield developments created through a 
process of property led regeneration (EDAW Plc, 2005). These policies attempt to minimise 
any physical disparities between the new housing developments and Kent Thameside’s 
existing communities which are predominantly composed of late Victorian and Edwardian 
terraces, inter and post war social housing. Blurring the boundaries between the new and 
the old is seen by the regeneration partners as an important means of making sure that all 
Kent Thameside residents, regardless of where they live, feel the benefits of regeneration 
(Dartford Borough Council, 2002, Kent Thameside Delivery Board, 2005). Reducing the 
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sense of physical disconnection between the new and the old, it is argued, will also help to 
increase the opportunity for social mixing between the two discrete groups of residents.  
This study will examine the implementation and impact of these policies. To do this it will 
look in detail at the key social regeneration projects carried out in the two decades following 
the launch of the Kent Thameside Association in the early 1990s. This analysis will be 
informed by evidence from a survey of 60 existing residents from existing Kent Thameside 
communities using semi-structured interviews and also 9 key local figures involved in 
managing the area’s regeneration. The evidence from local residents and key local figures, 
coupled with detailed observation of events and developments in Kent Thameside will help 
us to understand the degree to which the regeneration partners have succeeded in their 
ambition to create integrated communities and ensure that the benefits of regeneration are 
felt by all.  
There are three key reasons why this research will add to our body of knowledge on urban 
regeneration. Firstly, it will provide a useful addition to the literature on the social 
regeneration of growth areas such as the Thames Gateway. As Turok (2009) and the 
Thames Gateway Evidence Review (Oxford Brookes University, 2006) have stated much of 
the existing literature tends to focus on the Gateway’s complex governance arrangements 
and the challenge of funding its infrastructure needs. There been little research, however, on 
the impact of regeneration policies in the Gateway focused on existing communities, and 
attempts to integrate them with new developments. 
Secondly, much of the existing research on the Thames Gateway is ‘London-centric’ in 
nature and concerned with the regeneration experience of core city areas rather than the 
urban or semi-urban hinterland of Essex and Kent (Cohen, Rustin, 2008, Imrie, Lees, Raco, 
2009, Power, Richardson, Seshimo, Firth, 2004). This poses the risk, Turok (2009) believes, 
that the specific regeneration needs of the urban hinterland will be seen by national 
policymakers as either synonymous with those of the core city areas or become obscured 
altogether by the weight of evidence on the core cities. A study such as this which looks at 
the dynamic between national policy goals, the local policy agenda in a region outside 
London and the needs of the local residents most directly affected by this regeneration, will 
help us to address this risk.  
Thirdly, this study will give us an additional insight into the extent to which neighbouring 
residents benefit from any of the ‘trickle down’ effects such as new and improved amenities 
and employment opportunities that are purported to flow from major developments (Loftman, 
Nevin, 2003).  
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In summary, this study is an opportunity to examine the extent to which a property led 
approach to regeneration in one of the UK’s key growth areas has been able to “reconcile 
economic competitiveness with social cohesion” as successive governments have promised 
(Buck, Gordon, Hall, Harloe, Kleinman, 2002,1). By looking at the impact of regeneration 
policies on existing communities in the urban hinterland of the Thames Gateway, this study 
will help to allow the voice of existing residents to be heard and their role in shaping or 
influencing policy implementation in a growth area to be better understood. This study, 
therefore, will help to strengthen our understanding of the extent to which the urban 
regeneration narrative in a city region context is influenced by the interplay between the 
agendas of national and local policymakers and community actors.  
1.6 Structure of this study  
This study consists of four parts. Part I comprises the introduction to this study, the literature 
review and the methodology chapter. The literature review will consider the academic 
research and theories relating to the emergence and development of the property led urban 
regeneration model over the last thirty years. It will look at the social, economic and spatial 
re-structuring of the urban landscape in recent decades and the change in the way in which 
cities and city regions have been governed. This discussion will examine the emergence of 
the service led, post-industrial global city and the entrepreneurial partnerships that have 
fuelled urban redevelopment and fostered competition among and within city regions for 
investment capital. The literature review will also examine the academic debate around 
urban renewal and the re-kindling of interest in community and neighbourhood level 
interventions as a means of tackling poverty and social exclusion. In addition, it will consider 
the rationale behind the sustainable urban development discourse and the academic 
response to it.  
The methodology chapter will consider why a case study approach was adopted and why 
the particular study area was chosen. It will also discuss the methods used to gather and 
analyse the primary evidence underpinning this study and the aims and rationale behind 
them. This discussion will consider how a ‘typology’ of existing residents in Kent Thameside 
based on a survey of residents was produced and how data from interviews with key local 
figures involved in the regeneration of Kent Thameside was gathered and analysed.  
Part II of this study focuses on Kent Thameside. It looks at the emergence of the Kent 
Thameside regeneration agenda and examines its existing communities and the people who 
live within them. This section will begin with an analysis of how and why Kent Thameside 
came to be identified as a regeneration priority by the government. It will also show how 
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Kent Thameside has evolved as a regeneration concept over the years. The aim of this 
discussion is to situate Kent Thameside within the wider political and academic debate that 
has influenced the emergence and development of the Thames Gateway regeneration policy 
agenda. It will also examine how this wider debate has shaped - and also been shaped by - 
the policies and politics underpinning the regeneration of Kent Thameside.  
This discussion will be followed by an analysis of the socio-economic character of the three 
existing communities in Kent Thameside that provide the detailed case study evidence on 
which this study will focus: Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross. These villages are the 
communities most directly affected by the new developments taking place in Kent 
Thameside. This will be followed by a chapter setting out the profiles of the four groups of 
residents that make up the typology of residents discussed above.  
Part III of this study considers the impact of Kent Thameside’s physical and social 
regeneration initiatives on Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross. This section will 
examine, first of all, whether the Kent Thameside Association and its successor, the Kent 
Thameside Delivery Board, have been able to achieve their ambition of creating a seamless, 
‘integrated development’ where residents use the same community facilities, mix socially 
and identify themselves as equal citizens of the same community (Kent Thameside 
Association, 1997, Kent Thameside Delivery Board, 2005). This finding would support the 
hypothesis underlying the Kent Thameside and wider Thames Gateway regeneration model 
that new developments delivered through the property led regeneration on brownfield sites 
can be successfully integrated with existing communities. Secondly, it will consider whether 
they have been able to meet their goal of ensuring that existing residents are “genuinely 
involved in the regeneration process”: an objective which they see as necessary “if the root 
causes of deprivation are to be addressed successfully with a lasting effect” (Kent 
Thameside Delivery Board, 2005). This finding would support the hypothesis that 
participation delivers positives benefits to urban regeneration. 
In order to understand the degree to which these regeneration objectives have been 
realised, this study will examine in detail the key resident participation and integration 
focused initiatives that have been implemented in Kent Thameside over the last two 
decades. We will look, first of all, at the extent to which the Ingress Park and Waterstone 
Park housing developments, the two most mature and high profile developments delivered 
through the Kent Thameside regeneration programme, have been physically and socially 
integrated with Knockhall and Horns Cross, their immediate neighbours. The analysis in this 
chapter is supported by evidence from 35 semi-structured interviews with existing residents 
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in Knockhall and Horns Cross and also evidence from interviews with key officials and 
politicians involved in the building of Ingress Park and Waterstone Park.  
This study will then consider two of the key resident participation initiatives launched in Kent 
Thameside. The first, the Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust, was a community led body in 
Swanscombe backed by Blue Circle Cement in the late 1990s, the principal landowner and 
employer in Kent Thameside. The second, the Swanscombe Neighbourhood Renewal 
Action Plan, was a local authority led initiative launched in 2003 to ensure that the “major 
threats to the sustainability of Swanscombe posed by new development” were “turned into 
‘substantial opportunities’ for the community” (Dartford Borough Council, 2003g).  
Finally, this study will examine two urban renewal schemes in Swanscombe which were 
designed both to promote the integration of new and existing communities and to provide 
existing residents with the opportunity to actively participate in the renewal of their own 
community. The two initiatives, the Gunn Road Environmental Improvements Scheme and 
the Swanscombe Heritage Park Scheme, both of which were planned as resident led 
projects, were launched to help reduce the physical disparities between Swanscombe and 
the surrounding new developments. The analysis of all four of these Swanscombe based 
initiatives will be based on interviews with 25 Swanscombe residents and key local officials 
and politicians involved in the community’s renewal.  
Part IV of this study includes an analysis of the continued viability of the Kent Thameside 
regeneration model and summarises the study’s key findings and conclusion. It will begin by 
looking at whether the regeneration model, which is heavily reliant on a buoyant property 
market and the availability of significant private capital, is capable of meeting the area’s 
social regeneration goals. This chapter will question whether a regeneration model which 
relies on the costly redevelopment of brownfield sites outside the existing urban footprint is 
capable of successfully integrating new and existing communities and of ensuring that the 
planned resident led urban renewal schemes in existing communities are adequately funded. 
It will conclude by looking at how the regeneration model could potentially be strengthened 
and at some alternative ways in which the same social regeneration goals could be 
achieved. This chapter will be followed by a final chapter summarising the key findings of 
this study. 
1.7 Conclusion 
This introductory chapter examines the social, economic and political factors that influenced 
the emergence and delivery of the Thames Gateway regeneration policy framework in the 
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1990s and 2000s. It also considers the transition from the ‘rolled back neo-liberal’, property 
led approach to regeneration pursued in the London Docklands in the early 1980s to the 
‘rolled out neo-liberal’ form of regeneration followed in the wider Thames Gateway in the 
1990s and 2000s: an approach which was still property led but which also placed an 
emphasis on the social regeneration of existing, low income, ex-industrial communities and 
sustainable development.  
As well as providing an overview of the socio-economic and spatial characteristics of the 
Thames Gateway, this chapter examines the key features of Kent Thameside, one of the 
main growth areas of the Gateway, which serves as the primary case study area in this 
study. It then considers how the case study of Kent Thameside will be used to meet the 
principal aim of this study, namely; to examine the ability of the Thames Gateway 
regeneration model to deliver both brownfield regeneration and the renewal of existing 
communities.  
This chapter also discusses how this study will add to the body of literature on urban 
regeneration in the UK before going on to examine how this study is structured and the 
research methodology it uses.  
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Chapter 2  Urban regeneration in the UK: A literature review 
2.1    Introduction 
The practice of urban regeneration in the UK today has a complex lineage. It is the product 
of a multitude of often competing policy imperatives and its development has been analysed 
and critiqued by academics from a wide range of disciplines. It has been seen variously as a 
straightforward tool for bringing redundant land back into profitable use and, more 
ambitiously, as a mechanism for tackling social inequalities and bringing deprived 
communities back into the social and economic mainstream. If we are to understand the 
genesis and development of the regeneration of the Thames Gateway we need to f irst 
investigate the broad range of academic discourses and debates connected with the practice 
of regeneration in this country.  
This chapter will begin with a brief discussion of the key attributes that define the practice of 
urban regeneration today in the Thames Gateway. It will then move on to consider the 
social, political and economic events that led to the development of property led 
regeneration and place competition in the 1980s and the theories that have been used to 
explain their emergence. The social and spatial restructuring of urban spaces that 
accompanied these changes will also be examined. We will then turn to the academic 
debate about the community participation and sustainable development discourses, which 
emerged in the 1990s as central features of a re-branded form of property led regeneration. 
This chapter will then conclude with a discussion of the gaps in the existing literature that are 
relevant to this study and a summary of the key themes within the literature and the main 
lessons we should take from them.  
2.2  Defining the role of urban regeneration today in the Thames Gateway 
Urban regeneration in the UK is not a new phenomenon. It has its roots in the urban slum 
clearance and housing programmes that were set in motion by the new metropolitan 
authorities at the end of the Victorian era (Roberts, 2000). The state led urban reconstruction 
schemes that followed the two world wars are another influential forebear. But it is the neo-
liberal approach to regeneration put in train by the Thatcher government of the 1980s that 
has had the most influence on the form of urban regeneration that one finds today in the 
Thames Gateway (Jones, Evans, 2008, Tallon, 2010).  
Under Thatcher, Britain’s declining industrial centres, such as London’s East End and 
Liverpool, were exposed to a brand of regeneration that saw the development of privately 
funded commercial, office and residential spaces on derelict industrial sites as the key to 
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their revival (Brownill, 1999, Foster, 1999, Couch, 2003). It was a form of regeneration 
supported by an array of fiscal incentives and driven by entrepreneurial development 
corporations that operated independently of the old managerialist state in the form of publicly 
accountable local government bodies (Imrie, Lees, Raco, 2009, Boddy, Parkinson, 2004, 
Harvey, 1989). For the Thatcher government, property led and market driven “urban 
regeneration - as opposed to mere re-development - became akin to a moral crusade” 
charged with “rescuing not only the economy but the soul of the nation” (Tallon, 2010, 2). 
Her government’s zeal for market driven urban regeneration was shared by other liberal 
democracies facing the same post-industrial challenges. In the US, for example, 
regeneration partnerships between the public sector and city governments, aided by federal 
funds, emerged at the same time in places like Boston and Baltimore with the aim of 
transforming their run-down waterfronts and attracting new investment, businesses and 
people to their city centres (Williams, 2004).  
In the thirty years since the launch of urban regeneration corporations in the London 
Docklands and Liverpool our notion of urban regeneration has evolved appreciably. It is still 
primarily concerned with the physical improvement and economic renaissance of urban sites 
that have been blighted by the loss of manufacturing, transport or other industrial capacity. 
The neo-liberal ‘growth first logic’ of the 1980s that brought together private capital and an 
increasingly entrepreneurial state in an effort to deliver the urban infrastructure needed to 
capture flows of global investment remains resonant today (Imrie, Lees, Raco, 2009). 
However, urban regeneration now has a far stronger focus on social inclusion than was the 
case in the early 1980s. Couch, for instance, defines urban regeneration today not just as 
the “re-growth of economic activity where it has been lost” but as the “restoration of social 
function where there has been dysfunction, or social inclusion where there has been 
exclusion” (Couch, Fraser, Percy, 2003, 2). It is also defined he says, as befits the growing 
interest in sustainable urban regeneration, “as the restoration of environmental quality or 
ecological balance where it has been lost”. Roberts, too, sees urban regeneration as a 
“comprehensive and integrated vision” which “seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in 
the social and environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change” as well 
as its “physical and economic condition” (Roberts, 2000, 17).  
Tallon (2010) also accepts that urban regeneration has become more holistic over the last 
thirty years. However he believes that the nature of its role has been complicated by the 
emergence of a parallel policy discourse focusing on neighbourhood level urban renewal. 
This discourse emerged during the early years of the new Labour government and was 
inspired by Putnam’s theories about social capital and Etzioni’s communitarianism (Putnam, 
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1993, Etzioni, 1995) and by British experiments in co-operative housing community 
development such as the Priority Estates Project (Power, 1987). It led to the implementation 
of people and place based policy interventions in socially excluded neighbourhoods which 
were intended to build the social capital required to deliver social cohesion and improved 
social policy outcomes (Kearns, 2003). In Tallon’s view this led to a dilution of the urban 
regeneration concept under new Labour. Although the “policy rhetoric retains the language 
of a holistic approach”, Tallon (2010, 2) argues that the primary focus has been on 
“interventions in the built form to stimulate economic growth”. Durose and Lees (2012), 
though, have pointed out that new Labour’s interest in neighbourhood level urban renewal 
measures was short-lived. Not only did it prove harder than expected, they argue, to show 
that neighbourhood level approaches could tackle the causes of social exclusion, but the 
focus within government started to shift in the early 2000s towards city region focused 
regeneration programmes. This meant that the Treasury was less inclined to invest in new 
neighbourhood based programmes when the flagship New Deal for Communities and 
Neighbourhood Renewal Fund schemes eventually ended.   
By the end of the new Labour era, therefore, urban regeneration had once again become the 
primary vehicle through which the government and its partners sought to deliver the 
economic, social and environmental renewal of urban communities. Its ability to achieve this 
renewal had, however, become severely constrained by the consequences of the banking 
and financial crisis of 2008 which led a dramatic retrenchment in the scale and pace of urban 
regeneration in the UK – a position from which it has still to recover today (Granger, 2010).   
2.3 Urban social and economic restructuring and governance  
2.3.1 Understanding the Fordist crisis and the emergence of post Fordism 
The rise of the property led urban regeneration agenda in the 1980s is widely associated 
with a paradigm shift in the economy, society and politics of the UK and other western liberal 
democracies. If we are to understand why this agenda emerged then we need to examine 
this wider political and economic context and consider the principal theories that have been 
advanced to explain the changes that took place. In this section we will briefly describe the 
events that presaged the emergence of this new political and economic paradigm, before 
moving on to consider the three key theories used to explain this transition: regulation 
theory; the flexible specialisation theory and the neo-Schumpeterian theory.     
The radical shift in Britain’s political economy that took place in the mid 1970s was prompted 
by an apparent crisis in the post war Keynesian Beveridge consensus (Gamble, 1994). This 
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political consensus, which was characterised by a belief in Keynesian economics and 
support for a strong welfare state, had managed to secure full and stable employment and 
steady economic growth up to the early 1970s through a policy of state led demand 
management. The ‘oil shock’ of 1973, which led to a period of ‘stagflation’ as rising business 
and fuel costs forced up inflation while growing unemployment and a decline in households’ 
disposable incomes kept demand static, is often seen as the point at which the consensus 
began to unravel (Burk, 1990). With governments seemingly no longer able to control the 
economy via the favoured Keynesian method of fiscal and monetary policy management, 
political attention shifted, particularly on the new right, to alternative economic ideas such as 
monetarism.  
In the UK, the 1979 election victory of the Conservatives ushered in a period in which “the 
control of inflation”, through a monetarist policy, “became the primary aim of policy without 
much regard to repercussions on employment or growth” (Cairncross, 1990, 35). 
Monetarism, coupled with a growing reluctance by the government to intervene in support of 
manufacturing and extractive industries, which were facing ever stronger international 
competition, contributed to the ongoing decline of the UK’s heavy industrial urban centres 
which had begun in the 1970s. The manufacturing base of the UK’s traditional centres of 
industry such as Manchester, Liverpool, Sheffield, Birmingham, London and Glasgow, much 
of which had seen little investment in the previous thirty years, either in its plant, production 
processes or transport connections, was ill-equipped to survive in this new economic climate 
(Hall, 2006). Confronted by global competitors with more advanced technology and 
production methods, or lower labour costs and a more productive workforce, and a 
struggling national economy and a less interventionist state, many manufacturing 
businesses in these cities were forced to close. Between 1971 and 1983, the UK overall lost 
a third of its manufacturing jobs (Hall, 1985) while between 1971 and 2001 the UK’s twenty 
largest cities lost 2.8 million manufacturing jobs (Moore, Begg, 2004).  
Our understanding of the causes and consequences of this paradigm shift in western 
economies has been heavily influenced by the work of regulation theorists such as Aglietta, 
Lipietz and Jessop (Amin, 1995). Regulation theory, which has its origins in the work of 
Aglietta (1979) and Lipietz (1987) and Marxist analysis of the laws of capital accumulation, 
seeks to examine how the contradictions in western capitalism have been regulated by the 
state, the legal system and other powerful actors in order to ensure the continued hegemony 
of the capitalist order (Jessop, 1990). It argues that the history of capitalism is characterised 
by the emergence and breakdown of a series of distinct modes of economic production, or 
‘regime of accumulations’, which were regulated by a distinctive set of social and political 
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institutions and behavioural norms, or ‘mode of regulations’. Much of their work focuses on 
the transition around the 1970s from one dominant ‘regime of accumulation’, ‘Fordism’, to 
another, ‘post-Fordism’ (Amin, 1995). 
Fordism is a term coined by Gramsci, the Italian Marxist, to describe the mass production 
assembly line methods introduced by Henry Ford in the twentieth century during the inter-
war period and their effects on social life in Italy (Savage, Warde, Ward, 2003). The methods 
pioneered by Ford in the motor industry of Detroit came to dominate industrial production not 
just in the US but in much of Western Europe during the post war boom from the mid 1940s 
to mid 1970s. These Fordist economies were characterised by a “durable balance between 
mass production of standardised goods on the one hand and the mass consumption of 
goods on the other” which was made possible by the full employment of economically active 
males and a consistent growth in the purchasing power of the wider population (Heffernan, 
2000, 3).  
For the regulation theorists, the state, particularly in Western Europe, played a crucial role in 
the development and regulation of the Fordist economy. Interventionist and protectionist in 
nature, the post war managerialist state worked closely with industry, labour and capital to 
maintain production and demand for increasing volumes of mass produced goods by 
ensuring full employment, avoiding labour disputes and providing pensions and welfare 
payments to those too old, too young or too sick to work (Heffernan, 2000). In this it was 
motivated by a desire to avoid crises of overproduction and under-consumption such as the 
Great Depression of the 1930s.  
Post-Fordism, in contrast, which is seen as the dominant regime of accumulation after the 
ascent of the new right in the 1980s, is often characterised by a flexible, demand led, 
competitive service sector economy composed of small and medium businesses and an 
increasingly feminised and part-time workforce with less job security (Jessop, 1990). The 
economy also became increasingly globalised, with more businesses and indeed cities, 
competing at an international level for trade and investment.  
Boyer (1990), one the leading regulation theorists, suggests that the crisis in Fordism which 
gave rise to post-Fordism was driven by the growing social resistance, firstly to the rigid 
management and organisation of labour in Fordist enterprises and secondly to the narrow, 
standardised product lines produced by Fordist industry. Fordist producers, Boyer argues, 
lacked the capacity to respond efficiently to these new tastes and mentalities and were 
further undermined by the increasing globalisation of economic flows and production. This 
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reduced the productivity and profitability of the Fordist model and resulted in higher costs for 
industry and the state and ultimately unsustainable inflationary pressure on the system.  
The regulation approach is not the only model that exists to explain the transition from 
Fordism to post-Fordism. The flexible specialisation approach, which sees economic 
development in a less deterministic light than the regulation theorists, argues that two 
competing forms of industrial production, ‘mass production’ and ‘flexible specialisation’ have 
co-existed over the last two hundred years (Piore, Sabel, 1984, Sabel, Zeitlin, 1985). 
Flexible specialisation involves the production of bespoke products by innovative, highly 
skilled and adaptable workers while mass production focuses on the delivery of standardised 
goods by semi-skilled workers using special purpose machinery. Piore, Sabel and Zeitlin 
suggest that neither form of production is inevitably destined to dominate the other. 
However, they argue that at certain points in history social, political and economic events 
conspire to cause one of them to be seen as the dominant form. In the twentieth century two 
such ‘industrial divides’ have occurred: the inter-war period which saw the emergence of 
Fordist mass production and the 1970s which witnessed the crisis of Fordism and a renewed 
interest in the flexibility and dynamism offered by smaller specialist producers.  
Another key model is the neo-Schumpeterian approach. This approach is similar to the 
regulation approach in that it sees the history of the capitalist system, as did Kondratiev, as 
being composed of a series of ‘long waves’ of economic development. Where it differs from 
the regulation approach is in the emphasis it places, building on the work of Schumpeter, on 
technological innovation as the driving force behind the emergence of each new wave 
(Freeman, Clarke, Soete, 1982, Freeman, Perez, 1988). In this sense the neo-
Schumpeterian approach sees the emergence of cheap energy in the early twentieth century 
as being a key catalyst behind the development of the so-called fourth Kondratiev wave of 
mass production and consumption. Similarly, it regards the energy crisis of the 1970s as an 
important factor in the slow decline of this wave.  
The clarity and breadth of these models have had great appeal to a generation of social 
scientists who have attempted to understand and explain social and economics causes and 
consequences of de-industrialisation. Yet each model has attracted its share of criticism. 
Using the ideal form of Fordism presented by the regulation theorists to understand and 
explain processes of change taking place in specific locales with their own complex 
economic and governance arrangements has proved problematic (Hirst, Zeitlin, 1991). 
Regulation theory, with its clearly defined universal modes of regulation and regimes of 
accumulation, has also been criticised for “ascribing to history a systematic, functionalist and 
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logical coherence which it rarely possesses” (Amin, 1995, 11). The past and indeed the 
present is often a lot more inchoate and contradictory than the regulation theorists or indeed 
many analysts of supposed transition from Fordism to post Fordism are prepared to accept. 
Equally, the neo-Schumpeterian approach has been criticised as being too technologically 
deterministic while the opposition of two distinct and coherent forms of production posited by 
the flexible specialisation theorists has also been questioned (Elam, 1995). The Marxist 
geographer David Harvey, meanwhile, while sympathetic to many aspects of the regulation 
approach, has debated the extent to which the emerging regime of accumulation, which he 
chooses to call a ‘regime of flexible accumulation’ characterised by the revival of 
entrepreneurialism and neo conservatism, represents a definitive break with the past 
(Harvey, 1990). Flexible accumulation could, he argues, be seen as a “new combination of 
mainly old elements” rather than a radical reconstitution of the capitalist system (Harvey, 
1990, 196).  
Nonetheless, the influence of these models on our understanding of urban regeneration over 
the last thirty years has been considerable. The work of the regulation theorists, and of 
David Harvey, which examines changes in the way urban societies are governed and 
organised as well as how urban production has been managed, has had a particular impact 
on urban regeneration commentators. Their ideas feature prominently in the academic 
analysis of the ‘place competition’ between socially, economically and politically re-
configured entrepreneurial post-Fordist cities, which underpins the emergence of the 
property led regeneration model in the 1980s. In the following sections we shall examine the 
key arguments that have been used to explain the development of place competition. We will 
also briefly consider the academic debate about the impact on urban residents of two of the 
key social consequences of post-Fordism, namely, a rise in job insecurity and income 
inequality and the spatial re-structuring of the urban landscape as a result of changes in 
economic character of the Fordist city.  
2.3.2  The rise of place competition between post-Fordist cities    
In the last twenty years there has been a marked change in the way cities are perceived and 
marketed. According to Boddy and Parkinson (2004) cities in the UK, once viewed as 
economically and socially moribund, have come to be seen as dynamos of the economy that 
have a key role to play in ensuring the country’s international competitiveness. Porter (1995), 
writing in the mid 1990s about US also suggested that the perception of the inner city as an 
economically unviable entity that acted as a drag on the national economy was no longer 
relevant. He argued that the strategic location of the inner city, with their central business 
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and entertainment districts situated at the centre of a regional network of services, coupled 
with their supply of labour and their residents’ entrepreneurial acumen meant that inner cities 
were well placed to help the US sustain its competitive advantage.  
Today, cities have become adept at promoting these locational and infrastructural assets in 
a bid to attract new investment from across the globe (Boddy, Parkinson, 2004, Buck, 
Gordon, Harding, Turok, 2005). According to Deas (2005) cities, or rather the local coalitions 
of elite public and private actors at their head, view economic success as being contingent 
on their ability to compete effectively against their national and international peers. Their 
competitive standing in the eyes of international investors is influenced, they believe, by their 
capacity to assist business start ups and develop clustered trading networks of businesses. 
The skills offered by the local workforce and environmental factors such as the quality of life 
on offer in urban areas and the quality of the communications infrastructure are also seen as 
important by these coalitions.  
The urban studies literature suggests that the rise of ‘place competition’ between cities is 
underpinned by four key factors. The first is the globalisation of investment flows. Post-
Fordist city economies, it is argued, are increasingly driven by financial and service 
industries which are able to relocate more easily than Fordist industries which were often 
geared towards national or regional markets and dependent on local supply chains (Short, 
Kim, 1999). Sassen (2001) and Castells (1989) suggest that this service led economy is 
driven by ‘global cities’ such as London and New York which act as command points co-
ordinating global flows of information, people and commodities. These global cities are 
characterised by the clustering, or ‘agglomeration’ of related banking, financial and legal 
industries which are fuelled by a large pool of creative, highly paid workers who are well 
versed in the corporate norms and managerial routines of businesses in these networks 
(Sassen, 2001, Amin, 2000, Florida, 2002, 2005).  
Friedmann and Wolff (1982) and Friedmann (1986) have argued that this global economy is 
controlled from these cities by transnational corporations that have side-stepped national 
constraints and organised global production and markets to suit their own ends. Soja (1997), 
however, while acknowledging the importance of the command and control functions of 
global cities, has warned that this ‘cosmopolis discourse’ should not be allowed to 
overshadow the growing economic importance of the reindustrialising hinterlands of cities 
like New York, London and Los Angeles. The economies of global cities are much more 
complex and diverse, he argues, than the writings of the global city theorists sometimes 
suggest.  
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The second factor underpinning place competition is the apparent decline since the 1970s in 
the political and regulatory role played by the nation state and the associated rise in the 
importance of global city regions (Griffiths, 1998, Scott, 2001, Scott, Agnew, Soja, Storper, 
2001, Scott, Storper, 2003). In Scott’s (2001) view city regions function as the engine and 
‘territorial platforms’ for much of the post-Fordist economy.  These city regions, which 
frequently override national and political boundaries and regulatory regimes, are composed 
of dense, interdependent networks of flexible manufacturing and service industries that are 
embedded in global distribution networks. These business networks and coalitions, 
according to Storper (1997), which are created through ties of proximity and inter-personal 
contact, provide city regions with a crucial economic asset that helps to drive their 
development. City regions should not, however, be seen, it is argued, as autonomous forces 
of global economic and political change. Jonas and Ward (2007), Etherington and Jones 
(2009), Turok (2009) and Healey (2009) have criticised the tendency to see the city region 
as a discrete actor and have argued for an analysis that examines the complex and dynamic 
relationship in each region between city region coalitions, neighbourhood level politics, state 
level policies as well as global economic forces.    
Spatially, city regions are often polycentric or multi-clustered in form (Scott, Agnew, Soja, 
Storper, 2001, Hall, 2001, Clark, 2000). In London, for example, back office and routine 
production activities have migrated outwards from the centre to new networked ‘edge cities’ 
while the inner city spaces they have vacated have become home to skilled specialist 
services and workers and also immigrant communities (Hall, 2001, Buck, Gordon, 1986, 
Sassen, 2001, Fainstein, Gordon, Harloe, 1992, Fainstein, Harloe, 2002, Castells, 1989). 
Turok (2009) argues that the Thames Gateway, with its ‘edge cities’ of Stratford and 
Ebbsfleet and its command points in the London Docklands and King’s Cross - which are 
connected by a high speed rail network and Crossrail - can be seen as an emergent city 
region.   
The emergence of flexible production methods associated with the post-Fordist era is the 
third key factor behind place competition (Mole, 1996, Oatley, 1998). Computer based 
technologies have revolutionised the way in which information and commodities are traded 
while advanced electronic technology and labour intensive forms of craft production, often 
using cheap migrant or immigrant labour, have transformed the production, cost and range 
of manufactured goods. It is argued that these flexible production systems have significantly 
re-shaped the industrial geography and productive capacity of urban economies (Soja, 
1997). 
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The final factor concerns the shift from managerial urban government to urban governance 
(Brenner, 1999, 2004) and the emergence of competitive, market based forms of public 
service delivery as urban authorities have sought to respond to reductions in state funding 
(Graham, 1992).  The emergence of this brand of ‘urban entrepreneurialism’, usually 
delivered via public-private partnerships, has been the subject of extensive analysis and 
debate among urban policy theorists. According to Harvey (1989) urban entrepreneurialism 
is aimed at obtaining private capital to fund supply side initiatives that were once delivered 
by the state. The projects pursued by these entrepreneurial partnerships are often 
speculative in nature, Harvey states, and are invariably supported by marketing campaigns 
aimed at highlighting the key cultural, environmental and supply side assets of the city.  
The ‘urban regime’ theorists, such as Elkin (1987) and Stone (1989), argue that the growing 
interest in coalition building is due to a recognition by the agents of representative 
government that they need to reach an accommodation with the business community if they 
are to influence the way in which society’s largely privately owned  productive assets are 
deployed. Coalitions give the state the opportunity to press their business partners to act in a 
socially beneficial fashion while they give the business community enhanced access to the 
regulatory and political services. Stone (1989) argues that successful coalitions do not 
‘govern’ in the traditional sense. Instead, their success is built on their members’ ‘ability to 
achieve a mutually acceptable consensus often through informal private discussions.  
Logan and Molotch’s (1987) ‘growth machine’ thesis, meanwhile, highlights the prominent 
role played by ‘place entrepreneurs’, such as landlords, developers, transport and utility 
companies, in forming pro-growth coalitions to help them profit from their control of local land 
resources. These pro-growth coalitions, Logan and Molotch argue, are designed to allow 
‘parochial’ capital to maximise their assets by creating the necessary market conditions, 
infrastructure and pro-growth culture that will persuade national and international capital to 
invest in the area. In many cases these coalitions have evolved from small cabals of leading 
local power brokers into bodies that include education providers and other public and third 
sector organisations. This wider membership helps to normalise the pro-growth discourse 
and thereby marginalise opposition to development plans advanced by the coalition.  
Both of these US led urban coalition theories have had a significant influence on urban 
regeneration studies in the last twenty five years (Tallon, 2010). However some 
commentators, (Jessop, 1990, Peck, Tickell, 2002) have questioned their applicability 
outside of the US in countries like the UK with a more influential and interventionist central 
state where there is less scope for local autonomy.  
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The regulation theorists have also taken a close interest in these changes in urban 
governance (Amin, Thrift, 1995, Goodwin, Painter, 1996, Jessop, 1990, 1995, Painter, 
1995).  They argue that Saunders’ (1986) ‘dual state model’, in which the two major 
economic functions of government, social investment and social consumption, were clearly 
divided between central and local government, has been replaced by a more fluid structure 
with a greater accent on multi-level governance, coalition building, bargaining and inter 
organisation links (Harding, 2005).  Jessop (1990) contends that this multi-level governance 
is a result of pressure to boost economic competitiveness and the need to ensure that social 
welfare provision and supply side programmes are geared to the needs of the local labour 
market and prospective local investors. As a consequence, local government now has a 
greater role in promoting economic competitiveness and in delivering social investment 
programmes such as infrastructure improvements. This has led to a re-calibration of the 
‘vertical linkages’ between central and local government and stronger ‘horizontal links’ 
between the state and non-statutory and private sector actors at local and regional level.  
In Jessop’s view (1990), however, this new multi-level governance discourse has created a 
number of tensions and dilemmas which can be difficult to resolve. The desire to promote 
greater competition between different locales, for example, cannot easily be reconciled with 
the impulse to ensure that relationships between regional actors are more open and co-
operative. Other theorists have also highlighted the interactions, overlaps and tensions 
caused by the hybrid nature of these new governance structures. Newman (2001) has 
referred to the dynamic tension between the participatory, networked, hierarchical and 
technocratic elements of urban governance while Raco (2005a) and Smith (2003), writing 
about UK policy, have detected a ‘hybridity’ between neo-liberal economic priorities and a 
social democratic policy emphasis on social inclusion and sustainability.  
2.3.3  The rise of job insecurity and income inequality in the post-Fordist city 
Throughout much of the twentieth century a consensus existed between labour, capital and 
the state in the city (Butler, Hamnett, 2011). As we have already discussed, the state, 
industry and organised labour worked closely to maintain the output of mass production 
industries and ensure a steady demand for their products from a consumer society 
buttressed by full employment, rising incomes and the welfare state.  
In the UK, though, the balance between capital and labour shifted after the 1979 election as 
Keynesian priorities were replaced by a neo-liberal focus on economic growth and 
competitiveness (Brenner, 1999, Jessop, 1990). During this period of ‘rolled back neo-
liberalism’ the re-structured post-Fordist state abandoned its commitment to promote full 
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employment and implemented measures aimed at supporting the market and curbing the 
power of organised labour (Peck, Tickell 2006). As a result of this state restructuring, 
together with the international division of labour, greater competition, factory closures and 
de-industrialisation, the urban manufacturing base of Britain’s cities was decimated. 
Between the mid 1970s and the millennium the UK’s manufacturing sector lost over four 
million workers – more than half its workforce (Tallon, 2010). Many of these people either 
failed to re-enter the employment market or ended up working on the insecure, low wage, 
low skill margins of the economy (Hamnett, 2003).  
The tensions and contradictions created by these neo-liberal policies, particularly in the 
former industrial heartlands where there were high levels of unemployment, led eventually to 
the emergence in the 1990s of a form of ‘rolled out neo-liberalism’ by the state and its 
partners. Regulation theorists like Jessop (1990, 1995, 2002) and Peck and Theodore 
(2000, 2001) argue that we are witnessing a transition to a ‘Schumpeterian workfare state’ 
focused on ‘rolled-out’ neo-liberal supply-side policies that are aimed at preserving labour 
market flexibility whilst tackling any financial and educational barriers that could keep 
potential employees out of the labour market.  These ‘rolled out’ policies, which were a key 
characteristic of the new Labour administration after 1997, have been defined by Jessop 
(2002) as non-market ‘flanking’ regulatory interventions aimed at maintaining the legitimacy 
of neo-liberalism. In this new form of governance, job insecurity is still presented as an 
inevitable consequence of changes in the global economy (Levitas, 2005). Measures aimed 
at alleviating its impact, however, have been implemented by the government. Individuals 
are encouraged, for instance, to seek to improve their own job security by taking advantage 
of new training and life-long learning opportunities. In this way, Levitas (2005) suggests, job 
insecurity ceased to be seen as a structural feature of the economy but as something that 
individuals have the opportunity, and indeed the responsibility, to address.  
An increase in job insecurity in the post-Fordist city has been coupled with a rise in the level 
of income inequality. Scott (2001) argues that while there has been some upward mobility 
from the lower social tiers, the wage levels of those at the bottom end of contemporary urban 
society have been kept low by the presence of low paid service and manufacturing activities 
which have been supported by successive generations of immigrants. The gap between the 
low paid, low skilled service workers and wealthy finance and business professionals tends 
to be particularly acute, Scott argues, in the largest global city regions which have become 
“vortexes of unprecedented cultural, ethnic and racial variation” (Scott, 2001, 5). In London, 
for example, where half of the UK’s migrants live (ONS, 2011), the post war migrants from 
Britain’s colonies and former colonies have been joined in the last thirty years by a more 
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diverse range of migrants including those with no historic connection to Britain, including 
those from Eastern European EU states.   
The social polarisation of global cities like London and New York has been discussed by 
Friedmann and Wolff (1982) and Sassen (1991) while Mollenkopf and Castells (1991) have 
examined the development of ‘dual cities’. They argue that the wealth gap in cities has been 
accentuated by the decline of skilled middle income groups in the manufacturing industry, 
creating a so-called hour-glass effect in society. New York, Mollenkopf and Castells state, 
has been transformed following the collapse of the city’s manufacturing, trucking and 
warehousing industries and the rise of professional, white collar service industries “from a 
relatively well-off, white blue collar city into a more economically divided, multiracial, white 
collar city” (Mollenkopf, Castells, 1991, 8). Skilled white blue collar workers have been 
replaced, they argue, by white male, professional managers; female, black or Latino clerical 
workers; and Latino and Asian manufacturing workers. 
Hamnett (2003), however, suggests that this polarisation thesis is over-reliant on the 
experience of New York and Los Angeles and is less applicable to European cities like 
London where the proportion of semi-skilled and unskilled jobs has been steadily shrinking. 
Instead, he believes that London is experiencing an upwards shift in its occupational class 
structure as a result of the shift from a manufacturing to a financial and business led 
economy. Income inequality is still on the increase in the London region, he argues, but it 
exists between a large and growing professional middle class whose incomes have grown 
rapidly and a group of low skilled workers chasing a diminishing pool of jobs who often 
struggle to find work in the new economy. Many of these low skilled and low income 
households, however, are concentrated in London’s eastern boroughs including the Thames 
Gateway on which this study will focus. Power et al (2004) observe that seven of the ten 
London Thames Gateway boroughs are among the eighty poorest local authorities in the 
country. Hackney, Newham and Tower Hamlets, for example, are, respectively, the second, 
third and seventh most deprived authorities in the country, despite the presence of growing 
pockets of affluence.  
2.3.4  The spatial re-structuring of the post-Fordist urban landscape 
It has been argued that spatial polarisation of income groups is on the rise in the UK. Dorling 
(2011), for example, suggests that most white families were much freer to choose where 
they lived in the 1970s than today. Since then families have become ever more willing, 
Dorling states, to spend a higher proportion of their income on housing in area that allows 
them to live away from poorer people and people from ethnic minority backgrounds. Rising 
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house prices in the 1980s and 1990s, coupled with growing income inequality, 
unemployment, a fear of crime and gaps in the educational outcomes of schools in different 
areas have all served to increase the attraction of buying property in an expensive and 
exclusive area.  
Yet while the spatial polarisation thesis holds true for the UK as a whole, a more complicated 
picture emerges when one looks at London. Hamnett (2003) argues that the growth in the 
professional middle class in London and its expansion into previously working class areas 
has in fact led to a decline in ‘gross segregation’ between working and middle class areas. 
There has, however, been an increase, Hamnett suggests, in ‘micro-scale segregation’ in 
London with small enclaves of middle class owners in renovated period houses living 
immediately adjacent to low skilled, working class households living in social housing. These 
middle class households have moved into the space vacated by white working class 
families, who, over the last fifty years, have taken advantage of rising wages and better 
education and career opportunities to leave their inner London terraces in favour of larger 
houses in the Home Counties or the fringes of London (Dench, Gavron, Young, 2006). This 
retreat to London’s hinterland has been inspired in part, Watt (2009) believes, by a desire to 
live among their peers and to preserve a sense of white working class culture. Yet, the non-
white population of London, many of whom migrated to inner London during the long post 
war boom, have also begun to move steadily outwards in recent years, adding to the ethnic 
diversity of once almost universally white areas such as Havering and Thurrock in the 
Thames Gateway (Butler, Hamnett 2011).  
In the last twenty years a significant number of studies have examined the spatial re-shaping 
of the London region. There is also a small but growing literature on re-shaping of other 
major UK cities such as Birmingham, Manchester and Glasgow (Porter, Barber, 2006, Seo, 
2002). Many of the studies on London have focused on the causes and impact of the 
gradual ‘gentrification’ of the city’s inner boroughs by highly educated and paid professional 
households. The cultural and political identity of these gentrifiers, and their degree of social 
investment in the places in which they live, tends to vary by area. Early gentrifiers in 
Hackney, for example, were often engaged in the liberal arts, left of centre in their politics 
and possessed a strong sense of commitment to the area (Butler, 1996). The new middle 
class residents in the Docklands, meanwhile, tend to work in business and finance, be more 
conservative in their outlook and have less of a stake in the community than their 
counterparts in Hackney (Butler, Robson 2001). Similarly, the young, usually childless, 
professionals who have moved into new build riverside developments in outer London 
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Thames Gateway boroughs have not chosen to form relationships with the neighbourhoods 
around them (Davidson, 2009).  
While the middle class gentrification of deprived communities has, according to Lees et al 
(2008), often been portrayed as a phenomenon that can assist the economic renaissance of 
the post-Fordist city, evidence of a positive social impact at neighbourhood level is limited. 
Evidence in London, for example, of social mixing or cohesion between middle class 
gentrifiers and their lower income neighbours is sparse (Butler, Robson, 2001, Davidson, 
2009). Gentrification is also often seen by low income, working class communities as akin to 
a process of colonisation and cultural appropriation that disrupts social networks and leads 
to the loss of valued shops and services (Atkinson, Bridge, 2005, Lees, Wyly, Slater, 2008, 
Keddie, Tonkiss, 2010). Dench, Gavron and Young (2006), for example, vividly describe the 
sense of loss and bitterness felt by the residual white working class community in Bethnal 
Green at the withering away of the rich communal life of their terraced streets following the 
exodus of many of their peers to the suburbs and the arrival, first of Bangladeshi immigrants 
and then of young middle class professionals.  
The causes of urban gentrification have been the subject of some dispute. Ley (1996) and 
Hamnett (2000) argue that gentrification is inextricably linked to the changing industrial 
profile of cities like London as white collar professional occupations have replaced manual 
working class occupations. Shifts in the cultural preferences and work patterns of middle 
class households have also led to a renewed preference for inner city living rather than life in 
the more distant suburbs (Ley, 1996, Butler, 1997, Bondi, 1991, Warde, 1991). However, 
Smith (1979, 1987, 1996), has argued that gentrification is primarily a consequence of a 
growing ‘rent gap’ in the inner city between property values and the underlying land value 
which has been duly exploited by property based capital and developers. In Smith’s view, 
gentrification represents a ‘back to the city’ movement by capital not people. Yet this 
interpretation does not, Hamnett (2003) and Butler and Robson (2001) believe, explain the 
fact that much of gentrification in London has been led by individuals or small scale 
developers rather than large property companies. Any market based interpretation of 
gentrification therefore also needs to take into account middle class tastes and cultural 
preferences.  
The salience to the UK of Smith’s (1996) other influential theory on gentrification, his 
identification of what he describes as the ‘revanchist city’, has also been questioned. Using 
New York as his model, Smith has argued that gentrification has become a key feature in the 
arsenal of wealthy right wing whites who want to extract their revenge against the low 
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income and immigrant communities whom they believe have stolen ‘their city’ from them. 
Investing in areas such as the Lower East Side has been promoted, therefore, as a means 
of reclaiming the city from social undesirables and making it liveable again. Lees et al 
(2008), though, have urged caution in ascribing revanchist tendencies to gentrifying 
communities in the UK. They argue that close attention should always be paid to the specific 
characteristics and history of each gentrifying neighbourhood - something they allege Smith 
is reluctant to do - before reaching any conclusions about the causes and impact of 
gentrification on the area.  
2.4  Urban renewal and community participation 
A key aspect of regeneration policy in the UK over the last twenty years has been the focus 
on promoting community participation in the planning and delivery of urban renewal 
programmes. This emphasis on community involvement and partnership, which began under 
the Major government in the 1990s and intensified under new Labour, is, in part, a reaction 
to the perceived failure of the ‘trickle down’ approach to regeneration during the Thatcher 
government (Imrie, Thomas, 1999). The regeneration of places such as the London 
Docklands created tens of thousands of new jobs and homes, but, it is argued, failed to 
improve the quality of life or economic prospects of the deprived communities living nearby 
(Imrie, Lees, Raco, 2009, Brownill, 1990, Foster, 1999). Enabling communities to participate 
in urban renewal programmes was seen not only as a basic right of citizenship but as an 
important means of improving residents’ knowledge and confidence and ultimately their 
employability and quality of life (Goodlad, Meegan, 2005).   
If we are to analyse the participation programmes implemented in Kent Thameside, it is 
important that we understand why this community participation discourse arose and what it 
was hoped it would achieve. In the following section, therefore, we will consider the 
philosophy that underpinned this discourse, the goals of community participation and the 
academic reaction to it.  
The focus on community participation under new Labour was heavily influenced by Putnam’s 
(1993) ideas about social capital and Etzioni’s communitarianism (1995). Etzioni argued that 
the state had become disengaged from the lives of ordinary individuals. He saw communities 
with their shared basic values and shared rights and responsibilities as the principal drivers 
of a successful and cohesive society. Each successful community was, in turn, Etzioni 
believed, supported by strong families which served to teach individuals about the values 
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and responsibilities that they were obligated to observe and accept as a condition of their 
membership of that community.   
Putnam, meanwhile, saw ‘social capital’, or the social networks and associations that bind 
individuals and groups of people together, as a community asset that was essential to the 
successful pursuit of shared objectives. In Putnam’s view social capital exists in three 
distinct forms: ‘bonding’ social capital between people of similar backgrounds and 
worldviews; ‘bridging’ social capital between people with different life experiences and 
backgrounds; and ‘linking’ social capital that creates connections between communities and 
community organisations such as voluntary groups and organisations that hold economic or 
political power. The concept of social capital has also been explored by Bourdieu (1991), 
who believed that it constituted, along with economic, cultural and symbolic capital, the 
social position of each individual. Coleman (1994) too, believed that social capital was an 
important resource that helped to maintain family relationships and social organisation and 
enable educational achievement. 
To a government seeking to differentiate itself from the ‘rolled back neoliberalism’ of the right 
and the centralising, Fabian, managerialist tendencies of previous Labour governments, the 
ideas of Etzioni and Putnam were highly seductive (Fuller, Geddes, 2008). A policy agenda 
aimed at enabling communities to realise their social capital resources and thereby banish 
the sense of powerlessness that was supposedly preventing them from achieving their 
potential was inherently more attractive than the redistributionist welfare model favoured by 
the old left which had arguably stifled individual autonomy and choice (Deakin, 2001, 
Kearns, 2003, Imrie, Raco, 2003). In this way, redistribution became redefined as the 
redistribution of opportunities rather than as the redistribution of financial resources via the 
tax and benefits system (Fuller, Geddes, 2008) whilst people became the ‘objects’ of urban 
policy intervention (Dikec, 2007). Supply side measures, such as education and training 
programmes, and new governance arrangements such as New Deal for Communities 
Partnerships, would give individuals the means to increase their social capital and seize new 
economic opportunities (Imrie, Lees, Raco, 2009, Tiesdell, Allmendinger, 2001). 
“Participation”, in urban renewal partnerships, the government stated, would “empower 
(communities) against social exclusion” (DETR, 2000a).  
New Labour’s participation agenda was also characterised, however, by a strain of 
authoritarian liberalism (Dean, 2007). There was no place in the new order for individuals 
who failed to acquire the skills and competencies needed to fulfil their responsibilities to the 
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state as economically active and socially engaged citizens.  The right to good public services 
and the state’s assistance was not a given, but one that had to be earned (Freeden, 1999).  
The value of a policy discourse focused on developing the social capital of communities has 
been heavily debated. On the one hand it is portrayed as a pragmatic course of action by a 
post-Fordist state with diminished resources and influence which has become dependent on 
external partnerships and community empowerment in order to achieve its social policy 
goals (Stoker, 1998). Enabling communities to take ownership of their social problems and 
to develop their own solutions to them is also seen as a way of ensuring their effectiveness 
and long term sustainability (Anastacio, Gidley, Hart, 2000, Halpern, 2004). Kearns (2003), 
meanwhile, suggests that a focus on the social capital of communities helps to concentrate 
political attention on improving the extent and quality of interactions between the individuals 
within a community, community groups and the agencies of representative government. In 
this way it can help, he says, to ensure the effective integration of area based regeneration 
initiatives with local, regional and national policy programmes.  
On the other hand, however, it has been pointed out that social networks are often unevenly 
spread and can exclude as well as include (Taylor, 2002, Giddens, 2000, Kearns, 2003). 
Strong bonding capital between spatially concentrated groups, for example, can create 
hostility to outsiders and new ideas, while powerful sectional interests in the community can 
delay or obstruct regeneration and marginalise the views of certain constituencies (Kearns, 
2003).  
While there are mixed views about social capital, most discussions on the issue tend to 
agree that the delivery record of community participation programmes in the UK has been 
largely disappointing (Colenutt, Cutten, 1994, Mayo, 1997, Cebulla, Berry, McGreal, 2000). 
One reason for this is that communities are often expected to play by ‘rules of the game’ 
which are dictated by government agencies (Taylor, 2002, 2003, 2007). In many cases 
communities find themselves unable to influence the agenda in the way they want and are 
reduced to the tokenistic role of validating decisions taken by policymakers elsewhere 
(Fearnley, 2000, Purdue, 2001). 
In this sense, the participation process, rather than being one focussed on genuine 
empowerment, becomes, according to Foucault (1979), an indirect means for the state to 
preserve and extend its power with the community effectively ‘co-opted’ to serve as an agent 
of the state. Foucault and other governance theorists argue that arms length participation 
vehicles and partnerships, which operate beyond the peripheries of the state, are, in fact, a 
more effective method of sustaining state power than its own formal, statutory institutions 
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(Foucault, 1979, Rose, 1999, Somerville, 2005, Morison, 2000). As Cooke and Kothari 
(2001) have pointed out, participatory vehicles are effective in preserving power differentials 
between the community and the state and other powerful actors, precisely because the 
practice of participation serves to obscure the status differences between those involved. 
State control is not exerted in a direct or coercive way, but through more subtle means with 
communities encouraged to internalise and reproduce certain behaviours and attitudes that 
help to reinforce state power (Rose, 1999, Taylor, 2007).  
The attitude of local state actors can also act as barrier to effective participation. Local 
councillors and professionals, for instance, sometimes see participation as a threat to their 
legitimacy and status and seek to limit the scope of community representatives’ involvement 
(Taylor, 2003). Fuller and Geddes (2008) also highlight the difficulties faced by new 
participatory bodies and partnerships, such as Local Strategic Partnerships and New Deal 
for Communities Partnerships, which often lack the necessary resources or political support 
to resist attempts by established statutory providers to marginalise or co-opt them. Equally, 
the resources and training given to individuals involved in participation processes to enable 
them to fulfil their role is often inadequate (Taylor, 2002, 2007). The time and budget 
allocated to participation projects is also insufficient in many cases to ensure that genuine 
community wide engagement takes place (Jones, 2003).  As a result much of the community 
participation in urban regeneration and renewal projects in the UK tends to take place at the 
manipulation or therapy level of Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation, rather than at the 
partnership, delegated power or control levels (Taylor, 2007).  
A further barrier has been created by the inconsistency of central government’s policy on 
neighbourhood engagement. The government’s enthusiasm for community participation and 
neighbourhood based interventions, which was much in evidence when new Labour came to 
power, ebbed away steadily after the millennium. Durose and Lees (2012) argue that 
growing scepticism with Parliament and, more significantly, within the Treasury about the 
lasting value of neighbourhood based interventions ensured that the New Deal for 
Communities, the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund and the associated Working 
Neighbourhoods Fund were not replaced when they came to end of their scheduled lives 
between 2008 and 2010. They cite a critical report from the House of Commons ODPM 
Select Committee in 2003, which complained about the uncoordinated expansion in the use 
of neighbourhood based initiatives and the government’s failure to integrate them into its 
mainstream spending programmes, and the Treasury’s 2007 Sub-National Review, which 
raised similar concerns, as evidence of the declining stock of neighbourhood related policies 
within government.  
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The subsequent evaluations of the New Deal for Communities and the National Strategy for 
Neighbourhood Renewal programmes, also failed to convince Ministers to invest in further 
interventions at neighbourhood level (Durose, Lees, 2012). While they showed that ‘place 
based’ schemes aimed at improving the environment of deprived neighbourhoods have 
achieved some positive outcomes, the results of ‘people based schemes’ designed to 
improved their social and economic capital have been less impressive. In other words, while 
these programmes have had success in dealing with the symptoms of deprivation they have 
found it much harder to address its causes in the limited time available to them (Sheffield 
Hallam University, 2010, Amion Consulting, 2010).  
Yet despite the equivocal findings of many studies on neighbourhood interventions and 
community participation, some grounds for optimism have been identified. A number of 
authors have drawn on Foucault’s (1979) theory about the potential for resistance to 
dominant forms of power and Giddens’ (1986) structuration theory, which argues that the 
actions of individuals are both shaped by and shape the social structures that affect their 
lives, to suggest ways in which a more active and equitable form of engagement could take 
place. Atkinson (2003) and Raco (2003) argue that communities are not passive, uncritical 
entities that are invariably manipulated by powerful political bodies to suit their own 
purposes. Communities have the capacity, they believe, to adapt to the new style of 
partnership based governance and to exploit it to their own advantage. However, for this to 
happen, Goodlad and Meegan (2005) argue, participants need sustained training, 
information and advice. A culture of constructive working relationships between individuals, 
community groups and policymakers also needs to be fostered which allows space for 
conflict and disagreement to emerge. Taylor (2007) also suggests that the participation 
process needs to learn to accommodate ‘outsiders’ whose ideas and beliefs diverge from the 
dominant prevailing discourse.  
Docherty, Goodlad and Paddison (2001) and Richardson (2008), meanwhile, highlight the 
importance of building communities’ confidence in the process and structures of 
participation. Participation structures, they argue, need time to become embedded in the 
community and for individuals to begin to trust them, especially in areas with limited 
experience of community engagement. Ensuring that engagement is followed soon 
afterwards, for example, by tangible action, such as improvements to the local environment, 
is an important way, Richardson states, of building community confidence in participation 
structures.  In short, community participation exercises can achieve positive social outcomes 
if the state is willing and able to make a long-term investment in participation structures and 
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to give participants the necessary training and space to articulate their own views in a 
meaningful way.  
2.5  Urban regeneration and sustainability 
The concept of ‘sustainable development’ has become an integral feature of urban 
regeneration in the UK in the last two decades. Often used as a term to describe 
development that promotes social and economic progress while respecting the environment 
(Raco, 2005a), its best known definition is provided by the 1987 Brundtland World 
Commission on Environment and Development which called it “development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987).  
Interest in sustainable urban development, or in “finding ways of making cities future proof”, 
grew significantly in the 1990s in response to concerns about climate change, rising sea 
levels and the growing level of urban consumption of power, water, raw materials and land 
(Girardet, 2008, 3). In 1992, the year in which the UN’s Earth Summit in Rio called for a 
transformation in global attitudes and behaviour in relation to the environment and 
development, London alone consumed 20 million tonnes of petrol and generated around 60 
million tonnes of carbon dioxide (Joplin, Girardet, 1997). The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, which was set up in 1988, estimated that by 2100 average temperatures 
would have risen by 5.8 degrees centigrade since the start of the industrial revolution while 
sea levels would have risen by 90 centimetres – imperilling the future of many of world’s 
leading cities given their waterside location (IPCC, 2001). Rogers and Power, meanwhile, 
(2000, 142) called the “uncontrolled consumption of resources and the production of waste 
in cities” as “two of the biggest environmental threats throughout the world”.  
In this section we will be focussing on the key sustainable development principles that came 
to influence the regeneration policy of the Major and Blair governments in the 1990s and 
2000s. During this period the government sought “to review their policies and give 
themselves a greener image” (Glaister, Burnham, Stevens, Travers, 2006, 28). With 
research showing that cities with a strong concentration of jobs and high use of public 
transport had lower energy consumption per capita than the sprawling cities of the US 
(Newman, Kenworthy, 1989), Ministers began to take an interest in the concept of a high 
density, ‘compact city’ that concentrated new development on redundant, brownfield, ex-
industrial sites rather than on greenfield sites.  
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This interest led the new Labour government to set up the Urban Task Force to establish a 
new vision for urban regeneration “founded on the principles of design excellence, social 
well-being and environmental responsibility” (Urban Task Force, 1999). The Task Force’s 
final report, Towards an Urban Renaissance, concluded that the principle of sustainable 
development needed to be adopted within urban settlements in order “to alleviate the 
increasing global ecological pressure”. It called for “well designed, compact and connected 
cities supporting a diverse range of uses – where people live, work and enjoy leisure time at 
close quarters”.  
It is the core principles of the Urban Task Force’s report; the notion of the compact city; the 
focus on brownfield development; and an interest in creating socially mixed communities, 
which we will examine in this section. These principles underpinned both the urban policy 
white paper, Delivering an Urban Renaissance, (DETR, 2000a) and the Sustainable 
Communities Plan of 2003 (ODPM, 2003a) which led to an intensification of the 
government’s development ambitions in the Thames Gateway. The Task Force’s report also 
led the government to stipulate that new homes should be built at a density of 30 to 50 
homes per hectare and to increase the brownfield development target from 50 to 60 per cent 
of new housing (DETR, 2000c).  
An examination of the literature relating to the development and implementation of these 
three principles is important if we are to analyse the steps taken in Kent Thameside to 
deliver brownfield development that is well integrated into the existing urban community.  We 
will begin, however, with a brief overview of the academic response to the sustainable urban 
development discourse.  
2.5.1  Overview of the sustainable urban development debate 
The concept of sustainable urban development has been understood and employed in many 
different ways. Lombardi et al argue that “the proliferation of definitions and 
conceptualisations of sustainability render the term so poorly understood and slippery that it 
can be easily pressed into the service of almost any ends” (2011, 273). Asleithner et al, too, 
(2004) have suggested that the ‘intrinsic vagueness’ of the concept of sustainable 
development could act as a barrier to the delivery of a holistic and coherent form of 
sustainable urban regeneration. The concept has been invoked by the ‘growth first’ business 
lobby, for example, to justify energy intensive road infrastructure projects on the basis that 
they will create jobs and stimulate the economy (Couch, Denneman, 2000). Governments, 
meanwhile, have attempted to promote sustainability by encouraging or ‘nudging’ consumers 
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to reduce their energy consumption and to behave in more environmentally aware ways 
(While, Jonas, Gibbs, 2004, Thaler, Sunstein, 2008).   
Much of the debate about sustainable urban development has focussed on the difficulties of 
reconciling a national economic development agenda designed to improve living standards 
and therefore increase personal consumption with a concern for environmental 
sustainability. Owens, in fact, (1992) argues that sustainable urban development is an 
oxymoron as urban areas will always be net consumers of energy and degraders of the 
environment. According to Hall (2006) governments have sought to resolve this tension 
through a policy of ‘ecological modernisation’. In the UK, this approach is designed to ‘green’ 
regeneration through regulatory measures such as the landfill tax and ‘section 106’ 
agreements that divert developers’ resources towards schemes that promote sustainability.  
Haughton, however, has argued that these sustainable development policies rarely go far 
enough. The government’s Sustainable Communities Plan of 2003, for example, was, he 
said, “only tangentially linked to notions of sustainable communities” and “pale green” at best 
(Haughton, 2003, 96).  Not only did it fail to address how the water and energy needs of new 
development would be met, it failed to insist that developers meet basic environmental 
standards. Lombardi et al (2011) also suggest that many sustainable development 
approaches in the UK are concerned primarily with using design and technology solutions to 
mitigate the impact of development rather than the pursuit of a more holistic agenda. They 
contend that real progress towards achieving sustainable urban communities is only possible 
once the ‘growth first’ development culture is challenged and a more balanced 
conceptualisation of sustainability is adopted. 
However, others have argued that the emergence of the sustainability discourse has, despite 
its flaws, had an impact on the behaviour of urban residents, regeneration professionals and 
government agencies and has improved the sustainability of the urban environment 
(Satterthwaite, 2002, Evans, Jones, 2008). The value of these improvements should not, 
they say, be underestimated. 
2.5.2  The compact city 
The concept of the ‘compact city’ with a high density of population was seen by the Urban 
Task Force (1999) as a means of providing urban populations with better access to facilities, 
ensuring a more efficient use of land and energy resources and reducing social segregation. 
The Task Force found that residential areas where densities fall below 20 homes per hectare 
are typically served by one local centre covering an area with a 1.5 kilometre diameter. This 
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type of layout encourages excessive car use, the Task Force’s report argued, as over half of 
the homes in these areas are more than a five minute walk from the centre. It also reduces 
the level of contact residents have with each other, local traders and other service providers 
and consequently diminishes the sense of community in the area.  
Two members of the Task Force, Richard Rogers and Anne Power, argued that a minimum 
urban density of 50 homes per hectare would make communities walkable, use less energy,  
increase the vitality of neighbourhoods and create the critical mass of people necessary to 
support local bus services, shops and schools (Rogers, Power, 2000). By “living together in 
closer proximity” and creating a “wider hinterland that restores the balance of the urban 
environment”, we “would begin to make good the damage we are causing” to the 
environment, they concluded (Rogers, Power, 2000, 142). 
Using a range of examples from across Europe, Rogers and Power concluded that it was 
possible to build communities at this density whilst preserving the parks, play areas, mature 
trees, squares, large abutting gardens and other green infrastructure that urban residents 
find to be important to their quality of life. Moreover, higher densities, they said, did not mean 
that developers were limited to building apartment blocks for single or two person 
households. It was also possible, as the Victorian and Edwardian suburbs of Britain’s cities 
demonstrated, to achieve a density of 50 homes per hectare with well designed, low rise, 
terraced and semi-detached family houses.   
In a bid to achieve this more compact city, central and local government in the UK has 
promoted the regeneration of city centres and prominent brownfield sites often through the 
creation of high density apartments marketed at affluent, childless professionals (Boddy, 
2007). These gentrified enclaves are often close to visually arresting arts, sports or shopping 
facilities, or ‘cappuccino boxes’, which are designed to re-brand the city as desirable, 
cosmopolitan spaces (Plaza, 2006). As a result of this policy of ‘positive gentrification’ 
(Cameron, 2003) there has been a resurgence in the population of many British city centres 
after decades of decline as their industrial base contracted. Between 1993 and 2003 the 
population of central Manchester, for example, rose from just 200 to over 15,000 (Tallon, 
2010).  
Yet according to some authors the compact city model is based on false assumptions. Lees 
(2003) has complained, for instance, that the type of higher density housing described in the 
Urban Task Force’s report is generally suitable only for wealthy professionals with no 
children. She has criticised the “assumption” that people found social, cultural and economic 
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diversity preferable to the modernist mono-zoned city or the strict segregation of work 
spaces, home spaces and population groups of the Garden Cities.  
Peter Hall, meanwhile, a fierce opponent of ‘urban cramming’, added his own footnote to the 
Urban Task Force’s report stating that there “is no overriding need to save Greenfield land, 
of which we have a surplus in South East England” (Urban Task Force, 2005). He argued 
that densification would lead to an increase in apartment construction which would be 
“unsuitable for families and undesired by residents”. The same criticisms have been levelled 
at the compact city model in the US, where zoning restrictions have been introduced to 
discourage suburbanisation (Senior, Webster, Blank 2006).  
Breheny, on the other hand, has questioned whether the compact city model is the most 
effective means of achieving a significant reduction in energy consumption (1995, 1997). 
Although the empirical evidence suggests that urban compaction could lead to energy 
savings, he questions whether the savings are sufficient to justify “draconian urban 
containment policies”. He suggests that an increase in fuel prices and duty has the potential 
to deliver the same energy savings, but far more quickly (Breheny, 1995, 91).  
2.5.3 Brownfield development  
It has been argued that brownfield development is crucial to preventing urban sprawl and 
ensuring greater urban densification (Tallon, 2010). In the UK, a target of concentrating 50 
per cent of all new development on previously developed brownfield sites was introduced in 
the mid 1990s. This target was later raised to 60 per cent in 2000 by the new Labour 
government which also implemented a ‘sequential test’ whereby green field sites would only 
be used after all available brownfield alternatives had been exhausted.  
To encourage brownfield development, which many developers were reluctant to engage in 
due to the high cost of assembling and remediating the land and delivering the necessary 
infrastructure, the government introduced a series of tax and regulatory incentives (Raco, 
Henderson, 2006, Dixon, Raco, Catney, Lerner 2007). Tax breaks and grants to meet the 
costs of land remediation were introduced along with fast-track planning processes and a 
reduced planning fee structure in some cases. Compulsory purchase orders were also used 
to help developers assemble land while transport infrastructure schemes were promoted by 
central and local government in order to improve site access.  
The availability of public sector funding to help off-set developers’ costs has played a large 
part in persuading developers to embrace brownfield development according to Syms 
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(2001). By 2004, brownfield sites accounted for 70 per cent of new housing compared to just 
56 per cent in 1993 (Dixon, 2007). Yet some authors have questioned whether the 
presumption in favour of property led brownfield development is always in the best interests 
of the community: Assumptions that the economic benefits of commercial brownfield 
development will inevitably ‘trickle-down’ to existing communities, should be treated with 
caution, according to Dair and Williams (2001) and Lees (2003). Brownfield development, 
they note, can diminish the well-being of existing communities by increasing pollution and 
congestion, forcing up the cost of property and local services and displacing existing 
residents to more ‘affordable’ areas.  
Raco and Henderson (2006) believe that there is also a risk that privileging the commercial 
development of brownfield sites, regardless of the quality of the application, will rule out 
other potential uses supported by the community. They point out, as do Greenberg and 
Lewis (2000), Syms (2001) and Williams et al (1996), that for local communities the ‘value’ of 
brownfield sites often lies in their capacity to serve as a recreational or leisure resource, not 
in their commercial potential as a housing resource. Other authors, meanwhile, have pointed 
out that the high cost of developing brownfield sites, means that the commercial viability of 
some brownfield schemes could be undermined if there was a change in government policy 
or a reduction in the financial or regulatory incentives on offer to developers (Adams, De 
Sousa, Tiesdell, 2010).   
2.5.4 Mixed communities 
The concept of mixed communities is underpinned by the idea that the mixing of individuals 
from different social backgrounds and income groups can help to promote economic renewal 
and address social and economic inequalities (ODPM, 2006). Florida (2005) argues that the 
mixing of people with varied life experiences not only promotes cultural vitality but is also a 
source of economic innovation. Inclusive, mixed communities are also seen as a vehicle for 
stimulating ‘creative trickle down’ between social groups (Peck 2005) and as a key 
requirement for cities that are seeking to compete effectively on the global stage (Rose, 
2004). Hills (2007), meanwhile, describes the policy of promoting income mix within new 
developments as a way of ensuring that communities don’t become stigmatised or isolated 
by the presence of a predominantly low income, social marginalised groups of residents. It is 
a key feature, he says, of the former Labour government’s objective of ensuring that no-one 
is disadvantaged by where they live.  
The mixed communities’ thesis has been influenced in part by the regeneration experience 
of the London Docklands which created new wealth and thousands of jobs in places like 
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Canary Wharf from the mid to late 1990s onwards but left the surrounding low income 
communities in the Isle of Dogs largely untouched (Imrie, Raco, Lees, 2009, Brownill, 1990, 
Foster, 1999). Another key influence has been William Julius Wilson’s (1987) analysis of the 
impact of middle class flight from US inner cities. Wilson argued that the exodus of these 
families weakened the social capital of inner cities and removed a vital social buffer that 
could mitigate the impact of a growing culture of joblessness. He also argued that the loss of 
blue collar, male dominated, manufacturing jobs gravely damaged the traditional African 
American family unit. The US government’s HOPE VI programme of poverty de-
concentration and the New Deal for Communities programme in the UK have both been 
informed by Wilson’s work.  
The literature on the delivery of mixed communities tends to focus on two key areas: the 
concept of ‘tenure blind’ development and the design and appearance of the public realm 
(Roberts, 2007). Tenure blind developments usually seek to ensure the integration of 
households of different tenures by ‘pepper-potting’ houses of each tenure group across the 
development rather than concentrating them in discrete groups. They will often also seek to 
make sure that there are no obvious architectural differences between the houses of each 
tenure group. According to Roberts (2007), tenure blind development is now seen as 
orthodox best practice in much of the regeneration literature. A clearly defined public realm, 
on the other hand, is seen as an important device for enabling strangers to encounter each 
other (Sennett, 1990, 1994). Talen (1999) concludes that a high quality network of streets 
and public spaces with houses designed with front gardens and front doors that face the 
street can help to important, if weak, social ties and help to engender a sense of 
neighbourliness.  
Yet the literature also suggests that the concept of social mix is frequently opaque and ill-
defined and is employed by developers, planners and policy-makers in ways that often fail to 
match their rhetoric on mixed communities (Bridge, Butler, Lees, 2012). In addition, it has 
been argued that many of the claims made about mixed communities are flawed and are not 
supported by the available evidence (Imrie, Lees, Raco, 2009). One criticism is that 
strategies aimed at promoting social mix are little different to the policy of ‘positive 
gentrification’ described above as they are invariably addressed at deprived, low income 
neighbourhoods instead of high income communities which may be just as socially 
homogeneous (Bridge, Butler, Lees, 2012, Lees, Slater, Wyly, 2008). As Lees et al point out 
(2008), there are few examples of policies that promote the movement of low income 
residents into communities that are predominantly composed of high income households. A 
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policy discourse based on social mixing is designed, they argue, to deflect criticism and 
resistance to what is, in effect, a policy of state led gentrification.  
A second criticism is that the mixed community discourse significantly over-states the 
willingness and capacity of people from different social and economic backgrounds to mix 
with each other even when they live in close proximity (Bridge, Butler, Lees, 2012, Bridge, 
2005). Butler and Robson (2003) have shown that even gentrifiers who are ostensibly 
committed to promoting and embedding local diversity, often do not engage with people of 
different backgrounds in a meaningful way: they describe this phenomenon as the 
construction of a ‘Brixton of the mind’. Equally, Le Gales (2012) has argued that when 
people of different social or ethnic groups live in the same building or neighbourhood, they 
each adopt strategies of avoidance or distinction, such as the selective use of local public 
spaces and services, rather than grasp the opportunity to mix. Beekman (2001), Goodchild 
and Cole (2001) and Thompson-Fawcett (2003), meanwhile, have highlighted the tensions 
that can emerge when people of different tenures and life stages live in close proximity to 
one another. In Cheshire’s view (2006, 2007) the creation of mixed communities can also 
undermine the social networks and community services that emerge around clusters of 
people of the same income group.  
The claim by policymakers and developers in the UK that discrete new developments in 
regeneration areas like the Thames Gateway can be physically and socially integrated into 
the existing urban fabric (Raco, Henderson, 2009) has also been questioned. Davidson 
(2009) found little evidence of social mixing between new developments in London’s ‘Blue 
Ribbon Network’ alongside the Thames in South east London and existing communities in 
Plumstead and Thamesmead. The Blue Ribbon Network had been billed by the Mayor of 
London as a means of revitalising Thameside communities that would promote social 
integration between income groups, yet this does not appear to have happened. Royal 
Artillery Quay, for example, a Barratt Homes development, is not only physically divorced 
from the neighbouring community, protected by a network of steel gates and security 
cameras, but its population of young, childless professionals have little in common with their 
neighbours, according to Davidson, and choose not to socialise locally or use local services. 
In Manchester too, new prestige waterside developments such as Salford Quays are also 
seen as being poorly integrated with their lower income neighbours (Henderson, Bowlby, 
Raco, 2007). However, there is a need, according to Doucet et al (2011), for more research 
to be carried out on the attitudes of existing residents towards neighbouring new 
developments. 
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Some authors do believe though that with good neighbourhood management, good design 
and careful tenancy management it is possible to create developments in which there is at 
least a mutual tolerance or a degree of social interaction between people of different income 
groups and backgrounds (Roberts, 2007, Rogers, Power, 2000). Roberts (2007) highlights 
the importance, for instance, of creating attractive, well-maintained common spaces such as 
courtyards and play areas at the intersection between the housing of different tenure groups. 
She also emphasises the need to ensure that there is a visual relationship and coherence 
between the housing of each tenure group: the creation of a terrace of low rise social 
housing alongside a high rise block of owner occupied apartments, for example, would 
lessen the scope for interaction between each group.  
Doucet et al (2011), meanwhile, who examined the relationship between the flagship Kop 
van Zuid development in Rotterdam and its lower income neighbours, found that a holistic 
regeneration strategy that caters for the needs of both existing residents as well as new 
residents can help to build support for new development within the existing community. In 
the case of Kop van Zuid, it was the creation of improved transport links, together with the 
retention and improvement of existing retail and community services that helped to secure 
support for the development among existing residents.  
Davidson (2008) has also highlighted this point in relation to gentrified communities. 
Avoiding what he describes as ‘neighbourhood resource displacement’, such as the loss of 
popular local shops, social clubs and meeting places, will help to ensure that existing 
residents feel as though they still have a stake in the community following the arrival of high 
income residents. A programme of neighbourhood improvements that is unsympathetic to 
the needs and wishes of existing residents can create a ‘geography of privilege’, Davidson 
concludes, which alienates the existing community and leads to a loss of identity and a 
sense of place. In short, unless new and existing residents are treated in an equitable 
fashion by regeneration bodies, it is difficult to create an environment in which it is possible 
to build a socially integrated community.  
2.6  Gaps in the literature 
This chapter has shown that there is a mature literature on both the rationale behind the rise 
of the property led regeneration model and its implementation over the last thirty years. 
There is also a strong body of work on the key discourses of sustainable development, 
integration and community participation which have informed the development of the 
regeneration goals adopted by successive governments.  
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Brownill and Carpenter (2009) have shown that the governance of the Thames Gateway is 
understood and articulated in different forms across the region in response to local 
circumstances: as a result, there is both a Stratford story, a Thurrock story and an Ebbsfleet 
story. Absent from the literature, however, is a compelling body of work examining the 
practice of regeneration beyond the central urban core of growth areas like the Thames 
Gateway. As stated in the introduction to this study much of the existing literature tends to be 
‘Londoncentric’ in focus (Cohen, Rustin, 2008, Imrie, Lees, Raco, 2009, Power, Richardson, 
Seshimo, Firth, 2004). The same is true of other regeneration areas in the UK. While there is 
an established literature on the regeneration of Manchester, Birmingham and Glasgow, there 
is much less material on the regeneration of satellite communities such as the mill towns of 
East Lancashire. A literature focused on these more peripheral areas will not only provide us 
with a more nuanced understanding of how regeneration is being delivered in the UK, it will 
also add weight to the emerging literature on city regions. 
As Doucet et al (2011) observe, the body of literature examining the response of existing 
communities to major regeneration developments is also limited. Most of the studies that 
have been carried concentrate on the motivation and aspirations of incoming, high income, 
gentrifiers. The lower income existing community is often seen as an undifferentiated entity 
which responds to regeneration in a uniform way (Paton, 2012). The possibility, therefore, 
that the existing community may respond in an uneven way, or seek to re-shape the 
regeneration narrative in different ways is ignored. A literature then that recognises the 
agency of existing communities and seeks to understand their role in reproducing or 
contesting the key aspects of the entrepreneurial, property led regeneration model, will 
strengthen our appreciation of how regeneration evolves.  
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined the key political, economic and social processes that led 
to the emergence of an entrepreneurial, market driven form of property led regeneration 
policy agenda in the 1980s. The principal theories used to explain the ascent of this policy 
agenda, which is seen as a manifestation of a new post-Fordist, neo-liberal form of 
governance, have also been examined. Many of these theories, such as Regulation theory, 
David Harvey’s urban entrepreneurialism thesis, and Logan and Molotch’s growth machine 
thesis, have been heavily influenced by Marxist analysis of the inherent tensions and 
contradictions present within the capitalist system.  
The property led regeneration of the 1980s, which is based on a reconfigured relationship 
between capital and labour following the crisis of the Keynesian-Beveridge model, is seen by 
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these theorists as an attempt to release the growth potential of declining urban centres by an 
increasingly entrepreneurial state. They argue, however, that the benefits that this growth 
first imperative brought to urban centres were too narrowly focused and failed to reach the 
low income, ex-industrial communities that surrounded these experiments in urban 
entrepreneurialism. Later regeneration models, such as those that emerged in the 1990s 
and 2000s, which focused on social inclusion, integration, participation and sustainability, 
are seen by them as an attempt to resolve the tensions created in the 1980s and to maintain 
the legitimacy of the growth first logic. 
This analysis has had a major influence on much of the existing literature on urban 
regeneration in the UK. As we have seen in this chapter many of the policy developments 
relating to urban regeneration in the last twenty years, by both Conservative and Labour 
governments, have been interpreted as vehicles for preserving a neo-liberal, growth driven 
form of governance. Some authors, for example, believe that progress on achieving 
sustainable urban development is only possible once the ‘growth first’ imperative has been 
reviewed. Others have questioned whether genuine community participation is achievable 
when much of the participation infrastructure is designed and maintained by the state and 
used to preserve and reinforce its power. The focus on increasing the social capital of 
communities, meanwhile, is seen by some authors as a means, first and foremost, of 
enabling them to become ‘active citizens’ with the skills necessary to help ensure the 
continued competitiveness of their city on the global stage. At the same time, it is recognised 
that there is scope for participants to challenge these assumptions and to establish their own 
counter-narratives.  
Yet the regeneration literature also contains a more pragmatic body of work which 
acknowledges the limitations of current regeneration policy, but nonetheless recognises that 
opportunities exist to deliver an inclusive and sustainable form of regeneration. A sustained 
and well resourced programme of training and support, for example, can help to create an 
environment in which it is possible for local residents to participate in the planning and 
delivery of regeneration in a meaningful way. Similarly, it has been shown that effective 
neighbourhood management and sensitive planning can provide the opportunity for social 
mixing to take place on some level. Such studies provide a valuable counterpoint to the 
important insights provided the critique of ‘rolled back’ and ‘rolled out’ neo-liberal 
governance.  
The literature also emphasises the need to examine the extent to which regeneration 
practice is shaped by the specific environment in which it takes place. In their study on the 
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theory and practice of gentrification Lees et al (2008) have highlighted the importance of 
understanding the particular characteristics of each gentrifying neighbourhood before 
reaching conclusions about the causes and impact of gentrification. Raco (2005a), 
meanwhile, has emphasised the fact that regeneration policies have hybrid origins and are 
formed through the complex interplay of disparate and sometimes competing philosophies 
and political pressures.  
 It is important therefore that any study of the practice of regeneration seeks to understand 
both the dominant political, economic and social discourses in which it is situated and also 
the local factors and personalities which shape and re-shape it over time. As Giddens (1986) 
states, individual action both shapes and is shaped by the social structures that affect their 
lives and even powerful actors re-interpret or occasionally subvert the norms which they 
themselves uphold or have helped to create.  
This study then will use this broad academic narrative relating to the development of neo-
liberal entrepreneurial governance and the social and spatial re-structuring that followed the 
crisis of Fordism in order to examine and understand the regeneration of the Thames 
Gateway; with a specific focus on communities in Kent Thameside. Its description and 
analysis of the strategies and schemes used to deliver integrated development in Kent 
Thameside and to promote community participation in regeneration will be closely informed 
by the critique of the sustainability and participation discourses discussed in this chapter.  
This study will also examine the extent to which these dominant discourses have been either 
re-produced or re-shaped or subverted by local actors in Kent Thameside in response to 
particular local circumstances. As Turok (2009) says, the Thames Gateway is not a 
monolithic entity but a patchwork of diverse economies and communities governed by a 
myriad of competing and overlapping delivery structures: Each community engages with the 
Thames Gateway regeneration agenda constructed in Whitehall in its own distinct fashion. 
Consequently, we need to examine the Thames Gateway, as this study seeks to do, in a 
layered way that takes account of the cascading of policy from the national to the very local 
and respects the nuances of each area. For within the Gateway there are multiple 
regeneration narratives which are continually being constructed and reconstructed.  
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the aims, rationale and methods behind the fieldwork in Kent 
Thameside that underpins this study. This fieldwork was carried out in order to examine the 
extent to which the regeneration model pursued in 1990s and 2000s in the Thames Gateway 
is capable of delivering the social and physical integration of new and existing communities 
and of empowering residents by enabling them to participate in the design and delivery of 
regeneration programmes.  
This chapter begins by discussing the case study method of empirical research and 
examines the rationale for its use in this study. It also examines the approach taken to 
identify appropriate case study sites and discusses the methodological strategy 
underpinning the case study approach. The following section provides a discussion of the 
methods used to gather and analyse the primary evidence underpinning this study and the 
aims and rationale behind them. It will look first at the production of a ‘typology’ of existing 
residents in three established ex-industrial communities in Kent Thameside based on a 
survey of residents. It will then discuss the data gathered from a set of interviews with key 
officials, politicians and developers involved in the regeneration of Kent Thameside. The 
strategy and techniques used to identify and recruit interviewees as well as the challenges 
involved in this strategy are also considered. This will be followed by a description of how the 
fieldwork interviews were planned and delivered in 2007/08 and how the data from these 
interviews were recorded and analysed. 
This chapter then moves on to consider the main ethical issues generated by this fieldwork 
process such as the author’s dual status as a researcher and a staff member of a Kent 
Thameside Member of Parliament. It will conclude with a discussion of the strengths and 
limitations of the fieldwork process. 
3.2  The case study method  
3.2.1    The rationale for the case study method used in this study 
Despite the “magnitude and social importance” of the Thames Gateway regeneration project, 
there has been “little attempt”, Cohen and Rustin observe (2008, 2), to “develop locally 
grounded case studies” that will help us to provide a critical assessment of the Thames 
Gateway effect. This study, which takes a case study based approach, is an attempt to 
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address this research gap and to strengthen our understanding of the impact of regeneration 
in the Thames Gateway on existing communities.  
The case study method is described by Yin (2003) as an empirical research strategy that 
allows the researcher to examine complex organisational, social and political phenomena 
such as institutional, organisational or neighbourhood change in a holistic and meaningful 
way. Its reliance on multiple sources of evidence and its ability to deal with a variety of 
evidence types - including documents, interviews, surveys and observations - enables the 
researcher, Yin says, to explore the wider context in which complex phenomena are situated 
and in so doing produce a grounded and nuanced explanation of why or how these changes 
have taken place. Moreover, Yin argues that it is possible, provided the researcher 
undertakes a ‘generalising analysis’ rather than a ‘particularising analysis’, to produce 
explanations that have a theoretical legitimacy beyond the boundaries of the specific case 
study in question.  
This study, which aims to examine the impact over time of regeneration measures on 
existing communities and the people who live there, requires a methodology like the case 
study method which allows us to collect and analyse different types and sources of evidence 
and to examine, in detail, the social, economic and spatial context in which regeneration is 
taking place.  
If we are to understand the extent to which regeneration has been able to empower existing 
residents and promote the integration of new and existing communities, we need to examine 
the types of people who live in these communities and to understand their backgrounds and 
lifeworlds. We also need to examine how these communities have developed over time and 
what their relationship is with the sites on which the new developments are situated and the 
bodies responsible for their development. The range and depth of evidence that can be 
brought together through the case study method will allow us to develop this understanding. 
In the next sections we will look at how and why the case study sites used in this study have 
been identified before examining the methodological strategy underpinning the case study 
method.     
3.2.2 The identification of case study sites in the Thames Gateway 
3.2.2.1  Kent Thameside 
The area identified as the primary case study area is Kent Thameside, one of the Thames 
Gateway’s ‘strategic growth locations’ (ODPM, 2003b). Kent Thameside, the name given to 
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the urban areas of the Kent boroughs of Dartford and Gravesham north of the A2 highway 
(Map 3.1), stretches from the borders of Greater London in the west to the edge of the 
Medway Towns twelve miles to the east. It is home to around 150,000 people, or 
approximately 1 in 10 of the population of the Thames Gateway. 
Map 3.1 Map of Kent Thameside 
 
Source: Kent Thameside Delivery Board (2005) 
The principal reason for the selection of Kent Thameside is that it has been widely identified 
as an exemplar of social regeneration in the Thames Gateway (Nelson, Quan, Forrester, 
Pound, 2005, Oxford Brookes, 2006). The government commissioned Thames Gateway 
evidence review, for example, picked out Kent Thameside as one of the few key growth 
areas where social regeneration has been pursued with the same vigour as physical 
regeneration (Oxford Brookes, 2006). The review cited the development of Neighbourhood 
Renewal Action Plans in Kent Thameside, which aimed to identify and deliver the social, 
economic and infrastructural projects required to allow existing communities to extract 
tangible gains from the regeneration of ex-industrial brownfield sites in the area, as an 
illustration of Kent Thameside’s commitment to social regeneration. Kent Thameside was 
also one of the few growth areas to be allocated funding from the ODPM and DCLG 
following the launch of the Sustainable Communities Plan in 2003 to deliver social 
regeneration projects in existing communities.  
This commitment to social regeneration from the Kent Thameside regeneration partners, 
which was acknowledged and supported by the government, mean that the area has the 
ability to tell us a great deal about the potential of the Thames Gateway regeneration model 
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to deliver meaningful benefits for existing residents living alongside the main regeneration 
sites. Kent Thameside, moreover, is unusual in that its regeneration plans pre-date both the 
Sustainable Communities Plan of 2003 and the Thames Gateway Planning Framework of 
1995. The Kent Thameside Association, a partnership founded in 1993 between the local 
authorities and the main private sector developers, was set up to drive forward both the 
area’s physical regeneration and to equip existing residents with the skills and opportunities 
necessary to benefit from this regeneration. In this sense, a study of Kent Thameside, unlike 
many other areas in the Thames Gateway, allows us to trace the development of a social 
regeneration programme over an extended period of time.  
The maturity of the Kent Thameside regeneration vision also enables us to examine how the 
governance of a key regeneration area in the Thames Gateway has evolved over time in 
response to particular political and economic changes. It allows us to gauge how the 
relationship between local regeneration actors has changed over time and also to explore 
the extent to which national politics has shaped the local vision and whether the local vision 
has influenced the national agenda. In short, this case study provides an important 
opportunity to examine the degree to which the governance of the Thames Gateway is 
consistent with the more fluid, multi-level, neo-liberal governance arrangements described 
by Jessop (1990) which were driven by inter-agency bargaining and coalition building.  
In using Kent Thameside, a regeneration area outside of London, as a case study site, this 
study will also provide a useful addition to our existing core of research on the Thames 
Gateway which tends to be ‘London-centric’ in nature and to ignore the regeneration 
experience of non metropolitan areas (Cohen, Rustin, 2008, Imrie, Lees, Raco, 2009, 
Power, Richardson, Seshimo, Firth, 2004).  
A further reason for selecting Kent Thameside as a case study was the author’s knowledge 
of the area and local connections due to his professional experience as a Dartford Borough 
Councillor and a constituency based member of staff of the Member of Parliament for 
Dartford. This experience gave the author a detailed understanding of the existing 
communities in the area and the key regeneration sites, policies and officials in Kent 
Thameside. In view of this experience, the author decided it was justifiable to focus 
exclusively on Kent Thameside as a case study site, rather than to spend some of the time 
allocated to the fieldwork process examining other parts of the Thames Gateway. 
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3.2.2.2  Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross 
Three existing communities within Kent Thameside were identified as appropriate case study 
sites: Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross (Map 3.2). They were selected as they are 
the communities that are most directly affected by new development in Kent Thameside. 
Swanscombe, the largest of the three communities with a population of 7,500 lies 
immediately to the west of the new Ebbsfleet International Station and to the north of the 
proposed Eastern Quarry development. Knockhall, a community of 4,000 people, lies 
immediately south of Ingress Park, the largest of the new developments built as a result of 
the Kent Thameside regeneration programme, and to the east of Waterstone Park, another 
significant new Kent Thameside development. Horns Cross, meanwhile, which has an 
equivalent sized population as Knockhall, lies to the west of Waterstone Park and north of 
Bluewater Regional Shopping Centre, the first major Kent Thameside brownfield site 
redevelopment.    
Map 3.2 Map of Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross 
 
       Source: Bryan Jones (2014) 
Swanscombe and Knockhall have also been identified as ‘priority communities’ by the local 
authorities for investment and neighbourhood renewal due to their deprivation challenges 
highlighted in the Indices of Multiple Deprivation (see appendix nine). ‘Priority community’ 
status was seen as a means of attracting external funding to deliver programmes aimed at 
enabling residents to take advantage of the opportunities created by regeneration. All three 
communities, meanwhile, were selected as target areas of the EU Urban II Thames Gateway 
Kent Programme. This programme aimed to reduce the disparities between the new and 
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existing developments in Kent Thameside and to build the capacity and confidence of 
existing communities (see appendix nine).  
The proximity of Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross to the key regeneration sites and 
their status as priority renewal areas means that they are ideal case studies through which to 
examine the extent to which Kent Thameside has succeeded in meeting its key integration 
and resident participation goals. To this end, this study will look in detail at the impact on 
these communities of the key regeneration programmes created to deliver these goals. In 
Swanscombe, it will look at the impact of the Swanscombe Neighbourhood Renewal 
Strategy and Action Plan, which was designed to enable residents to identify their priorities 
for regeneration and the measures needed to achieve them, and at two urban renewal 
projects designed to give residents a leading role in improving the environment of their 
community. This study will also examine the extent to which Knockhall and Horns Cross 
have become physically and socially integrated into the two new developments next to them: 
Ingress Park and Waterstone Park.  
3.2.3 The methodological strategy underpinning the case study method 
The case study approach used in this study is a multi-method one. In order to examine the 
extent to which social and physical integration has taken place in Kent Thameside and the 
degree to which existing residents have participated in the regeneration process, four types 
of primary data were collected from the case study sites in Kent Thameside.  
The first type is survey data from semi-structured, in-depth interviews carried out by the 
author with existing residents from Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross and Kent 
Thameside regeneration partners. The second type is official statistical data derived in the 
main from the UK Census relating to changing population, age, employment, educational, 
housing type and housing tenure patterns between 1971 and 2011 of the three communities 
and Kent Thameside (ONS, 2011, 2001; OPCS, 1991, 1981, 1971). In addition to this official 
data, data from Mosaic geo-demographic profiling system relating to post-code areas in Kent 
Thameside (Experian, 2010) was also collected.  
The third type is the publications relating to the regeneration of Kent Thameside produced by 
the key public and private sector regeneration partners between 1979 and 2013. This 
includes local authority development, planning and land use strategies, local authority 
committee minutes and agendas, the publications of public-private partnerships such as the 
Kent Thameside Delivery Board, and government planning frameworks relating to the 
regeneration of the Thames Gateway and Kent Thameside. Community newsletters from 
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private sector developers, town councils, residents’ associations and other community 
bodies were also collected.   
The final type of data collected was derived from the author’s ethnographic observation of 
Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross between 2005 and 2013. During this time the 
author visited the three communities regularly in order to observe and record the types of 
housing, shops, community services and amenity spaces found in each community and to 
gain an understanding of residents’ lifestyle patterns and how they interact in public and use 
their immediate environment and services. The author also recorded any changes to the 
housing stock, shops, services and amenities that took place over this time as well as any 
observable alterations to the population mix and lifestyle patterns within each community. 
These observations and also any interactions with service providers or residents were 
recorded by the authors in a series of field journals.  
The data from these four sources was used and analysed in different ways. The survey data 
from the in-depth, semi-structured interviews with residents was analysed qualitatively in 
order to produce the ‘typology’ of residents in existing communities set out in chapter six 
(see sections 3.3 to 3.6). A limited amount of quantitative analysis was also undertaken in 
order to support chapter seven, which looks and the social and physical integration of the 
new and existing communities, and chapter nine, which considers two neighbourhood 
renewal projects in Swanscombe. The quantitative analysis in chapter seven examines the 
number and frequency of visits by Knockhall based interviewees to Ingress Park and 
Waterstone Park, while the analysis undertaken for chapter nine examines the level of 
awareness and use among Swanscombe based interviewees of the two renewal projects. 
The survey data from the interviews with key regeneration figures was analysed qualitatively 
and used to inform the discussion in chapters six to ten examining the delivery of the Kent 
Thameside social regeneration and resident participation goals and the viability of the Kent 
Thameside regeneration goals.  
The official data from the UK census underpin chapter five which examines the social, 
economic and spatial character of Swanscombe, Knockhall, Horns Cross and also Ingress 
Park and Waterstone Park. The documentary evidence, meanwhile, from public, private and 
community bodies plays a key role in chapter four which examines the emergence of the 
Kent Thameside regeneration model. However, it also informs the discussion and analysis in 
chapters six to ten. The primary use of the data collected from the author’s ethnographic 
observations was to guide the selection of resident interviewees in Swanscombe, Knockhall 
and Horns Cross, to help formulate an appropriate interview schedule, and also to enable 
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the author engage interviewees in an informed and sensitive way. However, this data also 
helped to inform the author’s understanding and analysis of the impact of the key Kent 
Thameside regeneration initiatives on the three communities.  
3.3  The aim and rationale of the fieldwork in Kent Thameside  
3.3.1     Existing residents 
The primary aim of the fieldwork carried out for the purposes of this study was to examine 
the attitudes of existing residents in Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross to the 
regeneration that is taking place in Kent Thameside.  
This fieldwork was intended to identify the range of views present within the different 
communities in relation to the delivery of Kent Thameside’s key social regeneration goals. In 
line with main questions underpinning this study, it sought to establish whether residents felt 
that they had been able to influence Kent Thameside’s regeneration priorities or to 
participate in the urban renewal schemes affecting their communities. It also aimed to 
examine whether residents felt that new developments such as Ingress Park had become 
physically and socially integrated into existing communities and to find out what economic, 
social or infrastructural benefits residents felt they had gained from regeneration.  
A further goal of this fieldwork with existing residents was to challenge the tendency of local 
and national policymakers to see existing communities as undifferentiated entities whose 
attitudes in relation to regeneration are broadly similar. As Paton (2012) argues, 
policymakers often think of new and existing communities in binary terms and tend to ignore, 
or suppress, the cultural, physical and economic differences present within each community. 
Moreover, local councillors and professionals sometimes resist external attempts to engage 
residents as they perceive them as a threat to their legitimacy and authority within the 
community (Taylor, 2003). Both of these factors are apparent in Kent Thameside. The 
‘community voice’ in the local regeneration discourse is usually articulated by influential 
community organisations such as Swanscombe and Greenhithe Town Council which purport 
to speak for the wider community. Their views are often accepted uncritically by local 
policymakers and very few attempts have been made to engage directly with residents in 
order to develop a more nuanced understanding of local attitudes to regeneration. 
The fieldwork strategy in relation to existing residents was informed by two key assumptions. 
The first was that the existing community would contain a diverse range of perspectives on 
regeneration and it would not be possible to reduce the opinions expressed by the 
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community to one, single, broadly consistent perspective. The second assumption was that 
the extent of residents’ emotional commitment to Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross 
had an important influence on their attitudes to regeneration. Furthermore, as the extent of 
this commitment appeared to be changing across the three communities, it followed that one 
would find marked differences in residents’ attitudes to regeneration. 
The first assumption was based on an analysis of local census data from 1971 to 2001 
which showed that Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross had become significantly more 
economically and socially diverse since the end of the local paper and cement making 
industries in the 1980s (see chapter five). Not only were the working lives and housing 
circumstances of people in the community more varied, they were spending less time with 
other and they were subject to a wider range of social, cultural and economic influences. As 
a result it seemed reasonable to assume that their ambitions for regeneration and their 
expectations of what it would deliver would be quite different. 
Although the three communities were still overwhelmingly composed of relatively low skilled, 
white British households, the economically active population was no longer concentrated in 
manual quarrying and manufacturing occupations based within a ten kilometre radius. Retail, 
wholesale and construction related occupations were becoming the most important 
employment sectors, while an increasing number of people were working in finance and 
public sector jobs. It was also apparent that more people were commuting into Greater 
London for work and that the housing and tenure profiles of the communities were changing. 
A significant number of new build flats and detached houses were available for purchase 
and rent in each community while the proportion of houses available for social renting was 
falling sharply.  
The second assumption was also based on an appreciation of the changing demographics 
of Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross. While it was apparent that many residents in 
each community had lived in the area for most of their lives and had strong emotional ties to 
the area and its industrial legacy, it was also clear that new people were moving into the 
communities who had few ties to the area and saw it perhaps as a temporary home (Dartford 
Borough Council, 2004c, 2005b). As many of these new residents are likely to have been 
attracted to the area at least in part by the advent of Ebbsfleet and Bluewater and the 
prospect of a sustained long-term growth in the local housing market, one might expect them 
to exhibit a broadly positive attitude towards the regeneration of Kent Thameside.  
Longer-term residents, on the other hand, might be expected to display a more ambivalent 
attitude to regeneration. As Raco and Henderson (2006), Syms (2001) and Williams et al 
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(1996) point out the commercial regeneration strategies governing the redevelopment of 
brownfield land are not always consistent with the way in which existing communities have 
used these sites in the past or would like to see them used in the future. This can lead, they 
argue, to tensions emerging between long-term existing residents and regeneration 
agencies.  
Having analysed official data on the socio-economic composition of residents, it was then 
necessary to develop a more fine-grained approach to understanding residents’ views. In 
order to answer the main questions underpinning this study and to test the assumptions 
discussed above it was decided to produce a ‘typology’ of residents in Swanscombe, 
Knockhall and Horns Cross using the survey method to gather data from a series of semi-
structured, in depth interviews with residents. This typology would look to identify similarities 
and differences in residents’ socio-economic circumstances and the extent of their 
engagement in their community and then look for correlations between these factors and 
their attitudes to regeneration. Each resident interviewed would be asked to provide details 
of the length of their residency in the community, the extent of their family, social and 
employment ties in the area, and their involvement in any community organisations. 
Interviewees would also be asked to say how long they expected to remain living in their 
present community and, if they planned to move on, when and where they would go and 
why. This data, along with information about their employment, education, housing and 
domestic circumstances and their responses to questions about regeneration would then be 
analysed to see if it was possible to identify clusters of similar residents. Profiles of any 
resident cluster identified through this process, setting out their shared socio-cultural, socio-
economic and attitudinal characteristics, would also be produced to help contextualise and 
explain their attitudes to regeneration.  
This approach was influenced in part by the Mosaic geo-demographic profiling system 
(Experian, 2010). Mosaic classifies British post-code areas according to sixty one lifestyle 
types that are based on shared socio-cultural and socio-economic behaviours. The variables 
used to construct each lifestyle type are derived from UK Census data, MORI’s financial 
surveys, Experian’s own Lifestyle Surveys and other geo-demographic data. Mosaic and 
other geo-demographic profiling systems such as the National Classification of Output Areas 
(ONS, 2003) are playing an increasingly prominent role in public service delivery and in 
academia (Longley, 2005; Anderson, 2010). Such neighbourhood classifications are being 
used in health, education and policing policy to assess risk and target interventions more 
effectively and in academia to understand the effect of people’s home environments and 
social backgrounds on their behaviours (Singleton, 2004; Farr, Wardlow, Jones, 2008; 
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Ashby, Longley, 2005; Butler, Hamnett, 2011). The Mosaic neighbourhood classification was 
used to refine and contextualise the residents’ typology produced for this study. The 
residents’ profiles that comprise this typology along with details of the Mosaic classification 
of each resident are set out in chapter six.  
3.3.2  Kent Thameside regeneration partners 
The other principal targets of the fieldwork process were the key officials, politicians and 
developers involved in the planning and delivery of regeneration in Kent Thameside. The 
primary aim of engaging key figures associated with the Kent Thameside Association and 
later the Kent Thameside Delivery Board was to understand the rationale behind these 
organisations’ social regeneration goals and the challenges and obstacles involved in their 
delivery. Testimony from the regeneration partners would also help to establish the extent of 
their commitment to their stated social regeneration goals and the level of resources they 
had available to deliver them. This fieldwork, therefore, provided an important opportunity to 
examine whether the rhetoric about the value of social regeneration articulated in the key 
Kent Thameside policies and strategies (Kent Thameside Association, 1995, 1997; Kent 
Thameside Delivery Board, 2005) was matched by their actions. In order to meet this aim, it 
was decided to carry out a series of semi-structured, in depth interviews with key Kent 
Thameside regeneration partners. It was felt that in depth interviews would be the most 
effective way of exploring the complex issues relating to the social regeneration goals of 
Kent Thameside and its governance.  
3.4  Identifying and recruiting fieldwork respondents  
3.4.1 Existing residents 
It was decided during the fieldwork planning stage that a survey using semi-structured, in 
depth interviews would be used as the principal evidence gathering method in Swanscombe, 
Knockhall and Horns Cross. It was felt that this method would be the most effective means 
of exploring complex issues such as the extent of residents’ emotional commitment to the 
communities in which they were living. One to one interviews were selected over group 
interviews as it was felt that this format would be more likely to elicit strong responses from 
members of the community who were not used to articulating their views in public 
(Esterberg, 2002).  
Given that in depth interviews are time consuming to carry out and analyse, the author took 
the view that the sample of residents participating in the study would need to be relatively 
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small. He estimated that it would only be possible to interview around sixty residents during 
the fieldwork of 2007/08 out of a total population of approximately twelve thousand. This 
meant that it would be extremely difficult to identity a sample that was fully representative of 
the populations of Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross. However, the author felt it 
would be possible to achieve a broadly representative sample that contained a balanced 
geographical spread of interviewees and was broadly representative of the age profile, the 
educational attainment profile, the employment profile and the housing tenure and property 
size profiles of the three communities. Therefore, a purposive sampling method was 
adopted. This would be based on the analysis of demographic data from the 2001 census.  
As discussed in the previous section the author used a range of methods to identify and 
recruit potential interviewees. After reviewing census data and the electoral register and 
spending time in each community and observing and recording conditions the author 
produced maps of the communities with detailed information of the property and tenure 
types present in each street and drew up a provisional pool of the households he wished to 
target. The author then began to contact households in the pool either in person by door-
step knocking or by phone, if their landline details were publicly available, to see if they 
would be willing to be interviewed.  
These methods proved to be effective in recruiting older retired residents, people who 
worked part-time or were full-time parents or carers and people who worked regular full-time 
hours in the local area. However, these methods were less effective in recruiting people who 
worked irregular hours or commuted for work outside the area. Consequently, it became 
necessary to supplement the provisional pool towards the end of the fieldwork process with 
people who had been recommended by previous interviewees. In this snowball method the 
previous interviewees made the initial contact with the potential interviewee, who were 
usually neighbours, acquaintances or family members, and then reported back to the author. 
All of the people interviewed were recruited either from the pooling or snowballing methods 
with the exception of the two interviewees who were recruited opportunistically at a 
community event that the author attended.  
Initially, the author had wished to recruit an equal number of interviewees from each the 
three villages. However, he eventually decided to focus more on Swanscombe and 
Knockhall as they were more directly affected the new developments in Kent Thameside. 
Horns Cross is some distance away from Ebbsfleet and Ingress Park and is only directly 
affected by the Waterstone Park development. In view of this, twenty six interviewees were 
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recruited in Swanscombe, together with twenty seven in Knockhall and a further seven in 
Horns Cross.  
A summary of the backgrounds of these sixty interviewees can be found in tables 3.1 to 3.3 
and more detailed information about them is set out in appendices 3 to 5.  Figures 3.1 to 3.6, 
meanwhile, describe the housing tenure, qualification and age profiles of the interviewees in 
Swanscombe and Knockhall and compare them to the data for all Swanscombe and 
Knockhall residents from the 2001 census. These figures show that the main tenure types in 
each community along with the main qualification types and age groups are represented in 
each cohort of interviewees – although there are no interviewees in private rented 
accommodation. At the time the interviews took place private rented households accounted 
for fewer than 1 in 10 households in Swanscombe and Knockhall and greater priority was 
given to identifying interviewees in social rented accommodation, a tenure type which 
constituted more than 1 in 4 households in Swanscombe. Due to the low number of Horns 
Cross interviewees, equivalent figures have not been produced for Horns Cross.  
Table 3.1 Summary details of Swanscombe interviewees 
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Figure 3.1 Level of highest qualification of Swanscombe interviewees and all   
  Swanscombe residents  
 
Figure 3.2   Housing tenure of Swanscombe interviewees and all Swanscombe residents 
 
Figure 3.3 Ages of Swanscombe interviewees and all Swanscombe residents 
 
          Swanscombe interviewees         All Swanscombe residents (%) (Census 2001) 
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Table 3.2 Summary details of Knockhall interviewees  
 
Figure 3.4 Level of highest qualification of Knockhall interviewees and all   
  Knockhall residents  
 
 
 
 
  78 
 
Figure 3.5   Housing tenure of Knockhall interviewees and all Knockhall residents 
 
Figure 3.6 Ages of Knockhall interviewees and all Knockhall residents 
 
          Knockhall interviewees         All Knockhall residents (%) (Census 2001) 
 
Table 3.3 Summary details of Horns Cross interviewees  
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3.4.2 Kent Thameside regeneration partners 
The task of recruiting interviewees from among the Kent Thameside regeneration partners 
was made relatively easy due to the author’s familiarity with local regeneration processes. 
Most of the individuals who were interviewed had existing knowledge of this research and 
were interested in its findings. Consequently all the individuals contacted by the author 
agreed to be interviewed and were willing to set aside the necessary time for the interview.  
It was important that the sample of regeneration partners identified as potential interviewees 
reflected the mixed public and private sector membership of the Kent Thameside 
Association and the Kent Thameside Delivery Board. In view of this the author contacted 
three senior private sector developers: an executive from Land Securities, which was 
responsible for developing the Ebbsfleet Valley; an executive from Countryside Properties 
which had the house building contract for Waterstone Park; and a senior executive from 
London and Continental Railways, the company charged with building Ebbsfleet Station and 
the high speed rail link.  
Four public sector regeneration partners also agreed to be interviewed: the Chief Executive 
of the Kent Thameside Delivery Board; a senior Dartford Borough Councillor who was a 
former Leader of the Council; a senior director from Dartford Borough Council; and a former 
Chief Executive of Dartford Borough Council who had been a founding member of the Kent 
Thameside Association. At a later stage in the fieldwork process two senior public sector 
professionals who worked in the Swanscombe and Knockhall area, a local GP and a 
secondary school headteacher, also agreed to be interviewed. Details of the backgrounds of 
the interviewees can be found in appendix seven. 
3.5   The planning, delivery and recording of fieldwork interviews 
3.5.1 Existing residents 
Prior to the start of the interviews with existing residents, a detailed interview schedule was 
drafted and piloted with four residents in Swanscombe and Knockhall whom the author knew 
personally. The final version of the interview schedule, which was revised after the piloting 
stage, can be found in appendix two.  
The interview schedule consisted of four sections of open response questions. The first 
section included questions on interviewees’ personal circumstances while the second 
section explored their perceptions of their community. These sections provided the 
background information necessary to produce the typology of residents. The third section 
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included questions designed to establish how much the interviewees knew about the 
regeneration of Kent Thameside and the fourth section was composed of specific questions 
related to the area’s social regeneration goals. This section explored residents’ views on the 
integration of new and existing communities and the extent to which they had been involved 
or were aware of any initiatives relating to the regeneration of their community or the wider 
Kent Thameside area.  
The interview schedule also initially contained some closed response questions designed to 
gauge residents’ awareness of specific regeneration schemes. However, these questions 
disrupted the flow of the interview and interviewees were reluctant to engage with them as 
they saw them as a test of their knowledge: as a result they were dropped after the first two 
interviews and all questions became open-ended.  
When discussing the arrangements for each interview, most interviewees indicated that they 
wanted it to take place at their home address. However, five of the sixty interviewees asked 
for a location that was close to where they worked: two interviews, therefore, were carried in 
Bluewater shopping centre; one was carried out in a supermarket cafe; and one took place 
at the business address of the interviewee. The author tried, whenever possible, to ensure 
that at least an hour was set aside for each interview. It was thought that an extended period 
of time would help to establish a rapport between the interviewer and interviewee and would 
give the interviewee time to think about their answers and bring in new issues that they 
believed were relevant to the topic in question. It was hoped that this would help give the 
interviewee more control over the content and tone of the interview.  
In the event, the extended interview format proved to be helpful: many interviewees became 
more relaxed and expansive in their answers in the latter part of the interview and some 
returned, unprompted, to topics they had already addressed in order to provide additional 
insights. A change in the format of the interview, which was made after the first two 
interviews, also had an important impact on the depth of the answers given by interviewees. 
Whereas the initial interviews had placed an equal emphasis on developments that had yet 
to happen, such as Ebbsfleet Valley, and on developments that had already taken place, 
such as Ingress Park, the later interviews focused much more on the latter type of 
development. Although the author provided pictures and plans of future developments, many 
interviewees found it difficult to relate to them or to comment on the impact they might have 
on existing communities. Focussing on completed developments such as Ingress Park 
enabled many interviewees to provide richer answers when discussing topics such as the 
social and physical integration of new and existing communities.   
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The author, with the consent of participants, chose to record each interview in full rather than 
take verbatim notes. This allowed the author to focus on the interviewee during the interview 
and to replay the interview at a later stage in order to pick additional nuances and to 
compare responses. After each interview the author prepared a report with details of the 
interviewee’s age, gender, relationship status, occupation, educational attainment, housing 
status and the extent of their social and family connections and voluntary activity in the 
community. The report also included a selective transcription of the relevant parts of the 
interview. 
3.5.2     Kent Thameside regeneration partners 
As with existing residents, a detailed interview schedule, which was piloted with two Dartford 
Borough Councillors, was prepared before the start of the interviews with the regeneration 
partners.  This schedule, which was composed of open-ended response questions, was 
designed to enable each interviewee to set out their understanding of each key social 
regeneration goal, and why and how it had emerged (see appendix six). It also provided 
them with an opportunity to explain the challenges involved in meeting these goals and to 
describe the ways in which they had changed over time. Interviewees were also invited to 
comment on the governance arrangements in place in Kent Thameside and the wider 
Thames Gateway and their strengths and weaknesses as a means of delivering the 
government’s regeneration programme. Finally, interviewees were asked to comment on the 
nature of their engagement with existing communities and to describe what had worked well 
and what could have been improved.  
Prior to the interviews, some regeneration interviewees had requested to see a copy of the 
interview questions in advance. This raised a question about whether they may prove 
guarded in their response, even though they had been willing to agree to be interviewed. 
However, the interviewees all provided very full and detailed answers and placed no 
restrictions on the type of issues they were prepared to address or how their responses 
could be used. This may be because they knew the author was familiar with the practical, 
political and financial challenges involved in the regeneration of Kent Thameside and 
understood the difficult choices, barriers and competing pressures they faced as 
professionals. As Nutt and Bell (2002) have noted, interviewees are often willing to disclose 
more when the interviewer has a similar personal or professional background and is able 
show empathy with their situation.  
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All the interviews with the key regeneration figures were recorded in full and then selectively 
transcribed. Interview reports containing the transcriptions and details of the interviewees’ 
professional status and the nature of their involvement in Kent Thameside were then 
produced.  
3.6  The analysis of the fieldwork interviews 
3.6.1  Existing residents 
The data from the interviews with existing residents was analysed thematically based on the 
material collected during the interview process. After replaying the interviews the author 
produced an index of the key themes and sub themes that were discussed by the 
interviewees. In identifying these key themes particular attention was paid, as recommended 
by Ryan and Bernard (2003), to repetitions in the interviews; similarities and differences in 
the way interviewees discuss a topic; the use of metaphors and analogies by interviewees to 
explain their opinions; and the use of linguistic connectors such as ‘since’ or ‘because’ to 
explain why events have occurred. The key themes and sub themes identified are set out in 
tables 3.4 and 3.5. After producing this index of themes, the interview data relating to the 
themes were transcribed and recorded in the interview reports and in a database produced 
for each key theme.  
Table 3.4 Index of the key themes relating to residents perceptions of their own  
  community 
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Table 3.5 Index of the key themes relating to residents’ perceptions of the   
  regeneration of Kent Thameside  
 
This thematic analysis of the interview data was used to support the production of the 
residents’ typology. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the typology was created by 
examining the residents’ level of commitment to their community; their socio-cultural 
preferences; their socio-economic status; their plans for their lives and their attitudes to 
regeneration. The intention was to see if discrete clusters of residents could be identified 
with comparable life journeys and expectations and similar attitudes to regeneration. In the 
event, it proved possible to identify a typology composed of four discrete groups of residents.  
Two thirds of the residents interviewed were classified using this typology. The typology 
revealed significant variations in the backgrounds and life choices of Swanscombe, 
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Knockhall and Horns Cross residents and also marked differences in their attitudes to 
regeneration. At one end there is a discrete group of residents, who are ‘Just Passing 
Through’ Kent Thameside. They have moved to the area for investment reasons attracted by 
the regeneration vision for Kent Thameside. However, they have limited social or emotional 
capital invested in the community and most will expect to move on within a few years. At the 
other end there are the older, blue collar residents from Swanscombe who have always lived 
and worked in the area and are rooted in the community: these ‘Guardians of the Flame’ 
recognise the need for additional housing but are ill at ease with the scale and pace of the 
regeneration plans and the social changes taking place within their own community.  
The third group of residents, meanwhile, the ‘Community Crusaders’, are educated, 
professionals who are heavily involved in community projects aimed at promoting social 
cohesion and improving the skills and confidence of local residents. They are sceptical, 
however, about some of the claims made by the Kent Thameside regeneration partners and 
feel that the opportunity posed by regeneration to improve the quality of life and life chances 
of existing residents has largely been squandered. The largest group, though, which 
accounts for a third of the interviewees, is composed of residents with busy family and 
working lives who have few complaints about their lives or the communities in which they 
live, except with regard to the level of services available for younger people. These ‘Happy 
Families’ have a more pragmatic attitude towards regeneration than their peers and tend to 
focus on positives it will bring to their lives. Detailed profiles of the four residents groups are 
set out in chapter six and a summary with details of the socio-economic backgrounds of the 
members of each residents group can be found in appendix eight.  
The residents who have not been included in this typology fall into five categories. The first 
category is a sub-set of the ‘Happy Families’ group. It consists of four residents whose 
attitudes to regeneration and whose lifestyles are similar to the ‘Happy Families’ group, 
except that they do not have children or grandchildren and are therefore less exercised 
about the quality of service provision for younger people in the area. The second category 
includes four older residents, who, like the ‘Guardians of the Flame’ group, have always lived 
and worked in the area and are also uneasy about the impact of regeneration on them and 
their communities. However, due to the fact that they live in Knockhall and Horns Cross, 
rather than Swanscombe, which, it is argued, lends the Guardians of the Flame a distinctive 
sense of identity and loyalty to place, they have not been included in this group.  
The third category consists of two residents who are first generation immigrants from the 
commonwealth who have settled permanently in the area with their families. While their 
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attitudes to regeneration are similar to the ‘Happy Families’ group, the difference in their life 
journeys and their wider network of social and family connections, which tend to stretch 
across London and the South east, means they have not been included in the group.  
The fourth category consists of five middle age residents with comfortable incomes and busy 
professional lives who have been living in Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross for 
some years, due to family connections or because of the affordability of housing in the area 
and its transport connections to London. The attitudes to their community and to towards 
regeneration vary, which is why is they have been included in the typology. Some are 
sceptical about regeneration, see few positives about living where they do and are 
considering moving elsewhere. Others, despite being disengaged from their community, are 
prepared to tolerate living there due to its convenience. The final category of residents 
consists of six residents, or outliers, whom it has not been possible classify due to the 
unusual nature of their life journeys and current lifestyles.  
The thematic analysis used to produce the residents’ typology was also used to inform 
chapters seven and nine which examine the delivery of the Kent Thameside social 
regeneration goals. The data from the sub-themes relating to the integration of new and 
existing communities were used to support the analysis in chapter seven. In this case, the 
data from Knockhall interviewees relating to the frequency and nature of their visits to 
Ingress Park and the extent of social interaction between them and Ingress Park residents 
was used to examine the extent of social integration between the two communities. The data 
from the sub-theme focusing on comparisons between the treatment of new and existing 
residents by the regeneration partners was also examined in this chapter. In chapter nine, 
meanwhile, the data from Swanscombe interviewees relating to the quality of the urban 
renewal schemes in the community was used to support the analysis of the Gunn Road 
Environmental Improvements Scheme and the Swanscombe Heritage Park Scheme.  
3.6.2 Kent Thameside regeneration partners 
The data from the interviews with the Kent Thameside regeneration partners were analysed 
thematically in the same fashion as the data from residents’ interviews. The index of the key 
themes and sub themes generated after replaying the interviews is set out in table 3.6. The 
data linked to these themes have been used extensively throughout this study in the analysis 
of Kent Thameside’s governance arrangements and the delivery of its social regeneration 
goals.  
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Table 3.6 Index of the key themes from interviews with Kent Thameside   
  regeneration partners  
 
3.7  Ethical considerations  
Prior to beginning the fieldwork process there were two key ethical issues that needed to 
addressed and resolved. The first was the author’s dual status as an academic researcher 
and as a professional with a close personal involvement in the regeneration of Kent 
Thameside. The second issue, which was linked to the first, was how to ensure that potential 
interviewees did not feel obliged to participate in this research and were able to make a free 
and informed choice about participation. 
As a former Dartford Borough Councillor and a constituency based staff member of the 
Member of Parliament for Dartford, the author was in a position in 2007 to gain privileged 
access to information relating to Kent Thameside and to negotiate access to potential 
interviewees. This created the dilemma as to how the author should represent himself to 
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potential interviewees. Electing to withhold information from potential resident interviewees 
about the author’s professional status would help to avoid a scenario whereby interviewees 
felt either pressured into taking part in the research or believed that in agreeing to participate 
they would gain improved access to local decision makers. It would also help to equalise the 
power relationship between the interviewer and interviewee and lessen any inhibitions the 
interviewee may have had about speaking freely. On the other hand, it would have been 
extremely difficult for the author to separate his professional and academic roles and ensure 
that his professional background and knowledge had no influence on the interview process 
or that the information gained from the interviews had no bearing on his subsequent 
professional activities. After all, the interviewer is not a neutral facilitator but a co-creator of 
the interview data: their personality, appearance and background have a powerful influence 
on the interviewee and the responses they give (Esterberg, 2002). Moreover, withholding 
information about aspects of the author’s status which are clearly relevant to the subject of 
the interview could be construed by interviewees as disingenuous and misleading.  
The ethical dilemmas facing the ‘practitioner-researcher’ have been discussed by Bell and 
Nutt (2002). Using the example of Nutt’s research with foster carers whilst working as an 
employee of the National Foster Care Association, they highlighted the practical difficulties 
involved in keeping the identities of researcher and practitioner separate. Having decided 
initially to withhold her professional identity from interviewees, Nutt found that aspects of her 
professional self leached into the interview process and that her professional status became 
clear to some interviewees as a result of their interaction during the interview. Although she 
felt that revealing her dual status might make it difficult for some interviewees to know 
whether they responding to her as an ‘insider’ practitioner or an ‘outsider’ researcher, she 
eventually took the view that she needed to be transparent about her status. In fact, Nutt and 
Bell argue, as do other qualitative researchers (Oakley, 1981; Edwards, 1993), that revealing 
personal details to interviews can help to build up trust between the interviewer and 
interviewee and encourage greater disclosure by the interviewee.   
The author decided therefore to disclose details of both his professional and academic 
status when approaching potential interviewees. When engaging interviewees directly he 
began by stating that he was a university graduate student carrying out research in Kent 
Thameside. If they were happy to proceed, he but then went on to explain that it was his 
professional interest in the area as an employee of the local MP that had led him to engage 
in this research. He also highlighted the fact that he had lived in the area for twenty years 
and had also served as a Borough Councillor. If potential interviewees showed any initial 
reluctance to be interviewed, then the author ended the conversation at the point and did not 
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go on to reveal his professional status in case the interviewees felt obliged to change their 
mind and take part. Every individual who agreed to be interviewed was given a ‘cooling off’ 
period before the actual interview took place and they were encouraged to contact the 
author if they had any questions about the research or wished to withdraw from the 
interview.  
While the majority of interviewees were contacted directly by the author without the prior 
involvement of a ‘gatekeeper’, a few potential interviewees from social groups that were 
otherwise difficult to reach were contacted first by previous interviewees as part of a 
‘snowball’ recruitment method. Although these intermediaries were asked to emphasise the 
fact that the research was part of an academic study and was being undertaken by a 
graduate student who happened also to work for the local MP, there is no record of these 
conversations and no way of knowing for certain how the author was described or how the 
research was pitched. As Miller and Bell (2002) state in their discussion of the role of the 
gatekeeper in qualitative research, there is a risk that some interviewees who are contacted 
or ‘volunteered’ by powerful or assertive gatekeepers may feel that they have limited scope 
to resist participation. In this study, the author attempted to mitigate this risk by selecting 
intermediaries whom he believed would present the interview request in a sensitive fashion 
and would ensure the potential interviewee felt under no pressure to comply.  
In one case, two potential interviewees were approached opportunistically by the author at 
the end of a community event that he was attending in a professional capacity. While this did 
represent a blurring of the boundaries between the author’s professional and academic 
roles, the author believed that an exception could be made in this instance in view of the 
personalities of the people in question. The author was satisfied that they would understand 
the academic focus of the research and that they would only agree to be interviewed if they 
were certain that it was something that they wanted to take part in. 
A further issue related to the author’s status as a ‘practitioner-researcher’ that had to be 
addressed was how the author should respond to questions from interviewees during and 
after the interview which were prompted by his professional role. In line with the approach 
taken by Bell and Nutt (2002) the author decided that while such questions should be 
answered directly, and not be deflected or deferred, it was important to try to draw a 
distinction between the author as an academic interviewer and as a political professional. 
Consequently, the author decided if any such question was asked he would stop the 
recording of the interview and only turn it on again once the question had been answered. In 
the event a number of interviewees did ask some general questions about public services in 
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their community and future development in Dartford which the author then answered directly. 
The author felt this empowered the interviewees and helped to make the interview a less 
formal, more conversational experience which, in turn, encouraged interviewees to disclose 
more in their answers.  
Following each interview the author provided each interviewee with his academic contact 
details and encouraged them to get in touch if they had any questions about the progress of 
his research or any other issue related to the regeneration of Kent Thameside. Once the 
fieldwork was complete the author decided to withdraw himself from any professional 
business or community events relating to the residents of Swanscombe, Knockhall and 
Horns Cross. As the interviewees had provided the author with some sensitive personal 
information, he wanted to avoid any embarrassment or awkwardness that might occur if he 
came into contact with them again in a professional capacity.  
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the rationale for employing the case study method of empirical 
research in this study, and for selecting Kent Thameside and Swanscombe, Knockhall and 
Horns Cross as the case study sites. This chapter also sets out the methodology used to 
identify, gather and analyse the primary data used in this study and the rationale behind it. It 
examines in detail the aims and implementation of the fieldwork strategy used to engage the 
two main target groups of this study: the existing residents of Swanscombe, Knockhall and 
Horns Cross; and the key officials, politicians and developers involved in the regeneration of 
Kent Thameside. The key hypotheses that have informed this strategy and the ethical 
considerations and methodological literature that have influenced its design have also been 
considered.  
This fieldwork strategy has yielded a rich volume of interview data which has enabled the 
author to produce a typology of residents that has highlighted the social and economic 
diversity present within the existing communities and the differences in attitudes to 
regeneration. In this sense, it has addressed a notable weakness in the evidence base 
underpinning the regeneration of Kent Thameside. Up to now the existing community has 
been treated as an undifferentiated entity and the commentary on regeneration from the 
existing community has been provided almost exclusively by a small cohort of powerful 
individuals who purport to represent the community. This interview data has also provided a 
valuable and detailed commentary - from both residents and the regeneration partners - on 
the delivery of the key social regeneration goals of Kent Thameside on both participation and 
integration.  
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However, the interview data does have its limitations. While the interview data from the Kent 
Thameside regeneration partners is broadly representative of the key public and private 
constituencies that have shaped the area’s regeneration goals, the cohort of sixty resident 
interviewees can only provide a partial snapshot of the views of the existing community. In 
this case, the depth and quality of the responses provided by residents has inevitably limited 
the study to a more qualitative approach. This has restricted the scope for undertaking a 
quantitative analysis of the residents’ responses.  
Although the author has endeavoured to ensure that the cohort of interviewees is 
geographically balanced and includes residents from the key socio-economic groups in 
Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross it is possible that some viewpoints and nuances 
will have been missed. The author’s dual status as a ‘researcher-practitioner’ is also 
significant. While steps were taken to mitigate the impact of his status on interviewees and 
the data they provided, it may have influenced the decisions of some interviewees to 
participate in the research.  
The evidence provided through this study will help to strengthen our understanding of the 
impact of regeneration on existing communities in Kent Thameside and the wider Thames 
Gateway. But in reviewing this evidence the limitations described above need to be borne in 
mind.  
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Part II 
 
Kent Thameside: its people, communities and regeneration policies 
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Chapter 4  Kent Thameside: The emergence of a regeneration vision 1979-2013 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter has three key aims. It aims first of all to explain how and why Kent Thameside 
came to be identified as a regeneration priority by the government in the 1990s. It will then 
show how the regeneration and governance of Kent Thameside evolved over the next two 
decades. This discussion will help to contextualise the analysis of Kent Thameside’s social 
regeneration goals in the later chapters of this study.  
Secondly, it aims to situate Kent Thameside within the wider policy and academic debate 
that has influenced the Thames Gateway regeneration policy agenda (see appendix one for 
a timeline of key events). It will examine the gradual evolution of regeneration policy in the 
UK from a neo-liberal belief in the 1980s in the power of the market to transform under-
performing local economies to the more subtle, ‘rolled out’ neo-liberalism of the 1990s and 
2000s which placed a greater emphasis on social regeneration and sustainable 
development. It will also explore the dynamic between national regeneration policy, the 
Thames Gateway policy discourse and the local policy discourse in Kent Thameside. The 
key social and economic issues that have influenced the scale and pace of regeneration in 
the Thames Gateway - such as the recessions of the early 1990s and the late 2000s; the 
post millennium property market boom; and the growing influence of environmental politics - 
will also be explored. 
Thirdly, this chapter aims to examine the relationship between Kent Thameside’s 
governance partnerships - such as the Kent Thameside Association - and regional and 
national regeneration bodies over time. It will consider the extent to which the governance of 
Kent Thameside is consistent with the fluid, multi-level, neo-liberal governance 
arrangements driven by inter-agency bargaining and coalition building which were described 
by Jessop (1990). 
4.2  Reviving the East Thames Corridor 1979-91 
The election of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government in 1979 was a pivotal moment 
for the East Thames Corridor. Determined to sweep away the rigid planning system, the 
local authority bureaucracy and the high taxation, which it felt was constraining economic 
growth in the region, it embarked on a series of initiatives designed to revive its sclerotic 
market economy (Heseltine, 2000). In 1980, the six volume South East planning guidance 
was shelved in favour of a loose two page guidance document. And in 1981, an ‘Urban 
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Development Corporation’ was set up to take control of vast swathes of the London 
Docklands, as well as the planning powers of the local authorities (Imrie, Thomas, 1993a; 
Brownill, 1990). The new London Docklands Development Corporation was given central 
funding to acquire and prepare land for development and an Enterprise Zone was created 
which gave new investors substantial tax breaks.  
Two years later, North West Kent got its own Enterprise Zone. The decline of the area’s 
manufacturing base, coupled with rising unemployment and its growing economic reliance 
on London, had persuaded Kent County Council and the government that urgent action was 
needed to promote the industrial regeneration of the area (Kent County Council, 1984). For 
Conservative controlled Kent County Council it was a politically expedient strategy. By 
focussing its economic development strategy on the North of the county, Kent was able to 
placate urban members who were demanding action to help tackle the county’s industrial 
decline, whilst appeasing rural members who wanted a brake on new development, 
particularly on green field sites (Vigar, 2000).  
In the event Enterprise Zone status for North West Kent did not prove to be quite the 
panacea that its supporters hoped it would be. The rate of development across the zone 
varied substantially, leading Kent County Council to conclude that “Enterprise Zone 
designation in itself will not generate immediate development and employment”. It found that 
other issues were also important; such as the “availability of land and premises, location and 
accessibility, and the image and environment of the area” (The Financial Times, 1985).  
North West Kent’s problems were mirrored in the wider East Thames Corridor. According to 
SERPLAN (1987), the association of South East planners, a wide range of factors were 
inhibiting the Corridor’s economic development potential and preventing the region matching 
the impressive growth of the M4 corridor west of London. A combination of issues including 
the population’s low spending power; its low skills level; the poor environmental image of the 
East Thames Corridor; and its inadequate road and rail networks, were holding back the 
area’s growth, SERPLAN found.  
Yet, the East Thames Corridor had one asset that the M4 corridor could not match: the 
proposed Channel Tunnel rail link between London and Paris. In Kent, a team was set up to 
determine how to realise the Tunnel’s economic potential. Their ‘Strategy for Kent’, 
published in 1987, concluded that the M25 and the new link would ‘interact strongly’ and 
have a significant impact on the economy of Dartford and Gravesham (Kent Impact Study 
Team, 1987). This would, it claimed, justify the establishment of the Dartford and 
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Gravesham area as a ‘growth centre’ with Dartford’s strong potential as a major distribution 
hub a particular cause for optimism.  Their recommendation echoed a call by Martin 
Simmons (1987) in an influential article in ‘The Planner’ for the Channel Tunnel Rail Link to 
be used to stimulate the economy of the Thames estuary, and in particular the industrial 
towns of North Kent.   
However, a report by Deloitte, Haskins and Sells (1989), commissioned by SERPLAN, 
concluded that the image of the East Thames Corridor would have to be radically overhauled 
in order to persuade the private sector to invest in the area. Deloitte suggested that the East 
Thames Corridor should try to replicate the Glasgow Action project, which was set up in 
1985 to enhance Glasgow’s appeal to business and new residents and to promote an 
entrepreneurial climate.  
The Deloitte report, with its focus on property led regeneration and the re-branding of the 
area, borrowed heavily from the Docklands regeneration model. It was based on the premise 
that the main barriers to regeneration were physical ones, in terms of lack of road capacity, 
and on site constraints. If these could be removed, then, with the right kind of marketing, the 
market could be relied on to provide the investment and the jobs that the area needed. It 
was an approach that typified the government’s intrinsic belief in the power of the market 
alone to transform the prospects of Britain’s declining industrial heartlands. However, even 
by the late 1980s it was a model that was already beginning to attract critics. In the next 
section we will consider this criticism and discuss the government’s reaction to it. 
4.3 A new approach to urban regeneration in the East Thames Corridor 1991-94  
The brand of private sector, property led regeneration described in the Deloitte report had 
already begun to attract criticism by the time it was published in 1989. The London 
Docklands Development Corporation’s ‘entrepreneurial governance’ style was accused of 
leaving the Docklands “redeveloped but not regenerated” (Brownill, 1999). The House of 
Commons Employment Select Committee, meanwhile, concluded that Urban Development 
Corporations “cannot be regarded as a success if buildings and land are regenerated but the 
local community are bypassed and do not benefit from regeneration” (Imrie, Thomas, 1999, 
23).   
It was a criticism that John Major’s new Conservative administration took to heart. Its 
flagship urban policies, the City Challenge initiative of 1991 and the Single Regeneration 
Budget of 1994, were recognisably Conservative in that they obliged cities to bid against one 
another for central funding. But in contrast to the urban policy of 1980s, they were founded 
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on the principle that regeneration required partnership between the public and private 
sectors and the community if it was to succeed (Tallon, 2010). There was also a more overt 
focus on social issues such as education, housing and health (Cullingworth, Nadin, 2006).  
Major’s arrival in Downing Street also heralded the return of Michael Heseltine to the 
Department of Environment. Back in power, Heseltine turned his attention once again to 
East London:  
“My vision was to build on the success of the London Docklands Development 
Corporation by stimulating development out into the East Thames Corridor” 
(Heseltine, 2000, 398).  
To assist him he appointed Peter Hall, “a left of centre but internationally renowned expert 
on urban planning”, as his special adviser (Heseltine, 2000, 398). Hall saw the development 
of the Corridor as a necessary response to the outward drift of population and jobs from 
London (Hall, 1989). Hall castigated attempts by the Callaghan government in the 1970s to 
halt this through a programme of inner city revitalisation. He concluded that even with the 
development of the London Docklands, that the “outward drift will continue as strongly as 
ever” and that there is no “long-term substitute for new building in the rest of the south east” 
(Hall, 1989, 28).  
A disciple of Ebenezer Howard’s garden city movement, Hall supported the creation of 
‘discontinuous clustered developments’ focused on ‘radial transport corridors’ extending out 
from London. These new communities, Hall insisted, should be small, semi-self contained, 
walking scale communities clustered along public transport routes like ‘beads on a string’ or 
a ‘linear version of Howard’s Social City’. Investment in high profile employment hubs, he 
said, would counteract the ‘huge magnet of central London’ and ensure the economic 
success of the corridors (Hall, Ward, 1998, 154-8). Hall envisaged that the ‘East Thames 
Corridor’ could become the prototype for sustainable, public transport orientated, urban 
development not just in the UK, but across the world.  
Confirmation of the East Thames Corridor’s status as a regeneration priority for the 
government came in March 1991. With Peter Hall in attendance, Heseltine outlined his plans 
to an audience of planners for a linear city in the corridor with a string of new centres on both 
sides of the Thames. He also hinted at the prospect of a major high speed rail link in the 
East Thames Corridor. 
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''The East Thames corridor contains much land of poor environment, and 
development opportunities that cry out to be taken. Its position makes it an area of 
key significance for communications linking not only London and the South-east but 
the Midlands and the North with Europe'' (Schoon, 1991) 
This became a reality in October 1991 when the Transport Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, 
announced that the new Channel Tunnel Rail Link would include an intermediate 
international station located in the corridor (HC Deb 1991).  
Political interest in the Corridor was strengthened by the 1992 household projection figures 
for England which calculated that an extra 4.4 million new homes were required by 2016: the 
need for housing being particularly acute in the South east. Anxious not to alienate the 
wealthy shire counties the government signalled its intention to concentrate this new housing 
on previously developed, ‘brownfield’ sites – which the East Thames Corridor possessed in 
abundance (Cullingworth, Nadin, 2006). From now on, Ministers announced, 50 per cent of 
all new development would be located on brownfield sites.  As well as bringing investment to 
run down areas and containing urban growth, it was a policy, Ministers promised, that would 
cut energy consumption; promote greater social mixing; lead to better urban design; and 
promote greater public participation in the development process (Raco, Henderson, 2006; 
Punter, 2010). It represented, The Guardian said, a dramatic shift in policy.  
“The ideological purity of economic liberalism has been dissipated as environmental 
problems have come home to roost, not least in the mighty green backlash in Tory 
shires to the perceived over-development of their patches. Where once development 
came first, planning tagged along and people came nowhere, it is recognised in 
government now that there should be more of social element to planning.” (Vidal, 
1990) 
In North Kent, Blue Circle Industries, which owned over 1,000 hectares of redundant 
‘brownfield’ chalk quarries and cement production plants, saw its chance to transform the 
value of its portfolio. The company had gained planning permission for the redevelopment of 
its Western Quarry site in Greenhithe as a shopping centre in May 1990. However, the 
proposal for an intermediate international station on the new Channel Tunnel Rail Link 
offered an even greater prize. But in order to persuade the government to locate the station 
in North Kent, Blue Circle recognised it needed the participation of the local authorities and 
other community partners. Shortly afterwards, in 1993, the Kent Thameside Association, an 
informal coalition involving Dartford and Gravesham Borough Councils, Kent County 
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Council, and Blue Circle was formed. The Association’s aim, according to Dartford’s Chief 
Executive at the time, who was interviewed for this study, was: 
“To try and influence the work being carried out by the government in setting up the 
East Thames Corridor under Michael Heseltine. The aim of the partnership was to 
show that we could talk with one voice in the community and to ensure that North 
Kent got the maximum benefit it could from development in the Gateway.” (CSH) 
The ensuing contest for new station, which pitted Stratford and Rainham against ‘Ebbsfleet’, 
Kent Thameside Association’s candidate, was reminiscent of a City Challenge funding 
round. In their bid, the Kent Thameside team promised Ministers a ‘Euro-city’, with up to 
12,500 homes and 34,000 jobs to be created around the new station. Moreover, it would be 
a self-sustaining centre built according to Peter Hall’s precepts with its own offices, shops, 
hotels and community amenities. All of this, the team claimed, could be delivered by the 
private sector without any public finance. Blue Circle would provide the land for the station at 
no charge and the cost of building the station and associated infrastructure would be met out 
of the proceeds from the commercial development.   
The announcement of Kent Thameside’s privately financed Euro-city plan in March 1993 
was perfectly timed. It came just days after Michael Howard, the new Environment 
Secretary, had established a task force of civil servants to put together plans for 
redeveloping the corridor - a project complicated, the Financial Times noted, by the absence 
of any available public sector capital funding (The Financial Times, 1993). The Euro-city 
project was also boosted by a government commissioned report into the development 
potential of the corridor which found that Ebbsfleet had the edge over Stratford and Rainham 
as the location for the new station (Llewelyn Davies, Roger Tym, 1993). Llewelyn Davies’s 
report concluded that Ebbsfleet, which was close to the M25 and had an abundance of 
brownfield land suitable for commercial and housing development, would make an ideal 
“outer growth point” in the Corridor that could act as “a countervailing attraction” to London.  
However, the Llewelyn Davies’s report said little about the social regeneration of the 
Corridor’s existing communities. It concentrated instead on the transport and environmental 
challenges that had to be addressed if developers were to see the Corridor as anything other 
than “the place where London generates its power and dumps its rubbish”. There was no 
discussion about how to ensure existing residents’ access to the new jobs and homes 
created in the Corridor. For seasoned regeneration observers the report was a 
disappointment. The Docklands Consultative Committee (1993), composed of local 
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authorities and community organisations, complained about the report’s “emphasis on land 
development, rather than community needs, existing economic structures or social 
regeneration”.  
4.4 The emergence of the Thames Gateway Planning Framework 1994-97 
As civil servants prepared the planning framework for the Corridor, aimed at formalising 
Michael Heseltine’s regeneration vision, the media speculated about the cost of delivering 
the framework. “The big unanswered question is funding”, said The Independent:  
“The task of turning round this deprived area to create a centre for industry and 
tourism as well as an attractive place to live, is a mammoth one....(Yet) although 
government money has been fed into transport links, other  development is likely to 
depend on the private sector.” (Brace, 1994) 
It was a question to which Ministers too could not find an answer. At the launch of the draft 
planning framework for ‘Thames Gateway’ in September 1994, the Environment Minister, 
David Curry, did his best to dampen expectations about the scale of the project. The 
government wasn’t looking for “megalopolis or a corridor city”, he told the media (Minton, 
1994). And while the Gateway had the potential to provide hundreds of thousands of new 
jobs, a figure in the tens of thousands was “more certain”. The proposed housing delivery 
target of 110,000 new homes, 70,000 of which were to be delivered by 2006, was also short 
of many commentators’ expectations. The plan was, the Royal Town Planning Institute 
noted, “a lot less lavish than Heseltine’s vision developed by Peter Hall”. But then Curry, who 
hadn’t any government money to commit to the Thames Gateway, could not afford to be 
lavish: “It will be very exciting” but “I’m not going to pay for most of it” he admitted.  
However, even Curry’s streamlined development vision failed to appease the sceptics. 
Planning Week reported that although some inward investment would follow the transport 
opportunities, “planners remain concerned that lack of funds is the fatal flaw behind the 
down-scaled project” (Minton, 1994). Church and Frost (1995) were equally sceptical: they 
questioned whether companies would be willing to invest in the Thames Gateway and divert 
expansion away from the west of London without policy direction or incentives from 
government or substantial investment in new infrastructure. 
The Minister also found himself embroiled in a controversy over the location of the new 
station. In August 1994, the Transport Secretary, Brian Mawhinney had awarded the station 
to Ebbsfleet. Yet accusations that the bid’s success owed more to the connections between 
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Tory grandees and Kent Thameside’s public affairs company, than its commercial merits, 
soon emerged (Oborne, 1994). Curry had to insist to the Commons that “Ebbsfleet was 
chosen because it stood up commercially from the very start” (HC Deb, 1994). Many felt that 
Stratford, an area with high unemployment, would have been a better location. In the end 
Ministers made a partial climb-down: the government wouldn’t give its official support to a 
station at Stratford but would allow contenders for the rail link construction contract to 
include Stratford in their bid if they felt there was a business case to do so (Barker, 1995). 
Despite these criticisms, it was clear from the new planning framework that some of the 
lessons from the 1980s had been learnt (DoE, 1995). While it reaffirmed the government’s 
commitment to “working with the market” in order “to attract new investment and new 
residents”, it also stressed the importance of;  
“building on existing economic and community strengths; reinforcing the economic 
base, and strengthening existing communities” 
It declared that “the government is keen for those living in the Thames Gateway to share in 
the success” that the growth of the region’s business sector would generate. To enable this 
there would be an expansion of the Gateway’s further and higher education base coupled 
with new investment in health and cultural opportunities. This would ensure that regeneration 
is able to make “the most to be made of the talents and resources of local people”. 
Furthermore, the driving force behind the delivery of these objectives wouldn’t the 
government or Urban Development Corporations, but local authorities in partnership with 
business interests. This would help to ensure that “the wider matters of community 
regeneration...in established communities” are addressed in tandem with the physical 
regeneration of the Gateway’s brownfield sites.  
The framework also confirmed Kent Thameside’s status as one of the Gateway’s two main 
centres of development – the other being Stratford. With the new station at Ebbsfleet, the 
government believed that the area had the potential to provide 30,000 new homes “over the 
next 30 years” as well as “significant opportunities for employment”. Kent Thameside would 
also be, the framework promised, a “sustainable development”: “jobs, housing and services 
(would) be in easy reach of each other” and “new and existing centres of community and 
commerce” would be integrated. House development close to Bluewater, for example, would 
be encouraged. This would allow Bluewater “to act as a focus in the new Kent Thameside 
rather than standing alone as an out of town centre”. 
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The Kent Thameside Association took a close interest in the drafting of the framework. Blue 
Circle, in particular, was keen to see the framework implemented quickly. It felt that the 
existing planning system - which produced carefully negotiated land use plans that required 
lengthy consultation - was ill-equipped to respond to the opportunities emerging in Kent 
Thameside (Hull, 1998). For Blue Circle to realise its development ambitions, it needed a 
planning framework that provided a strong development vision for the next thirty years, and 
underlined Kent Thameside’s regional and national significance. This was necessary to 
ensure co-ordinated support for the Kent Thameside agenda from across government. 
Official recognition for the Kent Thameside project would also help to unlock investment from 
the private sector. Consequently Blue Circle lobbied Ministers for an early publication of the 
framework and strove to ensure that its development principles for the Thames Gateway 
were consistent with its own (Hull, 1998). In fact, Dartford’s Chief Executive at the time, who 
was interviewed for this study, said that “almost everything put forward” by the Association 
was included in the Thames Gateway Framework.  
The Association also commissioned David Lock to produce a local development vision. 
Lock, a close associate of Peter Hall, was the Chief Planning Adviser to the Department of 
the Environment. His role was to set out how the development principles established in the 
Thames Gateway Framework would be met in Kent Thameside. The document would have 
no statutory footing, but with political control of Kent Thameside split between three local 
authorities, it would fulfil the pressing political and commercial need for an overarching 
strategic framework for the area. As Hull states; 
“It points to the importance of the partnership approach in the process of area 
regeneration. Although partnerships have no executive power they can bring people 
with various resources together. So in this case Blue Circle bring money, land and 
government influence, KCC bring highways and planning powers and the districts 
local planning permit responsibilities” (Hull, 1998, 332). 
It was an attempt to reinvent the planning process to make it relevant to a new paradigm in 
which local authorities and private enterprise were the co-authors of regeneration. It is also a 
strong illustration of the fluid, multi-level, networked neo-liberal governance described by 
Jessop (1990). As much a business case for development as it was a strategic framework; it 
was designed to sell the Kent Thameside vision to investors and to the local community. It 
shows a blurring of the boundaries between the local authority - the regulator of 
development -and the commercially driven private developer. The commercial imperative to 
publish in quick time, one shared by all the Kent Thameside partners, led a reversal of the 
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usual local plan consultation process: instead of consulting first and spending time 
establishing a consensus view, the partners’ final vision was presented to the community 
who were then encouraged to buy in to it.  
The vision itself, ‘Looking to the Future’, envisaged the creation of over 30,000 new homes 
and 50,000 new jobs on brownfield sites around Bluewater and Ebbsfleet (Kent Thameside 
Association, 1995). In line with the government’s new Strategy for Sustainable Development 
(DoE, 1994) these new communities would “embody the principles of sustainability” while the 
“utmost importance” would be attached to “protecting the identity of existing communities 
and ensuring that existing residents benefit directly from the Kent Thameside initiative”. The 
new communities would also be planned with “the use of public transport in mind” with the 
community infrastructure located locally in order to “minimise the need to travel”.  
David Lock (2010) subsequently described the Kent Thameside Vision as “a unique exercise 
in British town planning”. He claimed that its focus on “mixed use, public transport-orientated 
development on brownfield land” - principles that have “become an established part of 
national planning policy and the cornerstone of the move towards sustainable development” 
- was highly innovative for its time. Yet Lucas (1998, 211) felt that Kent Thameside would 
find it hard to deliver a shift towards more sustainable transport. While Dartford took public 
transport “very seriously” - opting for higher densities on new developments to make them 
attractive to public transport providers and supporting the development of a tram system - 
Lucas found Kent less supportive. Kent believed that the development intensity in Kent 
Thameside was insufficient to justify new public transport projects and felt that neither the 
government nor private finance would be willing to fund them. In Kent’s view, it was the road 
network, which had still had spare capacity, which would absorb most of the traffic generated 
by development. In short, she felt it would difficult to translate the “rhetoric of support for 
public transport improvements in the Thames Gateway” into action.  
Nonetheless, the Kent Thameside Association (1997) was optimistic about the future. By 
1997 construction of Bluewater was underway; Blue Circle had submitted a development 
application for Ebbsfleet; and the government had struck a deal with London and Continental 
Railways to build and operate the new Channel Tunnel Rail Link. The Association was also 
working on a ‘community involvement strategy’ aimed at ensuring that existing residents 
were “able to become more closely involved in the Kent Thameside initiative”. However, one 
key question remained unresolved, namely, how would Kent Thameside fare after the 
forthcoming General Election which the Labour Party, out of power for almost twenty years, 
was widely expected to win. In the next section, we will find out. 
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4.5 The Thames Gateway under New Labour and the Third Way 1997-2000 
The profound re-shaping of the British political landscape that took place in May 1997 was 
nowhere more apparent than in the Thames Gateway. The Thameside seats of Kent and 
Essex, which had been Conservative for a generation, opted decisively for Tony Blair’s New 
Labour project. The tide in Blair’s favour was so strong that by the morning of 2 May, the 
entire Thames Gateway, every constituency from Tower Hamlets to Dartford, the Medway 
Towns and Swale, was in Labour hands. But while the Thames Gateway was evidently 
ready for New Labour, it remained to be seen whether New Labour was ready to engage 
with the Thames Gateway project.  
The local authorities in Kent Thameside, eager to keep their regeneration plans alive, 
insisted that their vision for the area was consistent with the new policy agenda. Labour’s 
promise of new political discourse a third way between the neo-liberal, market focused 
mantras of the right and the dirigiste welfare state of the old left (Giddens,1998), was well 
suited to Kent Thameside, they claimed. It was the ideal location to embed this new 
discourse and to establish “a blueprint for the nation” (Dartford Borough Council, The 
Thameside Local Authorities Team, Travers, Kleinman, 1998).  
“Among the government’s key priorities are job creation and the welfare to work 
programme, environmentally friendly development, an integrated transport policy, 
quality lifelong learning and a new house building programme focused on brownfield 
sites. The regeneration programme underway in Kent Thameside provides the 
government with an ideal opportunity to meet these policy objectives in the South 
east and to act as a blueprint for the nation.” 
The plea to Ministers was motivated by a pressing need for new funding to meet existing 
“service demand pressures” and to provide the social infrastructure needed to achieve “a 
balanced community”. Yet with Blair and his Chancellor Gordon Brown still wedded firmly to 
the Conservatives’ modest spending plans there were limited resources available for the 
Thames Gateway. Under Blair (1997), just as it was under Major, “the economic prosperity 
on which everything else turns” relied, not on an expansionist state, but on the existence of 
an open, well functioning, deregulated market and a fiscal environment that was conducive 
to business. Regeneration in the Thames Gateway would continue to depend primarily on 
“attracting jobs and inward investment through partnerships with business” (Blair, 1997).   
Nonetheless, there were important differences between the governments. Deeply concerned 
about rising inequality, Labour ministers had promised to place ‘social justice’ at the heart of 
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their policy agenda. An overriding priority for the government would be to address the 
causes of deprivation in an effort to deliver genuine equality of opportunity for all. Labour 
believed that this would be attained by creating a more inclusive and engaged citizenry, with 
individuals empowered to take responsibility for their own economic destiny through the 
support of an enabling state (Giddens, 1998, 65). Blair sought to replace the individualism of 
the 1980s with a more communitarian ethos that was predicated on balancing one’s 
individual rights with one’s civic and personal responsibilities: rights were no longer to be 
automatic; they had to be earned (Johnstone, Whitehead, 2004). 
Labour’s communitarian impulse led to a renewed policy interest in neighbourhood 
regeneration. Under the Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy, intensive, multi-agency 
programmes aimed at tackling the barriers to education, skills development and employment 
and other ‘neighbourhood effects’ that entrenched social exclusion were targeted at the 
country’s most deprived neighbourhoods (Atkinson, Kintrea, 2002). “Nobody should be 
disadvantaged by the area in which they live”; the government’s new Social Exclusion Unit 
insisted (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001a, 75). This was complemented by a focus on reducing 
welfare dependency and getting people into work. Initiatives such as the New Deal and the 
tax credit system were the key, Ministers argued, to the creation of active, empowered 
citizens.  
Labour’s belief in the importance of community empowerment also led to a greater emphasis 
on involving residents in regeneration. Whereas the Major government had attempted to 
engage the community in the Single Regeneration Budget programme, but rarely 
succeeded, Labour insisted that the community needed to be involved in its flagship New 
Deal for Communities programme from the outset. Under this programme, it was local 
residents, not civil servants, who were charged with identifying the key regeneration 
challenges. Partnership working was also encouraged: firstly to ensure joint working 
between public sector and community partners; and secondly to try and lever in additional 
resources (Fordham, GFA Associates, CRESR, 2010). Under Labour, “urban renewal (was) 
no longer seen as something that is done to communities but a process with which members 
of the community have a duty to actively engage” (Johnstone, Whitehead, 2004, 10).  
Ministers were also concerned about the quality of urban life – particularly in view of the 
progressive decline in the numbers of people able or willing to live in England’s urban 
centres. Avoiding the ‘doughnut effect’ seen in US cities, with affluent and expanding 
suburbs surrounding declining urban cores, was a priority for the government. This led the 
Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, to set up the Urban Task Force in 1998 under the 
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chairmanship of Richard Rogers. The Urban Task Force (1999) was charged with 
“identifying the causes of urban decline in England and recommending practical solutions to 
bring people back to our cities, towns and urban neighbourhoods”.  
Prescott was also determined to deliver an ‘integrated transport policy’ that promoted 
sustainable travel and ensured that the different tiers of government and transport modes 
operated in unison. Having urged the public to judge him against the pledge that “within five 
years more people will be using public transport and driving their cars less” (Schoon, 
Laurance, 1997), he then published a White Paper (DETR, 1998a) that set out plans to allow 
congestion charging in cities, tax workplace parking and road charging. According to Hine 
and Preston (2003) it was indicative of a new faith in land use planning as a transport 
demand management tool and a more holistic approach to public transport focused on 
creating a seamless, door to door passenger experience.  
Kent Thameside’s new integrated land use and transport planning framework, published a 
few months after the White Paper, reflected this new approach. It rejected the roads 
dominated ‘predict and provide’ transport planning model in favour of a planned shift from 
private to public modes of transport underpinned by carefully planned public transport 
orientated developments (Kent Thameside Association, 1999). 
This vision of a development landscape geared around the needs of public transport was 
heavily influenced by Urban Task Force (1999). Their report, Towards an Urban 
Renaissance, called for “well designed, compact and connected cities supporting a diverse 
range of uses – where people live, work and enjoy leisure time at close quarters”. It was 
followed by Delivering an Urban Renaissance; the first government white paper on urban 
policy since the 1970s (DETR, 2000a). Both concluded that mixed tenure, high density 
developments located in compact centres with a mixture of uses and a strong public 
transport system would provide the quality of life necessary to draw people back into the 
country’s urban centres. Better connections between key employment zones, city centres 
and poorer areas would also help to tackle social exclusion (Rogers, Power, 2000; Power, 
Houghton, 2007).  
The call for more compact urban areas was enthusiastically endorsed by the Council for the 
Protection of Rural England. “Urban renewal has to be the dominant paradigm,” it claimed: 
“Protecting the countryside whilst renewing towns and cities is both “modern and 
progressive” (Building Design, 2000). Yet, there were also dissenters. Peter Hall, a member 
of the Urban Task Force, but also a fierce opponent of ‘urban cramming’, added his own 
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footnote to the Task Force’s report stating that there “is no overriding need to save 
Greenfield land, of which we have a surplus in South East England” (Urban Task Force, 
2005). He argued that densification would lead to an increase in apartment construction 
which would be “unsuitable for families and undesired by residents”.  
The government was unmoved by these concerns. Embroiled in a heated political debate 
about the number of new houses required in the South east, it needed a way of delivering 
extra housing whilst keeping the Home Counties’ green fields intact. The Urban Task Force’s 
densification agenda offered Ministers a way to achieve both. Prescott duly called for more 
mixed use, high density developments in urban locations with good public transport and 
announced an increase in the brownfield development target from 50 to 60 per cent of new 
housing (DETR, 2000c). A sequential test whereby green field sites would only be used after 
all available brownfield alternatives had been exhausted was also introduced.  
As we will see in the next section, The Thames Gateway, with its acres of redundant 
brownfield sites close to the capital, offered Prescott an obvious opportunity to implement his 
new vision. 
4.6 Accelerating growth in the Thames Gateway under Labour 2000-2003 
In March 2000, John Prescott confirmed the government’s commitment to the Thames 
Gateway “as a hub for development and regeneration” while announcing the new house 
building target for the South east. More houses would be built in the South east, but by 
concentrating development in an expanded Thames Gateway it would be possible to 
“conserve Greenfield land” while satisfying the growing demand for urban housing – 
particularly among “single people, low-income families and key workers” (HC Deb, 2000). It 
was enough to neutralise some of the media opposition to housing growth in the South east. 
The Evening Standard, usually one of Prescott’s most caustic critics, concluded that the 
announcement struck the “right balance” between “homes and fields” (Moore, 2000).  
The Channel Tunnel Rail Link, which Prescott had rescued by releasing £1.6 billion of 
government backed bonds to pay for its construction, provided the government with an 
added incentive to press ahead with the Gateway’s regeneration. Having talked up the link’s 
role “in regenerating north Kent and the east Thames corridor” in order to justify its bail out, 
Prescott was keen to see progress made (HC Deb, 1998). At the link’s ground-breaking 
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ceremony, he revealed that he wouldn’t be ‘calling in’ Blue Circle’s planning application for 
Ebbsfleet. This would ensure that it could be progressed “without delay” (DETR, 1998b)1.  
However, delivery in the Gateway was proving to be slower than the government had hoped. 
Roger Tym and Partners’ (2001) review of the Thames Gateway Planning Framework 
concluded that delivery was being hindered by the absence of a single accountable Gateway 
wide body. It also found that development in the Gateway was running significantly below 
that in central and west London. Future progress would depend heavily, Tym stated, on the 
provision of key transport projects such as phase two of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link. The 
report also warned that the community infrastructure required to meet “the needs and 
aspirations of existing communities” would be hard to secure through planning gain alone. 
This warning was echoed in the North Kent Area Investment Framework which calculated 
that the additional net contribution required from the public sector to “ensure existing 
residents benefit fully from the change” would be £4.3 billion over twenty years (Thames 
Gateway Kent Partnership, 2002). Without this funding, the Framework concluded, it would 
hard to deliver the housing growth anticipated in North Kent. 
Eventually, Prescott, under pressure to tackle rising house prices, decided that urgent steps 
were needed to unblock housing delivery. In July 2002, he admitted to MPs that his target of 
39,000 new homes a year for the South east “simply wasn’t being met” (HC Deb, 2002). This 
shortage of housing was “causing record housing costs”, he said, and making it more difficult 
for companies to “recruit and retain staff “and for “young people to get on the housing 
ladder”. The answer, Prescott claimed, was to “accelerate existing proposals for significant 
growth in the Thames Gateway” and other growth areas. There would be a “renewed 
emphasis on delivery” in the Gateway and new means established for delivering “rapid 
regeneration”. It appeared that time had been called on the gradualist model of delivery of 
the Thames Gateway Planning Framework, which had eschewed fixed targets and left it to 
local partnerships to decide when it was appropriate to bring forward key developments.  
The promised ‘step change’ in housing delivery was unveiled in February 2003 in 
‘Sustainable Communities: Building for the Future’ (ODPM, 2003a). Two months later, the 
economist, Kate Barker, was commissioned by the government to conduct a review of 
housing supply in the UK and to identify ways of improving the responsiveness of the 
housing market. 
                                                             
1
 Phase one of the CTRL from Folkestone to Ebbsfleet opened in 2003. Until the opening of phase 
two from Ebbsfleet to St Pancras in 2007, trains joined the existing rail network at Ebbsfleet and 
terminated at Waterloo.  
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The Communities Plan included a commitment to provide an extra 120,000 homes in the 
Thames Gateway by 2016. The delivery of this target would be overseen in each sub-region 
of the Gateway by new delivery vehicles. Local partners would be able to choose between 
‘non-statutory partnerships’, ‘urban regeneration companies’ and ‘new style local 
development bodies’ equipped with development corporation powers. Prescott also 
announced a £446 million fund to support the delivery of land remediation, affordable 
housing and community infrastructure: a fund David Curry had been unable to offer in 1995.  
The new homes in the Gateway would be created in ‘sustainable communities’ and would be 
built according to the design principles set out by the Urban Task Force and the Urban White 
Paper. They would have a “well integrated mix of decent homes of different types and 
tenures” and would be of “sufficient size, scale and density to support basic amenities in the 
neighbourhood and minimise the use of resources”. Residents would also be able to 
participate in the “planning, design and long-term stewardship of their community”. However, 
their sustainability would depend on the presence of a “flourishing local economy” to provide 
jobs and “strong leadership” capable of reacting quickly to changes in the market.  
Fundamental to the success of this vision was investment in the Gateway’s transport 
infrastructure (Llewelyn Davies, Steer Davies Gleave, Roger Tym & Partners, Atkins, 2003). 
If the Gateway was to become a competitive location for development, it needed high quality 
regional and local transport. The Channel Tunnel Rail Link was needed to provide the 
‘strategic spine’, allowing ‘contra-commuting’ from London to hubs such as Stratford and 
Ebbsfleet. The Crossrail network would then provide ‘the vertebrae’ linking intermediate 
locations, while local transit schemes, such as Docklands Light Railway extensions and 
Fastrack in Kent Thameside, would enable “efficient local circulation”. Other schemes such 
the Thames Gateway Bridge between Beckton and Thamesmead would strengthen cross 
river relationships and increase access to job and commercial opportunities. The report saw 
Fastrack as an immediate priority given that Ebbsfleet International Station was due to open 
in 2007. 
For Buck et al (2005) the government’s Communities Plan was an expression of the ‘new 
conventional wisdom’ which dictates that communities must be well governed, socially 
inclusive and economically competitive in order to succeed. In these sustainable 
communities, according to Raco (2005a), the competing pressures of the market and civil 
society are reconciled by New Labour’s active citizenry whose stewardship role is intended 
to steer the development process in ways that are mutually beneficial for both residents and 
investors. However, some commentators argued that the Communities Plan was no more 
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than a neo-liberal adaptation to a new economic climate in which supply side failures - such 
as a shortage of affordable housing and public transport services - were affecting the 
competitiveness of London’s economy (Peck, Tickell, 2002;  De Angelis, 2008). 
Brownill and Carpenter (2009, 266), meanwhile, have highlighted a tension in the 
government’s attempt to marry economic competitiveness with a social inclusion agenda in 
the Communities Plan. They have questioned the compatibility of the “low skills equilibrium” 
in the Gateway with the drive to create high skill jobs in knowledge intensive industries. 
There is an inconsistency, they conclude, between this high skills agenda and the desire to 
create new jobs which “will provide local residents with more choice as to where they work 
and live”. While investment in the skills base of existing residents will help to narrow this 
skills gap, a degree of commuting, both in and out of the Thames Gateway will be inevitable; 
undermining the goal of creating communities of people who live and work in the same area.  
Power et al (2004, 36), on the other hand, felt that the high environmental and infrastructural 
cost of building large new communities from scratch was hard to justify: A far better 
approach, they believed, would be to work out from existing centres with established 
infrastructures. By concentrating on renovating existing housing and creating new housing 
on small, redundant town centre sites, it would be possible to deliver extra capacity “more 
cheaply, more quickly and more sensitively”, whilst also benefitting existing communities.   
The political response to the Communities Plan also focused on the infrastructural costs of 
development. The House of Commons Housing, Planning and Local Government Select 
Committee (2003) concluded that although it was an “opportunity to develop good practice in 
building high density neighbourhoods” the costs of implementation were likely to be 
prohibitive. Only a fraction of the Gateway’s infrastructure needs would be met by the £446 
million fund allocated by the government. The House of Commons Environmental Audit 
Select Committee (2005) and the South East County Council Leaders Committee (Roger 
Tym and Partners, 2004) echoed these conclusions: both expressed concern as to whether 
the infrastructure of the South east could accommodate the extra houses proposed in the 
Communities Plan.  
Kent Thameside’s development plans, however, were largely unaffected by the Sustainable 
Communities Plan. A brownfield regeneration plan had been in place for a decade and there 
was limited scope to extend it. Moreover, the Kent Thameside Association was already 
pursuing a regeneration model that reflected the plan’s key principles. ‘Looking to an 
Integrated Future’ promised sustainable developments aligned along public transport 
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corridors with high residential densities of 90 units per hectare in the 200 metre zone either 
side of the route (Kent Thameside Association, 1999). These developments would be served 
by a dedicated lane rapid bus system with the flexibility to expand as the pace of 
development and passenger numbers increased. 
Concerted efforts to ensure that existing residents were able to extract the maximum gain 
from regeneration were also being made. Indeed, the government’s Thames Gateway 
Evidence Review described Kent Thameside as one of the few areas in the Gateway where 
“social regeneration is being considered as seriously as physical regeneration”  (Oxford 
Brookes University, 2006). Their efforts were underpinned by an £18 million European Union 
funded six year regeneration programme aimed ‘achieving social inclusion’ in Kent 
Thameside’s existing communities. This was followed in 2003 by a Community Strategy 
which identified a series of ‘priority communities’ that were facing “particular economic, 
social or environmental issues that make it difficult for them to share in the new opportunities 
regeneration will bring” (Kent Thameside Local Strategic Partnership 2003). A 
neighbourhood renewal action plan, modelled on the targeted, multi agency approach 
adopted by Labour’s Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy, was also implemented in 
Swanscombe, one of Kent Thameside’s ‘priority communities’ (Dartford Borough Council, 
2003g). 
Nevertheless, the government was keen to see the pace of delivery stepped up in Kent 
Thameside. Work had begun on only two of the key Kent Thameside brownfield sites, 
Waterstone Park and Ingress Park, and many developments, including Eastern Quarry, were 
still at the planning stage. According to a Dartford Borough Council director interviewed for 
this study the “panic on housing policy” at national level was so acute that “accelerating the 
rate of housing development” had become the dominant theme in all discussions between 
the Council and the government. Other key regeneration objectives, such as the goal of 
establishing Ebbsfleet as a major economic hub in the Thames Gateway, were “obscured”, 
he said, by the imperative to create more houses.   
It was for this reason that the Kent Thameside Delivery Board was established in 2003. One 
of the ‘non-statutory partnerships’ envisaged in the Communities Plan, the Delivery Board 
brought together the key public and private partners involved in Kent Thameside. In contrast 
to the Kent Thameside Association, the Board was run by a full-time Chief Executive and a 
team of civil servants and financed directly by the £446 million Communities Plan fund. Its 
function was to co-ordinate the delivery of key housing developments; lead on the 
implementation of Fastrack; promote the Kent Thameside ‘brand’ and co-ordinate efforts to 
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improve its physical environment. One of the board’s first actions was to produce the Kent 
Thameside Regeneration Framework (Kent Thameside Delivery Board, 2005). This provided 
a formal expression of the key regeneration objectives that the members of the Kent 
Thameside Association had identified over the previous decade. 
The delivery board was not the first choice of the Kent Thameside partners. They would 
have preferred “a looser arrangement” led by the local authorities akin to the existing Kent 
Thameside Association. However, it became apparent to the Leader of Dartford Council at 
the time, who was interviewed for this study, that “the government neither trusted us nor 
thought that we had the right abilities to do it ourselves”. The option of a development 
corporation was also ruled out, as Kent Thameside, unlike Thurrock, had no need for an 
agency with the powers to assemble land and prepare it for development.  
The delivery board emerged as a compromise choice: it had no obvious champion among 
the local regeneration partners, but it was the most palatable option available. Unfortunately 
for the board this lack of local support constrained its effectiveness as an organisation. With 
the local authorities “unwilling to devolve powers to it or to give it teeth”, according to a 
Dartford Borough Council Director, who was interviewed for this study, the board struggled 
“to work out what its role was” or to “find meaningful work to do”. The board and the local 
authorities found it difficult to co-ordinate their efforts to prevent the duplication of work in 
areas where they had overlapping responsibilities. As a result the board struggled to build up 
political capital or to establish a distinctive identity for itself.  
4.7 The governance and delivery of the Thames Gateway after the launch of the 
 Sustainable Communities Plan 2003-2008 
The delivery and governance arrangements established in the Gateway by new Labour have 
been the subject of considerable criticism. After the introduction of the new tier of local 
development vehicles in 2003, there were over fifty agencies with a direct interest in 
regeneration operating at various spatial levels in the Thames Gateway. For Ministers the 
complexity of the delivery landscape in the Gateway was a strength. David Miliband (2005), 
the Local Government Minister, insisted that “a complex set of projects” required a flexible 
approach that allowed each sub-area of the Gateway to select a delivery mechanism 
appropriate to its needs and objectives. It was “network governance” that allowed “horizontal 
as well as vertical linkages” that was necessary rather than a top-down, “one size fits all” 
strategy.  
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Allmendinger and Haughton (2009, 629) saw merits in Miliband’s argument. They felt that 
the “complex, multilayered, fluid and sometimes fuzzy scales of policy and governance 
arrangements” in the Gateway, a place where “almost everyone is busily co-ordinating with 
others” provided opportunities for creativity, innovation and consensus building. However, 
Richard Rogers complained that “the plethora of overlapping, but differently funded and 
monitored, regeneration bodies” in the Gateway had resulted in “fragmented decision-
making and institutions which lack coherent area-based delivery mechanisms” (Urban Task 
Force, 2005). Hornagold and Hills (2007) also found that regeneration practitioners were 
confused by delivery the arrangements and frustrated by the apparent lack of clear 
overarching strategy from central government.  
Brownill and Carpenter (2009, 262), meanwhile, detected “an uneasy tension between 
different scales of governance” and concluded that “arrangements for ‘governmentality’ have 
not been working in the Gateway”. Each sub-region, they noted, had developed similar 
economic growth strategies - usually based on attracting financial, environmental, transport, 
leisure and advanced engineering businesses to their area - and were competing against 
each other for investment. They also pointed out that Stratford, the 2012 Olympics venue, 
had received a disproportionate share of central resources and political attention after 
London was chosen as the Olympic city.   
Another area of concern raised by the House of Commons Public Accounts Select 
Committee (2007) and the National Audit Office (2007) was the DCLG’s capacity to lead the 
Thames Gateway project. A small department with limited Cabinet influence, the DCLG was 
seen to be in weak position to ensure that the Thames Gateway was treated as a cross-
government priority. The Public Accounts Committee found that major developments were 
being “delayed due to a lack of joined-up infrastructure investment”. The Eastern Quarry 
development in Kent Thameside, it noted - a key development in the Gateway - had been 
suspended owing to the Highways Agency’s refusal to give its consent to the development 
until new investment in the road network was secured.  
In Keith’s (2008, 61) view, the DCLG’s difficulties in securing infrastructural investment in the 
Gateway were exacerbated by a misconceived development time-scale. The problem, or the 
‘gateway paradox’ as he described it, was that the housing growth targets set out in the 
Communities Plan were “too high over the short-term but too low over the long-term”. An 
“over-ambitious” development target in the short-term demanded a level of infrastructural 
investment that Ministers found hard to justify. Yet the more modest long-term Gateway 
growth targets, which demanded less from the public sector, were equally unattractive to the 
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Treasury as it made investment “fiscally wasteful and economically sub-optimal”: physical 
infrastructure became more expensive because of the “higher per capita costs for each 
public sector infrastructure decision”. A more prudent strategy, Keith believed, would have 
been to increase the Gateway’s growth targets but to phase in development over a much 
longer period. Not only would this have strengthened the case for public sector investment 
but it would also have ensured that the necessary infrastructure was delivered as new 
businesses and residents arrived, instead of many years later.  
The absence of a long-term programme of public sector investment beyond the £446 million 
Communities Plan Fund was also deterring private sector investment. Even in 2005, with 
“property markets becoming hotter”, Regeneration and Renewal reported the failure of a 
private sector investment capital fund for the Gateway due to a lack of interest. According to 
the House Builders Federation (Walker, 2005): 
“The problem lies in whether or not the potential will turn into a realistic business 
proposition. There is still no indication as to how much the government is prepared to 
invest in the required infrastructure to make the Gateway an attractive and viable site 
for sustainable communities. Nobody is going to take on a loss making project.”  
While the non-delivery of key developments due to infrastructure delay was becoming a 
concern for Ministers, an equal if not greater problem was the quality of the developments 
that were being delivered. The National Audit Office report (2007) found that although there 
were some good developments in the Gateway, such as Greenwich Millennium Village and 
St Mary’s Island in Chatham, many fell short of the standards set out by government. 
CABE’s Chief Executive, Richard Simmons, was more vehement still: design quality in the 
Gateway needed to improve dramatically, “if the Thames Gateway is to avoid becoming an 
urban wasteland of badly-designed housing estates and public spaces” (Simmons, 2007). 
The media was also highly critical:  
“The Thames Gateway is a tragic fiction of a non-place ...the dumping ground of 
crass new housing for poor people.” (Glancey, 2006) 
 “Inside Prescottgrad there are Barrack-like homes, no local shops, schools, 
playgrounds - not even a post-box.” (Gilligan, 2006) 
In response to this criticism, Ministers appointed a Thames Gateway ‘Tsar’, Judith Armitt, in 
2006 to give the project renewed momentum and leadership. A cross Governance board and 
integrated funding streams were also established to provide a coherent decision making 
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mechanism at national level. In addition, a strategic framework for the Gateway with key 
regeneration objectives and outcomes was launched in 2007 to provide an overarching 
‘vision’ (DCLG, 2007). The framework was supported in the 2007 Comprehensive Spending 
Review by a £600 million package for transport and infrastructure improvements. However, 
Ministers made no move to streamline the Gateway’s network of delivery agencies or to 
review the decentred, network based delivery system.   
The government’s other significant move was to appoint the architect, Terry Farrell, as their 
Thames Gateway Parklands Design Champion. After publishing a Thames Gateway 
Parkland Vision (Farrell, 2008), Farrell was commissioned to ‘refresh’ the government’s 
overall Thames Gateway Vision (Farrell, 2008, 2009a, 2009b)). These vision statements 
imagine the Gateway as an ‘eco-region’ capable of acting as an exemplar in sustainable 
living. His appointment was a recognition by Ministers that the negative perceptions of the 
Gateway had to be reversed if businesses and prospective residents were to be persuaded 
to invest in the Gateway.  
Farrell’s vision was supported by Ministers but they lacked the resources to implement it. A 
£35 million package of measures was announced, including the establishment of an Institute 
for Sustainability, but in Chaplin and Nicolaou’s opinion (2010, 233), it was a “weak offer” 
that was “woefully inadequate” for the task in hand. It failed to address the cost of 
assembling the land necessary to deliver the Parklands Vision or to set out any “sticks or 
sanctions” aimed at persuading developers, local authorities to take action. It was typical of 
the constrained climate in which the government had to operate in the wake of the banking 
crisis and the credit crunch. For the Gateway, it was a sign of things to come.  
4.8 After the credit crunch: The Thames Gateway in an era of fiscal austerity 
 2008-2013 
In 2006 Ministers had felt confident enough, with the economy booming, to raise the housing 
delivery target in the Gateway from 120,000 to 160,000 homes by 2016 (DCLG, 2006b). Yet 
by the end of the Labour government Ministers had become far more cautious: In the view of 
Shahid Malik, Labour’s last Thames Gateway Minister; 
“We cannot ignore the challenges of the economic recession and must be prepared 
to think innovatively about how the Thames Gateway vision can best be achieved in 
the years ahead... the Thames Gateway could be thought of as a 70-year journey, 
which we are but a fraction of the way through.” (Malik, 2009) 
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Unfortunately for Kent Thameside the opening of the new station at Ebbsfleet in late 2007 
coincided with the start of the financial crisis. Ebbsfleet’s developer, Land Securities (2009), 
which had invested over £100 million in the site after acquiring it in 2001, was badly affected 
by the credit crunch. By 2009, the company had effectively suspended work on the site. 
Having pledged to fund highways improvements of £40 million in 2007 so that it could begin 
construction in Eastern Quarry, Land Securities now described the development as a 25 
year project that would be rolled out gradually (Estates Gazette, 2010). As a result none of 
the promised homes or offices at Ebbsfleet had been started when the first services into St 
Pancras got underway.  
Elsewhere in the Gateway, a series of transport projects were abandoned. In 2008 the 
Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, scrapped the £70 million DLR link from Beckton to Barking 
and Dagenham along with the £450 million Thames Gateway Bridge plan.  
Hopes that public sector investment could help to ‘kick-start’ development in Kent 
Thameside were encouraged by the DCLG’s decision in early 2010 to inject £23 million into 
the Kent Thameside Strategic Transport Programme. However, such hopes proved short-
lived. After the new coalition government came to power in May 2010, the DCLG’s 
contribution was immediately suspended (HM Treasury, 2010).  All central funding for 
Thames Gateway programmes was then cancelled in the subsequent Comprehensive 
Spending Review. The loss of this funding, which had been the primary source of support for 
most of the Gateway’s local delivery vehicles, proved terminal for the Kent Thameside 
Regeneration Partnership, as the Delivery Board had been re-named. The partnership was 
wound up in April 2011 after failing to identify any replacement funding from the local 
authorities or developers in Kent Thameside.  
The demise of the local delivery vehicles and many of the other regional and sub-regional 
partnerships and agencies created in the Gateway under Labour had been signalled prior to 
the election when David Cameron vowed to roll back “the growth of the quango state” 
(Cameron, 2009). The new Thames Gateway Minister, Bob Neill, confirmed the 
government’s determination to curb the influence of central government and encourage 
localism: 
“We do believe the best way forward is to hand over the reins to local people. 
Decisions about the Thames Gateway shouldn't be taken in Whitehall. They should 
be taken in the area, by the people who know the area.” (Neill, 2010) 
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The ‘glue’, Neill said, would be the new Thames Gateway Strategic Group, composed of 
local authority and business leaders. The Group would replace “the plethora of bodies we’ve 
had up to now.” Neill made it clear that the government wouldn’t be “issuing more blueprints 
from Whitehall (or) setting targets” for the Gateway. The target driven culture supported by 
direct grants from Whitehall would be replaced by an incentives based system that rewarded 
local authorities for success in attracting investment and overseeing economic and housing 
growth.  
 Local Enterprise Partnerships for Kent, Essex and East Sussex and the London Thames 
Gateway were also created to provide business and civic leaders with a forum to promote 
private sector growth (BIS, 2010). Local authorities would also be able to finance capital 
projects by borrowing against their future tax revenues through ‘Tax Increment Financing’ 
vehicles. Under this model, local authorities or other agencies would be allowed to raise 
money upfront for infrastructure projects by offering investors a share of the extra business 
rates generated by new development. 
The Conservative controlled Kent County Council welcomed the new agenda with its 
“pragmatic localist solutions” (Carter, 2010). But ultimately the experiment with localism was 
short-lived. Local authorities proved unable to find local solutions to the development 
impasse and in the summer of 2012 Ministers intervened once again in a bid to unlock 
development. Amid growing criticism of its failure at national level “to invest for growth” 
(Eaton, 2012), the government announced a new infrastructure deal to enable a limited 
amount of development to take place in Eastern Quarry. As well as agreeing to bring forward 
improvements to key road junctions, Ministers announced that Land Securities’ upfront 
contribution to the revived Strategic Transport Programme was to be cut from £40 million to 
£25 million. In return the company made a commitment to deliver 1,500 new homes in 
Eastern Quarry by 2020 (DCLG, 2012). It was solution, a government spokesman claimed, 
that was made possible because of Ministers’ preparedness “to bang heads together” at 
local level (Walmsley, 2012).  
News in Autumn 2012 that a private developer was in negotiations to build ‘Paramount 
World’, a £2 billion theme park on Swanscombe Peninsula, provided local regeneration 
partners with some further cause for optimism (Peck, 2012). Whether these announcements 
represent a watershed moment in the history of Kent Thameside, or another false dawn, 
remains to be seen.  
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4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the evolution of the Kent Thameside and wider Thames Gateway 
regeneration policy agenda over the last thirty years. It has found that while the scale and 
pace of delivery demanded by Ministers has fluctuated in line with the economy, the same 
concerns about the adequacy of the infrastructure and social regeneration programmes 
planned for the Gateway have been consistently articulated. Even when government 
spending and private investment in the Gateway were at their peak in the years following the 
launch of the Sustainable Communities Plan, commentators were sceptical as to whether 
the scale of the resources available matched the scale of Ministers’ ambitions for the area.  
The Thames Gateway has been seen by Ministers as an opportunity to provide London with 
the homes and workers it needs to sustain its status as a global city. It has also been 
viewed, however, as a means to deliver the homes, jobs, skills and services needed to 
regenerate the South east’s most deprived region and as a potential exemplar of sustainable 
development. Yet few commentators have been convinced that the property led 
development model followed since the Thames Gateway first emerged is capable of meeting 
such a demanding, and at times contradictory set of objectives. While there have been some 
undoubted successes, such as the creation of a high speed rail link and the 2012 Olympic 
developments at Stratford, many of the Gateway’s key brownfield regeneration sites remain 
mired in a morass of intractable planning, financial and infrastructural problems. The 
Gateway has also been hampered by the lack of a clear, consistent development vision or 
identity. A physically, socially and economically heterogeneous region with no obvious 
centre, the Gateway has proven to be a difficult entity to define. It also boasts few obvious 
regeneration success stories or iconic developments capable of stoking the interest of a 
sceptical media and public.  
This chapter has also explored the way in which the governance of Kent Thameside and the 
wider Thames Gateway has evolved over the years and looked at the interaction between 
competing local, regional and national policy priorities. Inevitably, one finds that in many 
cases the local policy discourse has been shaped by national priorities while local 
preferences have had to be put to one side in order to accommodate the wishes of national 
politicians. Westminster’s pressing political need in the mid 2000s to accelerate housing 
delivery in the Gateway, for example, led to the marginalisation of Kent Thameside’s social 
regeneration plans and its commercial development goals for Ebbsfleet. In this sense 
Turok’s (2009) observation that the government’s regeneration plans for the Gateway have 
often obscured local regeneration priorities holds true.  
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Yet, this chapter has also found examples of circumstances in which local regeneration 
partners have succeeded in influencing national policy on the Thames Gateway. In the mid 
1990s the Kent Thameside Association used its political connections and resources to 
influence the shape of the Thames Gateway Planning Framework and to ensure that 
Ebbsfleet was selected as the location of the new international station on the channel tunnel 
rail link. One finds at this point a blurring of traditional boundaries between the public and 
private sector and local and national government with Blue Circle instrumental in driving 
forward Kent Thameside’s regeneration policy and a key Ministerial adviser employed by 
local regeneration partners to define the shape and form of Kent Thameside’s new 
developments. It is a potent example of the fluid, multi-level and multi-partner neo-liberal 
governance described by Jessop (1990).  
However, the most notable characteristic of the governance of the Thames Gateway, and 
certainly the one which has attracted the most comment, is its complexity and fluidity. This 
had made it difficult to provide the consistent, co-ordinated regeneration vision that the 
Gateway requires (NAO, 2007). The plethora of overlapping delivery agencies created in the 
aftermath of the Communities Plan in 2003 led to confusion and strategic uncertainty within 
the Gateway. Yet the decision of the coalition government in 2010 to sweep away the 
different tiers of governance and abolish local delivery agencies has created a policy 
vacuum in Gateway and made it difficult to co-ordinate delivery across local authority 
boundaries. This governance quandary has stymied the Thames Gateway regeneration 
agenda and reduced confidence in its delivery potential.  
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Chapter 5 Mapping the Communities 
 
5.1  Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the key social, economic and spatial 
characteristics of the three existing communities and the two new developments examined in 
this study, Swanscombe, Knockhall, Horns Cross, Ingress Park and Waterstone Park (see 
Map 5.1).  
Map 5.1     Swanscombe, Knockhall, Horns Cross, Ingress Park and Waterstone Park 
 
          Source: Bryan Jones (2014) 
Using data from the UK Census (ONS, 2011, 2001; OPCS, 1991, 1981, 1971) this chapter 
will examine the ways in which the existing communities have changed over the last forty 
years following the decline of Kent Thameside’s traditional industries. It will highlight the 
growing occupational, class and ethnic heterogeneity of the three communities and examine 
the impact this has had on their housing stock, environment and infrastructure. However, it 
will also draw attention to the social and economic legacy of the three communities’ 
industrial past. While the cement and paper mills of Kent Thameside have long since gone, 
traces of an economy that was once dominated by semi and unskilled manual occupations 
can still be found in Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross. The spatial character of 
Ingress Park and Waterstone Park and the types of people who have moved into these 
communities will also be considered in this chapter. 
This chapter will begin with a discussion of Kent Thameside’s industrial past and its impact 
on the communities examined in this study. It will then move on to examine the social, 
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economic and spatial character of each of the five existing and new communities before 
concluding with a summary of their key characteristics.  
5.2 The extent of Kent Thameside’s cement and paper making industries 
Sixty years ago, as Britain continued its recovery from six years of war, much of the new 
housing and offices being built across the country were being produced with cement from 
the kilns of Kent Thameside. Two fifths of the cement produced in the UK, and over two 
thirds of the chalk used to make it, came from a narrow estuarine strip on either side of the 
Thames between Dartford and Gravesham and Purfleet and Grays (Beaver, 1944). One 
quarry in Swanscombe was producing over a million tonnes of chalk a year alone. Kent 
Thameside in particular, the Geographical Journal noted, had a set of physical attributes that 
made it unusually well suited for the production of cement (Beaver, 1944, 177). 
“In north Kent, the cement companies control some 5500 acres of land, and the 
expansion of Stone, Greenhithe, Swanscombe, and Northfleet is almost impossible. 
Yet there is no denying that Thames-side is the most suitable locality in all England 
for the cement industry. The chalk lies adjacent to the river bank, river mud or 
London clay is easily available for mixing with chalk, private wharves exist for the 
import of coal and the export of cement, and the London market is on the doorstep.” 
By the mid 1950s, cement production, which at the turn of the century had been based in 
over a dozen plants in Kent Thameside, had been restricted to four major plants: Kent’s 
Works in Stone, Johnson’s of Greenhithe, White’s of Swanscombe - the largest in the 
country in the interwar period - and Bevan’s of Northfleet (see map 5.1). The four plants, all 
of them run by ACPM, the producer of Blue Circle cement, employed 2,720 workers and 
were the biggest  employer in Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross (Coleman, 1954).  
Picture 5.1 Johnson’s Work in Greenhithe and behind it Kent Works in Stone in 1938 
 
Material removed for copyright reasons 
See www.britainfromabove.org.uk   
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Picture 5.2 The New Northfleet Paper Mill and White’s Works in Swanscombe in 1932 
 
Another important post war employer in Kent Thameside was the paper industry. The 
Empire Paper Mill, which had been set up in 1906 on a site next to Ingress Abbey to produce 
wallpaper, recruited many of its workers from Knockhall. The company had even built its own 
housing estate in Knockhall Road to house the workers it had imported from Lancashire. The 
Imperial Paper Mill, which processed pulp into newsprint for the Daily Mirror, Bowater’s 
Paper Mill, the New Northfleet Paper Mill and British Vegetable Parchment also employed 
many of Swanscombe and Knockhall’s residents (see map 5.2). 
 Map 5.2  The cement plants, paper mills and chalk quarries of Kent Thameside  
  
 
                              Cement Plants                   Paper Mills                  Chalk quarries 
  Source: © Google (2009) 
The activities of the cement and paper industries during this post war period left a 
conspicuous impression on the landscape and environment of Kent Thameside (see picture 
5.3). Writing in the 1950s, Coleman (1954) observed that: 
Material removed for copyright reasons 
See www.britainfromabove.org.uk   
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 “Stone, Greenhithe and Knockhall are no more than a narrow industrial ribbon, 
virtually dependent on a single industry, but where paper begins to rival cement, 
Swanscombe and Northfleet thrust broad nuclei into the countryside.......The 
immediate scene betrays ubiquitous legacies from past generations of cement 
manufacturing - row upon row of uninspired nineteenth century dwellings made even 
more repellent by a stale coating of dust, great factory agglomerations and above all 
pits. Truly, the freshly gashed landscape of extractive industry is raw and harsh.” 
Picture 5.3 Eastern Quarry south of Knockhall in 1953 
 
 
By the mid 1960s, with demand for cement still booming, the four Kent Thameside cement 
plants were producing over 2.5 million tonnes of cement a year; or 15 per cent of UK output 
(see table 5.1). Optimistic that demand would continue to expand, Blue Circle drew up 
ambitious plans to open a vast new plant in Northfleet that would be among the most 
technologically advanced in Europe. The company’s plants in Greenhithe and Stone and the 
old plant in Northfleet were to be closed as part of the review, but overall cement production 
in Kent Thameside would continue to rise. In the short-term the company’s confidence 
proved well founded. In 1970, the year the new Northfleet plant opened, UK production hit 
an all time high of 20 million tonnes and Blue Circle emerged as the world’s largest cement 
producer. The company’s demand for labour too was undiminished: in the early 1970s over 
1,800 people were employed at the Northfleet works, either directly or through Blue Circle’s 
contractors.  
 
 
Material removed for copyright reasons 
See www.britainfromabove.org.uk   
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Table 5.1        Kent Thameside cement production 1966-2006   
 
However, the oil shock of 1973 put paid to both the post-war surge in cement demand and 
Blue Circle’s pre-eminence. Demand tumbled throughout the 70s and early 80s, and UK 
production fell to just 13 million tonnes in 1984. Blue Circle’s board responded to these 
tougher market conditions by conducting a radical overhaul of its working practices. Between 
1985 and 1991, the company’s ‘integrated working programme’, carried out in the face of 
fierce Union opposition in many plants, slashed labour costs and workforce numbers - 
mainly through voluntary redundancies - but managed to maintain production at the same 
level. By the turn of the 1990s, a UK workforce of just over 2,000 staff was producing the 
same output as Blue Circle’s mid 1980s workforce of just under 10,000 staff (European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2002). In Kent 
Thameside, almost 200 jobs were lost when the Swanscombe Plant closed in 1990 after 150 
years of continuous operation, while the workforce at Northfleet was reduced to a fraction of 
its size in the early 70s.  
The cement industry experienced a brief fluorescence in the late 1980s due largely to major 
infrastructure projects such as the new Dartford River Crossing, the Channel Tunnel and the 
building boom in the City of London and the Docklands.  However, the recession of the early 
1990s coupled with growing competition from cheaper European imports forced Blue Circle 
into further cutbacks and redundancies. In 1992, plans to shed another 200 jobs at the 
Northfleet Plant were announced along with the closure of one of the plant’s kilns and the 
mothballing of another. Although some of this capacity was restored at Northfleet in the mid 
1990s, when plans to build Bluewater Shopping Centre were confirmed, the plant’s future 
appeared precarious due to an acute shortage of available chalk deposits. The plant 
remained open for another decade, sustained primarily by the construction of the new high 
speed channel tunnel rail link, but it eventually closed in 2008, a few years after Blue Circle 
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had been taken over by the French group, Lafarge. By the time of its closure the Northfleet 
Plant employed just 240 people: less than a tenth of Blue Circle’s total workforce in Kent 
Thameside in 1950s.  
The paper making industry of Kent Thameside also felt the effect of stronger international 
competition from lower price producers. The New Northfleet Mill closed in the 1970s and the 
Imperial Paper Mill closed shortly afterwards in 1981 after a period of sustained 
redundancies. The Empire Paper Mill struggled on until the 1990s but was eventually closed 
in 1993 after its Norwegian owners failed to turn its fortunes around. By the millennium the 
only paper mill still in existence was the Bowater’s Mill in Northfleet which had become part 
of the Kimberly Clark group.  
As a result of these plant and mill closures and the gradual contraction of the cement and 
paper making workforce unemployment rose steadily in Kent Thameside in the 1980s. In 
1991 unemployment hit 13 per cent in Swanscombe having stood at just 5 per cent in 1971. 
Joblessness among men in the Galley Hill area of Swanscombe was even higher; exceeding 
15 per cent in 1991. Unemployment fell over the next decade as new retail and construction 
jobs became available at Bluewater and distribution and warehouse jobs were created at 
Crossways Business Park in Stone. Yet, the manufacturing sector of the local economy, 
which had been responsible for half of all jobs in Swanscombe in 1971, never recovered. By 
2011 only around 6 per cent of the workforce in Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross 
were still employed in manufacturing jobs (figure 5.1) 
Figure 5.1 Proportion of jobs in the manufacturing sector in Swanscombe, Knockhall and 
  Horns Cross 1971-2011 
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5.3  Kent Thameside’s industrial legacy 
When asked to describe their community, a number of residents interviewed for this study 
chose to liken them to the old mining communities of South Wales. Villages like 
Swanscombe may only have been twenty miles from the heart of London, but they had the 
same insularity and community spirit, they argued, that one still found in the mining villages 
in the remote, isolated valleys of South Wales.  
Decades of occupational homogeneity created by the dominance of the cement and paper 
making industries had helped, they said, to build kinship and social networks that were as 
strong and resilient as those that one might find in these Welsh valleys. The working lives of 
the people, usually men, who used to work in the chalk quarries, cement plants and paper 
mills of Kent Thameside also closely resembled the lives of those who worked in coal 
mining. Not only was the work physically arduous and sometimes dangerous, they said, but 
it generated a strong sense of solidarity and identity that survived the closure of the quarries 
and mills. As one Swanscombe resident said: 
 “I always likened Swanscombe to an old mining community and all those old ideas 
 still permeate the community. When I first started playing football in Swanscombe, 
 four or five of  the team had ‘made in Swanscombe’ tattooed across their backs – 
 and that’s a tattoo that they still have done. Generally there is a sense of community 
 and cohesiveness that is still there.” (BFI) 
The sense of residual solidarity described here is also highlighted in the literature examining 
the social identity of other small, spatially distinct post-industrial communities that were 
reliant on one or two industries (Bostyn, Wight, 1987; Warwick, Littlejohn, 1992; Waddington, 
Critcher, Dicks, Parry, 2001). In their study of former coal mining communities in South 
Yorkshire Warwick and Littlejohn (1992) found that the culture associated with traditional 
industries is able to survive for several generations after the industries and social institutions 
associated with them have disappeared. The “gregarious sociability of the old pit villages is 
still remembered and enjoyed in contemporary pubs and clubs”, Warwick and Littlejohn 
found (1992, 131), and their villages’ mining identity is still celebrated in everyday 
conversation. Waddington et al (2001), meanwhile, have argued that many former mining 
communities worked hard to preserve previous standards of family and community life 
following the demise of the pits: the post industrial identity of these communities is 
characterised as much by processes of social and cultural continuity, they claim, as it is by 
processes of social change and economic dislocation.  
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The tension highlighted by Waddington between an industrial past dominated by a select 
number of local employers and a more diverse post-industrial future is also in evidence in 
Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross. The villages are no longer as occupationally 
homogeneous as they were during the heyday of Blue Circle cement and the paper making 
industry. Like many former coal mining communities, they have been obliged, as we will see 
later in this chapter, to embrace a more eclectic set of occupations and have also become 
home to a more heterogeneous population, many of whom have no family connection with 
the old industries.   
Yet, while Horns Cross, and to a lesser extent Knockhall, have become absorbed into the 
residential suburban hinterland of Dartford, Swanscombe still retains the look and feel of a 
mining community. Not only has it kept the narrow terraced Victorian and Edwardian streets 
and social clubs and facilities once funded by the cement industry, it remains just as 
physically isolated as it was half a century ago. It is surrounded to the south, north and east 
by deep quarries and is accessible by road and rail only via a few remaining narrow chalk 
ridges. Moreover, memories of the old cement and paper industries also still run deep in all 
three villages. Many older residents who started work in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s began 
their working lives in the mills, plants and quarries of Kent Thameside while many of their 
parents worked solely for Blue Circle or one of the paper mills. As three residents 
interviewed for this study said: 
“Talk to people in their eighties here and they’ll all talk about Blue Circle. Everyone 
knew what was happening there then. Take my wife. Her father worked for Blue 
Circle, her mother worked for Blue Circle, she worked for Blue Circle and I worked for 
Blue Circle too.” (RFO) 
 “I worked down in Eastern Quarry when I was younger on the mill gang. …I was at 
the Kent Works for 20 years before I was transferred up there though. …My father 
worked for 51 years for Blue Circle, I worked there, my brother worked 
there…suppose it runs sort of in the family.” (KBA) 
“When I started work in 1961 the day after Boxing Day on the Northfleet Paper Mill, I 
was 15. My father also worked in the paper mill, apart from the war years, from the 
1920s until he retired in the 1970s. It was always called industrial North Kent in them 
days. You had Northfleet Paper Mill, Kent Craft, British Vegetable Parchment, 
Imperial Paper Mill, Johnsons, Whites, Bevins and Empire Paper Mill.” (WBA) 
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The strong sense of identity and place that residents derived from working in the cement and 
paper mills and quarries of industrial north Kent has not diminished over the years. In fact, 
many former industrial workers have clung on ever more tightly to these memories over the 
years as north Kent’s iconic industries have been replaced by generic service based 
industries and more and more of the workforce have begun to commute to London. 
However, any notion of nostalgia for this industrial past and the identity and social cohesion 
it engendered is tempered by their recollection of the environmental damage caused by the 
cement industry in particular. The industries provided residents with a living and a way of life 
but it came at a cost. As three residents recalled:  
 “Greenhithe in the past (had) its cement industry...and its people had to put up with a 
lot of dust, noise and the rest of it. When my wife first came here all we had was 
houses, a few shops in the high street surrounded by industry and nothing else.” 
(DBL) 
“We were always covered in dust from the cement factories. We seemed to be under 
a constant dust cloud from something or another” (RFA) 
“For years the community had to put up with all the dust from Blue Circle” (PMA) 
The continued presence of this industrial past in the collective memory of existing residents 
has important implications for the regeneration of Kent Thameside. It has had a clear 
influence on the priorities for regeneration of many older residents who experienced 
industrial North Kent at first hand. Having grown up in a polluted and despoiled landscape 
many older residents now place a high premium on protecting the remaining green spaces 
and woodland areas in the vicinity of Swanscombe, Knockhall and Stone. For them the 
regeneration of Kent Thameside should be seen as an opportunity to enhance the area’s 
natural environment in recompense to those existing residents who invested their working 
lives in the cement and paper making industries and tolerated the pollution and noise they 
generated. As two residents commented: 
“I’d love to see that little bit of woodland given back to us - which was an ancient 
woodland. People from miles around used to come to it. They said that they were just 
going to dig the chalk out and put it back. That should have been stopped.” (SWO)  
 “There are benefits that were promised to us years ago when it was all signed. You 
 know the nice tree lined avenues up here; promises that everything would be spick 
 and span....We’re the ones who’ve been putting the money in for the last 50 
 years.” (RFA) 
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This testimony highlights the fact that the key brownfield regeneration sites in Kent 
Thameside are not blank canvasses devoid of any cultural or historical meaning. As Raco 
and Henderson (2006) state these sites are rich in significance for many existing residents 
due to their previous uses. This significance is perhaps greatest for those residents who 
worked there or witnessed their previous uses, but they also have significance to their 
relatives and friends and also to new residents who are seeking to establish a connection to 
the area. Like the mining communities of South Yorkshire or South Wales, the industrial past 
of Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross continues to exert a powerful influence on the 
present. It is important, therefore, that the regeneration partners understand how these sites 
were once used and how they are viewed today by the existing community while planning 
their redevelopment.  
5.4   An overview of Swanscombe 
Swanscombe is the largest of the three existing communities examined in this study. After a 
period of contraction in the 1970s and 1980s as its industrial base shrank, its population has 
grown steadily over the last twenty years and now stands at around 7,500. It is orientated 
around a core of late Victorian and Edwardian two to three bedroom terraces that were built 
for the employees of the cement and paper industries (see picture 5.4 and appendix eleven) 
Picture 5.4  A traditional terraced street in Swanscombe in 2012 
 
              Source: © Google (2012) 
This historic terraced core was substantially enlarged during the inter war and post war 
periods by the addition of terraces, low rise flats and semi-detached houses in the west and 
south of the village (see picture 5.5). A small estate of more modern housing with some 
detached housing was built after the millennium in the north west of the village on the site of 
a former chalk quarry. Yet in 2011 almost half of Swanscombe’s housing stock still consisted 
of terraced housing while detached housing accounted for fewer than 1 in 20 homes.  
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Picture 5.5  An inter-war terraced street in Swanscombe in 2012 
 
  Source:  © Google (2012) 
In the last decade the tenure profile of Swanscombe has changed substantially (see figure 
5.2). In 2001, fewer than 1 in 10 of houses in the village were privately rented. By 2011, 
however, this figure had risen to 1 in 4 of Swanscombe’s housing stock. It appears that the 
proximity of the new Ebbsfleet Station and Bluewater to Swanscombe, coupled with the 
relatively low average cost of housing in Swanscombe, has encouraged a significant growth 
in the buy to let market. Over the last ten years the average property price in Swanscombe 
has been consistently lower, despite the regeneration of Ebbsfleet, than the average 
property price in both the South East and England as a whole. In 2010, the average price in 
Swanscombe was £159,000 – some £50,000 less than the average price in the South east 
(Right Move, 2011).  
Figure 5.2 The housing tenure profile of Swanscombe 1971-2011 
                      
This change in Swanscombe’s tenure profile has coincided with a dramatic increase in the 
proportion of residents from non White British backgrounds. In 2001, Swanscombe was 
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almost exclusively composed of White British residents. Yet ten years later almost 1 in 6 
residents were from non White British backgrounds. The largest contingents among this non 
White British population are Eastern European and Black African residents. Many of these 
Black African families have migrated eastwards from Lewisham, Greenwich and Bexley in 
search of larger and more affordable housing. Kent’s selective secondary education system, 
which has provided Kent Thameside with six grammar schools, is another undoubted 
attraction. This out-migration of minority groups into areas outside of London previously 
dominated by White British families mirrors a trend that is occurring in the Essex and 
Thurrock parts of the Thames Gateway (Watt, 2009; Butler, Hamnett, 2011).  
The growth in the private rental market has also been accompanied by an increase in the 
village’s population turnover, particularly among younger residents, according a senior GP at 
Swanscombe Health Centre, who was interviewed for this study. 
 “You’ve a number of fairly cheapish starter homes and the people who come in don’t 
 see this in any way as their ultimate destination. They’ll stay a couple of years and 
 then move on. You can see that in the practice profile. Our practice size is about 
 10,500 and we’ve probably got a flow of maybe 100 to 200 patients every month; so 
 there’s quite a rapid turnover and it tends to be at the younger end.” 
One of Swanscombe’s older long-term residents, who was interviewed for this study, also 
commented on the growing population turnover in the village’s old terraced streets. 
 “People are moving in and out so fast now, we don’t really get the chance to get to 
 know them. This particular area has changed, with so many being sold for 
 development and letting. People might stay for only six months before moving on.” 
Another notable change in the last decade in Swanscombe in the last ten years is the 
increase in the proportion of people working in managerial and professional occupations. 
This figure rose from 1 in 5 residents in 2001 to 1 in 4 residents in 2011, although it remains 
much lower than the national average. Many of these professional residents are 
concentrated in the new estate in the north west of the village (see picture 5.6). However it is 
also likely that some younger professionals, attracted by the village’s modest rental and 
purchase prices and its rail connections to London, are moving into Swanscombe’s older 
terraces (see appendix ten for details of property prices in Swanscombe).  The Mosaic geo-
demographic profiling system (Experian, 2010) also highlights this change. Mosaic suggests 
that Swanscombe now contains a number of ‘New Homemaker’ households: a category that 
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includes young people on middle incomes in a secure job in a large private or public sector 
organisation who often rent flats or small starter homes in areas of brownfield regeneration. 
Picture 5.6 A modern housing estate in Swanscombe in 2012 
 
              Source: Bryan Jones (2012) 
Yet despite this change Swanscombe remains a recognisably white, low skilled, working 
class community. Even in 2011 the proportion of residents without qualifications far 
outstripped the proportion of residents with degree level qualifications (see figure 5.3 and 
appendix twelve).  
Figure 5.3 The qualifications profile of Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross 2001-2011                 
 
In contrast, in the Thames Gateway as a whole there is now parity in the proportions of 
people with a degree level qualification and those without a qualification. The occupations 
held by Swanscombe residents reflect this skills profile. In 2011 more than 1 in 3 residents 
worked in semi-routine or routine occupations and almost 1 in 10 of the workforce was 
unemployed: both figures are appreciably higher than the national and Thames Gateway 
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average. The retail and wholesale industry, which accounted for 1 in 5 jobs in Swanscombe 
in 2011, is now the most popular occupation sector in the village.  
This is in part a legacy of Swanscombe’s industrial past. Until the 1970s it was possible to 
leave school at 16 with few or any qualifications and to get a job immediately in the cement 
or paper making industry. As a consequence the community placed a relatively low value on 
the attainment of formal educational qualifications. This culture is still in evidence today. The 
headteacher of Swanscombe’s non-selective secondary school, who was interviewed for this 
study, identified the historic culture of low educational and professional aspirations, as the 
community’s greatest challenge.  
 “There’s a poverty of self-aspiration at times, rather than financial poverty. One of my 
 biggest battles is the level of literacy that the students come in here with. I think that 
 in Year 7 we have 60 per cent of students who have a reading age that is below their 
 chronological age. That’s quite a demand..... What I want to do is to say hang on a 
 minute education can have a value too - because people here have had a more than 
 reasonable life based on the local chalk pits and the work that Blue Circle has done. 
 Swanscombe has been well served by the industries around it, but things are rapidly 
 changing and it has to adjust.” (NJO) 
Data from Mosaic tends to confirm this picture. The most common Mosaic groups in 
Swanscombe are ‘Ex-council community’, ‘Industrial Heritage’ and ‘Terraced Melting Pot’ 
households. Mosaic describes Ex-council community neighbourhoods as being populated by 
people “who are practical and enterprising, rather than well-educated, who have created a 
comfortable lifestyle for themselves through their own hard work” and live on pleasant well-
built council estates” (Experian 2010, 11). Industrial Heritage people, meanwhile, are 
“traditional and conservative, living in communities that historically have been dependent on 
mines, mills and assembly plants for their livelihood” while Terraced Melting Pot people are 
described as being young, poorly educated and employed in relatively menial, routine 
occupations (Experian 2010, 11-13). 
The shops and community facilities in Swanscombe are also consistent with this white, 
working class identity. The village’s much depleted high street contains an array of hair and 
tanning salons, bookmakers, tattoo parlours, fast food shops and a medium sized Co-op 
food store (see picture 5.7). A members only social club, which is popular among 
Swanscombe’s thriving football, cricket and bowls teams, is located adjacent to the high 
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street. The only visible sign in the high street of a change in Swanscombe’s socio-economic 
identity is the recent addition of two estate agents.  
Picture 5.7 Swanscombe High Street in 2012 
 
              Source: © Google (2012) 
The high proportion of council housing in Swanscombe is another indication of the village’s 
residual working class identity. In 2011, almost 1 in 4 houses in Swanscombe were rented 
from the council, compared to around 1 in 10 houses in the Thames Gateway and just in 1 in 
11 houses in England as a whole. This substantial council housing stock, which accounts for 
1 in 6 of all council homes in Dartford, is a legacy of a major post war building programme 
undertaken by Swanscombe’s former Urban District Council before it was absorbed into 
Dartford Borough Council in the mid 1970s.  
This building programme, much of which was funded through the tax income the Labour 
controlled Urban District Council received from Blue Circle, ensured that by 1981 over half of 
Swanscombe’s housing stock was council owned. Many of Swanscombe’s council housing 
tenants are former employees of Blue Circle and the paper industry who have lived in the 
same house for decades and who have never wanted or never been able to exercise their 
right to buy. Yet Swanscombe’s council housing also now contains families who come from 
across Dartford Borough and have no previous family or work connection with the village. As 
we shall see in chapter six, this is a source of resentment for some of Swanscombe’s long-
term, indigenous residents.  
The emergence of the Swanscombe and Greenhithe Residents Association as the main 
political force in Swanscombe is due in part to the lingering sense of injustice felt by the 
village’s indigenous community about the loss of its Urban District Council and its political 
independence. The Residents Association, which is dominated by long-term Swanscombe 
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residents, now controls the Swanscombe and Greenhithe Town Council and represents the 
village on Dartford Borough and Kent County Councils. In low turnout local elections it has 
succeeded in mobilising its membership far more effectively than the Labour Party which 
controlled the village for several generations up until the 1980s. Its success is testimony, as 
chapter six will demonstrate, to the continued strength of the identity and sense of 
exceptionalism forged during the village’s industrial past.  
5.5 An overview of Knockhall 
Knockhall is an appreciably smaller community than Swanscombe. Although its population 
has grown steadily in the last twenty years to just over 4,000 in 2011, it remains only around 
half the size as its neighbour Swanscombe to the east. Like Swanscombe, its core consists 
of late Victorian and Edwardian terraces built to house the workers of the cement and paper 
industries and inter war and post war terraces and semi-detached houses (see appendix 
eleven). However, Knockhall experienced significantly more development in the 1980s and 
1990s than its neighbour. These new estates of detached and semi-detached houses in the 
south of the village had a marked impact on Knockhall’s population and scale. The village 
also includes some substantial mid Victorian villas built for the burgeoning middle class of 
North Kent which pre-date the arrival of the cement and paper industry.  As a result, 
Knockhall’s industrial past is less readily identifiable as it is in Swanscombe. 
There are also important differences between the housing tenure profile of Knockhall and 
Swanscombe (see figure 5.4). The owner occupied sector has always been significantly 
larger than the council rented sector in Knockhall. Even in 1981 two thirds of the housing 
was owner occupied and fewer than 1 in 4 houses were rented from the council. As a result 
Knockhall experienced an earlier influx than Swanscombe of people brought up outside the 
community who have no personal connections with the cement or paper making industries.  
Figure 5.4 The tenure profile of Knockhall 1971-2011 
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In the 1980s and 1990s, Knockhall’s relatively low property prices and its proximity to 
Greenhithe station made it an attractive location for many younger couples looking to buy 
their first home (see appendix ten for details of property prices in Knockhall). According to 
one long-term Knockhall resident interviewed for this study this influx has had a noticeable 
impact on the character of the community. 
 “We now have more professional, upwardly mobile people moving in and that’s 
 bringing money into the area. They’re changing that sense of insularity, because 
 they’re no familiar with that history and they’re living for the now. If you think of 
 Knockhall, we’ve got new housing up the top, but even the  old housing is changing. 
 As the older people have died or moved into nursing homes, younger people 
 have moved in and they’ve modernised.” (RBA) 
This influx of new residents continued in the 2000s as Knockhall experienced the same 
sharp growth in its private rented market as Swanscombe. Most of these rented properties 
are flats, either in converted Victorian houses (see picture 5.8) or purpose built flats built in 
the last thirty years. Indeed, flats are now the most common property type in Knockhall. In 
2011, they accounted for 4 in 10 properties in the village compared to 3 in 10 properties only 
a decade earlier.  
Picture 5.8  Converted mid Victorian villas in Knockhall in 2012 
 
               Source: Bryan Jones (2012) 
This change in the population of Knockhall over the last thirty years has altered the 
occupational and educational profile of the village. While there is still a significant white, 
working class community in the village composed of relatively low skilled people who have 
lived in the area for most of their lives, they no longer represent the majority of Knockhall’s 
population. Knockhall now contains a similar proportion of Eastern European and Black 
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African residents to Swanscombe and it is also now home to a large population of 
professionals with degree level qualifications. In 2011, almost 1 in 4 Knockhall residents had 
degree level qualifications while fewer than 1 in 5 residents had no formal qualifications (see 
figure 5.3). The proportion of residents working in managerial and professional roles also 
now outnumbers the proportion working in routine and semi-routine occupations. More than 
1 in 3 residents are managers or professionals while only 1 in 4 residents are engaged in 
routine or semi-routine activities – figures which are the same as the national average. 
Furthermore, only around 1 in 20 Knockhall residents were unemployed in 2011, a rate 
almost half that of Swanscombe.  
The data from Mosaic confirms this change in Knockhall’s occupational and educational 
profile (Experian, 2010). As well as the ‘Industrial Heritage’, Terraced Melting Pot’, ‘Ex-
council Community’ and ‘New Homemaker’ households that one finds in Swanscombe, 
Knockhall is also home to some ‘Suburban Mindset’ households. These are industrious, 
married individuals who work in city office jobs and live in the kind of semi-detached house 
which is found in the southern part of Knockhall. While they work hard, they also value their 
independence, Mosaic states, and do not often get involved in their local community. 
As we will see in chapter six, many of these new professional residents do not see 
themselves living in Knockhall for more than a few years. For them it is a convenient and 
affordable stepping stone on the way to a larger family house further out into Kent. Most 
have limited family and social connections in Knockhall and when at home rarely venture far 
into the community. They are much more likely to use the shops and restaurants in nearby 
Bluewater, which can be reached on foot in twenty minutes, than they are to visit one of the 
handful of pubs or social clubs in Knockhall. These local pubs and clubs, such as the British 
Legion Club and the Ingress Tavern, remain bastions of Knockhall’s white, working class 
community.  
Apart from its pubs and social clubs, Knockhall has few other community facilities. It has no 
shops, other than two convenience stores and a small post office, and has limited sports 
facilities (see picture 5.9). The focus of the community, if it can be said to have one, is its 
primary school, which, as chapter six will demonstrate, is one of the few places that brings 
together existing working class families and the professional middle class residents of 
Knockhall and Ingress Park.  
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Picture 5.9 A terraced street and shop in Knockhall in 2012 
 
                   Source: © Google (2012) 
While this relative dearth of local facilities does not exercise Knockhall’s professional 
residents, it is a significant issue for many of the village’s longer term residents. A frequent 
complaint, which is discussed in chapter six, is that Knockhall has not received its fair share 
of resources when compared to Swanscombe. They argue that Swanscombe and 
Greenhithe Town Council, in particular, which is led by Swanscombe residents, tends to 
privilege the needs of Swanscombe over those of Knockhall. Although Swanscombe is 
larger and faces more significant deprivation related issues than Knockhall, the palpable lack 
of investment in Knockhall’s community infrastructure in the last twenty years, lends this 
complaint a certain credibility. 
5.6  An overview of Horns Cross 
With a population of around 3,500 Horns Cross is the smallest of the three existing 
communities examined in this study. It is also split between two historic cores and as such is 
the least spatially coherent of the three villages. At its northern end close to the Thames and 
Stone Crossing station are the Edwardian terraces of Charles Street which were created to 
serve the workers of the Kent cement works (see picture 5.10) and some terraces and town 
houses built in the 1960s and 1970s near St Mary’s Church. At its southern end, near 
London Road, is a more eclectic mix of inter war and post war terraces and semi detached 
houses, substantial detached bungalows and terraces and flats built in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The two poles were only connected in the 1990s by a large development of flats built on land 
once owned by Johnsons cement works (see picture 5.11 and appendix eleven).  
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Picture 5.10  Charles Street in 2012 
 
                 Source:  © Google (2012) 
This lack of spatial coherence or any obvious centre means that Horns Cross is not as 
immediately recognisable as a single, discrete community as Swanscombe and Knockhall 
are. Its residents are as likely to see their immediate locale as a peripheral part of Stone to 
the west or Greenhithe village to the north east next the Thames as they are to describe 
themselves as residents of Horns Cross. Moreover the residents in Charles Street in the 
north are likely to have relatively little engagement with the residents of Hayes Road or 
Morgan Drive to the south. The only environment in which the disparate parts of the 
community might encounter each other is the Co-op food store, the post office or the pubs in 
London Road. In truth, Horns Cross can be more accurately described as a part of the 
extended suburban hinterland of Dartford to the west than as a discrete community in its 
own right.   
Picture 5.11  Flats built in the 1990s in Horns Cross in 2012 
 
                 Source: © Google (2012) 
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Much of Horns Cross today is a transient, dormitory settlement composed of young single 
men or women or childless couples who live in privately rented flats such as those seen in 
picture 5.11. In 2011, flats made up almost half of the housing stock in Horns Cross, a figure 
which far outstrips the average proportion of flats in Kent Thameside, the Thames Gateway 
or in England (see figure 5.5) and 1 in 3 Horns Cross properties were privately rented (see 
figure 5.6).  
Figure 5.5  The property type profile of Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross in 2011 
 
The occupants of these flats are educated to GCSE or A Level standard - the proportion of 
Horns Cross residents with level 2 and 3 qualifications exceeds the national average - and 
they often work in intermediate, non professional, white collar service sector occupations. 
Crossways Business Park to the north of Horns Cross, whose offices are occupied in the 
main by the back office administrative and technical arms of national financial, legal and 
construction companies, is a prime example of the type of place where Horns Cross 
residents work. Over 1 in 6 Horns Cross residents work in these intermediate occupations 
compared to just 1 in 10 in the country as a whole.  
Unsurprisingly, the Mosaic data for Horns Cross shows that the community is dominated by 
transient ‘New Homemaker’ households. This category consists of young people on middle 
incomes in secure white collar jobs who often rent flats or small starter homes in areas of 
brownfield regeneration (Experian, 2010). 
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Figure 5.6 The tenure profile of Horns Cross in 2011 
                        
Horns Cross does still contain some older white, working class residents who have lived in 
the area for all of their lives but they now represent a far smaller proportion of the population 
than they did thirty years ago. In 2011, only 1 in 11 people in Horns Cross were aged over 
65, a figure which is half the national average and only marginally larger than the proportion 
of Eastern European residents living in the community. Moreover, only around 1 in 6 Horns 
Cross residents had no formal qualifications (see figure 5.3).  
Of all the existing communities examined in this study, therefore, Horns Cross is one with 
the least connection with Kent Thameside’s industrial past. It now houses a predominantly 
young, affluent, reasonably well educated and above all transient population which is not 
bound by any strong social or emotional ties to the immediate area.  
5.7  An overview of Ingress Park 
Ingress Park is the largest of the new developments that have been created to date as part 
of the Kent Thameside regeneration programme. Built in the last decade, it stands on the 
site of the former Empire Paper Mill and a Merchant Navy College. The estate, which 
stretches from the eastern border of Greenhithe village to the edge of Swanscombe 
Peninsula in the west and from the Thames to London Road in the south, contains around 
1,000 houses.  
Compared to Knockhall, Swanscombe and Horns Cross it is an expensive place to live. In 
2007/08, a three to four bedroom terraced house in Ingress cost between £350,000 and 
£400,000: approximately double the cost of an average terrace house in Knockhall a few 
hundred metres away (Right Move, 2011). It has been marketed primarily as an estate for 
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high income, professional households who work in London and this is reflected in the data 
from the 2011 census. More than 1 in 3 residents in the Ingress Park area have degree level 
qualifications and over half work in managerial or professional occupations – a proportion 
which is dramatically higher than in all three existing communities to the south.  
The age profile of Ingress Park also differs from the existing communities. The archetypal 
Ingress Park resident has an established career, is married or in a long-term relationship and 
is aged between 35 and 54. Around half of these career couples, who account for almost 
half the estate’s population, will have children of school age or younger. The proportion of 
residents aged 16 to 24 or over 65, meanwhile is well below the national average. In short, it 
is an estate that predominantly attracts mid career professionals who are looking for a 
modern, well appointed house in easy reach of London. The fact that Ingress Park has no 
shops or community facilities of its own suggests that these residents are more interested in 
the quality and location of the house than they are in finding an area with a strong, well 
functioning community.  
The Mosaic data for Ingress Park, which shows the development to be dominated by 
‘Careers and Kids’ households, is consistent with this picture. These people are “well-
educated and established in a technical, junior or middle management career, in which they 
benefit from the prospect of future career development” (Experian, 2010, 10). Their lives are 
focused on “the needs of their growing children and the creation of a comfortable home” 
which is usually located in well-equipped, if not spacious, purpose built family housing on the 
outer edge of a town. Their life outside of work is dominated by the car with family trips to 
modern out of town retail centres such as Bluewater to shop, eat and go to the cinema being 
a popular leisure activity. 
The character and appearance of Ingress Park, a topic which will be examined in detail in 
chapter seven, is also quite different from that of its neighbours. It is a high density 
development with few detached houses built around Ingress Park, an early nineteenth 
century mansion which is now occupied by a private business. It is mainly composed of 
terraces and townhouses constructed, according to the developer, in a ‘local vernacular’ 
style that apes the clapboarded villages of the Kentish countryside (see picture 5.12). 
However, it also contains a large number of riverside flats (see picture 5.13). Unsurprisingly, 
the overwhelming majority of houses on the estate, around 7 in every 10, are owner 
occupied. Yet there is also a sizeable private rented market on Ingress Park, particularly in 
flats, and around 1 in 10 houses are rented from housing associations.   
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Picture 5.12  Terraces and townhouses in Ingress Park in 2012 
 
                 Source: Bryan Jones (2012) 
Picture 5.13 Riverside flats in Ingress Park in 2012 
 
                Source: Bryan Jones (2012) 
 
Despite the attempt the mimic the appearance of a Kent village, Ingress Park cannot be said 
to have a village feel to it. It is largely empty by day and at weekends and is geared towards 
the time poor lifestyle of the well paid commuter with its easy access to Greenhithe station, 
Bluewater and the A2. Like Horns Cross, it is firmly orientated within the social and 
economic orbit of greater London and feels largely disconnected from industrial and cultural 
heritage of Kent Thameside.  
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5.8 An overview of Waterstone Park 
Waterstone Park, a development of 650 homes built in the last decade, is located to the 
south west of Ingress Park on the site of former Blue Circle research facility. Horns Cross 
lies to its west, separated a land-filled chalk quarry, and Knockhall lies to its west on the 
other side of a shallow vale. To its north lies London Road while Bluewater is situated 
immediately to the south beneath a steep chalk cliff.  
While property values at Waterstone Park are not quite on a par with Ingress Park - the 
estate does not have the same sweeping views of the Thames for which Ingress residents 
pay a premium - the residents of the two estates are very similar in many respects. Like 
Ingress Park, 1 in 3 residents have degree level qualifications and just over half work in 
managerial or professional occupations. The estate also attracts the same mid career 
professionals in the 35 to 54 age bracket as Ingress Park and is dominated by the same 
‘Careers and Kids’ Mosaic households (Experian, 2010). Almost half of Waterstone Park 
residents are in the 35 to 54 age group while only 1 in 20 residents are over the age of 65. 
Evidently, it is not a place where people come in order to retire.  
However, there some slight differences in the tenure and property profile of Waterstone Park 
and Ingress Park. Waterstone Park is built at a lower density and has more detached 
houses. It also has a larger proportion of shared ownership housing and homes rented from 
housing associations. As a result only 6 in 10 houses at Waterstone Park are owner 
occupied.  
Nonetheless, the design and character of Waterstone Park is, as we will see in chapter 
seven, much the same as Ingress Park. One finds the same architectural contrast between 
the traditionally designed, locally inspired, terraces and semi-detached houses built in the 
estate’s first phase part of the estate, and more modern, streamlined flats built in a later 
phase (see pictures 5.14 and 5.15). The estate also has the same dearth of community 
facilities and is equally as quiet during the day.  Like Ingress Park it is apparent that the 
estate is built for professional households for whom convenient road and rail links and a 
modern house that is easy to maintain are of more value than a strong and well functioning 
local community that is well endowed with facilities and services.  
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Picture 5.14 Traditionally inspired townhouses at Waterstone Park in 2012 
 
                 Source: © Google (2012) 
Picture 5.15 Modern flats at Waterstone Park in 2012 
 
                  Source: Bryan Jones (2012) 
5.9  Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the key social, economic and spatial 
characteristics of Swanscombe, Knockhall, Horns Cross and Ingress Park and Waterstone 
Park. It has also looked at the industrial history of Kent Thameside and examined the impact 
of its legacy on the area’s existing communities.  
It is apparent that while villages like Swanscombe have lost the industries that lent them their 
distinctive industrial character, the fierce sense of place and clan loyalty felt by the workers 
of ‘industrial north Kent’ has not gone away. The regeneration priorities articulated by these 
former industrial workers today are heavily influenced by the memories and emotional legacy 
of this past. Yet, it is equally clear that all three existing communities are in the throes of a 
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significant social change. New residents are moving into these communities as a result of 
the area’s improved transport links, modest property prices and the growth of the private 
rental market. Many of these new residents will move on within a few months or years as 
their income and savings grow. Consequently, the residual white, low skilled working class 
population of Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross is becoming appreciably less 
dominant. Although Swanscombe is still a recognisably white working class community, 
Knockhall is now far more mixed while Horns Cross has largely become a dormitory 
settlement for young allied professionals and administrators. These changes mean that the 
population of Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross is becoming better educated, more 
occupationally diverse and also more ethnically diverse.  
The growing socio-economic diversity of Kent Thameside’s existing communities identified in 
this chapter will be discussed further in the next chapter which sets out the profiles of the 
four residents’ groups revealed as a result of the fieldwork undertaken for this study.  
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Chapter 6  A typology of the residents of Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross  
6.1  Introduction 
A key aim of this study is to reveal the range of views about regeneration present within the 
three existing communities examined in this study and in doing so to challenge the tendency 
of policymakers at local and national level to regard the existing community as a single, 
undifferentiated entity (Paton, 2012).  
The typology of residents which is set out in this chapter is a product of this aim. It was 
designed, as discussed in chapter three, in order to test two key ideas. The first is that the 
existing community contains a diverse range of perspectives on regeneration and that one 
cannot reduce the community’s opinion to one broadly consistent perspective. The second is 
that the extent of residents’ emotional commitment to Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns 
Cross has an important influence on their attitudes to regeneration.  
These ideas were partially examined in chapter five which considers the impact of Kent 
Thameside’s industrial past on the worldview of the existing residents who lived through this 
past and explores the social and economic character of the three existing communities. The 
residents’ typology set out here further underlines the growing social and economic diversity 
of these communities revealed in chapter five. It also highlights the diversity and complexity 
of existing residents’ views on regeneration and suggests that their emotional stake in their 
community does indeed have an important bearing on these views.  
Four discrete groups of residents were revealed as a result of the thematic analysis of the 
interview data with existing residents, namely: Just passing through; Guardian of the Flame; 
Community Crusaders; and Happy Families. This chapter will set out the profiles of these 
four groups in turn and will also consider the extent to which they match the Mosaic 
classification ascribed to the members of each group. It will conclude with a discussion of the 
key lessons that we can draw from this typology and the degree to which it is able to confirm 
our two key hypotheses.  
A table with details of the members of each residents group and their socio-economic 
backgrounds appears in appendix eight.  
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6.2   Group A: Just passing through 
6.2.1   Introduction 
This group of residents is predominantly composed of young couples in their late twenties or 
thirties who have moved out of Greater London in a bid to get on the property ladder. 
Educated to degree level or A level standard they hold down responsible middle ranking 
service sector jobs in the City of London or Docklands or work in the public sector as primary 
or secondary teachers or civil servants. They are usually either childless or have only 
recently started a family. Although they account for only a small proportion of the overall 
population of the area at present this group has grown rapidly in size over the last decade. 
These residents tend to live either in modern terraces on small, infill developments of 
conventional design built in the last twenty years or in traditional pre 1919 terraces. When 
these interviews were conducted in 2007/08 residents in this group were also more likely to 
be found in Knockhall and to a lesser extent in Horns Cross than in Swanscombe. This was 
due in part to the faster and more frequent rail services into London at the time from 
Greenhithe compared to Swanscombe. Knockhall’s greater proximity to Bluewater Shopping 
Centre may also have given the village an edge over Swanscombe in these residents’ eyes.  
This section will look in detail at these residents’ reasons for moving to Kent Thameside and 
the factors that influenced their choice of home. It will then go on to consider the extent of 
their engagement with the local community before exploring their attitudes to new 
development in Kent Thameside.  
This group has been identified on the basis of the interview testimony of five residents living 
in Knockhall.  Unsurprisingly, four of these residents are in the ‘New Homemakers’ Mosaic 
group, which as we saw in chapter five, consists of young people on middle incomes in 
secure jobs in large private or public sector organisations who often rent flats or small starter 
homes in areas of brownfield regeneration (Experian, 2010). The other resident, who lives in 
a slightly larger modern terrace, features in the ‘Careers and Kids’ Mosaic group which is the 
most common group in Ingress Park and Waterstone Park.  
6.2.2  Reasons for moving to Kent Thameside 
These residents were attracted to Kent Thameside principally by the relative affordability of 
its housing and their assumption that prices would rise more sharply compared to the 
regional average in the short to medium term because of the so-called ‘Ebbsfleet effect’.  
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“I guess a lot of people will move out from London and set up here. We’ve been 
thinking about moving out a bit further but the thing that’s keeping us here to be 
honest is the Ebbsfleet development. It’ll probably mean that house prices will go up.” 
(NTI) 
For these residents space was as important as price. Finding a house in a quiet area with 
well-proportioned rooms, a garden and a parking space was of paramount importance to 
them. Many of them considered moving to the more voguish Thameside developments such 
as Ingress Park and Waterstone Park but were put off by the premium charged for living 
there; the density of the layout; and the size of the housing. They prefer developments that 
resemble the lower density suburban communities in which many of them grew up. These 
communities, with their large gardens, generous living space and clear demarcations 
between properties, represent the ideal to which they aspire. They want good neighbours but 
they also value their privacy and their personal space.  
“The thing about Waterstone Park is that they really pack the houses in to what is 
quite a tight site - I don’t know if they’re going to do the same over here at Eastern 
Quarry. Some of the houses, we went over to have a look, and I think I’d have to 
duck to get in some of them.” (ABR) 
“I was interested in Ingress Park and it seems to be reasonably well built, but quite 
crowded in though. It’s a good place to build: I wouldn’t live that close to a river, but 
there you go.” (TCA)  
“Ingress Park: we were actually toying between moving there and here. We looked at 
the houses that were on offer there and we looked at the houses that were on offer 
here – and the ones here were almost, not literally, half price, so that’s why we 
moved here”. (NTI) 
6.2.3 Community engagement 
In most cases contact between this group and the community around them is minimal. They 
commute to work and spend their limited leisure time socialising with an existing network of 
friends and family - few of whom live in the immediate area. They do not envisage staying in 
the area for more than a few years and consequently have no real motivation to invest time 
in strengthening their ties with the community. This is something they feel can wait until their 
next move further out into Kent once they start a family or their children begin school.  
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“Hopefully house prices will go up. It’s an investment. We thought we’d get our own 
house here and then move on.” (SHA) 
“The people that live here have lived here for a long time so I know my neighbours 
for four doors either way. On a good summer’s day there can be four or five families 
outside talking to each other – and you don’t get that in London. The downside is that 
it’s not London which is why I tend to socialise in London rather than here.” (TCA)  
“I’m quite happy here but if I was to move it would probably be further out into Kent”. 
(GST) 
Consequently their expectations of the community or the agencies responsible for its 
management or governance are fairly low. They are frustrated by the amount of traffic on the 
roads and they wish the trains they use to commute to London could be less busy. If pressed 
they may pass a comment about the council’s recycling or waste collection performance – 
which is probably the only service that they are conscious of the council delivering – but that 
is usually all.  
“I’d say the recycling is quite good; that’s Dartford Council isn’t it? It’s good to be able 
to recycle everything into the same box. To be honest I don’t have a lot of contact 
with the council really.” (SHA) 
“It’s a great place to live. My only reservation is the traffic” (NTI) 
“When I moved here 3 years ago there was hardly anyone getting on the trains. It’s 
virtually doubled in 3 years and sometimes you’re fighting to get a seat.” (ABR) 
Their daily lives are also played out within a narrower geographic area than long-term 
residents. They don’t use the local pubs, shops or leisure facilities to the same extent as 
residents who have been brought up in the area and who have constructed their social life 
and identity around them. Their ‘community’ may not extend, in fact, beyond the few 
neighbours on either side of them with whom they are on nodding or first name terms. Lack 
of motivation or time may partly explain this reluctance to broaden their local horizons but 
they also worry about the response they’ll receive from an unknown and unfamiliar group of 
people. 
“I’ve got really good neighbours here: It’s a little community that I’m really happy to 
come home to. Whether I feel safe to walk along the road at night I’m not sure to be 
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honest. I like the fact that it’s a bit out of the way but with Bluewater – a mini Oxford 
Street – just down there.” (NTI) 
“Around here there is a choice of about three pubs of which one is not very friendly 
shall we say. You have to go into Bluewater or South East London if you want to go 
out in the evening.” (TCA) 
Trips out locally for these residents tend to begin and end with Bluewater; a safe, neutral, 
impersonal environment in which everyone is a stranger but which operates according to a 
set of familiar and readily comprehensible rules and regulations. The only other local 
facilities in which they take any interest are gyms and sports clubs. Typically though, they 
prefer to use private sector gyms outside of the immediate area rather than more local 
council funded facilities.  
“We did go to Cygnets down the road (Town Council funded), but we now go to Next 
Generation in Dartford, which is much nicer, really much nicer, even though you have 
to pay for it.” (SHA) 
“We used to be members of the fitness place at the Hilton hotel down by the Dartford 
Crossing. I don’t know of anywhere in Greenhithe.” (NTI) 
6.2.4  Attitudes towards the new developments 
The attitude of this group towards new development in Kent Thameside is not 
straightforward. On the one hand they are enthusiastic about the opportunities that Ebbsfleet 
will bring to the area – many of them cite it in fact as one of the main motivations behind their 
move to the area. However, they tend to be less sanguine about the level of house building 
taking place in Kent Thameside. They express concerns about the pressure this will bring to 
bear on the local infrastructure; even though they are conscious that as recent arrivals they 
could be considered to be part of the problem.  
“I am quite pleased about the regeneration going on in the area, but at the same time 
I am worried about the extra people; the extra cars; the extra pollution. I have heard 
about (Eastern Quarry), but I suppose I’ve been trying to block it out really and 
pretend it’s not going to happen. It does concern me about the number of houses 
being built there. Everything around here is quite green at the moment but it’s not 
going to look like that in five years time.” (SHA) 
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“Virtually every week I’d say down by Greenhithe station, there’s this thing - I don’t 
know what it is - that takes the sewage out of the sewers. My mate who’s a plumber 
says it’s because the sewers can’t cope with all the people in the area.” (ABR) 
One resident is more ambivalent about new development; noting that;  
“If the south-east is, unfortunately, the powerhouse of the UK economy, then people 
have got to live somewhere: If it’s housing down in Eastern Quarry then fine”.  (TCA) 
This passing nod towards the need for greater housing equity is unique among this group. 
However, even he has qualms about the impact this development is going to have on his 
own lifestyle:  
“(I am) concerned about Greenhithe becoming overcrowded; I’ve seen its population 
double since I’ve been here”. (TCA) 
The views of these residents show a clear tension between their support for the principle of 
regeneration and their concern about practical implications of regeneration. They welcome 
the extra investment but not the additional people, the competition for services and the 
perceived loss of green space that it will entail. 
6.3   Group B: Guardians of the flame 
6.3.1  Introduction 
This group of residents, all of whom were born, schooled, married and, whenever possible, 
employed in Swanscombe, have a deep attachment to their village and the industrial and 
political institutions that built it.  They are usually of pensionable age, or just below, and are 
married or widowers. They live either in local authority or ex-local authority accommodation 
and in most cases have lived in the same house ever since they first married. Some are 
asset rich having bought their house cheaply under the right to buy legislation, but most are 
relatively cash poor after working for most of their lives in low-paid, manual professions. 
Many of the men will have spent at least some of their lives working in the cement industry 
around Swanscombe while the women tend to have worked as cleaners, caterers, or in 
basic administrative posts in between long breaks looking after their children. The majority of 
people in this group possess no formal qualifications and in 2007/08 many received some 
form of financial assistance from the state such as the Pension Credit, Jobseekers 
Allowance or Incapacity Benefit. Although large in number and still a strident voice within the 
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community, this group is declining in size with each passing year as fewer residents who 
experienced Swanscombe’s industrial past remain alive. 
People with similar backgrounds and employment histories as this group of Swanscombe 
residents - and an equally strong sense of attachment to place - can of course be found in 
both Knockhall and Horns Cross. It is the contrasting status of the three communities in the 
local administrative hierarchy that sets them apart. Whereas Knockhall and Horns Cross, as 
administrative satellites of Greenhithe, Swanscombe and Stone, have struggled to assert 
their own identity as distinct communities, Swanscombe has always fiercely defended its 
political and administrative independence. An independent urban district until the mid 1970s 
when it was absorbed - after much protest - into Dartford, Swanscombe has since managed 
to claw back some vestige of its lost status through an active Town Council. This sense of 
fierce independence is imbued in this group of Swanscombe residents: many of them were 
once tenants of Swanscombe Urban District Council and today they look back with 
conspicuous pride on the days when the village controlled its own affairs.  
Swanscombe’s physical isolation from its neighbours has also perhaps accentuated this 
sense of separateness and desire for self-sufficiency. While other communities in Kent 
Thameside have gradually morphed into one another over the last century, Swanscombe is 
surrounded on all sides by chalk pits and cement plants: only the rail line and a few roads 
built on the last remaining chalk ridges connect the village with its neighbours. Unlike the 
other communities Swanscombe is not a place that blends easily into the existing urban 
grain.   
This section will examine these residents’ perceptions of Swanscombe today. It will then go 
on to look at their relationship with the authorities responsible for the governance of the 
community before exploring their attitudes to new development in Kent Thameside.  
This group has been identified on the basis of the interview testimony of seven residents 
living in Swanscombe. These residents are split between three Mosaic groups: ‘Industrial 
Heritage’, ‘Terraced Melting Pot’ and ‘Claimant Cultures’ (Experian, 2010). While there are 
some income differences between these groups, with Claimant Culture households finding it 
more difficult to make ends meet than Industrial Heritage households, the educational and 
occupational backgrounds of the three groups are consistent with the profile of Group B set 
out above.  All three groups consist of people with few formal qualifications who work, or 
worked, in routine, semi skilled or unskilled occupations such as those provided by the 
cement and paper industries of Kent Thameside. 
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6.3.2  Perceptions of Swanscombe today  
This group’s vision of what Swanscombe is, or ought to be, is tinged with nostalgia for the 
time when the village governed itself and the ‘combine’2 was in its heyday. They guard this 
memory jealously and a sense of bitterness about what Swanscombe has lost since then is 
never far from the surface. Some express an almost visceral antipathy towards the village’s 
modern incarnation; an attitude that sits awkwardly alongside their reverence for the 
community in which they grew up. To them the community has become dirty, run-down and 
uncared for. They also regret the loss of the shops and services that were once the most 
potent symbol of Swanscombe’s social as well as economic health.   
In their eyes this decline is due primarily due to an influx of damaged, unsocialised outsiders, 
many of whom have been allocated social housing in Swanscombe by the borough council 
in Dartford that replaced their ‘own’ urban district council. They view this deterioration 
therefore as an exogenous process: one that has been driven by forces that they believe, or 
want to believe, are beyond their control. These interlopers, as they see them, are people 
that haven’t been subject to the same stabilising institutions - such as marriage and the 
paternalistic ‘combine’ - that once helped to control and structure the lives of “old 
Swanscombe people” like them.  
“It’s been neglected, it’s run-down. We’re having people move to Swanscombe who 
are in my opinion low-life; I don’t know why. You really feel ashamed to say that you 
live here anymore. This was a beautiful place years ago. I’ve good neighbours thank 
God; but they’re all old Swanscombe people.” (SWO) 
“I think that it is gradually getting run down. All the shops are disappearing – if it 
wasn’t for the Co-op we wouldn’t have anything. The rowdiness at night is on the 
increase. It’s got worse as it’s got bigger.” (DTR)  
“It used to be a nice place when I was younger. You’ve had a lot of Londoners move 
in…. and a lot of riff-raff from Dartford – which has brought the place right down.” 
(SPA) 
“I like the place but it’s altered. You get all the drop outs from Dartford sent down 
here. You couldn’t wish for a better place when we first moved in here. They had all 
                                                             
2 The ‘combine’ is a local short-hand term for the Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd 
which was formed in 1900 and its subsidiary the British Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd formed in 
1911 which were dominated by North Kent producers. The company was eventually re-branded as 
Blue Circle in the 1970s.  
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big families, but you never had them out here playing football, they all went down the 
park. We’ve now had our window broke, and our flower beds kicked up.” (KBA) 
“We’ve got one shop left in the High Street that sells food compared to years ago 
when there used to be a lot of independent traders. We have lost a lot of things, with 
the old cement works gone. It was always called industrial North Kent in them days. 
You had the Cement works, Northfleet Paper Mill, Empire Paper Mill…which is now 
gone, with all the houses there now.” (WBA) 
6.3.3  Perceptions of the local authorities 
The blame for Swanscombe’s alleged decline is also laid by this group of residents at the 
feet of Dartford Borough Council and Kent County Council in Maidstone. Not only have they 
treated Swanscombe as a convenient repository for ‘problem’ families, they are also 
accused of stripping the community of its assets and consistently failing to listen to residents 
or invest in the village’s infrastructure.  
“We was better off when we was our own Council, than we are under Dartford. Since 
we’ve come under Dartford I think we get ignored, and money spent on 
Dartford…that’s how it looks to the ordinary man….The local council here gets 
overruled by Dartford.” (KBA) 
“It grieves me that you could go to Dartford and everything is looked after – and we’re 
paying more money than them! For what? What are we getting?” (SWO)  
 
“There is a great distrust in Swanscombe of Dartford.... I don’t think there has ever 
been any discussion about what it is we want. I don’t think that we’re getting a great 
deal.” (MMU) 
“My wife was on the committee to save the old school and when they went down to 
Maidstone it was the same old story – you can’t win, can you?” (DTR) 
However, the Swanscombe and Greenhithe Residents Association, which has prospered 
politically, as a result of the perceived failure of the main political parties to represent the 
interests of Swanscombe residents, also comes in for criticism. The Town Council, now 
controlled by the Residents Association, was accused by a number of residents, for 
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example, of failing to do enough to safeguard local bus services – a major issue for older 
residents like them without access to cars.  
“My biggest grouse about Swanscombe is the buses. Up here they ignore us. You 
used to have the 308 and 309 up here all day. Now you’ve got the 455 to Dartford 
which packs up just after 2. …My missus can’t walk anywhere at all now. The 
Residents Association say they’ve been on about it but nothing’s been done.” (KBA) 
“The buses are bad, very bad. I can’t understand it because up this end you’ve got 
more older people, yet the last bus from Gravesend to here is half past two, so this 
end of Swanscombe is cut off after half past two. We have got onto the Residents’ 
bloke, but he don’t seem to want to know”. (DTR) 
In many ways their disillusionment with the Residents Association was predictable. There is 
a fatalistic streak about this group and it can seem sometimes that they expect 
disappointment; or even find it fortifying. The County Council has let them down, the 
Borough Council has let them down, and now the Residents Association looks set to do the 
same now that it has become ensnared in machinery of government: they expect nothing 
less from those that govern them. Only the former Urban District Council, long since 
abolished, escapes their ire.  
This ingrained fatalism also absolves them of any responsibility to try to improve the lot of 
the community: Trying to effect change, when even fellow residents serving on the Town 
Council - people who are as committed to Swanscombe as them - have tried and failed to 
address the village’s problems, would be pointless in their view. It is a curious paradox. On 
the one hand they see themselves as the heartbeat of the community and are fiercely 
protective of Swanscombe’s right to govern itself. Yet on the other hand they expect others 
to assume the mantle of leadership but nonetheless reserve the right, because of their 
seniority in the community, to pass judgement on any actions they take.  
6.3.4  Attitudes towards new development 
This group is suspicious of new development in the area and worried about the impact it will 
have on them and their community. One common fear is that it will remove the last traces of 
green space and woodland around the village and further impoverish it in terms of its 
community resources. 
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“There used to be places to walk to, but even they’re going. I’ve got a dog and I walk 
it up the woods, well what’s left off the woods. Or I could probably take him over the 
heritage park, other than that, that’s it.” (DTR)  
“I’d love to see that little bit of woodland given back to us, which was an ancient 
woodland; people from miles around used to come to it. They said that they were just 
going to dig the chalk out and put it back. That should have been stopped. There’s 
still a little bit left but it’s all fenced off now.” (SWO)  
They are also concerned about change to the character and social mix of Swanscombe now 
that new people are moving into the village because of the proximity of Ebbsfleet and the 
buoyancy of the local property market. It will create a community which is less intimate and 
less cohesive, they believe, with a much higher population turnover.  
“Because people are moving in and out so fast now, we don’t really get the chance to 
get to know them. …..This particular area has changed, with so many being sold for 
development and letting. People might stay for only six months or so before moving 
on.” (MMU) 
“We know the neighbours either side, but other than that no. Nobody’s interested 
these days. When we first moved in everybody spoke to each other, but now….you 
say good morning to someone and they just ignore you.” (KBA) 
“There are lots of foreigners moving into Swanscombe now. White people, black 
people; they don’t speak like us. And yet your own people don’t seem to be able to 
get places which seems wrong to me” (SWO)   
However, their greatest concern is that Swanscombe will be surrounded and cut off by new 
development. They are sceptical as to whether there will be any physical or infrastructural 
integration between the new and the old developments. Instead they see Swanscombe and 
new developments such as Eastern Quarry and Ebbsfleet as very different communities with 
very different residents that will inevitably have little to do with each other. Some also 
express resentment about the level of facilities that are due to be created in the new 
communities. This investment stands in stark contrast to the ‘neglect’ of Swanscombe which 
they feel continues to suffer from a lack of accessible community facilities.  
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“What I think, is that you’ve got everything going on around us, and we’re stuck in the 
middle if you see what I mean. So whether any of this will benefit us I don’t know.” 
(DTR) 
“I see Swanscombe as being surrounded by development, but there’s very little 
integration at all…and I don’t think the new areas would welcome any form of 
integration. There’s going to be Swanscombe and Eastern Quarry and each is going 
to have its own separate identity.” (MMU) 
“At Eastern Quarry they’re going to make their own little village, schools, 
doctors…another small town being developed. It just shuts us off again. And we’re 
surrounded by these new developments, and you’ve got Swanscombe, the old town, 
in the middle.” (SPA) 
Nonetheless, this group is not inherently opposed to development. They acknowledge that 
the development of Ebbsfleet International Station is likely to be a good thing for the area 
and they are broadly supportive of Bluewater even though it is not a place where they would 
choose to shop. Given the difficulties that their grandchildren face in finding a house, they 
also recognise the need to create some additional housing in the area; if not quite on the 
scale being discussed. It is their experience of regeneration to date in Kent Thameside that 
has fuelled their scepticism about the new development in Eastern Quarry and Ebbsfleet. 
One resident for instance refers to the failure to integrate Ingress Park into the rest of 
Swanscombe and Greenhithe.  
“Ingress Park is a nice enough development. I think people here look at it a little bit 
enviously. It is a bit them and us….I don’t think it’s really been integrated. It is a 
dormitory area. The people there don’t really give anything to the area. They might 
do so within the confines of the development but not outside it.” (MMU) 
The failure to incorporate Swanscombe into the new Fastrack bus network coupled with 
cutbacks to existing bus services within the village is seen as evidence that the regeneration 
partners aren’t giving Swanscombe’s needs the priority they deserve.  
“They didn’t tell us when Fastrack was being set up that they were going to take 
some of our services away in order to pay for it. You cannot get to the hospital from 
here by bus, which is disgusting.” (SWO) 
“My biggest bugbear is Fastrack. It cuts out Swanscombe entirely and we’ve got no 
feeders onto it. At the moment you can walk up to the George and Dragon and get it, 
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but the new route will go through the marshes, so we won’t be able to get to it at all.” 
(MMU)  
It seems therefore from this evidence that the regeneration partners have a great deal of 
work to do to persuade this group of residents that the regeneration of Eastern Quarry and 
Ebbsfleet is capable of providing Swanscombe with any significant, lasting, tangible benefits.  
6.4   Group C: Community Crusaders 
6.4.1  Introduction 
Articulate, passionate and single-minded, this group of residents are community 
campaigners who have made it their life’s work to change the face of Swanscombe, 
Knockhall and Horns Cross.  
Invariably, they are middle age professionals holding high level positions with management 
responsibilities usually, but not exclusively, within the public sector. They include local 
government officials, teachers, health officials, church ministers, engineers and business 
people. Although some work in London, most, particularly those in the public sector, work 
within North Kent; a situation which has helped to reinforce their connection to the area and 
enable them to develop a network of high level contacts. This group is also among a select 
handful of Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross residents, who have been college or 
university educated.  
Most weren’t born or brought up in Swanscombe, Knockhall or Horns Cross but moved there 
early in their careers - often from elsewhere in North Kent or South East London - in order to 
get on the housing ladder. Having grown attached to the area they then decided to stay and 
put down roots. They all now have comfortable incomes, but the size of their home does not 
always reflect their salary. A few now live in substantial detached or semi-detached houses, 
but a number have chosen to stay in the same modest terraced houses, some of them ex-
local authority, that they moved into as young professionals.  
Some are members of political parties and involved in local charities. They are often shrewd 
judges of local politics and know how to navigate the political landscape and gain access to 
local power-brokers. They are also quick to exploit these political contacts when necessary 
in order to further a local cause. This has given them an appreciation of the rationale behind 
key regeneration decisions and policies relating to Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns 
Cross and an insight into the personality and motives of the people responsible for making 
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them. Moreover; they understand the difficulties involved in making effective interventions 
and the obstacles that have to be overcome. They are pragmatic about what can be 
achieved, and realistic about the time-scales involved. However, when they feel an 
opportunity has been missed, or resources squandered, their criticism of those responsible 
is often robust. 
Although this group is extremely small in size, their impact on the community has been 
considerable. It is for this reason that this group of residents is profiled in this chapter. This 
section will look first at their general perception of Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross 
today. It will then consider their views with regard to the quality of the urban environment and 
the leadership provided by the local authorities in more detail. It will also briefly examine the 
actions they have taken themselves to promote a culture of ‘active citizenship’ in the three 
villages. Finally, it will explore their attitudes towards the new development in Kent 
Thameside.  
This group has been identified on the basis of the testimony provided by seven residents 
living in Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross. In this case the Mosaic Group profiles of 
these residents bear little relationship with the profile set out above. Given that the 
educational, occupational and cultural backgrounds of these residents are largely atypical of 
the communities in which they live, this is not surprising. The majority of these residents are 
notionally part of the ‘Ex-council community’ Mosaic group (Experian, 2010), which is 
characterised by low educational outcomes and routine occupations – the reverse of group 
C’s profile. In this case, therefore, it is clear that the Mosaic classification cannot be used to 
confirm our group profile. 
6.4.2  Perceptions of Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross 
This group of residents have a close interest in the cohesiveness of their communities. They 
are conscious that the number of residents who were born or grew up in the area is falling 
and they are concerned that fewer residents appear to have a social or economic stake in 
the three villages. In their eyes, the community is at a crossroads. While they see no reason 
why Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross cannot emerge as stronger communities with 
a clear sense of their own identity, they think there is a risk that the remaining bonds holding 
the community together could become further atrophied and disintegrate. They worry that 
the opportunity to reinvigorate the community provided by the arrival of a new set of 
predominantly younger, more affluent residents could be lost. 
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Finding a way to preserve the cohesiveness of the community is a key challenge for the 
villages they believe. However, they are not seeking simply to reproduce the sense of 
togetherness that the community had when the cement industry was the primary employer. 
They are conscious that the community has moved on and that a new identity needs to be 
forged: one that builds on the past and respects the contribution that existing residents have 
made to the area but also incorporates the demographic change that has occurred. This is 
crucial, they feel, in order to prevent the emergence of a socially fragmented and ghettoised 
community, split down the line between the old and the new residents.  
 
“When I first moved here it seemed like a model place to live: Everyone knew each 
other; everyone looked out for one another. The neighbourliness has changed since 
then. There is less and less social cohesion. But I actually think it has more potential 
than other communities because of that historic sense of identity. I always likened it 
to an old mining community and funnily enough all those old ideas still permeate the 
community. There are still people who have ‘Made in Swanscombe’ tattooed across 
their backs!” (BFI) 
“I moved here 18 years ago. People felt as though they were lost and being 
overlooked: the community had gone; the industry had gone; the shops had closed 
down….. Now we have more professional, upwardly mobile people moving in and 
that’s bringing money into the area. They’re changing that sense of insularity, 
because they’re not familiar with that history and they’re living for the now. ... But 
there needs to be a place where the different social groupings can actually interrelate 
so you can avoid social ghettos.” (RBA) 
“I think that more could be done in terms of place making and in doing so raising the 
civic pride of existing local residents and giving new and existing residents an 
opportunity to engage with each other through that shared cultural heritage.” (GBA) 
6.4.3  The quality of the urban environment 
These residents believe that if the community is to move forward the quality of the urban 
environment needs to be improved. In their opinion a lack of investment over the years in the 
street-scene and basic amenities of the three communities has left much of Swanscombe, 
Knockhall and Horns Cross in a parlous condition.  
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“A lot of Swanscombe looks unloved. There could be more flowers etc, more effort 
made to encourage householders to tidy up …. Where’s the money been spent? I 
don’t see any evidence of an improved street scene.” (BFI) 
“In Knockhall the roads and paths are not being maintained to the level to which they 
used to be. Another thing is that vandalism – and we’ve been lucky it’s been very low 
up to now – is beginning to escalate.” (TWR) 
“If you go back thirty years, (Horns Cross) wasn’t neglected as such but not a lot of 
resources went into it compared to Dartford and Gravesend. Every few years or so, 
the cement industry would build something to help keep people on board but that 
was it. But now they’ve gone there isn’t anyone to provide a helping hand.” (RFO)  
In their view this neglect has damaged the community’s self-esteem; a state of mind that is 
being exacerbated, they argue, by the new developments. Before the new developments at 
Ingress Park and Waterstone Park came on the horizon, this failure to invest in the fabric of 
the villages was less visible. However, now that houses there are being built, and existing 
residents are able to see the level of resources being invested in the fabric of these new 
estates, the poverty of their own environment has become more apparent. In fact even some 
of these residents, who are worldly, confident and professionally successful, come away 
from new developments such as Ingress Park, feeling as though they are ‘second class 
citizens’. 
“Swanscombe’s urban environment has to be improved. Compared to a lot of the 
new developments, it is very much second rate and when you go onto these new 
developments you come away feeling like a second class citizen.” (GBA)  
“The new developments will also have an impact in terms of showing the difference 
in the standards of housing there and the infrastructure monies used to maintain it 
and the standard of Swanscombe housing. It will show Swanscombe in an even 
worse light I think.” (BFI) 
However, it is not just the physical appearance of the villages that causes these residents 
concern. The provision of community facilities is also seen as wholly inadequate: This is felt 
especially keenly in Knockhall. Yet, there is also concern about the lack of community 
facilities in Ingress Park and Waterstone Park. These facilities are seen by the group as an 
essential prerequisite for building a more cohesive and integrated community. They believe 
that without these social arena, which help to anchor the community and generate a stronger 
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corporate identity based on shared experiences and activities, the community will struggle to 
flourish. 
In Knockhall much of the existing community provision has been stripped away in the last 
twenty years according to residents living there. A former NHS clinic that also provided a 
home for youth club was closed down due to concerns about its asbestos content and has 
yet to be replaced. Knockhall’s only community hall, meanwhile, is seen as woefully under-
utilised. And efforts by the church to create a new community facility that will act as bridge 
between the new and old communities have been hampered by funding difficulties. These 
Knockhall residents also feel that Swanscombe has received a disproportionate share of 
capital funding compared to Knockhall. 
“We’re finding a huge demand for community facilities. We’ve opened three 
playgroups here recently and we still have to turn people away. Where else can they 
go in the community? There’s also nowhere for teenagers to meet – even the open 
spaces are being reduced. And there’s is no real centre to this village. Where can 
people meet, or bump into friends?” (RBA) 
“There is a shortage of good local shops and there is a shortage of basic leisure 
facilities. ..I think the local councils pay lip service to Knockhall. The focus of the town 
council is Swanscombe and the focus of the borough council is Dartford. The 
resources that come into Swanscombe are very large; the resources that come into 
Knockhall are very small.” (BKE) 
“There’s nothing for the young here; nothing at all for pre-school age children. When 
we run the youth club the council didn’t do anything for us. When they knocked the 
clinic down and didn’t give us an option to go anywhere else.” (CCU) 
“Any facilities that we did have are gone. More people are moving in – they’re all 
young people who will eventually have children and so on. The church runs a mother 
and toddler group and it’s now heaving. The other day there were 35 adults down 
there.” (TWR) 
The residents living in Swanscombe on the other hand don’t appear to have the same 
concerns as their neighbours in Knockhall about the level of community provision within the 
village: a fact that adds credence to the suggestion that there is an imbalance between them 
in terms of resource allocation.  
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“Swanscombe is probably doing a lot better than Knockhall which is smaller and 
relatively isolated…. For a place this size the facilities in Swanscombe are pretty 
good. You’ve got the centre down Craylands Lane and the Swanscombe Centre, 
that’s got three badminton courts, an outdoor pitch and a weights room. You’ve also 
got football pitches at Swan Valley.” (GBA)  
6.4.4  Perceptions of the local authorities 
A key concern for the residents living in Swanscombe and Knockhall was the performance of 
Swanscombe and Greenhithe Town Council.  
The residents in Knockhall accuse the Town Council of a deliberate bias towards 
Swanscombe and of ignoring the needs of Knockhall. Its indifference is summed up for one 
resident by the failure of the Residents’ Association to put forward any candidates at the last 
local elections who lived in Knockhall. He suggests that the residents’ association’s 
continued ascendancy owes more to the still toxic reputation of the local Labour Party in 
Swanscombe and Greenhithe, than it does to any inherent political qualities it may possess.  
“There is a growing desire in Greenhithe for separation between Swanscombe and 
Greenhithe. At the last borough election not one of the six town councillors that 
actually got elected for Knockhall lived in Knockhall. Our problem was that for years 
the area was dominated by a necrotic and often corrupt Labour council. Now we 
have the Residents Association. They’re not corrupt but they offer poor 
representation to local people.” (BKE) 
“I do get the sense that Knockhall is being overlooked and that the emphasis is on 
Swanscombe. There is this constant sense of does anyone actually care about the 
people who actually live here?” (RBA)  
In Swanscombe, meanwhile, residents acknowledge the Town Council’s commitment to the 
community but have reservations about its decision-making record. One area of concern is 
the manner in which capital funding from the Borough Council and the Government aimed at 
regenerating Swanscombe has been spent. The decision to spend over a million pounds on 
a new building for the Town Council is seen as particularly ill-judged. Not only do they 
question the necessity of such a building, they feel the project has been badly managed with 
little thought given as to how its running costs will be financed in the long-term. 
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“I don’t agree with the decision to build a new set of council offices in Swanscombe. I 
can’t see the point when you should be looking at the wider spatial structure of the 
emerging community. It seems daft to be building something on the basis of the old 
when you should be looking at the new.” (GBA) 
 
“I’m not sure the new council building has helped. The problem was Dartford didn’t 
project manage it; Swanscombe didn’t project manage it, so it’s half empty. People 
didn’t think about the operational expenditure needed to run it.” (BFI) 
6.4.5  The need for active citizenship 
Another serious challenge in this group of residents’ view, one closely linked to the 
perceived lack of effective political leadership, is the absence of a culture of active 
citizenship in the community. Although there is dialogue between residents and their 
community leaders, in their opinion it is not a constructive one. Residents are willing to 
petition the local authorities on local issues and to press for better services, but they rarely 
play a role in identifying solutions or in implementing them. This responsibility continues to 
lie firmly in the hands of the small cabal of elected councillors and other influential local 
bodies. In this group of residents’ view little has changed since the days of the ‘combine’ 
when a small clique of paternalistic industrial bosses and civic fathers ran the villages. 
Challenging this culture of paternalism and empowering residents to take more responsibility 
for the management of their community is essential they believe if the communities are to 
move forward.  
It is a challenge that this group of residents have chosen to take on themselves. Many of 
them have become closely involved in activities and projects aimed at addressing perceived 
shortfalls in the facilities and resources available to the community3. As well as improving the 
level of community provision, one of the main motivations behind their work has been to try 
to inculcate a culture of active citizenship in the community.  
Residents have been given a central role from the start for instance in delivering the 
Greenhithe Community Market Garden project. The project is now ‘owned’ by the community 
                                                             
3
 BKE has led a project to create a Community Market Garden in Greenhithe. Until recently BFI was 
closely involvement in the running of Swanscombe Tigers Football Club. RBA and TWR are at the 
forefront of plans to build a new multi-purpose community facility on land at St Mary’s Church. CCU 
led a youth group in Knockhall until 2004. GBA is a community activist who has been a strong critic of 
aspects of the proposed new development in the Ebbsfleet Valley. RFO is a senior figure in the local 
Methodist Church.  
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and this has undoubtedly contributed towards its success. In Swanscombe meanwhile, 
residents’ efforts to sustain a local football club and provide it with a permanent base in the 
village, are aimed at reaching out to young men and teenage boys and helping them to 
establish a positive identity and become more self-confident.  
“I think that one of things that needs to change is the culture of paternalism where 
communities are told what they need rather than articulate what they need.” (BKE)  
“My job - with the gradual development of the Thames Gateway providing an impetus 
- is to bring this church into the heart of the community. If we don’t create more 
community facilities then I can only see people’s dissatisfaction with life here 
increasing. We want to use the church as a focal point where local people come 
throughout the day for all kinds of activities.” (RBA)  
“People say about the young people in Swanscombe that there is football and 
motorbikes – that’s how they identify themselves. Well they can’t do either. The 
Tigers now have 14 teams but we have to play outside the area. With so much green 
space around, and so much landfill, there should have been the opportunity to 
provide them with their own facilities.” (BFI)  
The projects have met with mixed success, largely due to the differing levels of buy in and 
financial support they’ve received from the local authorities and other statutory agencies. 
Nonetheless, they hope that their example will encourage other residents to follow their lead. 
At the very least they hope that it will begin to change the nature of the relationship between 
residents and the elected bodies serving them.  
6.4.6  Perceptions of new development 
This group of residents’ optimism about the capacity of Swanscombe,  Knockhall and Horns 
Cross’ capacity to reinvent themselves and become communities with active, politically 
engaged and self-confident residents stands in stark contrast to their attitude towards the 
new development in the area. Here their attitude is one of unalloyed pessimism.  
Their criticisms of the efforts being made to integrate existing communities and 
developments at Ebbsfleet and Eastern Quarry are particularly stinging. They believe that 
meaningful integration either physical, social or economic is more or less impossible given 
the location and design of the new developments and the type of housing being built in 
them. They are also sceptical as to whether ‘integration’ has ever been a serious goal of the 
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developers. Many of the actions taken by developers on the borders between the new and 
old communities are seen by residents as inconsistent with the policy of closer integration.  
“There’s no spatial masterplan for Swanscombe and Greenhithe taking into account 
Eastern Quarry, Ebbsfleet and Swanscombe Peninsula. If these places are allowed 
to develop as separate entities it will lead to alienation and social dislocation: 
Swanscombe could become a ghetto unless we’re careful. It’s not simply about 
providing footpath linkages, it is about making them coherent as a place with a real 
identity.” (GBA) 
“I think that there is an unwillingness to have the oiks from the council estate in 
Swanscombe mixing with Eastern Quarry residents; and this will have a negative 
effect in terms of social cohesion. There was supposed to be all sorts of walking 
routes linking Swanscombe and the quarry: well the only evidence of that so far is 
that they have put up a metal fence in order to shield it.” (BFI)  
“In my mind the way new housing developments are built creates separation. If you 
look at Waterstone Park, Ingress Park, they’re dead end estates; and that creates 
separation – them and us.” (RBA) 
“I went to the pre-launch of Eastern Quarry and the developers talked about this 
wonderful enclosed area with easy access to the motorway. They never want to talk 
to people about Swanscombe, Greenhithe or Stone. If you’re an optimist you could 
talk about a gradual gentrification of the area; if you’re a pessimist you’d say it was a 
recipe for disaster.” (RFO) 
The continued failure to upgrade the villages’ infrastructure is indicative, they believe, of the 
regeneration partners disinterest in achieving the integration of the new and existing 
communities. Swanscombe may have had some money directed at it in recent years, unlike 
Knockhall or Horns Cross, but it is not enough to correct the probable imbalance between 
the communities. In their view Eastern Quarry residents are unlikely to come to 
Swanscombe or Knockhall for any of their services as most of what they need will be 
provided on site. Obvious opportunities to create shared facilities, such as at the Swan 
Valley site, have not been exploited and the chance to link the new and the old via the 
Fastrack bus network has been squandered.  
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“I don’t think that in any of the negotiations that have taken place, any regard has 
been paid to the existing communities. They are going to build a new school in 
Eastern Quarry. Yet they’ve just built a new private finance school in Swanscombe; 
which is half full. Instead of providing new football pitches in Swanscombe – as Land 
Securities agreed – Kent are telling them to put them in Eastern Quarry. Any bus 
routes coming along? No. Anyone actually investing in Swanscombe town centre? 
No.” (BFI) 
 “At the moment it can seem like ‘them and us’, but you can prevent that by making it 
about ‘us’. It does seem silly creating facilities on the edge of Swanscombe - the 
Swan Valley campus - and then keeping it on the edge of both communities when it 
could be at the heart of both; or certainly linking both.” (RBA) 
“One problem is that Swanscombe isn’t going to be connected into the Fastrack 
network. It is difficult to get a system like Fastrack through an existing urban area 
with a relatively tight grained range of residential streets, but that doesn’t lessen the 
problem. Swanscombe could end up being relatively isolated compared to the new 
developments.” (GBA) 
To this group of residents it seems unlikely that the regeneration taking place will deliver any 
meaningful improvements in the fabric of their communities. In their view, neither the 
resources nor the motivation are there to make this happen. Although some economic 
benefits from regeneration will filter down to existing residents, most of the benefits, in their 
view, will be accrued by accident rather than by design. Sheer proximity to Ebbsfleet will 
guarantee some gains for the community, but they could have been greater if the right 
foundations had been put in place from day one. In their view Kent Thameside could well 
come to represent an opportunity lost, rather than an opportunity gained in twenty years 
time.  
6.5  Group D: Happy Families 
6.5.1  Introduction 
This group of residents is the largest of the four groups profiled in this chapter.  
A pragmatic, hard working group of people, with strong family and friendship networks and a 
dependable income, they have few complaints either about their own lives or the 
communities in which they live. They are not politically active or engaged and their ‘voice’ is 
  167 
 
one that is rarely heard in the ongoing debate about the direction of regeneration in Kent 
Thameside.  
These residents have lived in Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross for most of their 
adult lives. Many were born and raised locally while the rest moved to the villages in early 
adulthood as a result of relationship with a local man or woman or in order to find an 
affordable home. They tend to be in stable long-term relationships and have either children 
living at home or adult children and grand-children living nearby.  
In most cases, both partners are working, either both full-time, or one full-time and one part-
time. However, some are now semi or fully retired. Many of the men work in skilled trade 
occupations such as plumbing and carpentry for local firms or national service providers with 
local offices. In most cases they left school at sixteen and went on to gain the necessary 
vocational qualifications at a local FE college while training on the job. The rest work, or 
worked in semi-skilled or unskilled occupations. In the past they would have found work in 
the cement or paper making industries. Today they often work as warehouse, machine or 
transport operatives or in equivalent posts for companies based at places such as 
Crossways Business Park or Bluewater. 
Typically, the women in this group are employed locally in the retail industry or in 
administrative, catering or cleaning jobs in the public or private sector. However, a few 
women who possess Level 4/5 qualifications are working locally as education or healthcare 
professionals. Some women work full-time, but many work part-time to fit in with family and 
caring responsibilities. The exceptions are usually women with very young children or a large 
number of children who tend not to be in employment.  
While the majority of these residents live in two to three bedroom terraces, there is a mix of 
tenures among the group. Many in their thirties and forties have been able to afford to obtain 
mortgages. However, some younger residents, faced by rising house prices in Swanscombe, 
Knockhall and Horns Cross after the millennium have had to consider other purchasing 
options such as shared ownership deals. A few residents, particularly those in their fifties 
and sixties, are long-term local authority tenants who have not chosen to exercise their right 
to buy. 
These residents tend to have active local social lives. Many are regular visitors to local pubs 
and social clubs and a few have found the time to get involved in local sports clubs or 
voluntary organisations such as the Scouts. In most cases their involvement in these groups 
has been a long-term one that began when they were children. 
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This section will look first at these residents’ perceptions of Swanscombe, Knockhall and 
Horns Cross before going on to consider their attitudes towards the new development taking 
place.  
This group has been identified on the basis of the testimony provided by twenty residents 
living in Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross. Just over half of these residents were in 
the Terraced Melting Pot Mosaic group (Experian, 2010), which is composed, like group D, 
of semi and unskilled workers with few formal qualifications. Another trait which is common 
to both groups is their social lives. Terraced Melting Pot residents possess strong social 
networks in the immediate community and spend much of their spare time, as group D do, in 
local pubs, clubs and restaurants. The remaining residents are split between two Mosaic 
groups which also consist of householders with limited qualifications who work in routine 
occupations: Ex-council Community and Claimant Cultures. The contrasting housing tenure 
status of these two Mosaic groups, with Ex-council Community predominantly composed of 
owner occupied households and Claimant Cultures largely consisting of social rented 
housing, is consistent with the broad mix of tenures present in group D.  
6.5.2  Perceptions of Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross 
The residents in this group like living in Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross. They 
describe the villages as friendly and close-knit places; although some of those who arrived 
as adults acknowledge that that they’ve had to work hard to become accepted by the 
community. Their neighbours and friends are in constant touch and can be relied upon to 
help out with childcare responsibilities when necessary. 
“Yes it’s fine here. My kids are at a good school; my wife’s got her friends here.... I 
know Swanscombe has got a bit of a name for being a bad area, but it’s not really.... 
A lot of the people have been here for years and years. I wouldn’t say they don’t 
welcome you here but people moving here have got to keep a bit of an open mind 
and join in with things. If you do that then people are quite welcoming.” (PMI) 
“Yes this road here is nice and quiet. Everybody gets on. The youngsters here are as 
good as gold. I’ve lived here almost all life and I’ll never change. I know you’ve all 
new faces here now but all my mates are still all here.” (DFR) 
“The people around here are very friendly. One of our neighbours uses some 
interesting language when she’s had a few drinks. But nothing horrible; no-one 
coming around knocking on your door being offensive.” (EHR) 
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“Yeah I do like it here. There’s quite a variety of pubs. The neighbours are really 
friendly.... I play in the local cricket team too and it’s quite a tight knit bunch. We get 
on really well and most of us come from Swanscombe.  After cricket we usually go 
down the social club at the pavilion.” (MBR) 
Nonetheless there are aspects of the community which these residents would like to see 
improved. A key issue for them, which is unsurprising given their family circumstances, is the 
level of provision in the area for young people, whose needs they believe have been 
habitually ignored by the local authorities.  
“There’s loads for the old people - the senior citizens club, the Oast House - but 
nothing for kids. They put Bluewater in to pep it up, but there’s not much really and 
we’re supposed to be the gateway to England.” (JFR) 
“We need more things for teenagers to do around here I think. My son was stopped 
by the Police the other day and they told him to go Kings Farm in Gravesend.  There 
are loads of things to do there, they said. But we live in Swanscombe!’ Going to 
Kings Farm’s not the answer.” (SNE) 
They are also concerned about the level of traffic in the area, which they feel has increased 
sharply since the opening of Bluewater. 
“When I first came to the area, it was a bit down at heel and then all of sudden with 
Bluewater it became an area that people want to move to. But it is a very busy area 
with a lot of traffic and congestion.” (KFA) 
In the main, however, these residents are happy with their lives and are phlegmatic about 
the shortcomings of their community. After all, no community, they argue, however affluent 
or attractive is devoid of faults.  
6.5.3  Perceptions of new development 
This group of residents are equally pragmatic about the changes taking place in Kent 
Thameside. There is a downside as well as an upside to all new development, they say, and 
Kent Thameside is no exception. Rather than dwelling on the disadvantages of 
development, they prefer to reflect on the positives it will bring to their lives. 
The jobs that Ebbsfleet and the surrounding commercial development will create will provide 
a benefit for the area, they believe, that overrides most of the downsides they’ll experience. 
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For an area which experienced such heavy unemployment in the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
opportunities that Ebbsfleet will create for local people are a huge boon: one not to be 
dismissed lightly. Moreover; there is no doubt in their minds that the residents of existing 
communities will be able to embrace such opportunities. After all, they say, the communities 
have prospered in recent years thanks to the property led development industry and the 
expansion of the service sector economy. The growth of these industries has given them 
both work; a home; and a degree of financial security.  
The skilled tradesmen in this group know that the new development, as it takes shape, will 
always provide them with work. Those with administrative and secretarial skills are also 
hopeful of finding work at Ebbsfleet; an opportunity which will reduce their travel to work time 
and give them more at home with the family. The same is true of those residents in semi-
skilled posts. They are confident that Ebbsfleet will provide work for them too, just as the 
opening of Crossways and Bluewater did in the previous decade. 
“There’s a lot of people living here who will benefit from Ebbsfleet; people with their 
own businesses. There are so many guys here who are locksmiths, plumbers, 
carpenters.” (PMI) 
“It’ll be good for jobs, definitely. I worked in Canary Wharf and the City as a secretary 
for ten years. I don’t want to work in Canary Wharf or have that journey up to London 
again, so (Ebbsfleet) will benefit me as it’s on the doorstep.” (EHR) 
“I think Ebbsfleet is going to be a very good thing for this area. …Jobs, obviously, if 
they employ people from the area, and they should pick up some people.” (YST) 
“I think it can only do the area good in terms of jobs and in putting the area on the 
map and also for house prices.” (SNE) 
Nonetheless, these residents were less certain as to whether existing communities could be 
integrated seamlessly with the new developments. While less damning in their assessment 
than other groups, they were nevertheless conscious of the challenges that would need to 
be overcome for integration to be achieved. 
In their opinion, for integration to take place, considerable resources would have to be 
diverted into existing communities in order to upgrade their facilities and to create new 
shared services. Without these shared services the residents of the new developments 
would have no reason to venture beyond their expensive enclaves. New investment was 
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also important, they argued, in order to blur the boundaries between the new developments 
and altogether scruffier existing communities. 
“The way I’d like to see it is if the whole place is not separated but joined together 
with something. Whatever building works do take place in the Eastern Quarry need to 
bring it up so that it joins onto Swanscombe.” (PMI) 
“I think with Eastern Quarry... the chances are that you won’t ever need to meet up 
with anyone down there because they’ll have their own community sort of thing.” 
(SSM) 
“It’s all right if they can build the roads and all the amenities so we don’t go without 
because other people are moving in. I think it is a few too many houses though. 
People won’t know each other before long.” (JFR) 
This group of residents are also conscious of the significant difference in the price of housing 
- and also in residents’ income - between new developments like Ingress Park and the 
existing communities. Ingress Park is seen as a ‘nice’ development, but one which is well 
beyond their financial reach. It is a place for ‘businessmen’ and ‘professional types’, in their 
view, rather than people from their backgrounds.  
“We looked at some of the ‘affordable housing’ at Ingress Park, but it was still very 
high. The house was still £260,000, so we would have had to have a mortgage of 
£130,000; and then pay rent on top of it. No-one on a low wage is going to be able to 
afford to move in there.” (EHR) 
“We had a look at a house down in Ingress Park, but it’s very expensive and for the 
size of them you’re not getting a lot for your money. It’s all about the view over the 
river isn’t it? I think you’re only going to get businessmen buying them really.” (MBR) 
“We was amazed when we walked down there to see how many houses there were 
snaking along the river-front. It’s a lovely development; bit out of our reach though.” 
(KFA) 
Despite these reservations, the residents in this group do not question the principles 
underpinning the regeneration process. They are, by inclination, passive observers of the 
regeneration process who believe that it is for politicians and developers, not them, to decide 
where and in what manner development takes place. They see development as inevitable 
and beyond their control: a state of affairs they accept with equanimity and without rancour. 
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“Perhaps we’re better off not knowing too much about it before it happens because 
there’s nothing we can do about it anyway.” (JLO) 
“I don’t see what difference it would have made to involve us – because it is going to 
happen anyway.” (SNE)  
“We’re not very important in their scheme of things. When they’re moving so many 
thousand cubic metres of earth I suppose they’re worried about us saying ‘we’ve got 
a bit of dust up here’.” (EHR) 
In truth, this group of residents see the regeneration of Kent Thameside as tangential to their 
own lives. It will, they accept, ultimately create opportunities for them, but they are not 
people who get unduly exercised by events and issues that don’t have an immediate, visible 
impact on their lives and those of their family. They are content therefore simply to watch 
and let matters take their course.  
6.6  Conclusion 
This chapter has set out the profiles of the four distinct residents’ groups that have been 
identified using the data from interviews with residents in Swanscombe, Knockhall and 
Horns Cross. These profiles are broadly consistent with the Mosaic group classifications of 
the households in these groups. The exception is Group C, which, as we have seen, 
consists of individuals whose social, educational and occupational backgrounds are quite 
atypical of the households in the streets in which they live. Nonetheless, this analysis 
confirms the value of geo-demographic classification systems like Mosaic as a tool for 
understanding the social, economic and cultural diversity present within each community. It 
cannot capture outliers like Group C which deviate from the mean but it is a useful device for 
categorising the broad socio-economic character of individual clusters of households.  
 The profiles presented here provide only a snapshot of the three villages. Nevertheless, 
they confirm the idea that Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross are complex and multi-
facetted communities which resist any reductionist analysis that attempts to discern any one 
single ‘authentic’ community voice in relation to regeneration.  
The profiles also suggest that the nature of residents’ views on regeneration is closely linked 
to the extent of their stake in the community. This chapter has shown that residents who are 
family and career focused such and those who see themselves as only temporary residents 
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(Groups D and A) have very different attitudes to regeneration to those are heavily involved 
in community life and politics and residents who have first-hand experience of the area’s 
industrial past (Groups B and C). While the former groups are generally sanguine about 
regeneration, although they have some concerns about congestion and construction related 
disruption, the latter groups are much less content. The embattled residents of Group B, 
while acknowledging the need for more housing for their children and grandchildren, fear 
that regeneration will lead to loss of valuable amenity land and are suspicious of the motives 
of the regeneration partners, despite their public commitment to community engagement. 
The residents of Group C, meanwhile, who have strong opinions about how regeneration 
should be delivered, speak eloquently about the opportunities that are being missed by the 
regeneration professionals and the promises that have not been met.  
 
This chapter also underlines the need to treat with caution the views of those who purport to 
speak for the community, or to have a privileged insight into its consciousness. This is true 
not just for politicians or external actors, but also for residents, however long they have lived 
in the community and however well immersed they are in the life of that community. Self-
styled community leaders are as likely as any external agency to perhaps underestimate or 
downplay - not always wittingly it must be said - certain social trends that don’t fit their 
favoured political narrative. The testimony of residents in Group D, for example, which has 
highlighted the resilience of certain social networks, is far from consistent with the narrative 
of a community in decline articulated by residents in Group B. It is also at variance with the 
evidence of residents in Group C, who focus on the threats to the cohesion of the 
community, while making their case for new investment in the social infrastructure of 
Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross.  
An over-reliance on the testimony of the most vocal and politically active members of the 
community by development partners can lead to the adoption of policies that do not 
accurately reflect the will of the community. An illustration of this is the decision to include a 
plan for a ‘Major Urban Park’ into the design brief and planning application for the Eastern 
Quarry development (Dartford Borough Council, 2007b). This park, 46 acres in size, is due 
to be situated between the main Eastern Quarry development and Knockhall and 
Swanscombe to the north. It was included in the application at the behest of Swanscombe 
and Greenhithe Town Council which was anxious to replace the green space that had been 
lost to the community as a result of Blue Circle’s quarrying activities over the last fifty years. 
Yet while this decision seems to reflect the wishes of vocal older residents, such as those in 
Group B, it is less clear whether it meets the needs of other residents. It would probably find 
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favour with residents in Group A, who attach a high value to green space and a quiet 
environment, but most of the remaining residents whose views are reported here appear to 
believe that physical integration of the two urban communities is more important. 
Ironically, the officials at the Kent Thameside Delivery Board, in Dartford Borough Council 
and also Land Securities that were interviewed as part of this study, all questioned the 
wisdom of the urban park concept. However, they felt obliged to incorporate the park into the 
plans as the Town Council was in a strong position politically at the time as a result of the 
Resident Association’s coalition with the Conservatives at Borough Council level. They also 
had no other channels of communication with residents that would allow them to test local 
support for the plan; particularly among residents - such as those in Group D – who are 
disinclined, as we have seen, to engage in formal consultation exercises.  
It is an example that illustrates the need for developers and their public partners to build a 
relationship with the community that reaches beyond its most visible and voluble 
organisations and individuals. Time spent engaging residents across the community will 
often reveal multiple perspectives that may challenge existing pre-conceptions and prove 
difficult to reconcile; indeed it may make it harder not easier to establish a consensus as to 
how regeneration should proceed. Nonetheless, it is a necessary first step, if the whole 
community, not just a politically engaged minority, is to have a stake in the regeneration 
process.  
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Part III 
 
The impact of Kent Thameside’s social regeneration initiatives on 
Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross 
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Chapter 7 An integrated community? The relationship between Ingress Park and 
  Waterstone Park with Knockhall and Horns Cross 
7.1 Introduction 
A key aim of this study is to understand the extent to which the Kent Thameside 
regeneration partners have been successful in promoting the integration of new and existing 
communities in the area.  
Creating a seamless, ‘integrated development’ where residents use the same commun ity 
facilities, mix socially and identify themselves as equal citizens of the same community is 
one of the regeneration partners’ central regeneration objectives (Kent Thameside 
Association, 1997, Kent Thameside Delivery Board, 2005). Successive governments over 
the last twenty years, meanwhile, have also demanded an integrated approach to 
regeneration that places the interests of the existing community at the heart of the process.  
Consequently, “there is much onus on the development industry”, Imrie (2009, 98) observes, 
to ensure that existing communities are “core” to the regeneration process. The goal of 
‘knitting together’ new developments with existing communities is often presented, Raco and 
Henderson (2009) note, as an important rationale by developers and local authorities in an 
effort to legitimise their regeneration plans.  The tacit aim behind this ambition to create a 
mixed community is to ensure that existing residents, particularly in the more deprived 
wards, are exposed to the lifestyles and worldviews of incoming residents, many of whom 
are highly educated and employed in the knowledge intensive industries that Kent 
Thameside wants to attract.  
If we are to understand the extent to which integration is taking place between new and 
existing communities in Kent Thameside then we need to turn to Ingress Park and 
Waterstone Park. As the largest and most mature of the Kent Thameside developments, 
located adjacent to Knockhall and Horns Cross, they are well placed to help us determine 
whether the regeneration partners are succeeding in their bid to create a cohesive, 
integrated community (see map 7.1).  
Ingress Park, which lies immediately to the north of Knockhall, began in 2001 and now holds 
just over a thousand houses. It has long been seen as one of the Thames Gateway’s 
prestige developments. In the late 1990s planners and politicians in Kent Thameside saw 
Ingress, with its dramatic riverside setting, as an important opportunity to change the 
“derelict, chimney stack” image of the area (Llewelyn Davies, Roger Tym, 1993, Dartford 
Borough Council, 1995, 14). And in Crest Nicolson (2002) they had a developer which 
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shared this vision. For Crest, Ingress was a chance to create a visually arresting, high 
density development that would serve as a flagship for the company for years to come and 
strengthen its credentials as a socially responsible developer that is conscious of its 
responsibilities to existing communities (see figure 7.1). 
Map 7.1  The relationship between Ingress Park, Waterstone Park, Knockhall & Horns Cross 
 
                   Source: Bryan Jones (2014) 
        The yellow arrows indicate the main visual interfaces between Ingress Park,  
                    Waterstone Park, Knockhall and Horns Cross 
Waterstone Park, meanwhile, is situated half a mile south west of Ingress between 
Knockhall and Horns Cross (see figure 7.2). A joint venture between Countryside Properties 
and Land Securities, a city centre commercial developer making its first ever foray into the 
house building market, Waterstone Park now contains over 650 houses built in two phases.  
For Land Securities, it was an opportunity to “set a high design standard” that would “set the 
scheme apart from the average quality of most new housing in the surroundings” (CABE, 
2010b).  Its partnership with Countryside Properties, a company “who understands 
regeneration and delivers quality”, would, Land Securities’ said, “create a development 
which sits comfortably with the existing community” (Countryside Properties, 2011). The 
Chairman of Countryside Properties, who was interviewed for this study, has argued that 
successful regeneration “is not going to be done simply via new development, it’s going to 
be done by improving existing areas” and “engaging existing residents”. 
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Figure 7.1  Crest Nicolson advertorial from 2007 focusing on Ingress Park 
 
 
In order to test this commitment to integrated development this chapter will examine the 
testimony of twenty seven residents in Knockhall and Horns Cross interviewed in 2007/08 for 
this study. It will consider whether these residents see Ingress Park and Waterstone Park as 
an equal and intrinsic part of their community, or as exemplars of the type of affluent, 
spatially disconnected Thameside developments described by Davidson (2009) whose 
professional residents have no social or economic relationship with their less affluent 
neighbours. As well as helping us to meet a key aim of this study, this analysis will also 
provide a useful addition to the literature on major flagship redevelopments which, to date, 
Material removed for copyright reasons 
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has tended to focus on the people moving into these developments rather on how the 
residents of neighbouring communities relate to them (Doucet, Van Kempen, Van Weesep, 
2011).  
Figure 7.2  Countryside Properties advertorial from 2010 focusing on Waterstone Park 
 
 
 
This chapter will begin by looking at the relationship between Ingress Park and Knockhall to 
the south. It will start with a brief overview of Ingress Park and its key characteristics. As well 
as looking at its design, infrastructure and the way it relates to its neighbours, it will examine 
the critical response to Ingress Park from the development industry, design experts, the 
media, key figures in Kent Thameside and local resident organisations. Using the interview 
data with Knockhall residents, it will then to look at how the residents of Knockhall have 
responded to the Ingress Park development. It will examine any evidence of physical and 
social integration between the two communities and consider whether or not local facilities 
are being shared.  
Material removed for copyright reasons 
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We will then turn our attention to the design characteristics of Waterstone Park and its 
relationship with Knockhall and Horns Cross. This section will be briefer than the section on 
Ingress Park as the interviews with residents in Knockhall and Horns Cross yielded relatively 
little evidence relating to Waterstone Park.  
Finally, having summarised and compared the key findings from each case study, the 
chapter will end by looking at what lessons can be taken from them when it comes to 
planning future developments in Kent Thameside and the wider Thames Gateway.  
7.2 Ingress Park: a development ‘that cries out quality living’? 
To the north of the A226 lies Ingress Park; an estate of a thousand houses set in the 
manicured grounds of the listed Ingress Abbey. It’s a development that “cries out quality 
living” according to the former Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, who visited it with Tony 
Blair in 2002 (Community Care, 2003). CABE, meanwhile, the Government’s former advisory 
body on architecture and the built environment, has picked it out as one of the best 
developments the Thames Gateway has to offer. Its “subtle architectural details and 
interesting landscaping create a strong sense of place” enthused CABE’s experts (CABE, 
2010a). Ingress Park’s developers, Crest Nicholson, “have rejected the conventional 
procurement practices”, CABE explained, and have opted instead “for a bespoke design 
which takes its cue from the site and character of Kent's traditional towns and villages”.  
Picture 7.1    The entrance to the Ingress Park estate 
 
  Source: Bryan Jones (2012) 
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Picture 7.2    Some of Ingress Park’s ‘bespoke’, locally inspired housing 
 
                      Source: © Google (2012) 
Subtle architectural details come at a cost of course, and prices for a bespoke Ingress Park 
property are well in excess of those in neighbouring Knockhall4. The media’s coverage of the 
development has tended to reinforce this sense of exclusivity. Ingress Park residents are 
“middle England with a manicured twist”, one City based consultant told The Times. “We 
shop at Sainsbury’s not Asda: We have taste;” he insisted (The Times, 2003).  
Few Ingress Park residents have any personal links with the surrounding villages. A survey 
of Ingress residents carried out by Dartford Borough Council in 2005, to which almost 30 per 
cent of residents responded, found that only one in five residents had moved there from 
addresses within the borough of Dartford (Dartford Borough Council, 2005b). Just under 40 
per cent of residents meanwhile had come from London, and nearly 10 per cent had come 
from places outside the south east. Most were attracted to Ingress, the survey found, by the 
design and appearance of the development and the quality of the local road and rail links. 
Proximity to Bluewater shopping centre, described to The Times by one Ingress resident as 
“my corner shop”, was another important attraction (The Times, 2003). 
Ingress residents also show little inclination to establish ties within the local community. Less 
than one in ten residents, according to Dartford’s survey have become members of a local 
community group. People living at Ingress, one resident maintained, “don’t want a small 
town feel” (The Times, 2003). A residents’ association has been set up, largely in response 
                                                             
4
 In 2007 3-4 bedroom terraced houses in Ingress Park were on the market for between £350,000 -
£400,000. In Knockhall meanwhile the average price of a terraced house was £179,000 in 2007 
(Right Move, 2011). 
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to parking and speeding issues on the development, but it has found it difficult to make an 
impact. Its Secretary complained to Dartford Borough Council that;  
“Currently Ingress Park is ghost-like during the day with few people prepared to settle 
down for the long-term... The Residents Association here is in its infancy in Ingress 
Park and is struggling to develop a community spirit.” Ingress Park Residents 
Association, 2008) 
Today, any encounter between residents at Ingress is unusual. The estate’s design does not 
help. Although the views around the bend of the river over the Dartford Crossing are 
spectacular there are no facilities or features that would encourage anyone to linger there for 
long (see picture 7.3). With its ambiguous public space and coded rules and boundaries, 
Ingress is not a place that encourages spontaneous outdoor activities or any disturbance of 
its expensively maintained calm. As the former Chief Executive of the Kent Thameside 
Delivery Board, who was interviewed for this study, said:  
 “Visually, Ingress is an attractive development (but) the public space at Ingress is 
terribly ambiguous. If a family from London pitch into their car and say we’re going to 
have a picnic by the Thames, drive on to Ingress Park and open their picnic table and 
chairs and sit down there, would they be welcome? There’s no sign saying private 
land, keep off, but it has the air of being people’s front lawns, not communal parkland 
and that’s an issue of great importance for the future of the development.” (MWA) 
It hasn’t always been so. Early post war pictures of the riverside park at Ingress in the 
summer show children on swings and adults sitting by the river (see picture 7.4). Yet at the 
time the Ingress estate was privately owned. One half was owned by the Thames Nautical 
Training College - and subsequently by the Merchant Navy College - which used it for sports 
grounds and offices. The other half was occupied by the Empire Paper Mill which had been 
opened at the turn of the century as a wallpaper plant. Both had close ties to Knockhall. 
Most families in Knockhall would have known someone who worked at the mill or was 
connected with the college in some way5. Their owners also encouraged local residents to 
make use of the estate’s sport and leisure facilities6. So although the estate was privately 
owned it was in effect an integral part of the public realm and treated as such by residents.  
 
                                                             
5
 The pre 1919 terraces in Knockhall Road were built by the owners of the Empire Paper Mill for their 
new workers – many of whom had been recruited by the company directly from Lancashire. 
6
 Personal communication with a Swanscombe and Greenhithe Town Councillor, August 2007 
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Picture 7.3      The riverside at Ingress Park in 2008 
 
                      Source: Bryan Jones (2012) 
Picture 7.4 The riverside at Ingress Park in 1952 with maritime training vessel HMS  
  Worcester and the Cutty Sark in the background 
 
The only remnant from those post war days is the building that gave the estate its name; 
Ingress Abbey. Built as a country retreat by a successful London solicitor in the 1830s it has 
survived intact to this day despite long periods of disuse. It is now the estate’s principal 
feature, having been restored and its grounds re-landscaped by Crest Nicholson7.  
                                                             
7
 In return for this outlay the council agreed to a reduction in the social housing component of the new 
development. Consequently, only 10% of the housing at Ingress falls into the social and affordable 
category.  
Material removed for copyright reasons 
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Picture 7.5  The restored Ingress Abbey 
 
                        Source: Bryan Jones (2012) 
Yet, aside from the occasional heritage open day the abbey remains closed to the public. A 
film and TV technology firm, Pandora International, now occupies the building. The grassy 
terrace beneath the abbey is also rarely used. The estate’s architects had hoped this would 
serve as an amphitheatre where residents could gather for music performances and other 
community events. This never came to pass and the lush grass still shows few signs of use, 
despite its obvious appeal as a play or picnic area.  
In fact, ten years after work on the first houses began Ingress still lacks even the most basic 
of community facilities such as a shop, pub or community centre. The planned Fastrack bus 
route through Ingress has been beset by planning and financial problems whilst plans for a 
primary school, health centre and shops have been either shelved on put on hold.  Indeed, 
the secretary of the Ingress Park Residents Association suggested that a failure to attract 
‘families’ to the estate - which one can interpret as code for people willing to invest in the 
community and put down roots there - is largely due to this absence of community facilities 
(Ingress Park Residents Association, 2008).  
“Neither Ingress Park nor Greenhithe Village has any community meeting place. 
‘Greenhithe’ Community centre is in ‘Knockhall’ and not readily accessible to the 
younger element. ... We need somewhere to hold meetings, have mother and toddler 
groups, youth facilities, adult education and a host of other uses. More families must 
be encouraged to move to Ingress Park and the prospect of a school/community 
centre will improve that.” 
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It isn’t just the Residents Association that is frustrated by the lack of facilities. When 
interviewed for this study, the Leader of Dartford Borough Council who struck the deal with 
Crest Nicolson admitted that he was wrong not to insist on having community facilities built 
at the onset of the development. 
“The biggest single mistake that was made as far as the new build was concerned 
was at Ingress Park. It consists entirely of houses and there are absolutely no 
facilities whatsoever for them down there. The school that was promised was only a 
land allocation and that’s not there even now and the development is coming to an 
end. It’s just a huge mass of very nice houses but no facilities. They have to come off 
the site to access facilities that we, living in this area, take for granted. That was a big 
mistake and we shouldn’t have done it. We should have insisted on it but the 
developer didn’t think about it either.” (JMU) 
The former Chief Executive of the Delivery Board made a similar point. Of all the lessons to 
be learnt from Ingress Park he said this was one of the most important. One cannot create a 
vibrant, sustainable community, he said, if you fail to provide the necessary arenas in which 
residents can get together and begin to build relationships. The same observations were 
made by residents in Knockhall interviewed for this study. 
“It doesn’t seem to be taking root as a real organic community as yet and there are 
no shops, or pubs or restaurants as yet to act as a real focus. There always seems to 
be a marked lack of actual residents. It always seems terribly quiet.” (DPA) 
 
“A lot of people are young professionals, exactly the people it was built to attract, but 
the overall picture has not been looked at. It’s a beautiful area, lovely houses, very 
expensive, but nothing down there for the families to do.” (TWR) 
 
“I’d like to see the abbey opened up for public use. I also don’t know what there is in 
terms of community facilities, doctors and so on; I’m not sure there is anything.” 
(DBL) 
In other words the “subtle architectural details” described by CABE can take you only so far. 
Without shops, community services and public space that is clearly delineated and well 
designed, any development, however attractive, will struggle to generate the critical mass of 
public interactions necessary to create a robust community.  
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7.3     The view of Ingress Park from Knockhall 
7.3.1    Do Knockhall residents feel that their needs have been given the same priority         
as those of Ingress Park residents? 
 
South of the A226, behind an Esso garage and the British Legion hall are the terraces and 
inter war semis of Knockhall. On the corner of Knockhall Chase is a small corner shop, next 
to which is a piece of overgrown wasteland, fenced off from the public. Opposite lies the site 
of Knockhall Health Centre, which was summarily pulled down in the 1990s when asbestos 
was disturbed in the building (see pictures 7.6 and 7.7).  
 
It seems a world away from the elegant houses and boulevards of Ingress Park. Yet despite 
the palpable differences in the character and appearance of Knockhall and Ingress Park, 
Knockhall residents’ attitudes to Ingress vary. While 40 per cent of the Knockhall residents 
interviewed for this study felt that a sense of injustice about the disparity between the two 
communities, other residents felt differently as we shall discover later in this section. 
 
Picture 7.6 The entrance to Knockhall Chase and Park Terrace in Knockhall 
 
 
           Source: © Google (2012) 
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Picture 7.7 Terraces in Knockhall Chase 
 
 
               Source: Bryan Jones (2012) 
We will start however by considering the views of the former group of residents. Two key 
characteristics are common to the residents in this group. First of all, they are all established 
long-term residents who have been living in Knockhall for well over a decade. Second, they 
are very community orientated. Some are leading community activists who have leadership 
roles in key community organisations like the local church. Others are or have been 
members of political parties, voluntary organisations or social clubs. Many of them are also 
in regular contact with the local authority and other service providers about the standard of 
local services.  
These residents made it clear that they resented the way in which the needs of Ingress 
residents appeared - consistently - to be given priority over their own by the authorities. One 
example given was the decision to give Ingress Park its own set of traffic lights on the A226. 
Two residents said; 
 “My sore point is that their convenience overtakes everyone else in that there is a 
traffic light system purely for their benefit. Well why? Why couldn’t they do that for the 
existing community? We’re the ones that have been putting the money in for the last 
50 years.” (RFA) 
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“It’s got its own set of traffic lights, but Knockhall, which is just as busy has got 
nothing. I don’t want any by the way, but I don’t like the fact that Ingress has been 
treated with some respect and the residents here haven’t.” (KWH) 
Another source of frustration is the disparity in the quality of the urban fabric and street 
furniture on display in Ingress Park and Knockhall. Two residents commented: 
       
They feel that Knockhall’s needs – or more specifically the needs of long-term residents – 
aren’t being given the consideration they deserve. It frustrates them to see newcomers, who, 
as they see it, have yet to contribute to the community, being treated better than them. For 
one resident this sense that Knockhall is being treated as a second class community was 
confirmed by the visit of the former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to Ingress Park in 2002; 
“When Tony Blair came to the new development, he didn’t come across to Knockhall 
to say hello to us too. It’s that kind of feeling: there’s all this activity going on around 
the abbey, but no-one’s really interested in the people that are already here.” (MCO) 
Many had been led to expect that Ingress would deliver real benefits for Knockhall. One 
resident said that the early meetings between the community and the Ingress design team 
had given her cause for optimism. At one meeting, she said, the architect had suggested 
that the swimming pool belonging to the old navy college would be retained as a community 
resource: “He told us to keep it and use it”, she said. Yet when the final plans for Ingress 
Park were drawn up the swimming pool “went straight away” she recalled. Her 
disappointment was compounded by the developers’ decision - backed by the council - to 
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spend several million pounds restoring Ingress abbey. Spending so much money on the 
abbey, a building that would never be used by the public, was misguided she felt.  
“What we wanted done was for Ingress Abbey which has no historical value – how 
much did they spend doing it up? At least a million pounds or so – to be left alone 
and the money used instead for community and services”. (SWH) 
Two other residents made the same point. The abbey now “looks wonderful”, one man said; 
but what was the point in doing it when “nobody can see it, because nobody can get in 
there”? Another hoped that it would eventually “be opened up for public use”. Other 
residents complained that Knockhall had gained little in terms of new or upgraded facilities. 
 “Knockhall in particular hasn’t seen any particular benefits from the Ingress 
development. The local primary school is still struggling to accommodate its children. 
The section 106 money could have been better used providing classrooms” (BKE) 
“What (have we)gained? Something like two thousand new houses and not a single 
new community facility in the eighteen years that I’ve been here” (RBA) 
“Amenities are the biggest disappointment; particularly the total disregard that 
Ingress has for us. I thought we’d actually gain something when the new 
developments got underway, but there’s been nothing” (KWH) 
In short, nothing has been done, as far as these residents are concerned, on the back of the 
new development to make their lives easier or better. All that the new development at 
Ingress has achieved, they believe, is to bring into focus just how impoverished their own 
physical environment is and how poorly served Knockhall is in terms of resources. In their 
eyes all the advantages that come with new investment have flowed in one direction only.  
Yet, as the Figure 7.3 shows, not everyone in Knockhall feels this way. In fact over 50 per 
cent of residents interviewed said nothing that suggested they felt any sense of injustice 
about the way in which Knockhall has been treated. It’s not that they felt that Knockhall had 
been dealt with equally - they simply expressed no opinion at all.  
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Figure 7.3 Knockhall interviewees perception of whether they and Ingress Park residents  
  have been treated equally 
 
These residents fall into two distinct categories of more or less equal size. On the one hand 
there are the newer arrivals to Knockhall, who are using Knockhall as a stepping stone on 
the property ladder. They work outside the area in relatively well paid jobs and spend little 
time at home in Knockhall. Understandably they are more ambivalent about Ingress Park 
than their more established, community minded neighbours. To them it is merely another 
development: it isn’t loaded with the same historical and metaphorical significance as it is for 
their neighbours. Indeed many of them have given serious consideration to buying a house 
in Ingress Park at some stage. It was only the prospect of getting more space for their 
money and more privacy from their neighbours that led them to choose Knockhall over 
Ingress. One Knockhall resident said; 
“We were actually toying between moving there and here. We looked at the houses 
that were on offer there and we looked at the houses that were on offer here – and 
the ones here were almost half price, so that’s why we moved here” (NTI) 
Another resident said that he was also put off by the proximity of Ingress to the river; 
“I was interested in Ingress Park and it seems to be reasonably well built, but quite 
crowded in. But I wouldn’t live that close to a river.” (TCA) 
They are also less concerned about the absence of community facilities in Knockhall. Like 
Ingress residents they see Bluewater as their primary shopping and leisure facility and are 
content to use their cars to get there. 
% 
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The other category consists of established, long-term residents whose family and work 
commitments leave them with little time or inclination to get involved in community causes. 
They harbour no resentment towards Ingress or its developers and they don’t see the 
Ingress development as a missed opportunity for Knockhall. Nor are they as critical of the 
way in which Ingress has been designed as Knockhall’s more recent arrivals. They see 
Ingress as a pleasant, attractive and well designed development. The only downside is that 
the prices of houses at Ingress are well beyond their financial reach: a fact they accept with 
equanimity and without any overt disappointment. 
“My cousin lives there; she’s got a lovely house. Cost her an arm and a leg but it is 
lovely.” (DFR) 
 “We was amazed when we walked down there to see how many houses there were 
snaking along the river-front. It’s a lovely development; but bit out of our reach” (KFA) 
This evidence suggests that residents’ views on whether Knockhall has gained anything as a 
result of Ingress are influenced by the size of their stake in the community. Residents who 
are active in the community and remember the Merchant Navy College and the Empire 
Paper Mill are the most unequivocal about the ‘unfairness’ of Knockhall’s treatment. They 
feel that the opportunity presented by Ingress to improve Knockhall’s services and to reward 
its long term residents for their commitment to the area has been squandered. 
The reverse is true for residents who have arrived since the start of Ingress and longer term 
residents for whom family, home and work are the priorities. The debate around the 
equitable distribution of resources and services between the new and the old communities is 
not one they have entered into or thought about it seems. As homeowners or aspirant 
homeowners who have considered a move to Ingress, or as the parents or grandparents of 
potential homeowners at Ingress, they don’t see the Ingress estate as a pernicious creation. 
Their attitude is one of ambivalence – although if challenged they may well consider Ingress 
to be an opportunity for Knockhall rather than as a threat. 
This evidence shows that one cannot make assumptions about the views of the existing 
community towards regeneration. As we have seen here, residents’ attitudes to Ingress Park 
vary considerably.   
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7.3.2 Is there any evidence of physical or social integration between Knockhall and 
 Ingress? 
Ingress Park is not a gated community. There are no ‘residents only’ signs, metal gates or 
security cameras guarding its entrance. However, its design does not encourage non-
residents to cross its threshold: Its well tended appearance; its executive trappings; and its 
rarefied calm imply that only those with a definite purpose - preferably a professional one - 
should consider entering. Casual visitors, who might want to take the air by the river or 
explore its housing, are less welcome, its design suggests.  
The A226, which skirts the entrance of Ingress Park and divides the estate from Knockhall, 
seems to reinforce this sense of physical separation. It is a busy road, one that’s often 
choked with idling traffic, particularly when the Dartford Crossing is busy or the sales are on 
at Bluewater. On such days it’s not uncommon to see a queue of stationary traffic half a mile 
long snaking up the hill. Yet it is a place that people seem to avoid if they possibly can. 
Some roads invite pedestrians, either because of the shops or facilities along it or because 
they live on one side and have business on the other. This one positively discourages them. 
The pavement is narrow and is covered with a thick crust of chalky mud and ragged 
undergrowth.  An encounter here with the procession of haulage trucks that grind their way 
up hill, their suspensions shrieking with the effort, is not one any pedestrian would relish. It 
appears to be the archetypal ‘border vacuum’ described so vividly by Jane Jacobs in The 
death and life of great American cities (Jacobs, 1972) 
Unsurprisingly Knockhall residents rarely visit Ingress Park. Although all but two Knockhall 
interviewees had visited Ingress Park at some point, only a very small number visit on a 
routine basis (see figure 7.4). Over half of the residents interviewed had visited the estate 
only once or twice and just over 10 per cent admitted that they no longer visited Ingress Park 
at all.  
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Figure 7.4  Frequency with which Knockhall residents visit Ingress Park 
 
 
Furthermore, only 10 per cent of visits to Ingress were for the purposes of visiting friends or 
family living on the estate or on work related matters (see figure 7.5).  
Figure 7.5 Reasons of Knockhall interviewees for visiting Ingress Park           
 
In fact, 60 per cent of the residents interviewed had seen no evidence whatsoever of any 
interaction between Ingress Park residents and the existing community (see figure 7.6). 
Among them are the same long-term residents and community activists we discussed in the 
previous section.  
 
%  
% 
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Figure 7.6  Knockhall interviewees perception of the extent of social interaction between 
  Ingress Park residents and Knockhall residents 
 
In their view, Knockhall and Ingress Park are two entirely separate communities that are 
physically and psychologically divorced from one another. They feel that the way in which 
Ingress has been designed fosters a sense of separation and precludes any meaningful 
interaction between the two communities.  
“It has become a ‘them and us’. We don’t mix; we don’t have any opportunity to mix.” 
(JPI) 
“People down at the Thames are like one unit; down the village they are one unit; us 
up here is like one unit” (CCU) 
 “If you look at Ingress Park, it’s a dead end estate; and that creates separation – 
them and us.” (RBA) 
Nonetheless there are subtle differences in opinion between the community activists; the 
older long-term residents; and the younger long-term residents. The older long-term 
residents appear to be the most emotionally affected by this apparent dislocation between 
the two communities. In their eyes the new development has broken the social bond 
between Ingress and Knockhall and appropriated part of their history. The familiar riverside 
park that they knew as children is now only a memory because of Ingress. The estate that 
has replaced it feels alien to them and removed from their own lives. One resident, a retired 
council tenant, who has lived in Knockhall all her life said that she is reluctant to spend any 
time at Ingress now; 
“We can’t walk anywhere because of the houses. You used to be able to go down the 
river. I used to take the children down to Greenhithe park to picnic, but if you go 
% 
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down there now…they say it isn’t private but you feel as though you’re encroaching 
on their private walkways. There is nowhere to sit down there now. There used to be 
benches but because they built the houses on the front there’s nowhere to put 
anything to sit on. There also used to be a little bit of woodland – peacocks used to 
be down there – that’s all gone. They’ve taken an awful lot away.” (JPI) 
To her Ingress is no longer a shared public space in the way that it used to be when it was in 
the hands of the naval college and the paper mill. It feels like a privatised space from which 
existing residents are excluded. Another of Knockhall’s older long-term residents made the 
same point.                               
__  
Some of the younger long-term residents also expressed concern about the disconnection 
between Ingress and Knockhall. Yet, it was the social differences between the two 
communities that concerned them, rather than the loss of amenity space. Two residents, for 
instance, referred to the gap in social status and wealth between Ingress Park residents and 
those in Knockhall. Both had visited Ingress, but neither felt particularly comfortable there 
given the type of housing on the estate and type of people living in them. One of them still 
visits the estate on occasion in order to help his son with his paper round, but the other 
made it clear that she has no desire to go back. She found the atmosphere on the estate 
stifling and even suggested that undesirable non-residents were being challenged by 
‘security’ staff8.  
“It’s very different to anything that’s been in Greenhithe before. My perception is that 
it is people who are quite upwardly mobile, who work in London in well paid jobs. I 
don’t see too many people in my position living in Knockhall selling their houses and 
                                                             
8 The management company at Ingress does not employ any dedicated security staff on the estate. 
According to the Crest Nicolson and Dartford Borough Council officers, the ‘security’ personnel are 
likely to have been parking enforcement officers employed by a private contractor working for the 
management company.  
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moving into Ingress Park – they couldn’t afford it. When it first opened you were 
almost frightened to go down there. There was this feeling that you weren’t allowed 
down there, which for people who have lived in Greenhithe all their lives must have 
been quite difficult... Now, my son’s got a paper round around there, and I 
occasionally go around and do it with him, but that’s it.” (MCO) 
 
“The only thing I have found there is that they have their own security down there 
chasing off basically anyone local that don’t live down there. Even adults are being 
questioned; ‘what’s your purpose in being down the estate?’ So people can’t cut 
through anymore to get to the bottom without being stopped by security to ask what 
their purpose is. I used to walk my dog down there; I can’t do that no more. I don’t 
know if there’s a stigma down there. You know that we’re the yokels and they’re the 
gentry.” (DCA)  
The community activists, on the other hand, spoke about the lack of interaction between the 
two communities from a more detached perspective. They were no less exercised about the 
apparent social disconnection between Ingress and Knockhall, but it tended to be other 
residents’ experiences – those of the people they encounter during their work in the 
community – rather than their own, that informed their comments. As individuals, they didn’t 
feel the same sense of personal loss or social disparity articulated by others.  
One community activist, for instance, expressed concern about the loss of amenity space in 
Greenhithe as a whole and the effective privatisation of the remaining green spaces. He 
complained that the available amenity space around Ingress Abbey had been sequestered 
by the developers and reserved, in effect, for the sole use of the new residents. However, 
the primary losers were not people like him but Knockhall’s older long-term residents who 
had witnessed the changes at first hand. 
 “The old residents will tell you about everything we’ve lost. There was also a lot 
more green space where children could play in days gone by. At the old Merchant 
Naval College, there was a great deal of sharing of space; that’s all gone now. In my 
mind the way new housing developments are built creates separation – them and 
us.” (RBA) 
However other Knockhall residents were less sceptical. The remaining 40 per cent of the 
residents interviewed expressed no opinion at all on whether there would any social 
interaction between Ingress and Knockhall residents. This group of residents was composed 
primarily - as in the previous section - of recent arrivals to Knockhall who had little invested 
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in the community and long-term residents whose family and work commitments allowed 
them little time for community life. Aside from the occasional comment about the cost of 
houses in Ingress Park, none of these residents expressed any view about the nature of the 
relationship between Ingress and Knockhall. They expressed no anxiety or reservation about 
visiting Ingress or making use of its facilities. Nor did they make any comment about the 
propensity of Ingress residents to engage with Knockhall residents, or vice versa. 
Nevertheless very few among them admitted to spending any time with Ingress Park 
residents or visiting the estate on a regular basis. One long-term resident revealed that he 
had a cousin living in Ingress whom he visited; one young mother said she had friends in 
Ingress that she’d made through her children; and a recently arrived resident said that he 
often jogged around the estate. However, these were the only examples of any routine 
interaction between Ingress and Knockhall residents alluded to in the interviews. 
In summary therefore, having taken into account the evidence from the interviews with 
Knockhall residents, it seems reasonable to conclude that there is little routine social 
interaction taking place at present between the residents of Knockhall and Ingress Park. Yet 
while the prospects for creating a genuinely integrated community do not, on the face of it, 
appear bright; there are some grounds for optimism. One cause for hope is Knockhall 
Primary School, a case study that will be discussed in the next section. Another reason for 
optimism is the attitude of Knockhall residents’ to Ingress. While some Knockhall residents, 
particularly older long-term residents feel alienated from their new neighbour, and others are 
conscious of the social disparity between the two communities, many Knockhall residents 
made it clear that they have no qualms about visiting Ingress Park or interacting with its 
residents. Ingress doesn’t feature in their weekly routines at the moment, but if an 
appropriate opportunity presented itself to engage with Ingress residents, they would have 
no compunction about taking advantage of it. It is enough to suggest that with careful 
management, the goal of an integrated community could yet be achieved. 
7.3.3 Is there any evidence of Knockhall and Ingress residents using the same 
 community facilities? 
While the Ingress Park estate offers few opportunities for its own residents or the residents 
from neighbouring communities to interact socially, the situation in Knockhall is different. In 
Knockhall there are a number of community facilities which provide an opportunity for 
Knockhall and Ingress residents to interact and in doing so potentially strengthen the 
relationship between the two communities. A case in point is Knockhall Primary School, 
which today is the main catchment school for Ingress Park and Knockhall. The school 
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provides the clearest evidence we have of Knockhall and Ingress residents sharing a 
community facility.  
Knockhall’s role as a shared facility is, however, an accidental one. It was the unwitt ing 
consequence of an abrupt strategic shift by the local authority in response to budgetary 
pressures and errors in its forward planning. When the first plans for Ingress Park emerged 
in the late 1990s it was envisaged that the estate would contain its own dedicated primary 
school. Initially, Kent County Council, the local education authority, proved receptive to the 
idea. However it changed its position when it became apparent that primary school rolls in 
the east of Dartford were in decline due to a drop in birth in the late 1990s. The authority had 
also become nervous about predicting the likely yield of primary school age children from 
new developments. Having already opened a new primary school in Craylands Lane in 
Swanscombe in 2000 in order to cater for the needs of a new 500 home estate - and got its 
predictions badly wrong - Kent was keen not to make the same, expensive, mistake again. It 
began to question the projected yield of primary school children for Ingress Park and 
decided to withdraw support from the project.  Only when existing primary schools in the 
area hit capacity, they told the developer and local politicians, would they be prepared to re-
examine the business case for a school at Ingress. The prospects for a school in Ingress 
Park took a further blow once it became apparent around 2005 that Land Securities’ plans 
for a 1,500 home development on Swanscombe Peninsula immediately to the east of 
Ingress were unlikely to go ahead. With the Swanscombe Peninsula development off the 
agenda, it became almost impossible to deliver the critical mass of children necessary to 
persuade Kent to revisit the case for a new school at Ingress. 
As a result Knockhall Primary has become the default primary school for the Ingress Park 
estate – one place where Ingress and Knockhall residents are obliged to spend time 
together. According to figures provided by Kent County Council some 45 per cent of the 
primary age children living in Ingress Park now attend Knockhall Primary9. These 52 children 
from Ingress account for just over 14 per cent of Knockhall’s total pupil roll of 367 pupils. The 
influx in children from Ingress Park was noted in the school’s 2004 Ofsted report (Ofsted, 
2004):  
                                                             
9
 These figures were provided in January 2009 by KCC’s Area Children’s Services officer for Dartford 
and Gravesham. They state that there are 114 children living on the Ingress Park estate currently 
attending primary schools in the Kent County Council area. 52 of these children (45.6%) attend 
Knockhall Community Primary School; 15 (13.2%) attend St Joseph’s Catholic Primary School in 
Gravesend; 9 (7.9%) attend Stone St Mary’s CE Primary School; 6 (5.3%) attend Bean Primary 
School; and 5 (4.4%) attend Craylands Lane Primary School in Swanscombe. The figures do not 
include those in private education and those in schools in Greater London and beyond.  
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“Although the school is located next one of the most disadvantaged wards in the 
county, there is a growing proportion of pupils from more advantaged homes (and the 
pupils now come) from a wide spectrum of socio-economic backgrounds”. 
The report also found that the school was making progress in terms of its academic 
performance and discipline. Having been put into special measures after its 2002 inspection, 
test results had risen and the report noted that the school’s leadership had worked hard to 
raise standards in the classroom and to improve attendance. Whether this improvement is in 
any way connected to the arrival of children from Ingress Park is impossible to say. Yet one 
Knockhall resident, whose wife teaches at the school, certainly felt that they had had a 
marked impact on the character of the school: 
“Lots of children from Ingress go to the primary school. It’s meant that there are a few 
more bright kids and a few more bright switched on parents at the school who want 
to have an impact on it.” (BKE) 
Another feature of the school picked by Ofsted in its 2004 report and again in its 2007 and 
2009 reports was its role a hub for the wider community. “The school is working hard to 
become a focus for its community,” the 2004 report noted - drawing particular attention to the 
school’s new 50 place nursery. The school’s 2009 report meanwhile, made reference to the 
children’s contribution to the Greenhithe Community Market Garden which had recently been 
opened in the grounds of the school (Ofsted, 2009). Indeed, the school’s developing role as 
a community hub has provided an opportunity for some parents in Knockhall to mix with their 
neighbours in Ingress Park for the first time. One Knockhall resident, a mother with four 
children of primary school age or less, said that she has made a number of friends through 
the school and the nursery who live on the Ingress estate.  
“The people from Ingress come to the same Mother and Baby groups as us; so 
there’s no them and us. I know quite a few friends that live down there. At Ingress 
you’ve kind of forced the issue; parents have to bring their children up here, because 
they don’t have a school of their own to choose.” (SSM) 
It is important, however, not to overstate the school’s role in knitting together the two 
communities. Only two of the residents interviewed highlighted the contribution that the 
school has made in enabling greater engagement between Knockhall and Ingress residents 
- and one of them was highly sceptical as to whether real integration is achievable. Another 
resident drew attention to the fact that while some Ingress parents are choosing to send their 
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children to Knockhall Primary, many are not; preferring instead to send their children to 
schools outside the area with stronger academic records. 
“Already you have people from Ingress Park saying we’re not going to send our 
children to that local school and they end up sending them to some private school or 
school with better prospects. I think it’s a recipe for them and us.” (RBA) 
Indeed, the only thing we know beyond doubt is that a substantial number of children from 
Ingress Park are mixing with their peers in Knockhall. Until further research is carried out we 
can only speculate as to the impact this had had on the school and the wider community.  
7.4 Waterstone Park: a development which sits comfortably with the existing 
 community? 
The sole entrance to Waterstone Park, a discreet side road off the A226 shaded by trees 
and flanked by a short stretch of three to four storey apartment blocks, belies the size of the 
development. Built by Countryside Properties in partnership with Land Securities in two 
distinct phases starting in 2002 and 2005, Waterstone Park now contains some 650 homes 
stretching south from the A226 up to the chalk cliffs overlooking Bluewater. It is one of the 
largest developments built in Kent Thameside in the last ten years. 
The first phase of development, comprising of 201 one and two bedroom flats and three and 
four bedroom houses, was built in a “neo vernacular style” (Countryside Properties, 2011) 
that was “designed to reflect Kentish architecture and the local vernacular of Victorian and 
Edwardian villas” (CABE, 2010b). The second phase of 450 flats and houses, built on the 
site of a former Blue Circle cement testing and research facility, was designed in a more 
“contemporary” style. The red, white and blue rendering of the “mews houses” of phase two 
now provide a striking contrast to the more traditional phase one houses with their London 
stock bricks and cream rendering. 
Like Ingress Park, Waterstone has its own ‘feature’ centrepiece; Stone Castle, a Georgian 
manor house incorporating a twelfth century tower. Unlike Ingress, however, it was already 
functioning as a conference and wedding venue and contributions from the developer for its 
restoration weren’t required. This allowed planners to set aside almost 30 per cent of 
housing for social and affordable purposes at Waterstone: a far higher proportion than at 
Ingress Park, where it accounted for just 10 per cent of the total. In terms of community 
facilities though, Waterstone is equally as bereft as Ingress Park. Only one small playground 
for children has been created on site to date. Around £150,000 was earmarked in the 
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Section 106 agreement struck with Dartford Borough Council in 2003 for a ‘community 
meeting space’ in the area, but in 2010 a suitable site had still to be identified.  
The reaction to Waterstone Park in the design and architectural community has been mixed. 
Phase two received a Building for Life Silver standard from CABE in 2007, with the judges 
commending it as a “really interesting” and “very brave and bold” out-of-town development 
(CABE, 2010b). They drew attention to its “light contemporary feel”; the absence of any 
“external distinction between the social and market housing”; “the diversity of housing” and 
the effective use of the hill-top location to give residents commanding views over the 
Thames and Bluewater.  
Picture 7.8   Phase two housing at Waterstone Park 
 
                                    Source: Bryan Jones (2012) 
Picture 7.9 Phase two housing at Waterstone Park 
 
                                  Source: Bryan Jones (2012) 
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Phase one, with its “neo-vernacular housing” has been less well received. One CABE 
advisor complained to the Guardian that it was a “standard product” that “doesn’t really take 
into account that it is in Kent or by the Thames” (Barkham, 2007). The buildings were not 
only “turned in on themselves”, wasting the hilltop location, but they often failed to relate to 
each other, he said, with some homes facing fences or blank gable ends. He also took issue 
with the build quality, pointing out that many of the buildings were cheap and already looked 
worn just a few years after completion. Many of the canopies around the entrances of the 
properties, for instance, were seriously discoloured and degraded. 
Picture 7.10 Phase one housing at Waterstone Park 
 
                   Source: © Google (2012) 
Concern about the way in which Waterstone Park relates to its surroundings has also been 
expressed by CABE. Its otherwise positive evaluation of phase 2 of the development, 
criticised the failure to build any physical links between the estate and Bluewater; pointing 
out that “there is no practical means of getting there except by car” via the development’s 
northern exit. The only direct connection between Bluewater and Waterstone, it said, was 
“an isolated path that runs steeply downhill” where it meets the busy main Bluewater access 
road. The evaluation also drew attention to the fact that the nearest supermarket was half a 
mile from the estate’s northern entrance and that the nearest primary school was a twenty 
minute walk from the centre of Waterstone. Waterstone Park was, the evaluation concluded, 
“a well designed enclave” which had “no connections to the locality” and did not appear to 
have been considered as part of a coherent urban design strategy for the area. 
The unusual geography of the site and the surrounding area undoubtedly complicated the 
developer’s task of integrating the development into its neighbouring communities. In 
addition to the cliffs at its southern end, the land drops sharply immediately to the east of the 
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development due to a former chalk pit, while the land on its western side is an undeveloped 
former gravel pit and landfill site that is now used chiefly to graze horses. Its only physical 
link with Horns Cross to the west is a path in the south west corner which is accessible only 
to cyclists and pedestrians. The busy A226 to the north also precludes any relationship 
between Waterstone and the housing to the north. Nonetheless, it is arguable, as CABE 
suggests, that more could have been done to soften these hard edges and to create a 
stronger physical relationship between the development and its neighbours. 
The difference in cost between the houses at Waterstone Park and the houses in Horns 
Cross and Knockhall has also made it difficult to integrate the estate into the community. 
While the prices of new houses at Waterstone Park in 2007 started at £157,000 for a one 
bedroom flat and £415,000 for a four bed house (CABE, 2010b), the average house price in 
neighbouring Horns Cross and Knockhall was just £153,000 and £184,000 respectively 
(Right Move, 2011). This price disparity is accentuated by the marked difference in the 
quality of landscaping and street furniture at Waterstone compared to its neighbours. 
Opinion among Waterstone residents about the development is mixed. On the one hand 
some phase one residents were so concerned about the structural problems they 
encountered when they moved in that they organised community meetings with local 
councillors and the MP10 and set up a Residents Association to pursue their grievances with 
the developer: According to the association, the “severity” of the problems “has resulted in 
owners struggling to get remedial works completed or to sell their property” (Waterstone 
Park Residents Association, 2011).  Yet on the other hand a Dartford Borough Council 
survey of all phase one households in 2005 (Dartford Borough Council, 2005b), which was 
answered by a quarter of households, found that 85 per cent of residents felt that it was 
good neighbourhood in which to live. Moreover 73 per cent of residents said that they were 
sufficiently satisfied with their home and the development as a whole to recommend it to 
others. This suggests that while some residents have serious concerns about build quality, 
most residents in phase one seem generally content with their houses and the development 
as a whole. 
But while most residents in Dartford’s survey appeared to like the development, very few 
were interested in making a long-term investment in the community. Only 5 per cent of 
residents were members of a local community organisation, either on the estate or in the 
wider community, and only 10 per cent of residents planned to stay at Waterstone for more 
than 5 years. According to the survey it was the attraction of a modern property in a 
                                                             
10
 These meetings were attended by the author of this study in a professional capacity 
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‘peaceful area’, that was in a good location close to a main rail station, the A2 and M25 and 
Bluewater that attracted them to Waterstone. In other words it was the convenience of the 
location and a modern property that required the minimum of investment or maintenance, 
rather than the presence of community facilities or a strong community spirit that occupied 
their thinking. This is borne out by the fact that while 85 per cent of residents felt it was a 
good community in which to live, the same proportion of residents admitted that it lacked ‘a 
strong sense of community’.  
The evidence examined so far appears to suggest that Waterstone Park is neither physically 
nor socially well integrated into the wider community. The testimony from residents in Horns 
Cross and Knockhall, which will be discussed in the next section, will allow us to test this 
idea. Is Waterstone seen by residents in existing communities as a separate enclave? Or do 
they have a more nuanced impression of the development and its relationship with the wider 
community? 
7.5 The view of Waterstone Park from Knockhall and Horns Cross 
Waterstone Park does not impinge heavily on the lives of residents in Horns Cross and 
Knockhall. Only eleven residents, less than a third of the thirty-four residents interviewed in 
the two villages, knew of the development and were able to express an opinion about it. 
Most of these residents, seven in total, lived on the eastern slopes of the shallow valley that 
separates Knockhall from Waterstone: the only area in the surrounding community to have a 
direct visual relationship with Waterstone. Beyond the crest of the valley in the central and 
eastern part of Knockhall, awareness of the development was much more limited; just three 
residents here were able to discuss Waterstone. In Horns Cross, meanwhile, only 1 resident, 
who lived at eastern tip of the village - no more than a hundred metres from Waterstone - 
had anything to say about the development.  
The few residents who were able to discuss Waterstone had a poor opinion of its design and 
appearance. Only one resident expressed a positive view about its design. This may well be 
due in part to the fact that construction of phase 2 of Waterstone was still in progress when 
the interviews were taking place. Negative comments about the “noise and dust from the 
construction work”, and the “sight of cranes on the horizon” were made by two residents and 
it is possible that the opinions of other residents too may have been influenced by the 
disruption caused by construction. Nonetheless, all of the residents who disliked Waterstone 
were able to point to specific design issues that they felt had undermined the development. 
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Three residents, for example, questioned the density of the development and size of the 
houses: 
“It’s very compact, very closed in; it doesn’t look very inviting at all to me. Not 
somewhere I would want to live.” (JHI) 
“The thing about Waterstone Park is that they really pack the houses in to what is 
quite a tight site. Some of the houses, we went over to have a look, and I think I’d 
have to duck to get in some of them.” (ABR) 
“As a development I think that they’ve gone far too far and tried to milk the 
development for all it’s worth and people are going to suffer for it.” (TWR) 
They also disliked the aesthetic of the modern ‘award winning’ phase two of the 
development; preferring the neo-vernacular style of phase one, which, ironically, was 
criticised by CABE.  
 “I wouldn’t move there. I think they’ve gone a bit too modern to be honest with you. A 
lot of the new ones have got metal balconies – it looks like a factory. I don’t think 
they’re attractive at all” (JAR) 
“The front part seems to be quite elegant, quite well designed, but then they’ve 
started in higher density stuff that overlooks this area” (TWR) 
“I thought the first phase was good; I really liked it. Some of the second phase 
though; the design leaves a lot to be desired” (JLO) 
However a number of residents echoed CABE’s comments on the isolation of Waterstone, 
and its lack of physical connections with the existing community. Waterstone, they said, was 
“closed off” from its neighbours; a “cul-de-sac” or “a dead end estate” that no tangible 
relationship with Knockhall or Horns Cross.  
“It’s stuck out of the way: you don’t really notice it to be honest with you. Because 
you’ve only got that little slip road there, you don’t tend to notice how many houses 
there are until you actually go in there. It’s not really part of the community. People 
go in their little estate and they stay in their little estate. There’s one way in and one 
way out – so no they don’t integrate. It’s like a barrier. With the old system of lines of 
roads people mixed in with one another.” (JAR) 
“Waterstone Park, Ingress: They’re just big cul-de-sacs these places (KFA) 
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“If you look at Waterstone Park, Ingress Park, they’re dead end estates; and that 
creates separation – them and us.” (RBA) 
This sense of division between Waterstone and its neighbours was exacerbated, some 
residents believed, by the houses prices at Waterstone which were far higher than those in  
in Knockhall and Horns Cross.  
“It’s an expensive, intensive development which will change the political map of the 
area and the nature of the existing communities that are here.” (BKE) 
“They’re very expensive places; to say the least” (JLO) 
“Waterstone Park is very expensive for what they’ve got there. I wouldn’t want to pay 
their prices.” (AFU) 
In fact in most cases residents were unable to point to any particular environmental or social 
benefits that they or the community had derived from the Waterstone Park development. 
One resident, whose children used the playground at Waterstone, felt that it had made the 
area “nicer than it was before”; but his comments were the exception. For most people, it 
was the downsides of the development that were most apparent. Two residents took issue 
with the extra traffic and pressure on the A226 that the development would generate. One 
resident also complained about the loss of his view while another resident was disappointed 
that a field of allotments had been lost because of construction.  
Nevertheless, it is what residents didn’t say about the development, rather than what they 
did say, that provides us with the most compelling evidence about the relationship between 
Waterstone Park and Knockhall and Horns Cross. The fact that over two thirds of residents 
had no comment to make about a major development of over 650 homes less than half a 
mile from their home is a graphic illustration of the failure of the developers and their public 
sector partners to integrate Waterstone Park into the existing urban grain. It is a 
development in Kent Thameside, but not part of Kent Thameside. It certainly cannot be 
described as sitting comfortably with the existing community.  
7.6 Conclusion 
It isn’t easy to provide straightforward answers to the questions posed at the start of this 
chapter. On the face of it, the prospects of integrating Ingress Park and Waterstone Park 
seamlessly into the existing urban grain would appear to be slim. Devoid of facilities, 
physically and aesthetically disconnected from its neighbours and seemingly populated by 
wealthy professionals with only the most tenuous of stakes in Kent Thameside, Ingress and 
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Waterstone would seem destined to remain marginal entities; developments that are 
indifferent to their neighbours and resolutely ignored in turn by them.  
In the case of Waterstone Park such scepticism would appear justified. Over two thirds of 
the residents interviewed in Knockhall and Horns Cross had nothing at all to say about 
Waterstone Park, despite its size and proximity to their home. It is a development that simply 
hasn’t impinged on their lives. The few residents who were able to talk about Waterstone 
tended to confirm CABE’s assessment of the development as a separate enclave with no 
connections to the immediate neighbourhood.  
However, the relationship between Ingress Park and Knockhall is far more complex. Like 
Waterstone Park, Ingress is physically divorced from the surrounding communities. Yet, as 
the interview testimony demonstrates, Knockhall residents are far from indifferent to Ingress. 
Virtually all the residents interviewed had an opinion about Ingress Park. Indeed many of 
these opinions were strongly expressed. In other words, Ingress - unlike Waterstone - is 
unquestionably a part of Knockhall residents’ lives.  
How can we explain this difference in perception? It is probably due in part to the fact that 
Waterstone Park is the junior of the two developments: not only is it smaller in size, it was 
built more recently than Ingress and is situated in a less prominent location away from the 
river. Consequently most of the political and media interest in Kent Thameside over the last 
decade has been directed at Ingress Park not Waterstone Park. We also need to consider 
the previous uses of each site. Whereas Waterstone Park is located on the site of former 
Blue Circle research and testing building, a small facility which had a comparatively low 
profile locally, Ingress Park occupies a site that has a far more important place in the 
collective memory of the existing community. As well as hosting the Empire Paper Mill and 
the Merchant Navy College, both of which were major local employers, the Ingress site has 
been an important leisure resource for thousands of local residents over the years. Its 
subsequent uses were always likely to be subject to greater scrutiny, and to be more keenly 
contested, than those of Waterstone Park.  
The response of Knockhall residents to Ingress Park reflects this interest. The older long-
term residents, who have strong emotional ties to Ingress, have found it difficult to reconcile 
themselves to the new development. They feel shut out from Ingress and believe that the 
development has appropriated part of their identity and heritage. The community activists in 
Knockhall meanwhile, who had high expectations of Ingress, given its billing as an iconic, 
exemplar Gateway development, also have strong views about Ingress Park. For them it is a 
missed opportunity. Not only has Ingress failed to deliver much needed community facilities 
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and affordable housing, but its developers have been insensitive to the needs of 
neighbouring communities: sparing no expense on the estate’s fittings, but allowing none of 
this investment to trickle down into Knockhall. It is, in their opinion, most definitely a case of 
‘them and us’ and no basis on which to build an integrated community.  
Yet these views, which are often expressed loudly and publicly, are not representative of 
everyone in the community. There are many residents, as we have seen, who have less 
emotional or political investment in Ingress. These residents take Ingress at face value; 
judging it on the basis of whether they could see themselves living there at some point if they 
had the money, not on any other grounds. And while some find the estate somewhat 
crowded and its houses ungenerously proportioned, many of them like the development and 
would be happy to live there. Yes, Ingress Park is wealthier and better maintained than 
Knockhall, but this isn’t something that inhibits them or lessens their interest in ultimately 
moving there or finding friends there. 
Nonetheless, it also apparent, Knockhall Primary School aside, that there is limited social 
interaction taking place between Ingress and Waterstone and the neighbouring communities.  
Only two existing residents in Knockhall and Horns Cross admitted to having friends or 
family living on either new development. This seems unlikely to change until further 
investment in social and community facilities – in both the new and existing communities – is 
made. It is the opportunity to share common facilities and to mix with another that potentially 
holds the key to further integration. The hard physical edges between the two communities 
can’t be removed, but they can be softened, psychologically at least, through carefully 
managed investment in the area’s community infrastructure. The question is; do the Kent 
Thameside regeneration partners still have the will, or more importantly the means to make 
this happen?  
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Chapter 8 Getting the locals on board: An examination of the strategies employed 
  by the Kent Thameside regeneration partners to involve existing  
  communities in the regeneration process 
8.1       Introduction 
In chapter seven we examined the measures taken by the Kent Thameside regeneration 
partners to promote the social and physical integration of the new and existing communities. 
In this chapter we will consider the other key regeneration objective relating to Kent 
Thameside’s existing communities, namely, the policies aimed at empowering residents to 
participate in the design of programmes relating to the area’s regeneration.  
A commitment to community involvement is strongly underlined in the key Kent Thameside 
regeneration strategies. The need to ensure that local people “are closely involved in the 
Kent Thameside initiative” was articulated by the Kent Thameside Association in the updated 
version of Looking to the Future published in 1997 (Kent Thameside Association, 1997). The 
Kent Thameside Regeneration Framework, published in 2005, also makes it clear that “local 
communities must be genuinely involved in the regeneration process if the root causes of 
deprivation are to be addressed successfully with a lasting effect” (Kent Thameside Delivery 
Board, 2005). This enthusiasm for community involvement is echoed by Kent Thameside’s 
main developers. A Land Securities’ executive and the Chairman of Countryside Properties, 
who were both interviewed for this study, said; 
“We have to find ways, certainly in the case of Swanscombe, of engaging with 
existing communities regarding our proposals so that they input and have the ability 
to comment on them. We employ a dedicated community liaison individual who is 
responsible for liaising with local community groups.” (RPY) 
 “The existing community is hugely important because they are the people who live 
and work there and have investments in the area. We have to consult them regularly 
and keep them informed so that they are able to play a part in the process. Without 
the support and enthusiasm of the existing population, regeneration won’t be as 
successful.....The lessons learnt from the London Docklands are being brought to 
Kent Thameside, and the right people are being brought on board.” (ACH) 
These comments are consistent with the more community orientated approach to 
regeneration of successive governments over the last twenty years. Conscious of the 
limitations of the Urban Development Corporations of the early 1980s, which have been 
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widely criticised for their failure to engage existing communities and to respond to their social 
and economic needs (Turok, 1992, Imrie, Thomas, 1993b, Brownill 1999, Foster, 1999), 
Ministers have adopted a “less property-oriented and more ‘people’-oriented” form of 
regeneration (Foley, Martin, 2000, 481). The government has encouraged developers to 
“adopt the language of social inclusion, partnership and community focus” (Imrie, 2009, 98) 
and regeneration partnerships have been encouraged to engage the community at an early 
stage. Effective community involvement schemes, the Thames Gateway Evidence Review 
noted, have a key role to play in easing “some of the tensions that could rapidly build up as 
development progresses” and ensuring that existing residents do not feel “excluded and 
alienated as new developments are built” (Oxford Brookes University, 2006). 
In order to assess the extent to which the Kent Thameside regeneration partners have 
succeeded in enabling residents to participate in the area’s regeneration, this chapter will 
examine two key resident participation initiatives launched in Kent Thameside: the Ebbsfleet 
Forum and Trust and the Swanscombe Neighbourhood Renewal Action Plan (NRSAP). As 
well as enabling us to answer one of this study’s key questions, this analysis will provide a 
useful addition to the literature on community involvement schemes in the Thames Gateway, 
which remains limited according to the Thames Gateway Evidence Review (Oxford Brookes 
University, 2006).  
This chapter will begin by examining Blue Circle’s proposal to establish the Ebbsfleet Forum 
and Trust; a community led body with its own dedicated resources and powers to deliver and 
manage specific projects within the community (Blue Circle Properties, 1996).  It will then 
consider the design and implementation of the Swanscombe Neighbourhood Renewal 
Action Plan (NRSAP) (Dartford Borough Council, 2003g). Launched in a bid to ensure that 
the “major threats to the sustainability of Swanscombe’ posed by new development” were 
“turned into ‘substantial opportunities’ for the community”, the Swanscombe NRSAP team 
sought to work with residents to identify and implement a series of local priorities for 
regeneration. This chapter will examine how successful the Swanscombe NRSAP has been 
in engaging residents to order to identify these priorities. We will then move on to consider 
the key findings from these case studies and the lessons we can take from them to inform 
future community involvement projects in the Thames Gateway.  
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8.2        Early promise? Blue Circle and the Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust 
8.2.1  The emergence of the Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust model 
In the early 1990s, Blue Circle was one of the main drivers behind the formation of the Kent 
Thameside Association. A key initial objective for Blue Circle and its KTA partners was to 
convince the Government to locate the proposed new international and domestic station on 
the Channel Tunnel Rail Link in Kent Thameside. After a well executed lobbying campaign 
led by Blue Circle, Ebbsfleet was confirmed as the location of the new station by the 
Government in August 1994.  
Blue Circle’s success illustrates the company’s skill as a political operator. It understood, 
better than any of the other bid teams competing for the station11, the importance of 
presenting a bid in terms that reflected the Government’s regeneration priorities. Ministers 
had wanted a bid that contained a major housing and commercial development scheme 
capable of acting as a driver of growth across the region, so Blue Circle promised to deliver 
a ‘Euro-city’ capable of housing 40,000 people. Its success earned the grudging admiration 
of the London Evening Standard: 
 “Ebbsfleet is a dirty little stream that flows through a grubby valley into the Thames 
between Dartford and Gravesend. It doesn’t even exist on the map. It was once the 
site of Europe’s largest cement works. Those have now closed, but the land 
remained in the ownership of cement manufacturer Blue Circle. When the 
Government announced that it was looking to build an intermediate and domestic 
station for the CTRL, Blue Circle spotted the chance to convert a dead weight on its 
books into a glistening asset. Without the CTRL, Ebbsfleet was all but worthless. As 
the site of a throbbing international station it is a potential goldmine.” (Oborne, 1994) 
Having gained Government approval for a station at Ebbsfleet, Blue Circle turned its 
attention to planning the development around the station. Once again, it set out to ensure 
that its development concept was consistent with the Government’s key regeneration policy 
goals. With the onus now on developers to speak the language of partnership, social 
inclusion and community focus, Blue Circle moved quickly to highlight its credentials as a 
socially responsible developer committed to inclusive regeneration. In early 1996 Blue Circle 
published its community development manifesto for Ebbsfleet, which set out its “guiding 
principles for the social and community development of Ebbsfleet” (Blue Circle Properties, 
                                                             
11
 Ebbsfleet was competing against Stratford and Rainham for the right to build the station. 
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1996). This manifesto, drafted by David Lock Associates, whose director was also the 
Government’s Chief Planning Adviser, recognised that the Ebbsfleet Valley could “provide 
major opportunities to bring social, community and economic benefits to those currently 
living, working and doing business in the area”.   
In the manifesto Blue Circle outlined a series of mechanisms that would enable existing 
communities to influence the regeneration process. Chief among them was its proposal for 
the establishment of an ‘Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust’. This new body, Blue Circle promised, 
would take the concept of an ‘Ebbsfleet Forum’ that had been proposed in the local authority 
led Ebbsfleet Development and Environment Framework, “one step further”. Whereas the 
Ebbsfleet Forum would ensure “clear communications and co-ordination” between the 
developers, local authorities and the community, the Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust would be a 
community led body with its own dedicated resources and powers to deliver and manage 
specific community projects. Elected community representatives would sit on this body 
alongside representatives from voluntary groups, local businesses, local authorities and 
other public sector bodies.  
The Blue Circle manifesto justifies the creation of such a body by stating that “successful 
regeneration initiatives” are usually underpinned by the creation of “appropriate vehicles to 
service the needs of all those involved in the process of change and development”12. 
Equipped with its own funding, The Forum and Trust would be able to undertake a variety of 
community, conservation and economic activities within the Ebbsfleet Valley, such as the 
management of open space. It could also be used as a conduit for resources earmarked by 
the developer and other bodies for the delivery of projects within the existing communities. 
Such a body also had the potential to perform an economic role within the existing 
communities: fostering the development, for example, of community businesses responsible 
for the management of open space. In short, The Forum and Trust could become, Blue 
Circle believed, “a major force in determining and influencing the long-term institutional and 
community infrastructure of the area.”  
                                                             
12
 One such vehicle is The Isle of Dogs Community Foundation (IDCF). Established in 1990, the IDCF 
is one of 64 community foundations in the UK. Community foundations have two principal remits - to 
establish a permanent and independent source of local charitable funds and to use these to make 
grants to local charities and voluntary groups for the benefit of the community. IDCF is a partnership 
between local businesses, statutory services, the voluntary sector and other intermediary agencies. It 
supports deprived communities on the Isle of Dogs and South Poplar. When London Docklands 
Development Corporation (LDDC) withdrew from the area in the late 1990s, it paid over to IDCF 
various amounts as endowments. The income from the endowment is available for grant giving along 
with any other funds that the Foundation raises. 
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This explicit recognition firstly of the importance of community engagement and secondly, 
and perhaps most strikingly, of the need to give existing residents the opportunity to 
establish some control over the regeneration process, was without precedent in Kent 
Thameside. The fact that it was first articulated by a developer rather than by a local 
authority is even more remarkable. It goes far beyond anything contained in ‘Looking to the 
future’, published just a few months previously (Kent Thameside Association, 1995). This 
discussed the need to make sure that existing residents benefit directly from the Kent 
Thameside initiative but failed to set out how this might happen. The Association admitted in 
its follow up document to Looking to the future published two years later that its earlier 
publication hadn’t paid enough attention to the social and community dimension of 
regeneration or the question of community engagement (Kent Thameside Association, 
1997).  
Why was Blue Circle so keen to pursue the idea of The Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust? The 
company’s corporate social responsibility agenda undoubtedly had a part to play. Blue Circle 
was the principal employer in the area for over a century, and had strong ties with 
Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross. The company would certainly have wanted to 
ensure that these communities were in a position to benefit from the regeneration 
opportunities presented by Ebbsfleet. Other members of the Kent Thameside Association 
however felt that Blue Circle’s social agenda was borne of commercial expediency rather 
than a sense of benevolent paternalism. One sceptic was the Chief Executive of Dartford 
Borough Council at the time, who was interviewed for this study. In his view the company’s 
obligation to extract the maximum possible commercial value from its Kent Thameside land 
holdings for its shareholders would always take priority over its social obligations to existing 
communities. While the Council and Blue Circle wanted similar outcomes from the 
regeneration programme, they were each motivated by different strategic objectives: 
“The Managing Director of Blue Circle, Tony Kemp, kept telling me that Blue Circle 
had the same social agenda as I had. I didn’t really believe it and I eventually said to 
him look we don’t have the same agenda, you have the bottom line that you have to 
meet for your shareholders, I have the public interest to consider, but we may have 
common outcomes.”  
The proposed Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust was useful for Blue Circle in helping to sell their 
redevelopment plans firstly to the community and secondly to the local authority and central 
Government. Neutralising local opposition to their plans for Ebbsfleet would help Blue Circle 
to smooth the passage of its planning application through Dartford’s development control 
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process. It also reduced the risk of the application being ‘called in’ by the Government and 
subjected to a planning inquiry and a lengthy and expensive delay. As a major application of 
national significance consisting of just under 800,000 square metres of employment, 
residential, leisure and retail development there was a strong possibility that Ministers would 
feel obliged to call it in for further scrutiny; even though it was consistent with Government 
policy for the Thames Gateway. The fact that Blue Circle submitted its formal planning 
application just two months after the publication of ‘Ebbsfleet: the first steps’ in January 
1996, certainly adds credence to the argument that the Forum and Trust was a device 
designed primarily to help the company gain planning consent as quickly as possible.  
An additional advantage for Blue Circle of the Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust, according to 
Dartford Borough Council’s Development Control Manager13, was that it would be able to 
limit the role of the local authorities in the management of Ebbsfleet and its amenities. The 
company had not been impressed by the way in which the local authority had managed the 
amenity land at the recently opened Crossways Business Park and was keen to avoid a 
repeat of this at Ebbsfleet. It wanted the Forum and Trust to take responsibility for managing 
Ebbsfleet’s park land and leisure spaces, rather than Swanscombe and Greenhithe Town 
Council, which had offered to take on the role. Through the Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust Blue 
Circle would be able to continue to exert a degree of control over how the amenity land at 
was managed and how its money was spent, while cultivating its image as an inclusive and 
community orientated developer.  
Unsurprisingly, Swanscombe and Greenhithe Town Council failed to endorse the proposal 
for a Forum and Trust in its response to the public consultation on Blue Circle’s application. 
Instead, the Town Council called for a liaison committee, whose membership would include 
the Council, to be set up to monitor the progress of the development – a proposal which was 
far less ambitious in scope than Blue Circle’s idea of an Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust. The 
Council’s willingness to accept a supervisory body with a very modest remit suggests that its 
members were concerned about the threat the Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust might pose to the 
Council’s political status and power in the community.  
Nonetheless, when the application eventually came before Dartford Borough Council’s 
Development Control Board in December 1997, the report to the board made particular 
reference to Blue Circle’s proposal to establish an Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust (Dartford 
Borough Council, 1997). It also reminded members that the Ebbsfleet Development and 
Environment Framework had placed special “emphasis on the involvement of local 
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 Personal communication, August 2008 
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communities as the development progresses”. Conscious of the Town Council’s concern 
about the Forum and Trust proposal, the report did not give an outright endorsement to the 
proposal, stating that “any proposals of this nature need to be considered in the context of 
the Kent Thameside partnership as whole”. However, it saw no reason why this extra work 
should delay consideration of the application. The Board duly granted the application 
provisional planning approval. 
8.2.2 The abandonment of the Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust model 
In the end, the Borough Council was not required to make a decision about the Ebbsfleet 
Forum and Trust. Although the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott announced in October 
1998 that he wouldn’t be calling the application in so that it could be progressed “without 
delay” (DETR, 1998b), the Section 106 negotiations dragged on for another five years, and it 
didn’t receive formal outline approval until November 2002. By this time the property arm of 
Blue Circle which had lodged the application had ceased to exist. Having become part of 
Whitecliff Properties in late 1996, a joint venture between Blue Circle and Lend Lease, the 
developer of Bluewater, the new company collapsed in 2000 and its remaining assets and 
land interests were sold on to Land Securities14. With each change of ownership and 
personnel, the focus within the organisation on community issues such as the creation of a 
Forum and Trust at Ebbsfleet seems to have progressively diminished. Land Securities, 
Britain’s largest commercial property company with extensive interests in Westminster and 
the City of London, has much broader goals and strategic interests than either Whitecliff 
Properties or Blue Circle. According to Dartford Borough Council’s former Chief Executive, 
Land Securities was far less active locally than its predecessors: 
“(One) thing that affected the Kent Thameside Association was that Blue Circle 
Industries entered into a deal called Whitecliff Properties with Lend Lease. This then 
collapsed and become part of Land Securities, who are a much bigger company in 
some respects in that Whitecliff were only involved in developing derelict land while 
Land Securities have other interests.” (CSH) 
                                                             
14
 In February 2001 Land Securities PLC acquired Whitecliff Properties from Blue Circle Industries 
together with 1013 acres of its Kent Thames-side and Cambridge portfolios for £60 million. The Kent 
Thames-side projects to be acquired include Crossways Business Park, Stone Castle and Eastern 
Quarry. In addition Blue Circle and Land Securities agreed to develop in partnership a further 825 
acres of Kent Thames-side at Ebbsfleet and Swanscombe Peninsula. Under the terms of the 
agreement Blue Circle retained ownership of the land while Land Securities provided development 
expertise and development funding. In the same month however Blue Circle Industries was taken 
over by the French building materials group, Lafarge, which now holds BCI’s stake in Ebbsfleet and 
Swanscombe Peninsula 
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These changes in ownership, combined with a general shift by developers to managing 
amenity land in house15, mean that the Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust model is no longer being 
actively considered by either the Borough Council or Land Securities. The lack of any 
meaningful support from within the community for the model has also contributed to its 
abandonment. Conceived in house by Blue Circle for its own managerial and strategic 
reasons, the company never made any concerted attempt to sell the idea to residents or key 
stakeholders in the community. Had the company sought to do so, and presented it to 
residents as an opportunity to influence the development agenda and the manner in which 
the developer monies were spent in the existing communities, it may well have generated a 
local momentum of its own and been more difficult to dismiss. 
It is an episode that illustrates the difficulty of seeking to impose a generic community 
engagement model on an area without paying due attention to the local circumstances. In an 
area with an established culture of community participation in major strategic issues, and a 
local authority sector which had the resources and experience to implement it, the Forum 
and Trust model may have been a success. In Kent Thameside however such a culture did 
not exist. In fact implementing the Forum and Trust model in such a climate may actually 
have set back the cause of community participation in Kent Thameside by reducing 
residents’ trust in the regeneration partners and prompting them to view engagement 
activities with cynicism. As the National Community Forum has argued, “bad participation” 
can have a “destructive impact” on the relationship between communities and the individuals 
and agencies responsible for their governance and lead to the embedding of “poor 
engagement practices” (Morris, 2006).  
It is fair to say therefore Blue Circle’s proposal for an Ebbsfleet Forum Trust promised far 
more than it was ever likely to be able to deliver in the circumstances. The fact that Blue 
Circle was apparently ready to work with the community in the regeneration of Ebbsfleet was 
a major step forward, and one that shouldn’t be underestimated. But the rhetoric of Blue 
Circle about the need for participation disguised another agenda which compromised the 
proposal. Vested local interests also played their part in side-lining the idea. In short, the 
area was ill-prepared for an initiative like this and its sponsors ill-equipped to implement it.  
 
                                                             
15
 Personal communication with Dartford Borough Council’s Development Control Manager, August 
2008 
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8.3  Putting residents in control? The Swanscombe Neighbourhood Renewal Study 
 and Action Plan 
8.3.1 Introduction 
The Swanscombe Neighbourhood Renewal Study and Action Plan (NRSAP) was set up in a 
bid to understand the needs of existing residents in Swanscombe and to examine how those 
needs could be met through the development process. It has been highlighted as an 
exemplar of effective community involvement in regeneration in the Thames Gateway. The 
Thames Gateway Evidence Review carried out by Oxford Brookes University picked it out as 
a rare example of “social regeneration being considered as seriously as physical 
regeneration” in the Thames Gateway (Oxford Brookes University, 2006). Physical 
regeneration may be quicker to achieve than social regeneration, it said, but without a 
concerted effort to promote social regeneration it would be difficult to deliver sustainable 
developments in the Gateway that were well integrated into the existing urban grain. Social 
regeneration projects such as the Swanscombe NRSAP, which attempt to “strengthen 
community capacity to manage the physical environment and engage in the regeneration 
process”, were fundamental, the review argued, to successful regeneration. The scheme has 
also been praised in an evaluation of community development work in North Kent by the 
University of Greenwich (Nelson, Quan, Forrester, Pound, 2005). This study, funded by the 
EU Urban II Thames Gateway Kent Programme, identified the Swanscombe NRSAP as a 
valuable opportunity to “strengthen community-based institutions and community 
engagement” in North Kent. 
This section will examine the Swanscombe NSRAP in detail to assess whether it has had 
the financial and human resources and the institutional and community support necessary to 
meet these social objectives. Does the project deserve to be seen an exemplar of good 
practice? Or were the Oxford Brookes and Greenwich studies premature in identifying the 
Swanscombe NSRAP as an effective vehicle for delivering social regeneration in the 
Thames Gateway? 
8.3.2 Background to the commissioning of the Swanscombe NRSAP 
The Swanscombe NRSAP was influenced by the Labour Government’s Neighbourhood 
Renewal Strategy. This provided additional funding, via the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund 
set up in 2001, to 88 of England’s most deprived authorities. Each of these areas was 
required to produce an ‘action plan’ that would identify, after extensive consultation with the 
local community, a set of key actions to improve the area and narrow the deprivation gap 
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between them and the rest of the country. The delivery of these action plans was led by 
Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) which included representatives from each main local 
public, private, voluntary and community organisation. These LSPs, the National Strategy 
Action Plan, stated, were “essential to co-ordinate services around the needs of each 
neighbourhood” and would ensure that “resources and policies... translate into real change” 
(Social Exclusion Unit, 2001b,10). Previous regeneration initiatives had been undermined, it 
argued, by a lack of joined up thinking at local level. Regeneration initiatives often failed to 
achieve the impact expected, it said, as only some of the partners involved in their delivery 
were able or willing to give them the strategic priority and resources they required. LSPs, 
which embodied the Labour Government’s enthusiasm for ‘joined up Government’, would 
ensure that such initiatives were delivered in a more coherent and consistent way in the 
future.  
Kent Thameside wasn’t one the areas that received Neighbourhood Renewal Fund money, 
but the newly established Kent Thameside Local Strategic Partnership saw the 
Neighbourhood Renewal strategy as a useful template on which to base its own deprivation 
strategy. It would not only save on design costs and allow for a quicker implementation, it 
would also give the strategy greater credibility in the eyes of outside funders. Consequently, 
the LSP’s Kent Thameside Community Strategy published in January 2003 announced that 
a series of ‘priority communities’ would be identified along the lines suggested by the 
Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy (Kent Thameside Local Strategic Partnership, 2003). 
“Particular attention” would be paid to these priority communities, it said, given the “particular 
economic, social or environmental issues that make it difficult for them to share in the new 
opportunities change will bring”. The strategy promised that the LSP partners would “work 
alongside these communities to help find solutions that work for them.” ‘Neighbourhood 
Action Plans’ would then be developed to identify and implement relevant schemes in each 
priority community.  
Four ‘priority communities’ in Dartford were identified using the data contained in the Indices 
of Multiple Deprivation 2000 shortly after the publication of the community strategy. One of 
the four communities, Swanscombe, was then selected as the most suitable candidate for 
the Borough’s first Neighbourhood Renewal Study and Action Plan following consultation 
with the ODPM’s Thames Gateway Executive. Their decision was influenced by a number of 
key local and national policy documents which recognised the need to allocate additional 
resources to Swanscombe in view of its deprivation challenges and its proximity to 
Ebbsfleet. The Case for Kent Thameside, for example, had highlighted the need for 
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 “A mechanism to safeguard the future interests…of areas such as Swanscombe, 
 Northfleet and Greenhithe with a strong sense of community identity that will be at 
 the centre of major new commercial, transport and residential developments”. 
 (Dartford Borough Council, Thameside Local Authorities Team, Travers, Kleinman, 
 1998)   
This call was repeated in the Government commissioned Thames Gateway Review in 2001 
(Roger Tym and Partners and Three Dragons, 2001). The review, which cited The Case for 
Kent Thameside, reminded Ministers that “many of the facilities within the existing 
communities are already under pressure and underfunded” and made it clear that this 
needed to be urgently addressed if the Government’s regeneration vision for the Gateway 
was to be achieved.  
The decision to select Swanscombe as the site of Dartford’s first Neighbourhood Renewal 
Action Plan was announced at Dartford Borough Council’s General Assembly on 27 January 
2003. Swanscombe, the Leader of the Council told members, had been chosen due to;  
“Its high level of deprivation; its geographical proximity to the new developments in 
the Kent Thameside area; and the likely effect the developments on the area.” 
(Dartford Borough Council, 2003d)  
The fact, he said, that there was already an “enormous amount of activity taking place in 
Swanscombe in both the voluntary and statutory sectors”, had helped to convince the 
Council to choose Swanscombe. Over the previous year substantial funding from the EU 
Urban II Programme, the Heritage Lottery Fund and the Children’s Fund had been levered 
into Swanscombe, creating a pool of resources to deliver the Action Plan. The Action Plan 
itself, he said, which was evidence of a shared commitment by all the Kent Thameside LSP 
partners to prioritise Swanscombe’s needs, would help to attract further funding in the future.  
Following the announcement, a working group composed of the Borough Council, Kent 
County Council, Swanscombe and Greenhithe Town Council, North Kent Police and 
representatives from the voluntary and community sector was set up to produce a formal 
brief for the project. The resulting brief had three main elements. Firstly; it stipulated that the 
NRSAP should include an analysis of how the new development in the Ebbsfleet Valley “will 
impact on the Swanscombe community”. Secondly; it called for “key actions” to “facilitate the 
regeneration of Swanscombe in the short, medium and longer-term” to be identified along 
with potential funding streams and delivery agencies. Finally; it made it clear that the NRSAP 
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should be “grounded in community consultation” and should include a “methodology for 
building the capacity of the local community to determine their own future”. Dartford Borough 
Council then made a successful funding bid to produce the Swanscombe NRSAP to the EU 
Urban II Programme, with match funding coming from the ODPM and the Council. Stratford 
Development Partnership (SDP) - which had managed Stratford’s SRB programme 
‘Tomorrow’s City’ for seven years and developed NRSAPs elsewhere in the country - was 
also recruited to lead the development of the NRSAP.   
8.3.3 Engaging residents in the Neighbourhood Renewal Study and Action Plan 
The resources available for the planning and design of the Neighbourhood Renewal Study 
and Action Plan (NRSAP) were relatively modest. The total budget was only £20,00016 while 
the funding criteria meant that money had to be spent in just a few months between April 
and July 2003. The Labour administration of the Borough Council was also keen to push the 
project forward as quickly as possible given the imminence of the local elections.  
Under such circumstances it was difficult to ensure that the NRSAP was grounded in 
community consultation as the brief required. By the time the final NRSAP was published in 
August 2003, the only direct face to face contact that SDP had had with residents was a half 
day focus group exercise attended by just eight people. Some face to face interviews were 
carried out by the team but these were with ‘key stakeholders’ such as local authority 
Councillors and officers, developers, business and voluntary sector representatives and 
statutory sector providers.  
A written questionnaire was delivered to all 2,500 households in Swanscombe, but despite a 
freepost return address and a £100 prize draw, only 222 questionnaires were returned; a 
response rate of 8.9 per cent. This, the NRSAP admitted, was “not a representative sample” 
of the village’s population and was “lower than anticipated”. Yet its authors should not have 
been surprised. The yield from written questionnaires is notoriously poor and rarely exceeds 
one or two in ten - especially in areas with low educational attainment and literacy levels like 
Swanscombe (Simmons, 2008). The abstract nature of the questions may also have 
deterred potential respondents. Residents were asked to describe the long-term impact on 
Swanscombe of the regeneration plans for Kent Thameside rather than about specific 
events or developments on the immediate horizon. They may also have been put off by the 
                                                             
16
 £5,000 came from Urban Thames Gateway Kent and £15,000 was provided by Dartford Borough 
Council and the ODPM.  
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fact that their views were being sought for the purposes of producing an ‘action plan’, rather 
than a tangible project.  
If members of the Kent Thameside LSP had any concerns about the survey methodology, 
they didn’t share them at any meetings at which the NRSAP was discussed in 2003. Nor 
were any concerns expressed by Dartford Borough Council. Dartford’s new Conservative led 
cabinet welcomed the NRSAP at their meeting on 16 October 2003 and called it “an 
excellent opportunity for the people of Swanscombe” (Dartford Borough Council, 2003a). 
The Council’s decision to include the Swanscombe NRSAP as a case study in its self-
assessment document submitted to the Audit Commission as part of the Comprehensive 
Performance Assessment exercise, suggests that it was satisfied with SDP’s work (Dartford 
Borough Council, 2003c). Indeed, it highlights SDP’s work in “contacting stakeholders active 
in Swanscombe” and organising “questionnaires, meetings and focus groups with residents”. 
It suggests that the Council’s primary concern was simply to demonstrate that a consultation 
with residents – of one kind or another – had taken place. It appears to have been less 
concerned about the robustness of the methodology used to carry it out or even the quality 
of the findings it produced.  
The interviews with senior Councillors carried out for this study support this view. They 
accept that community consultation has become a necessary part of a local authority’s work, 
but their understanding of what consultation is, or what it can be used to achieve is often 
narrow. Consultation in their view is merely a device, developed on the local authority’s 
terms, for communicating decisions and existing policy priorities to local residents. There is 
no suggestion that residents’ views will have any influence on the decision making process 
or be used to help shape the direction of future policy. Moreover, Councillors’ expectations 
as to the community’s likely level of interest in such consultation exercises are often very 
low.  
The Labour Leader of Dartford Borough Council, who commissioned the Swanscombe 
NRSAP at the start of 2003 just before Labour lost control of the Council, admitted that the 
response to the council’s consultation exercises on regeneration had often been “very poor”. 
The Council had, he said when interviewed for this study,  “issued a number of leaflets and 
had a number of meetings over the years” to “try to inform and advise about what it is we are 
trying to do in Kent Thameside” but only a handful of residents had ever attended these 
meetings or provided feedback on the leaflets. Nonetheless, he felt that the Council was 
doing everything it could be reasonably expected to do to engage residents. The problem, 
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he felt, was that “trying to interest people in regeneration is very difficult....you shouldn’t 
expect too much”.   
However one senior director in the Borough Council, who was interviewed for this study, was 
critical of the Council’s approach to community engagement.  
“I think that we’ve been rather conservative with a small ‘c’ in the way we’ve tried to 
engage the community, and by and large we’re a bit frightened of it as an 
authority...We haven’t been able to do it; we haven’t found the techniques.... I would 
say that we haven’t really been pushed by members to find different ways.” (RSC) 
In Swanscombe, he said, an added problem was that the local members were unwilling to 
countenance any engagement with residents that wasn’t directly controlled by them. A case 
in point was the Community Festival that was held as a result of the Swanscombe NRSAP.  
“The festival’s purpose was to get the community together to think more positively 
about itself; to develop a sense of empowerment so that it could move forward and 
take a more participative role in what’s going on around it. The festival almost got 
wrecked because of a political spat over who should launch it, who should be invited 
to it, how much the officer concerned should be reporting to the various members 
who might have an interest in it. It made things very difficult and it made the officers 
very nervous to go out and do the same things again.” (RSC) 
This example was symptomatic he felt of the attitude of the Borough Council leadership’s 
attitude towards community engagement in Swanscombe after the 2003 local elections. 
Elected Swanscombe and Greenhithe Residents Association Town and Borough Councillors 
were suspicious of Borough Council officers’ attempts to engage with ‘their’ residents and 
often obstructed their efforts to do so. As the Residents Association had a seat on the 
Borough Council cabinet they had the authority to block any engagement initiative or 
capacity building project they distrusted. In fact, he and his officers were often told by 
Swanscombe Councillors that such engagement work was unnecessary as they ‘understood’ 
what the community wanted to achieve from the regeneration taking place.  
“If you’re going to find out what the people really want, what their aspirations are and 
think through how you’re going to deliver that when you’ve got a new development on 
the way, you’ve got to be talking to them. The Town Council stand as a barrier 
between us and the people of Swanscombe. They presume to know everything about 
what the community of Swanscombe thinks and feels. It’s impossible to get past 
  223 
 
them to develop a meaningful dialogue of our own......That’s why I don’t really know 
what the community thinks: I know what the Leader of the Residents Association 
thinks, he tells me every day, but that’s about it.” (RSC) 
It is evident therefore that limited community consultation carried out by SDP while the 
evidence base for the Swanscombe NRSAP was consistent with the wishes and 
expectations of the Borough Council’s Councillors at the time. Although the NRSAP brief 
called for the final action plan to be ‘grounded in consultation’ there was little appetite locally 
- among elected members at least - to ensure that this recommendation was put into 
practice.  
8.3.4 Formal adoption and implementation of the Neighbourhood Renewal Study and 
 Action Plan 
The final Swanscombe NRSAP was adopted by Dartford Borough Council in March 2004. A 
Swanscombe neighbourhood renewal co-ordinator was also appointed by the Council for a 
three year period, with the help of funding from the Urban II Programme to liaise between 
the various delivery partners involved in the action plan. Some of the sheen was taken off 
this announcement however by the news that the Borough Council’s Community Department 
was to be abolished and that the Council’s Director of Community, who had been 
responsible for initiating the NRSAP, would be leaving the Council. The remainder of her 
department, which had lost many of its staff over the previous twelve months, was to be 
absorbed, the Council revealed, into an expanded Planning and Regeneration department.  
The range of initiatives identified in the NRSAP was extremely wide. Many of them sought to 
improve the appearance and character of the village and consequently to try to blur the 
distinction between the new communities of the Ebbsfleet Valley and the existing community 
in Swanscombe. A major programme of environmental improvements to the social housing 
development in Gunn Road was proposed based on “intensive consultation with local 
residents”. Improvements to Swanscombe’s street-scene, albeit modest in scale, were also 
included in the plan. There was even some discussion about developing a strategy to use 
Section 106 planning gain resources to improve the quality of the existing private sector 
housing stock; although this was never put into action. The NRSAP also called for the 
development of a retail strategy to improve Swanscombe’s shopping facilities and provide 
the community with a more clearly defined focal point. Measures to improve access for 
Swanscombe residents to the employment opportunities and transport services in the 
Ebbsfleet Valley also featured in the document.  
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A section on community involvement and capacity building was also included in the final 
NRSAP. It stated, somewhat ironically given SDP’s marked failure to engage residents in the 
production of the NRSAP, that “robust community involvement …and the involvement and 
support of local communities is a pre-requisite in order to achieve successful regeneration”. 
In the final NSRAP, SDP had drawn attention to the “unusual” absence of any tenants or 
residents associations within Swanscombe. They felt that this was indicative of a culture of 
“low self-esteem and low aspiration in Swanscombe” and also a consequence of the “strong 
perception that in the past the Council has not listened to the concerns of Swanscombe 
residents”. This lacuna needed to be addressed they warned if residents were to be able to 
engage directly in the regeneration process. Consequently, they recommended the 
establishment of a representative board comprised of residents, representatives from the 
business sector, the voluntary sector and the statutory sector which would operate along the 
same lines as a New Deal for Communities Partnership Board. As well as allowing residents 
to engage in the regeneration process, the board would also monitor and drive forward the 
recommendations contained in the NRSAP and ensure that there was a co-ordinated 
approach to the delivery of services. With the right support “the Swanscombe Partnership’ 
might be in a position in three to five years time to act as a ‘community trust”, the authors 
hoped, with the power to distribute small grants and manage regeneration funding. And to 
enable local residents to “successfully carry their remit on the board” and become effective 
community activists, it was proposed that a capacity building programme should be set up. 
This would help residents to develop financial and governance skills as well as soft skills like 
assertiveness and negotiation and fundraising skills.  
The Swanscombe Partnership proposal bore a strong resemblance to Blue Circle Properties’ 
call for the creation of an Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust in 1995; a proposal that had already 
been effectively abandoned by the time the Swanscombe NRSAP was published. The 
NRSAP authors acknowledge the obstacles that the partnership would need to overcome if it 
was to succeed. First of all it would need to gain the acceptance of Swanscombe residents, 
“large numbers” of whom, the authors admitted, “still view the Swanscombe and Greenhithe 
Residents Association as their representative ‘community’ organisation” despite its 
emergence as a political party. Secondly, it would have to win the support of the 
Swanscombe and Greenhithe Town Council: “Care needs to be taken”, the authors said, to 
ensure that the Swanscombe Partnership “avoids duplicating the responsibilities of the local 
authorities, particularly those of Swanscombe and Greenhithe Town Council”. The NRSAP 
did not, however, provide any practical ideas as to how such territorial disputes between the 
two bodies could be prevented. Moreover, the timing of the Swanscombe Partnership 
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proposal was poor. As the minority partner since May 2003 in the governing coalition on 
Dartford Borough Council, the Residents Association was in a strong position to rebuff any 
proposal that threatened its political pre-eminence in Swanscombe.  
SDP’s analysis, which emphasised the need to create a non political community 
counterweight to the Residents Association in order to encourage wider community 
participation in the regeneration debate, was a well considered one. But its policy 
prescription, which failed to take account of the fate of the Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust, or to 
consider the prevailing political climate in Dartford, was ill-judged. It was a generic solution 
that was a poor fit for Swanscombe’s specific needs at the time.   
Unsurprisingly the reaction to the Swanscombe Partnership proposal was muted. When they 
met to formally sign off the Swanscombe NRSAP on 21 March 2004, the members of 
Dartford Borough Council’s Cabinet ignored the consultants’ recommendation for a 
partnership. Moreover, the Conservative members present made it clear that they wouldn’t 
consider any new administrative arrangement that jeopardised the pre-eminence of the 
Town Council and their new allies in the Residents’ Association. As the minutes noted; 
“Members  were  keen  that  the  Town  Council  be recognised as a primary  force  
for change within  the community and should take the  lead on policy  formulation 
whenever possible” (Dartford Borough Council, 2004a). 
The new Conservative administration’s distaste for unelected partnerships no doubt also 
helped to hasten the demise of the putative Swanscombe Partnership. A month or so before 
adopting the NRSAP the Cabinet had implemented a review of the Council’s involvement in 
the various partnerships that had been set up at local and regional level to promote 
regeneration in Kent Thameside and the wider Thames Gateway. Partnership working in this 
area was placing “a significant burden on the Council in terms of resource demands” a 
Cabinet report of 18 December 2003 noted (Dartford Borough Council, 2003b). Not only 
were these arrangements very “complex”, but there were “significant areas of overlap in 
terms of both functions and membership”. A “rationalisation” would help to ensure efficient 
use of Council resources and also to help streamline the service delivery process. It is no 
surprise therefore that the Cabinet was unenthusiastic about the creation of another 
administrative layer in Swanscombe. 
Interest in the Swanscombe Partnership proposal may have been limited but it didn’t prevent 
the Borough Council and the Town Council from pressing ahead with other aspects of the 
Swanscombe NRSAP over the next few years. The Borough Council successfully sought 
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funding for a number of major projects in Swanscombe identified in the NRSAP from the 
ODPM’s Sustainable Communities Fund in 2004-0517. It also persuaded SEEDA to 
commission a master plan for Swanscombe and Greenhithe that would provide the ODPM 
and its partners with a rationale for sustained long-term expenditure on infrastructural 
projects within the two villages. The resulting Swanscombe and Greenhithe Master Plan 
document, which was produced by EDAW, another private consultancy, was published in 
March 2005 (EDAW Plc, 2005). Like the Swanscombe NRSAP, the Master Plan called for 
“greater engagement of the local community in the planning and development of the area”: It 
also warned that the implementation of the Master Plan “will not be possible without 
enthusiastic support from local communities”. Yet the recommendations made by EDAW 
were produced without any obvious consultation with residents at all. All of the discussions it 
had were limited to a select group of Councillors and officers from the Borough and Town 
Councils and an unspecified group of other “key stakeholders”. Again, this does not seem to 
have been challenged in any way, publicly at least, by Council officers or Councillors. 
8.3.5 Judging the value of the Swanscombe NRSAP 
How then should we judge the Swanscombe NRSAP? As a means of helping to lever in 
external investment to Swanscombe it must surely rank as a success; at least in the 
immediate aftermath of its launch. Without it the funding allocated to Swanscombe from the 
Government’s Sustainable Communities Fund in 2004-05 probably wouldn’t have been 
made available. One might question how this money was spent but the fact that it was made 
available at all counts as a considerable achievement. After all, Swanscombe was one of 
very few existing communities in the Thames Gateway to receive any direct investment from 
the fund. It suggests that the Government was equally as impressed by the Swanscombe 
NRSAP as the teams from Oxford Brookes and Greenwich. Just as importantly, the NRSAP 
was successful in raising Swanscombe’s profile both locally and nationally and in 
encouraging other public and private agencies to invest resources in its regeneration. 
SEEDA, Kent County Council, the Gateway Knowledge Alliance, Jobcentre Plus, Cisco 
Systems Ltd, the Urban Fund and Groundwork were among the organisations that pledged 
support for projects that were set out in the NRSAP.  
                                                             
17
 In September 2004 a bid for Sustainable Communities Plan funding worth £1.49million for projects 
in Swanscombe was submitted to the ODPM by Dartford Borough Council. In October 2004 the 
ODPM approved £1million of funding for Swanscombe. The principal projects funded from this 
allocation were: Improvements to the Swanscombe streetscene £130,000; Improvements to the Gunn 
Road Estate £374,500; London Rd junction improvements £165,000. 
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But while the Swanscombe NRSAP’s immediate impact in terms of attracting external 
funding was appreciable, its long-term impact is more difficult to identify. Once the initial 
flurry of funding activity was over, the NRSAP faded quickly from view. A year after its 
endorsement by Dartford Borough Council’s Cabinet, the NRSAP and its project delivery 
plan was “amalgamated” with the Swanscombe and Greenhithe Masterplan to form a 
“holistic project list” that the Cabinet hoped would provide “a clearer framework for action” 
(Dartford Borough Council, 2005a). The casual manner in which the Council dispensed with 
the NRSAP, supposedly the centrepiece of its regeneration policy for Swanscombe, 
suggests it had few real supporters within the authority or in the community. Things may well 
have been different if SDP had succeeded in ensuring that it was as “well grounded in 
community consultation” as the initial project brief had stipulated. Had residents been 
involved from the start in determining what projects should be brought forward for funding 
through the NRSAP it would not have been jettisoned so quickly. Interest from the 
community would have helped to sustain the NRSAP’s initial momentum by maintaining the 
pressure on the Council and its partners to find the resources necessary to deliver the 
projects in the action plan.  Yet few residents were aware of what the NRSAP was, or why it 
existed.  
The Swanscombe NSRAP can be seen therefore as another object lesson in how not to 
engage the community. It was commissioned no doubt out of a genuine desire to improve 
the lot of Swanscombe’s existing residents and to give them some control over the 
regeneration process. Yet short-term political expediency, namely the outgoing Labour 
administration’s desire to be seen to be taking immediate action within Swanscombe, 
coupled with a lack of resources, meant that the NRSAP was conceived and executed too 
quickly with too little input from the community. Once complete, the new Council 
administration was happy to exploit it for the purposes of satisfying its auditors, and the 
Government was equally eager to reward the Council for its best practice in promoting social 
regeneration. No-one seems to have had any interest however in sustaining it once these 
objectives had been met. The Town Council, wary of any attempt to usurp its authority, 
undoubtedly played a big role in its demise, but we should be cautious about attributing too 
much blame to them. The Town Council’s reluctance to co-operate with the Borough Council 
may have provided officers with a convenient excuse (in private at least) for the deficiencies 
of their engagement strategy, but it is by no means the only factor. The working culture 
within the Borough Council was hardly conducive to successful community engagement. 
There was no overt attempt by the Council’s directors or by elected Councillors to scrutinise 
the Council’s engagement policy or any concerted call to place the policy at the centre of the 
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Council’s operations. As far as the Borough Council was concerned it was a policy area of 
marginal importance that deserved only marginal resources and political capital.  
Perhaps more could have been achieved if further funding had been made available from 
the Government for the projects set out in the NRSAP and its successor documents, but the 
funding tap was very deliberately turned off by the ODPM after the first round of Sustainable 
Communities Plan funding in 2004/05. According to a senior Borough Council director 
interviewed for this study the ODPM decided that not enough progress was being made on 
housing delivery in Kent Thameside to justify the deployment of additional money for existing 
communities. Without this money, and with little prospect of any other external funder taking 
the ODPM’s place, the conjoined Swanscombe NRSAP and Masterplan was allowed to 
fade, virtually unnoticed, from public view. 
8.4 Conclusions 
On the face of it, the community engagement models examined in this chapter would seem 
to exemplify the sustainable, community orientated regeneration culture that successive 
governments have sought to instil in this country. The innovative Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust 
model proposed by Blue Circle was more ambitious than any method being considered at 
the time by the company’s local authority partners in Kent Thameside. If implemented it 
would have given the existing community the opportunity to play a central role in deciding 
how the developer contributions generated by the Ebbsfleet development should be spent. It 
would also have allowed the community to get involved in the management of the new 
amenities created by the Ebbsfleet development. The Swanscombe Neighbourhood 
Renewal Study and Action Plan was equally ambitious in its objectives: Not only did it set out 
with the purpose of identifying projects that would enable the existing community to benefit 
from the regeneration taking place, it aimed to ensure that its recommendations were 
grounded in community consultation.  
Yet, as this chapter has shown, neither project was ever in a position to achieve these aims. 
Both were hampered from the start by their sponsors’ ambivalent attitude to community 
engagement. To Blue Circle the Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust was primarily a concession to 
Government demands for ‘inclusive regeneration; though it also had a value as a 
mechanism to help the company retain control over the amenities created at Ebbsfleet. 
Dartford Borough Council, meanwhile, was more interested in protecting its relationship with 
Swanscombe and Greenhithe Town Council, than it was in engaging Swanscombe residents 
in a meaningful way. Without determined, influential supporters at the heart of each 
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organisation capable of inspiring others and navigating a path past the obstacles standing in 
their way, both projects were destined to fail to achieve their engagement goals.  
The projects exhibit many of the failings that have undermined previous community 
engagement exercises. There are strong parallels, for example, between the Stratford 
Community Forum, introduced as part of the Stratford City Challenge, and the putative 
Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust. According to Fearnley the Stratford Community Forum, which 
was set up in order to co-ordinate community consultation and participation, “never quite 
found its feet, arguably a victim of its origins, established as it was by local authority officers 
as a pragmatic response to Department of Environment requirements” (Fearnley, 2000, 
575). The fact that its “members were operating within an organisation and structure which 
was not ‘theirs” curtailed their effectiveness and meant that there “was only limited 
community-based ownership of key aspects of the Action Plan”. The Ebbsfleet Forum and 
Trust, also a pragmatic, top-down response to Government requirements, displays the same 
structural defects as the Stratford Community Forum. Like the members of the Stratford 
Community Forum, the Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust members would have been constrained 
by a structure imposed from above and dependent on their sponsor for funding and 
administrative support. This would have made it difficult for them to forge a distinctive 
identify and remit of their own.  
In this sense mechanisms like The Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust, despite being couched in the 
language of decentralisation and empowerment, are simply another means for powerful 
government and corporate actors to reinforce their control over local community actors. 
These arms length bodies are, as Taylor shows - drawing on the work of Foucault and 
governmentality theorists - often very effective in extending and normalising the political 
agenda of their sponsors (Taylor, 2007). Inviting local people to participate in the 
governance process - providing of course that they observe the rules that underpin that 
process - can help to neutralise resistance and ‘reproduce’ central power in new forms at 
local level. In this way control over local actors is exercised, not through coercion, but though 
co-option. The opportunity for local actors to resist the agendas of government or corporate 
actors and come up with their own alternative narratives does of course exist, but in reality 
the power imbalance between the two and the ability of the latter to frame the ‘rules of the 
game’ makes this difficult to achieve (Imrie, 2009).  
It is clear, therefore, that there is still a considerable amount of work to do in Kent 
Thameside before the rhetoric about the importance of empowering local residents to 
participate in the regeneration process can be translated into reality. To realise this goal, 
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local authorities and their partners should start by re-evaluating their attitude to community 
engagement. Effective community engagement takes time and requires authorities to be 
willing to accept outcomes that are not always consistent with their strategic outcomes, but it 
is nonetheless a crucial feature of modern Government. Today’s society demands a more 
open, collaborative, inclusive and transparent form of politics and “networked leaders” who 
have the capacity to “learn, listen and adapt” (Campbell, 2011). Consequently community 
engagement needs to be prioritised, and not treated as a minor, peripheral part of the 
governmental process. Local authorities need to learn to “embed a participation culture” into 
the heart of their operations (Morris, 2006). 
Secondly, local authorities and their partners need to reassess the way in which they engage 
their local communities. Speaking some years after he left the authority, a former Chief 
Executive of Dartford Borough Council, who was interviewed for this study, was candid in his 
assessment of the limitations of the engagement strategies used in local government. Local 
authorities, he felt, not only failed to ask the right questions when they engaged the 
community, they failed to consider what it was they hoped to achieve through the process. 
“Local authorities and their development partners are very bad engaging the 
community. I think that if you are going to engage people then you’ve got to look at 
mutual self-interest. People in Dartford aren’t really that bothered about how lovely 
Eastern Quarry is because they’re not going to live there. They’re going to be 
affected by it during its construction. They’re going to be competing with the people 
that live there when they finally move in. So what are their interests in the 
development? What benefits are there for them? That’s something we’re very poor 
at. I don’t think that we do enough of ‘what’s in it for me’. Almost everywhere is like 
that though; Dartford isn’t unique.” (CSH) 
It is a fair criticism. Many attempts at community engagement fail because more attention is 
spent on process than on outcomes; or in short the ‘how’ rather than the ‘why’. Very often it 
is hard to detect why an engagement exercise is being conducted - other than the need to 
be seen to be consulting residents and thus fulfilling various corporate and project 
management objectives. A lot of effort is spent on ensuring that the process is sound and 
that key groups have an adequate opportunity to take part, but rarely do officials stop to 
consider whether it is an exercise that people would actually want to take part in. 
Unfortunately, there is still a pervasive view in many town halls - as has been shown in this 
chapter - that whatever you do to engage with the public you will fail to get a response from 
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the overwhelming majority of people. This attitude is reason we see so many sterile, cynical 
and self-serving efforts at community engagement. 
People will choose to take part in engagement exercises when it is in their interests to do so. 
If the exercise relates to an issue that will have a direct impact on their daily lives, such as 
the possible loss of a much needed local service, then they will take part - particularly if it is 
clear that the outcome has not already been determined. They choose to take part because 
they feel they need to, rather than they ought to. Once this happens the issue can quickly 
develop a momentum of its own and energise the community. Even people with a marginal 
stake in the issue are swept along by its momentum; either because they don’t want to 
disappoint their neighbours or friends or simply because they don’t want to be left out. The 
most successful engagement exercises are effectively appropriated by the community and 
spawn a network of community activists, many of whom will have had no prior history of 
activism, who will then go on to fight other battles on behalf of their community.  
By embracing community engagement in a more meaningful way and making sure that 
every exercise is transparent and has a genuine purpose, we can go some way to ensuring 
that Kent Thameside residents are able to participate effectively in the regeneration process.  
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Chapter 9 Blurring the boundaries: An assessment of the impact of public  
  sector financed neighbourhood renewal projects aimed at reducing  
  the disparity between Kent Thameside’s new developments and its  
  existing communities 
9.1 Introduction 
In chapters seven and eight we examined the attempts by the Kent Thameside regeneration 
partners to promote the social and physical integration of new and existing communities and 
to empower existing residents to participate in the area’s regeneration. In this chapter we will 
consider two key neighbourhood renewal projects in the existing community which sought to 
achieve both of these objectives.   
From the start of the Kent Thameside project in the 1990s new development on the area’s 
brownfield sites has been seen by local politicians as a vital means of generating funds for 
the renewal of the area’s existing communities. For one long-standing Leader of Dartford 
Borough Council interviewed for this study, the first and foremost goal of the regeneration 
project was to “create a better quality of life for the people who already live here” through 
investment in the physical and social fabric of existing communities. By the end of the Kent 
Thameside programme there would, he hoped, be no overt social or physical disparity 
between the new and existing communities.  
The Council’s private sector partners have also underlined the importance of investing in 
existing communities. A senior Land Securities executive interviewed for this study said;   
“We don’t want to create isolated new development ghettos that have good facilities 
that alienate existing communities because they can’t answer the question ‘what do I 
get out of this?’ We have a positive policy when it comes to investing in existing 
facilities rather than build new facilities for the sake of it: This will encourage the dual 
use of facilities by existing and new communities.” (RPY) 
The Kent Thameside policy framework also reflects this goal. The Kent Thameside 
Regeneration Framework, for example, refers to the need for “strong links between the 
existing and the new communities” and called for “new and improved community facilities”.  
The EU’s Urban II Kent Thameside Programme, meanwhile, aimed to “build the capacity and 
confidence of (existing) communities in order to enhance social inclusion and to reduce the 
disparities with the standards set in the new developments”. This desire to blur the 
boundaries between the new and existing communities by improving the built environment of 
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existing communities was also instrumental in the establishment of the Swanscombe 
Neighbourhood Renewal Study and Action Plan (NSRAP) and the Swanscombe and 
Greenhithe Masterplan (Dartford Borough Council, 2003g, EDAW, 2005). Crucially, both of 
these plans highlighted the importance of ensuring that such renewal schemes were resident 
driven in their design and delivery.  
This chapter will consider whether the Kent Thameside regeneration partners have been 
able to translate this commitment to blurring the boundaries between the new and existing 
communities into action. It will examine two key neighbourhood renewal projects led by the 
local authorities and their partners that have been implemented in Kent Thameside in the 
last decade. It will explore the reasons for their selection before going on to look at how they 
were planned and delivered and whether they were able to meet their identified objectives. 
The response of the existing residents affected by these projects will also be considered. As 
well as providing another opportunity to assess the regeneration partners’ success in 
promoting the integration of new and existing communities and empowering existing 
residents to participate in regeneration, this analysis will allow us to consider the strengths 
and weaknesses of the local authorities and their partners as delivery agencies. 
This chapter will start with an analysis of the Gunn Road Environmental Improvements 
Scheme in Swanscombe, the best resourced renewal scheme to arise out of the 
Swanscombe Neighbourhood Renewal Study and Action Plan (NSRAP). Funded by Dartford 
Borough Council, the Urban II Programme and the ODPM’s Sustainable Communities Fund, 
and led by the Borough Council, the scheme aimed to deliver substantial improvements in 
the appearance and security of the Gunn Road estate, a key social housing estate in 
Swanscombe. We will then move on to consider the Swanscombe Heritage Park scheme, a 
new community park created in 2005 on a site where a world renowned set of Palaeolithic 
human remains were discovered. Led by Groundwork Kent and Medway, the project 
received funding from the ODPM’s Sustainable Communities Fund and the Single 
Regeneration Budget and was one of the key environmental schemes implemented as a 
result of the Kent Thameside regeneration programme.  
This chapter will end with a summary of the key findings from the two case studies and a 
discussion of the lessons which we can take from them to inform future neighbourhood 
renewal projects in the Thames Gateway. 
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Map 9.1 Location of the Gunn Road scheme and Swanscombe Heritage Park 
 
                 Source: © Google (2012) 
9.2 The Gunn Road Environmental Improvements Scheme 
9.2.1 Introduction 
A key issue to emerge out of the community consultation carried out as part of the 
Swanscombe NSRAP was a widespread concern among residents about the state of the 
local environment. The final NSRAP report stated that; 
“Dissatisfaction with the general environment featured strongly in the consultation, 
particularly with reference to traffic congestion, dirt, dust and the unkempt state of 
small green spaces such as road verges....Poor signage, a dilapidated street scene 
and a lack of definition and focus to Swanscombe have all been frequently raised” 
(Dartford Borough Council, 2003g). 
In response to these concerns the Swanscombe NRSAP recommended a series of steps to 
“improve the long-term sustainability of the community” such as an immediate programme of 
streetscape improvements. It also called for a review of existing council led horticulture and 
street cleaning services and suggested that if standards were not being met - or those 
standards were “not appropriate in light of major new developments in the area” - that 
developer contributions should be sought to raise the standards of the contract. In addition, 
the NRSAP identified a need for greater council tenant involvement in the monitoring and 
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management of environmental services; noting that “there is virtually no tenant involvement 
activity from local residents”.   
The key project to emerge from these recommendations was the Gunn Road Environmental 
Improvements Scheme. Building on work undertaken by the Town Council, the NRSAP 
identified the Gunn Road estate, a development of medium rise flats still largely owned and 
managed by Dartford Borough Council18, as being in particular need of an environmental 
overhaul. Surrounded on all sides by low rise terracing and bungalows, much of which is 
now privately owned, the Gunn Road estate was widely seen as one of the borough’s more 
challenging estates.  
The estate had a high turnover of tenants with many new tenants being housed from 
homeless by the council from other parts of the borough. A local GP interviewed for this 
study, who has been based in Swanscombe for twenty five years, said; 
“There tends to be pockets of housing that are managed by the council where there’s 
been an influx of families that are difficult to manage and also single parent 
families....If you take the council flats in Gunn Road, I’ve seen them move from a sort 
of middle aged or elderly population in to a predominantly young population - often 
single parents: they’ve been labelled as an area of difficult social housing.” (ATH) 
At the time when the Gunn Road scheme was being designed in 2003/04, the estate was 
also experiencing significant crime and anti-social behaviour problems. Around 200 offences 
had been reported in the previous year, although many others incidents went unreported. 
Criminal damage was a particular problem with graffiti, smashed windows, together with 
vandalism and arson to the garages, sheds and bin stores to the rear of the flats being the 
most common offences. Many offences occurred at night with local youths migrating to the 
estate from the neighbouring park once it closed at dusk. As a result the estate was in poor 
repair and had become an unattractive environment in which to live. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
18
 Only 1 of the 50 flats on the Gunn Road estate was sold on the open market between 2000 and 
2010 (Right Move, 2011)  
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Picture 9.1 View of the Gunn Road Flats looking south in 2008 
 
   Source: Bryan Jones (2008) 
Picture 9.2 View of the Gunn Road Flats looking north in 2008 
 
    Source: Bryan Jones (2008) 
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Picture 9.3 View of the Gunn Road Flats looking east in 2008 
 
   Source: Bryan Jones (2008) 
Map 9.2 The Gunn Road Environmental Improvements Scheme showing   
  location of pictures 9.1-9.3 
 
     Source: © Google (2012) 
 
  238 
 
To address these problems the Swanscombe NSRAP promised a major programme which 
would lead to improvements in the appearance and security of the Gunn Road based on 
“intensive consultation with residents”. This section will consider whether the scheme was 
able to achieve these objectives. Firstly, it will look at how successful it has been in creating 
a public realm which stands comparison with the best in Kent Thameside. Secondly it will 
consider how effective the project team has been in engaging local residents and delivering 
a scheme that reflected their needs and aspirations. It will also seek to draw some 
conclusions about the readiness of the project partners to deliver renewal schemes of this 
nature. 
9.2.2 Planning and implementing the Gunn Road Improvements Scheme 
In the run up to final publication of the Swanscombe NRSAP in the summer of 2003 a team 
from Dartford Borough Council consulted residents in and around the estate and local 
councillors in order to identify the key outputs and outcomes for the proposed Gunn Road 
scheme. The Council took its ‘Dartford Talking’ consultation trailer to the estate on two 
occasions to canvass residents’ opinions about the issues facing the estate and how they 
could be resolved through the scheme. It then followed this up with an evening meeting at a 
community hall close to the estate. Six key issues to be addressed emerged from this initial 
consultation: 
 Poorly designed footpaths and walkways 
 Insecure and inappropriately located communal gardens 
 Hazardous bin stores at basements of the apartment blocks 
 Insecure and vandalised garages 
 Intruders in the apartment blocks 
 Graffiti, vandalism and anti-social behaviour. 
As well as improving the security and physical appearance of the estate, the Council hoped 
that the Gunn Road scheme would provide a means to increase tenant involvement in the 
management of the estate and strengthen the community. At the time there was “a fairly low 
sense of community” on the estate according to the Council’s project development 
framework (Dartford Borough Council, 2003e). Moreover, there was no concerted pressure 
from residents on the authorities to address the estate’s problems or invest in its 
infrastructure or indeed any independent initiatives aimed at tackling them emerging from 
residents. This was due, the project framework claimed, to a combination of high resident 
turnover, high levels of criminal damage and fear of crime and a degraded environment.  
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A key output for the scheme therefore was to ensure that estate residents served on the 
Environmental Development Team19 which would be set up to develop and deliver the 
scheme. This team would be complemented by a residents’ led steering group that would 
monitor the scheme. Not only would this encourage the community “to take ownership of the 
project” and build a culture of tenant participation on the estate, the project framework 
concluded, it would help to ensure that the “environmental improvements were not reversed 
by vandals”. However, it took the Council longer to set up the steering group than it had 
expected. By the time the Council’s Housing Manager and its Tenant Participation Officer 
started the process of recruiting residents willing to serve on the steering group in November 
2003, the first designs for the scheme had already been produced. And it wasn’t until the 
very end of 2003, when the first phase of construction had been due to begin, that the 
steering group met for the first time. 
The first outline plan for the scheme was developed in house by the Council, before being 
passed to Architecture Limited for detailed design work (Dartford Borough Council, 2003f). 
Two designs involving the re-siting of entrance doors, the demolition of some or all of the 
garages, the removal of bin stores and alleyways and the creation of new bin stores and soft 
landscaping were then reviewed by the Council’s Environmental Development Team before 
being sent out to residents for consultation by questionnaire. The scheme chosen by 
residents, which involved the demolition of all the garages, was implemented in part in 
2003/04. The project framework states that the Council moved early as it was keen to deliver 
a ‘quick win’ that would give residents confidence in the scheme and encourage them to take 
an active role in its management. However, the remainder of the scheme had to wait until 
2004/05 due to delays in producing a bid that met the relevant Urban II criteria for funding. 
The scheme was also held up for some months as the tenders for the project turned out to 
be higher than the Council’s original project budget of £443,000. An extra £77,000 had to be 
vired by the Council from other housing capital projects to ensure the project’s eventual 
completion in March 2005 (Dartford Borough Council, 2004b).  
9.2.3 Reaction from residents to the scheme 
The immediate reaction from residents in and around the estate to the project was positive, 
but not overwhelmingly so. Residents were pleased that the estate’s problems were being 
recognised and that action to address them was being taken, but at the same time there was 
                                                             
19
 Serving alongside residents would be representatives from Dartford Council, Groundwork Kent 
Thameside, Kent Police and architectural consultants from Architecture Limited.  
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some concern about how durable the improvements would be. Some felt that the changes 
made would soon be reversed by vandalism and anti-social behaviour and others were 
sceptical about the Council’s ability to maintain the estate at an appropriate standard once 
the improvements were complete. These concerns were forcefully expressed at a meeting 
between residents, local councillors and the local MP held on the estate in the Autumn of 
200320. The Council’s project framework, which admits that Gunn Road “has not received 
adequate attention in recent years” and emphasises the need “to ensure that adequate 
resources will be allocated to the maintenance of the estate once the work is complete” 
suggests that residents’ concerns were not unfounded (Dartford Borough Council, 2003e).   
Estate residents were equally underwhelmed by the Council’s bid to involve them in the 
management and monitoring of the new scheme. The Council’s Housing Manager and 
Tenant Participation Officer worked hard to build up the membership of the steering group; 
making personal visits to individual residents to persuade them to join the group. But while 
the group was closely involved in the discussions that took place in 2004 and 2005 when the 
scheme was being planned and delivered, it didn’t survive for long once the project was 
complete. The Council’s hope that the steering group would provide the impetus for further 
resident led action on the estate to improve its facilities didn’t come to pass. Moreover, once 
the steering group disappeared, so too it seems did the opportunity for residents to play an 
active role in the long-term management of the estate. 
Nevertheless, the Council and the local MP did receive some feedback from residents. The 
MP’s office for instance received a number of complaints about the appearance and 
maintenance of the estate following the completion of the scheme. Most of them related to 
the cleanliness of the estate and the quality of the grounds maintenance. Of particular 
concern was the state of the new bin stores which, in their view, weren’t being cleaned and 
emptied frequently enough. The condition of the newly planted shrubs and borders around 
the estate was another major concern: many of shrubs and plants had been ripped out soon 
after being planted.  On the other hand most people seemed to think that the hard 
landscaping on the estate such as the new car parking area which replaced the garages did 
represent a considerable improvement on what was there before. Dartford Council also 
received complaints. A report to the Council’s Quality Services Committee in 2009 admitted 
that estate residents were disappointed with many aspects of the scheme (Dartford Borough 
Council, 2009). As well as being unhappy with the quality of communal cleaning on the 
                                                             
20
 The author attended this meeting in a professional capacity. 
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estate, and the state of the bin stores, residents were concerned, the report said, about the 
rapid deterioration in the newly landscaped area outside the flats.  
These comments mirror those made by residents interviewed for this study. When asked 
what they thought about the appearance of Swanscombe’s public realm and housing, a 
small number of interviewees - around one in five - used Gunn Road to illustrate their 
concern about the overall upkeep of the village. One elderly resident, for example, who lived 
in a local authority owned terrace next to the flats, complained:   
“I like the place but it’s altered. You couldn’t wish for a better place when we first 
moved in here. They had all big families, but you never had them out here playing 
football, they all went down the park....Now you get all the drop outs from Dartford 
sent down here. They pulled all the shrubs up that were put down here; the trees 
planted here have all been smashed up.” (KBA) 
Another resident contrasted the appearance of the estate with that of the new ‘buy to let’ 
properties that were being renovated in the village; 
“There’s some very poorly maintained houses in Swanscombe. You’ve got those 
dreadful maisonettes on Gunn Road, which aren’t maintained particularly well. But 
then you’ve got houses which have been bought by consortia for rent. They’re doing 
them up, which is changing the character.” (JMU) 
Two other residents questioned the way in which the project has been designed and 
managed:  
“I think there are big problems in respect of the cleanliness of the environment; the 
repair of the roads: just the general upkeep of the area could be better. I could show 
you an example up the road where £500,000 was spent at Gunn Road and it has 
fallen apart within two years; the landscaping is a disgrace.” (GBA) 
“To a degree the improvements at Gunn Road were successful - taking down the 
garages did help – but, you know, putting in nice new plants? They were ripped 
straight back out. The money would have been better going on facilities for the 
younger kids rather than fancy plants.” (PTU) 
It appears therefore that although the Gunn Road scheme succeeded in addressing some 
long-standing concerns of residents, residents felt nonetheless that more could have been 
done to maintain the scheme once it was complete. In their view an opportunity to transform 
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the appearance and reputation of the estate had been lost. It suggests that the concerns 
expressed by officers themselves and residents before the start of the scheme about its 
future maintenance were well founded.  
9.2.4 Discussion 
In a bid to safeguard its long term sustainability, the authors of the Gunn Road scheme tried 
hard to build in many of the best practice criteria set out in the key neighbourhood renewal 
literature. The Council consulted widely at each stage of the process; secured buy in for the 
scheme from the Police and other key public sector partners; and sought support from 
Groundwork, an organisation with a proven track record in engaging supposedly apathetic, 
‘hard to reach’ communities. It also encouraged the community to take long term ownership 
of the scheme by setting up a residents’ steering group and including residents in the 
Environment Development Team. The Council worked hard too to deliver some ‘quick wins’ 
using its own capital funding at the start of the project in order to overcome any latent 
scepticism among residents and give the scheme some immediate credibility. These 
techniques have been highlighted in the National Evaluation of the New Deal for 
Communities Programme  and by Power and Richardson in their analyses of the 
characteristics of effective neighbourhood renewal management (Sheffield Hallam 
University, 2010, Power, 2004, Richardson, 2008).  
Given the lengths the architects of the Gunn Road scheme went to in order to incorporate 
the best practice lessons from elsewhere into the scheme, the question we need to ask is 
why did it achieve only partial success? Why, for instance, did the residents steering group 
fail to survive? And why were residents so ambivalent about the physical and environmental 
improvements implemented through the scheme? 
One possible explanation is the narrow time-scale of the project and the failure to provide 
resources for capacity building. Much of the literature on effective neighbourhood renewal 
and management suggests that it takes a great deal of time to create a climate in which 
residents are able and willing to take responsibility for the management or monitoring of 
community assets and services. This is particularly so when one is starting from a very low 
base as was the case with Gunn Road which had no real history of resident involvement 
activity before the scheme started. A JRF report on Groundwork’s role in neighbourhood 
renewal illustrates this point well (Fordham, Gore, Knight Fordham, Lawless, 2002). 
Groundwork is an organisation that sees itself as a catalyst for others; it is not one that 
seeks to establish a permanent presence in an area. Nonetheless, Groundwork’s staff “were 
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under no illusion,” according to the report, “that the communities where they work may need 
their involvement over a long period of time”. In one estate in Merthyr Tydfil for instance, 
Groundwork staff spent some three years engaged in capacity building work among 
residents before they were ready to develop a regeneration strategy.  
In the case of Gunn Road, none of these potential difficulties appear to have been assessed 
or even predicted. The project framework talks at length about the positive outcomes that 
could be derived from effective resident involvement, but doesn’t put forward an engagement 
strategy aimed at delivering them. The only action taken by the Council was to direct 
residents towards a few services aimed at increasing “community participation and 
communication” run by external agencies elsewhere in Swanscombe. The project framework 
also refers to proposals for the creation of “further community training centres” in the future 
and expresses the hope that the new Police Community Support Officer will work to 
“promote community ownership of the project as well as improving the sense of community 
within the estate” (Dartford Borough Council, 2003e).  This, it seems, represents the full 
extent of the support on offer to residents.  
Dartford Council’s current Housing Manager21 has admitted that mistakes were made. 
According to him the council had allowed the Tenant Participation Officer position to lie 
vacant for several years and this deprived the residents of a key source of advice, practical 
support and encouragement. It was this, just as much as “apathy on the estate”, he believed, 
that was responsible for the failure to keep the steering group running for a sustained period. 
The Audit Commission has also been critical of the Council’s efforts to promote resident 
involvement. Its inspection of the Council’s landlord services in 2006 found that; “residents 
do not influence the service sufficiently and are not yet adequately encouraged to participate 
in decision making” (Audit Commission, 2006). Meanwhile, the resident involvement bodies 
that did exist, the commission concluded, had received insufficient support from the Council. 
Members of the Tenants and Leaseholders Forum, for instance, had been given “little 
training” and there had been “no attempt to assess training needs. Moreover; there had not 
been “a sufficient effort to address these weaknesses”.  
It suggests that the Council’s interest in resident involvement and empowerment at the time 
was fairly superficial. Certainly, the Cabinet reports on Gunn Road - which unlike the project 
framework were written for an internal audience - suggest that consultation and engagement 
work that did take place was driven more by funding criteria of the Urban II programme, than 
a deep-seated belief in the importance of the work. On one occasion in February 2004, the 
                                                             
21
 Personal communication, April 2010 
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report author even apologises to members for the latest ‘delay’ caused by the need to 
consult residents once again in order to satisfy Urban’s conditions (Dartford Borough 
Council, 2004e).  
In this context it is not surprising that residents in Gunn Road were slow to get involved in 
the steering group. It suggests that they didn’t trust the Council to take their views seriously 
or to deliver a project that was capable of addressing the estate’s problems.  
Arguably more should been done by the Council to address this absence of trust before 
embarking on the full-scale project. In short, the ‘quick wins’ the Council needed weren’t 
necessarily physical improvements to the estate per se, but tangible evidence that they 
valued residents’ opinions and saw them as the primary driver of change. The 
neighbourhood renewal literature shows that the most successful schemes are often those 
that emerge from within the community rather than those that are imposed, or at least 
initiated, from above. In fact, Richardson has suggested that bringing new outside agencies 
into a community to lead a project can sometimes increase residents’ sense of dependency 
instead of alleviating it (Richardson, 2008). A community is more inclined to assume 
ownership of a project and sustain it in the long-term, she found, if the concept has been 
generated and implemented largely by residents themselves. Clark and Southern have put 
forward a similar argument (Clark, Southern, 2006): In an article comparing the British 
approach to neighbourhood management and the French system of ‘Regies de Quartier’, 
they conclude that the French approach, which is engineered from within the community and 
not by the state, has much to teach the UK. The RdQ system, which “owes its existence to 
the political capacity of the people living in a disadvantaged urban area to articulate their 
own agenda of neighbourhood renewal”, has in their view helped to set in progress a new 
dynamic of partnership working and local institution building that has empowered 
communities (Clark, Southern, 2006, 188). 
However, the Gunn Road scheme was devised and implemented by the Council and its 
consultants. Although residents helped to decide the details of the scheme - ie where the 
new bin stores should be located and how they should be designed - the broad parameters 
of the scheme, and its timetable were decided by the Council. Residents’ role was simply to 
fill in the missing details. The basic structure and components of the scheme were in place 
long before the steering group was in place. Had the Council held onto its capital funding, 
and spent a year instead building bridges with the community and putting in place capacity 
building programmes aimed at giving residents the skills to lead the design process, the 
eventual scheme would probably have been a stronger one. If nothing else it would certainly 
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have reflected residents’ wishes more closely, whilst their local knowledge might have made 
sure that the scheme was sufficiently robust to ensure its long-term survival. In addition, the 
achievement of having overseen the scheme from start to finish, may well have given 
residents the confidence to go on and initiate other projects on the estate.  
The fact that Gunn Road became the first estate in the borough in 2008 to get its own 
‘Neighbourhood Agreement’ was a tacit admission by the Council of the failure of the earlier 
Gunn Road scheme to engage residents effectively. This agreement was designed to 
“involve residents in the delivery of local services and encouraging them to take 
responsibility, in partnership with the Council for their neighbourhood and the local 
community” (Dartford Borough Council, 2009). Gunn Road was chosen ahead of other 
candidates because of its enduring problems with anti-social behaviour and the absence of 
an active tenants association (Dartford Borough Council, 2008a). Launched at a fun-day on 
the estate, the agreement was signed by over a hundred residents, both social tenants and 
private residents, and nine local priorities for action for the Council, residents and other 
partners were identified. Most of them dealt with issues that the environmental improvement 
scheme had conspicuously failed to resolve. Chief among them was the ‘regeneration of the 
area outside the flats in Gunn Road’ which had become run down since the previous 
scheme with worn grass and missing shrubs. Commitments to improve the standard of 
communal cleaning and to increase the Police presence on the estate were also included in 
the Agreement.  
There were other issues too though, aside from an absence of a robust community 
engagement strategy that compromised the success of the scheme. One problem was that 
the scheme didn’t have a champion within the Council who was capable of ensuring that 
sufficient revenue support was made available to maintain the scheme after its completion. It 
had its backers within the housing department but they didn’t hold enough influence outside 
the department to secure the necessary additional funding. Had they produced a clear ‘exit 
strategy’ following the end of construction, spelling out exactly what needed to be done to 
maintain the scheme, perhaps they might have been in stronger position to negotiate a deal. 
Either this was never considered, or other priorities got in the way and officers’ attention was 
diverted elsewhere, as is often the case in front-line services. The Council also had no 
executive level mechanism in place for reviewing the impact of the scheme once it was 
complete: a surprising omission given how much Council money was spent on the project. 
The scheme was not discussed once or reviewed by any of the Council’s committees after 
the capital funding was spent. Consequently the Council deprived itself of an important 
opportunity to learn from the successes and failings of the scheme and to build those 
  246 
 
lessons into its protocols and policies. Another problem was that the responsibility for 
managing Gunn Road’s assets was split between several departments. The task of 
maintaining the new bin stores for instance - a source of much complaint after the scheme 
was completed - was divided between the housing department and the waste and recycling 
service; the latter being responsible for handling any complaints about their condition. This 
made it difficult to produce a co-ordinated and responsive service to residents: a problem 
recognised in the Gunn Road Neighbourhood Agreement, which put in place regular inter-
departmental Council meetings to monitor progress against the nine priorities for action.  
It is clear therefore that more thought should have been given to the management of the 
project after its completion. The Council’s failure to plan ahead and adapt its service delivery 
mechanisms to meet the scheme’s needs undermined the strengths of the project and 
diminished its long-term impact on the estate.  
9.3 The Swanscombe Heritage Park    
9.3.1 Introduction 
For those with an interest in human evolution, Swanscombe is a place that holds a special 
significance. It was here in 1935, on the site of a former gravel quarry, that fragments of a 
human skull, eventually dated at 250,000 years old, were discovered by a local amateur 
archaeologist. ‘Swanscombe Man’, as the remains became commonly known - even though 
they were subsequently identified as female - is the second oldest set of human remains 
found in Britain and is now on display at the Natural History Museum.  The site itself is now 
under the stewardship of English Heritage and has also been designated as a ‘Site of 
Special Scientific Interest’.  
Despite its archaeological significance the site was badly neglected until recently. Few 
Swanscombe residents, let alone any tourists, visited the site. Its only visitors tended to be 
either fly-tippers or off-road motorbikers. Restoring the site and creating a facility that’s 
attractive to local residents and capable of drawing in tourists, has long been an ambition of 
the Kent Thameside regeneration partners. The Kent Thameside Association’s first 
publication, Looking to the Future, published in 1995, saw culture and heritage, as well as 
investment in the area’s green infrastructure, as important tools in dispelling the ‘chimney 
stack image of the area’ (Kent Thameside Association, 1995). Not only would it make the 
area more conducive to new business and new residents, but it would strengthen the identity 
of existing communities and help to reinforce residents’ pride in the towns and villages in 
which they live. A decade later, the Kent Thameside Regeneration Framework also identified 
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heritage as a key driver “in building a sustainable environment and community for Kent 
Thameside” (Kent Thameside Delivery Board, 2005). The Government too has recognised 
that heritage has an important role to play in the regeneration of Kent Thameside:  
“Preserving and enhancing the Gateway’s rich environmental and cultural heritage” was 
identified by the ODPM as one of the key principles underpinning its work in the Thames 
Gateway (ODPM, 2005, 7). 
Concern among local residents about the loss of amenity space in recent years due to new 
development, has provided the regeneration partners with another equally powerful incentive 
to restore the Heritage Park. The Swanscombe NRSAP referred to the “dissatisfaction” 
among Swanscombe residents about the “number of local footpaths and traditional walking 
areas that had been lost as a result of adjacent developments” (Dartford Borough Council, 
2003g). It saw the Heritage Park, an underexploited green resource in the heart of the 
community, as an opportunity to improve amenity provision and also to address the 
emerging tension between the new and the existing communities about access to green 
resources.  
Picture 9.4 Swanscombe Heritage Park prior to the improvements scheme 
 
                                     Source: Bryan Jones (2004) 
English Heritage, meanwhile, has argued that “the rich historic environment in the Thames 
Gateway is an asset that has a vital role to play in creating new places and improving 
existing ones” (English Heritage, 2005, 1). It identified Swanscombe Heritage Park, whose 
archaeological and natural heritage was threatened by “fly-tipping, illegal motorcycling and 
burned out abandoned vehicles”, as an important regional resource and a priority for 
restoration (English Heritage, 2005, 24). Over the last fifteen years the Swanscombe 
Heritage Park scheme has attracted three major funding awards.  It received support first of 
all from Groundwork’s Community Greenspace project in North Kent funded by the Single 
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Regeneration Budget programme. This project, which was part of the £8 million North Kent 
Gateway Partnership programme that ran between 1998 and 2006, was set up to “promote 
accessibility to public green space and encourage the active participation of local residents 
through organised events”. The Park was also a major beneficiary of the £4.5 million North 
Kent environment programme launched in July 2003 as part of the Government’s 
Sustainable Communities Plan. Under this programme Groundwork was allocated a further 
£370,000 to carry out environmental improvements in the Park including the provision of new 
pathways, lighting and signage as well as a new entrance featuring a sculpture in the form of 
a handaxe. Three years later the Heritage Park received another £105,000 from the DCLG’s 
Bringing Natural Greenspace to the Doorstep programme in order to allow improvements to 
the park’s security arrangements to proceed.  
Thanks to this funding work on the new Heritage park began in 2005. By 2007 Dartford 
Council was able to report that as a result of the improvements the park had become a “hub 
for heritage in the borough” and an important green-space for local residents (Dartford 
Borough Council, 2007a). Groundwork Kent and Medway has been equally keen to extol the 
success of the project: The Heritage Park is “now finally receiving the attention it deserves 
as one of Northern Europe’s most important archaeological sites” it declared (Groundwork 
Kent and Medway, 2010). The “involvement of local people every step of the way”, it said 
has been “crucial to the project’s success”. “Local residents, schoolchildren and businesses 
have been consulted and have contributed thoughts and ideas throughout the Park’s 
development,” it argued. 
This section will consider whether these claims are justified. It will look, first of all, at the 
extent of the community’s involvement in the design, implementation and management of 
the project. It will also look at local residents’ response to the scheme. Has it been embraced 
by the community in the manner described? And to what extent has the scheme alleviated 
local concern about the erosion of community green space as a result of new development 
in the area? As a major environmental regeneration project that has received significant 
central Government funding, the Heritage Park provides us with an important case study. 
Like the Gunn Road scheme it has a lot to tell us about the capacity of the key local 
regeneration agencies to meet their stated commitments to Kent Thameside’s existing 
communities. It also provides a useful contrast to Gunn Road in that the principal agency 
responsible for delivering the scheme was Groundwork, a non-Governmental organisation 
with a long history of delivering urban renewal projects. Comparing and contrasting the two 
strategies will provide us with a more nuanced understanding of how social and 
environmental regeneration is being delivered in Kent Thameside.  
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Picture 9.5 Entrance to Swanscombe Heritage Park in 2009 
 
                  Source: Bryan Jones (2009) 
Picture 9.6  The hand-axe sculpture in 2009 
 
                              Source: Bryan Jones (2009) 
Picture 9.7  Landscaping features in the Heritage Park in 2009 
 
    
                      Source: Bryan Jones (2009) 
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Map 9.3  Swanscombe Heritage Park 
 
Source: © Google (2012) 
9.3.2 Planning and implementing the Swanscombe Heritage Park scheme 
The first significant steps towards the restoration of the Heritage Park were taken in 2001 
when Swanscombe Action Group was formed. Led by Swanscombe and Greenhithe Town 
Council, the group was set up in a bid to garner support among the key local regeneration 
agencies for the Park’s restoration and to identify a framework for delivering it. Providing a 
fitting backdrop for Swanscombe’s main heritage asset and an improved leisure facility for 
local residents were the main objectives for the Town Council and its local authority partners 
in Dartford and Kent. The immediate priority though was to find a solution to the illegal 
motorcycling and flytipping problems affecting the site. The group succeeded in securing an 
impressive array of members. As well as the three local authorities, Land Securities, Lafarge 
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Cement, English Nature, Craylands Primary School and Kent Thameside Delivery Board all 
joined the group. The other member of the group was Groundwork Kent and Medway which 
would become the body responsible for planning and implementing the restoration scheme.  
After Groundwork’s bid for a slice of the ODPM’s North Kent Environment Programme was 
provisionally accepted in 2003, its community development officers then spent the next few 
months working with the community to put together a development plan for the Park. Local 
businesses, as well as residents and community bodies were asked to contribute ideas and 
pupils from the local primary school were recruited as ‘Park Planners’ for the day. 
Groundwork was also instrumental in helping to set up the ‘Friends of Swanscombe Heritage 
Park’ in 2004. This group, which was composed largely of local residents, was established to 
promote community involvement in planning and managing the park and also to increase 
local usage of the park and its facilities. Its members went on to play a pivotal role both 
before, during and after the implementation of the scheme. 
The eventual scheme got underway in early 2005 and was officially opened that Summer. As 
well as a new hand-axe sculpture, which was chosen after a vote by the local community, 
the restored site included a network of stone and tarmac paths, picnic tables and benches 
and a set of stone interpretation panels providing information about its archaeology. The 
opening, which was carried out by an archaeologist from Channel 4’s Time Team, was a 
major community event with dozens of local school children among those present. The 
Friends of Swanscombe Heritage Park followed this up with family events at Halloween and 
Easter: each of which attracted over a hundred residents. The Friends also organised 
regular litter picking and bulb planting sessions for local schoolchildren aimed at “giving 
young people a sense of ownership when visiting the park in their free time” (Friends of 
Swanscombe Heritage Park, 2010). Seven years on the Friends are still active. They have 
keep fit events in the Park for adults as well as community litter picking and planting 
sessions and regular family events.  
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Picture 9.8 Photo from the official opening of the Heritage Park in 2005 featuring   
  Time Team Archaeologist Phil Harding and local primary school children 
 
 
However, not everything has run smoothly. After its opening, the Park continued to 
experience problems with fly-tipping and motorcycling just as it had done prior to its 
restoration. Even the community newsletter produced by Land Securities, one of the 
members of the Swanscombe Action Group, admitted that there were still problems to be 
tackled. In late 2005 ‘The Link’ commented: 
“There is still a long way to go to further improve the preserve the park for future 
generations. The Swanscombe Action Group is currently taking steps to combat fly-
tippers and illegal motorcycling which is spoiling the environment for the local 
community. Local volunteers are also active in developing fund-raising events, 
community activities and clean-up sessions at the park.” (Land Securities, 2005) 
Material removed for copyright reasons 
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In fact The Link was telling only half the story. According to a report to Dartford Council’s 
Cabinet, not only was there fly-tipping and illegal motorbiking, but the new lighting 
illuminating the sculpture had been smashed and the new interpretation panels defaced 
(Dartford Borough Council, 2007a).  
Faced with this vandalism, the Action Group members came to the conclusion that the 
security arrangements at the Park needed to be improved urgently. A new scheme including 
extra fencing to prevent future vandalism and a tree clearance programme to improve 
visibility across the site was put together and a further funding bid was submitted to the 
DCLG. The bid also included a plan for the repair of the damaged lights and panels and for 
the installation of new picnic and play facilities. Dartford Borough Council also pledged to 
undertake a feasibility study to assess the possibility of putting in new facilities to service the 
playing pitches in the Park which had fallen in disrepair. The plan was approved by the 
DCLG and another £100,000 was allocated to Groundwork to carry out the additional works. 
These works - the final round of improvements to the Park - were subsequently carried out 
during the course of 2008. 
9.3.3 Reaction to the Swanscombe Heritage Park scheme from residents 
To be judged a success, the Swanscombe Heritage Park scheme needed to be embraced 
by local residents. Yet the evidence from the interviews with residents in Swanscombe 
carried out for this study in 2007/08, suggests that this hasn’t happened. Asked if there was 
anywhere to go in Swanscombe if they wanted to go for a walk or cycle or walk the dog; only 
a quarter of interviewees mentioned by the Heritage Park specifically. As an expensive, high 
profile initiative one would have expected more residents to have mentioned the Heritage 
Park. In fact some interviewees complained that they had no access to green space due to 
new development - precisely the issue  the Heritage Park had been set up to address. Two 
older, long-term residents said; 
“Everything is being built upon! We used to be able to take the dog down to 
Ebbsfleet, but you’ve got the railway there now and we used to take him up the 
woods, but we can’t do that now, because they’re building up there.” (PTR)  
“We used to over the side of Stanhope Road, but we (can’t now). And there’s no 
woods. They’ve taken those away for housing. That’s going from Leonard Avenue 
down to the A2. There’s nowhere to take the dog off its lead.” (SPA)  
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However, it wasn’t just older residents who complained about the dearth of amenity space. 
One younger resident in his thirties, for example, who’d been living in Swanscombe for five 
years said; 
“Since they’ve started building the new Bluewater town or whatever it is, they’ve 
basically mullered everything and it’s all gone. There’s only one little path, which is all 
overgrown and not very pleasant.” (RWA)  
In fact, only one resident spoke positively about the Heritage Park. She said; 
“You’ve got the skull site I suppose, and you’ve got the woods and the parks and 
there’s also Bluewater, which you can walk around, so it’s not too bad.” (SNE) 
The remaining residents expressed concern about the anti-social behaviour and vandalism 
in the Heritage Park. Two female residents with school age children said; 
“We went on that walk with the boys behind the leisure centre where the heritage 
stone is – the oldest skull site – and we thought we’d have a stop but there were 
some boys on their motorbikes…..there’s also graffiti down there on all the signs. I 
wouldn’t feel safe going down there on my own.” (EHR) 
“The nearest place would be the skull site, but then that has the problem of 
motorbikes, burnt out cars, needles.” (LGA) 
Some residents did acknowledge the Heritage Park’s positive features. It was well 
landscaped and had some interesting walks and a lot of effort had been made to organise 
community events. Yet this made it all the more frustrating that anti-social behaviour was 
stopping people from making more use of the park.  
“You’ve got the skull site down the road – but a lot of people won’t go there because 
of the yobbo element. There’s a lovely walk through there – but it can be a bit 
daunting with the yobs.” (PMI) 
“The skull site would be perfect, but it’s isolated and you can only use it when they 
put an organised event on. It should be a tourist site because it’s a site of massive 
historical significance....but it’s just ignored - it’s a disgrace” (PTU) 
The improvements carried out in 2008 have done little to address residents’ concerns about 
anti-social behaviour and crime. The signage, lighting and other equipment are still intact but 
the anti-social behaviour problems have not gone away. Complaints are still being made to 
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Kent Police about late night anti-social behaviour by young people in the Park with drinking, 
littering, graffiti and the intimidation of other residents being seen as particular problems 
(Kent Police, 2010). 
9.3.4 Discussion  
The Swanscombe Heritage Park scheme has had a mixed impact. On the one hand the 
scheme has been the catalyst for the creation of a successful community organisation, led 
by resident volunteers, that has provided a range of popular family events in the Park. A key 
factor in the Friends’ success has been the support they have received from Groundwork’s 
Community Development Workers. Their presence has been crucial in helping the Friends to 
set up events, to recruit and support volunteers, and to ensure that the group’s momentum is 
maintained over time. Unlike some community organisations, which live precariously with no 
obvious goal beyond the delivery of the next scheduled event, the Friends have an 
established presence in the community, a regular calendar of events and a long term 
strategy. As well as working with local schools, they have used the marketing and publicity 
tools available to them to good effect. Land Securities has carried a feature about the 
Friends’ work in Link, its community magazine delivered to every household in 
Swanscombe, and encouraged residents to become members. Dartford Council has also 
drawn attention to their work on its website and press releases. Information about the 
Friends and a complete list of their events can also be found on Swanscombe Heritage 
Park’s own dedicated website.  
Although the social events organised by the Friends haven’t left any lasting physical imprint 
on the community, they have left an impact on the people who take part in them. They 
provide an important opportunity for local people to interact with one another and to forge 
relationships. The emotional capital that these events generate is arguably just as important 
a regeneration tool as the physical improvements to the public realm that blur the boundaries 
between the old and the new.  
The test for the Friends will be when Groundwork eventually withdraws its support and 
allows the group to become self-sustaining. Having been involved in the group for seven 
years, and worked hard to build up the management capacity and confidence of its resident 
volunteers over that time, the Friends are in strong position to do so. The group is certainly 
much better placed to carry on its work than the Gunn Road residents steering group which, 
as we have seen, received barely any support from Dartford Council and soon disappeared. 
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Without doubt, the Friends need to survive if the Heritage Park is to have a significant place 
in the life of the community in the future. 
The Heritage Park scheme has other strengths too. The quality of the work carried out in the 
Park for example has been very high. The pathways and the landscaping are of a standard 
that compares well to the quality of landscaping at Ingress Park for instance. The ‘hand axe’ 
sculpture at the centre of the Heritage Park is also a significant piece of public art that 
provides a fitting backdrop to the archaeological site. It is one of very few leisure destinations 
based in an existing community that has the potential to appeal to both new and existing 
residents in Kent Thameside as a well as a wider public from across the region. In this 
sense, the scheme would seem to provide an instance where the boundaries between the 
old and the new have been very effectively blurred.  
Unfortunately, the failure to eradicate the Heritage Park’s anti-social behaviour problems 
means that it has yet to achieve its potential as a leisure and cultural resource. According to 
a number of Swanscombe residents interviewed for this study, the Heritage Park’s problems 
are a consequence of the progressive erosion of the village’s informal leisure spaces such 
as the woods between Swanscombe and Eastern Quarry. These woods were well used by 
young people from the village due to their secluded character.  
One long term resident, the Chair of Governors of a local primary school, said; 
“There’s nowhere for the kids to go now to let their hair down. When I was young you 
had the woods and so on but all that has now gone.... The Council seem to be more 
interested in the big projects rather than places for kids. Money is not being spent in 
the right place as far as I’m concerned.” (LCA) 
The removal of these informal spaces on the fringes of the community, where young people 
can ‘let their hair down’ without offending the sensibilities of older residents, has damaged 
the community. It has turned Swanscombe’s formal recreation areas into contested spaces 
and sharpened tensions between different sections of the population. Many adult residents, 
who are unwilling to contest possession of these spaces with teenagers, choose instead to 
avoid them altogether; a state of affairs that leaves them feeling disillusioned and 
dispossessed.  
In this sense the Heritage Park scheme has repeated the mistake of the Gunn Road scheme 
in that it failed to consider the context of the project and it didn’t do enough to identify and 
tackle any threats to its viability. For a project that worked so hard to engage local residents 
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during the planning process, this failure to appreciate the scale of the anti-social behaviour 
threat is surprising. The onus on the delivery bodies to achieve tangible outcomes quickly 
may be partly to blame as it meant that they had limited scope to address the wider 
structural issues behind Swanscombe’s anti-social behaviour problems. However some 
blame must also be attached to the failure to embed the project into the core day to day 
activities and work plans of the main statutory agencies in Swanscombe. Although the 
project was conceived by the Swanscombe Action Group - a body that included all three 
local authorities - many of their key front-line officers who had a role in preventing anti-social 
behaviour or providing leisure services and youth services would only have had a passing 
involvement in the scheme. It barely received a mention in the committee minutes or 
agendas of Dartford Borough Council for example during its implementation phase. As a 
stand-alone scheme funded by a dedicated DCLG regeneration funding stream and 
delivered by an external non-governmental organisation, front-line local authority officers had 
few opportunities - and little incentive - to ensure that the aims of the project and its day to 
day management were consistent with their own work programmes and policies. Nor were 
they in a position to flag up potential threats and challenges to the successful delivery of the 
project based on their own experience and local knowledge. Had they been more closely 
involved in the project - and possibly even partly accountable for its outcomes - then 
conceivably the anti-social behaviour risk could have been identified earlier and a proactive 
rather than a reactive strategy to tackle it could have been adopted.  
If the Heritage Park scheme had been part of a holistic, carefully co-ordinated area-based 
strategy, one that placed as much emphasis on restoring the village’s informal recreation 
space as it did on formal space, then it’s possible that the scheme’s history would have been 
less troubled. Finding space for informal leisure activities that aren’t always popular or 
acceptable to mainstream opinion, is not a goal that gets much prominence in planning 
policy frameworks, but it is crucial nonetheless. Secluded areas well away from the eyes of 
authority for teenagers are every bit as important as well designed play areas for the under 
fives and picnic spaces for families. When land is scarce however, and has a high 
commercial value, then the needs of grandparents, parents and their young children tend to 
be prioritised over those of adolescents and other marginal social groups. So it has proved in 
Swanscombe. Although Swanscombe and Greenhithe Town Council has achieved a notable 
success in persuading Land Securities and its partners in Dartford to create a new ‘green 
buffer’ between Swanscombe and Eastern Quarry, it will be very different in character to the 
old woods that existed previously. In place of the woods, with their hidden spaces and 
informal paths, Swanscombe’s green buffer will consist of manicured green spaces, paths 
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and formal sports pitches - hardly an ideal environment for the village’s teenagers. If the 
Heritage Park’s anti-social behaviour problems are ever to be addressed, then a more 
inclusive leisure strategy that seeks to accommodate the needs of socially marginalised 
communities will be necessary.  
9.4 Conclusion 
The regeneration of the Thames Gateway has been characterised in the main by the 
regeneration of disused brownfield sites rather than the social regeneration of its existing 
communities. Social regeneration, despite its critical importance to the success of the 
Gateway regeneration agenda, has rarely been given the same attention as physical 
regeneration (Oxford Brookes University, 2006). One study calculated that less than 4 per 
cent of the Government regeneration funding in Thames Gateway Kent has “related to 
initiatives which will directly impact on the development of communities” (Nelson, Quan, 
Forrester, Pound, 2005). 
The two neighbourhood renewal schemes examined in this chapter, which sought to blur the 
distinction between existing communities and new development and to empower residents 
by giving them a central role in the planning, delivery and management of each scheme, are 
among the few exceptions to this trend. They may have struggled to meet some of their 
objectives, but the efforts made to improve the circumstances of existing residents, so 
unusual in the context of the Thames Gateway, deserve credit. 
Both schemes, however, had major flaws. In the case of the Gunn Road scheme the 
opportunity to build a lasting culture of resident participation in the management of the estate 
was lost. The Council was unable, or unwilling, to make the necessary time, resources and 
support available to ensure that the scheme was driven and managed by residents. It also 
failed to ensure the resilience of its key features or to put in place an adequate plan for its 
long-term management. This detracted from the environmental benefits of the scheme. The 
Swanscombe Heritage Park scheme, meanwhile, succeeded in creating an attractive 
amenity and also in involving residents in the planning and management of the project from 
the start. The scheme was badly undermined though by a failure to appreciate the threat 
posed by anti-social behaviour or to respond appropriately to it.  
In Dartford Council case, its officers lacked Groundwork’s expertise in engaging residents 
and equipping them to participate effectively in community projects. The Council also did not 
seem to have the same corporate commitment to promoting resident participation as 
Groundwork. Whereas Groundwork provided support and training over many years to the 
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Friends of Swanscombe Heritage Park to help the organisation to develop the capacity it 
needed to become self-sustaining, Dartford Council gave virtually no support to the residents 
led Gunn Road steering group. In the case of Swanscombe Heritage Park, the scheme was 
compromised in part by the fact that the lead delivery agency, Groundwork, was isolated 
from the main front-line public sector service providers and was not in a strong position to 
secure strategic support for the project from key officials. As such the scheme was not 
properly integrated into existing neighbourhood renewal and community safety strategies 
affecting Swanscombe. If it had been then the scheme might have been able to manage the 
anti-social behaviour threat more effectively.  
Nonetheless both schemes have had some positive impacts. The Heritage Park scheme is a 
leisure resource whose design and appearance stand comparison with the best of the new 
developments. Lessons too have been learnt from the Gunn Road scheme by Dartford 
Council and many of the scheme’s environmental and resident participation objectives have 
now been achieved thanks to the Gunn Road Neighbourhood Agreement signed in 2008.  
New turf, shrubs and fencing have been installed; the cleaning regime has improved; and 
residents are now attending and contributing to the regular monitoring meetings set up as a 
result of the Neighbourhood Agreement (Dartford Borough Council, 2009). Support is also 
being given to residents to enable them to chair monitoring meetings and set their agenda; 
the precursor, it is hoped, to the establishment of a formal residents association on the 
estate. Although Gunn Road’s street furniture and fittings are not on a par with a new estate 
like Ingress Park they are nonetheless well maintained. One would say that the distinction 
between them has at least been made fuzzier thanks to the improvements scheme.  
The two projects illustrate the crucial importance of ensuring that neighbourhood renewal 
schemes are first of all consistent and well integrated into existing renewal strategies and 
workplans and secondly that the delivery agencies have both the capacity, the will and the 
time to achieve its given objectives. A culture of active resident participation, in particular, 
can take a great deal time and officer capacity to build up, and is only possible if the 
organisation responsible is willing and able to commit resources over an extended period of 
time. Thirdly, and most crucially, these projects highlight the importance of ensuring that 
such schemes are driven by residents themselves and accurately reflect their priorities and 
needs rather than those of the project sponsors. Without buy in from residents and their 
active leadership from the start, the impact and enduring value of a neighbourhood renewal 
project is likely to be minimal.  
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The problem of course is that the resources to fund such projects have been difficult to 
identify, particularly in the current financial climate. The two schemes discussed in this 
chapter are among only a tiny handful of urban renewal projects targeted at Swanscombe, 
Knockhall and Horns Cross in the last twenty years aimed at blurring the boundaries 
between the new and existing communities. It suggests once again that the current Kent 
Thameside regeneration model needs to be re-examined if we are to be in a position to 
challenge the disparities between the new and existing communities.  
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Chapter 10 Is the Kent Thameside regeneration model fit for purpose? 
10.1  Introduction 
The Kent Thameside regeneration model is predicated on the private sector led 
redevelopment of large brownfield sites outside the existing residential footprint. As well as 
providing new homes, new jobs and new infrastructure for Kent Thameside, the model is 
expected to facilitate the renewal of the area’s existing communities. It envisages the 
creation of iconic, eye-catching communities which will, at the same time, be well integrated 
into the existing urban grain. It is a demanding prescription, even in a strong economy. It 
relies heavily on the presence of a buoyant property market, a well-resourced public sector 
and above all a confident development industry that has access to a strong credit supply.  
The aim of this chapter is to examine the viability of this regeneration model. Using the 
evidence discussed in the third part of this study it will consider whether this model is 
capable of delivering the integrated, well balanced communities that the Kent Thameside 
regeneration partners envisage. It will begin by focusing on two specific issues. It will look 
firstly at the practical challenges involved in delivering an integrated community using this 
model: a community in which the housing and facilities are well integrated physically and 
whose residents mix with one another, share the same services and feel part of the same 
community. It will then look at the costs involved in achieving integration and the renewal of 
existing communities. The chapter will then move on to discuss some potential ways in 
which the Kent Thameside model could be revised or strengthened. 
10.2  The practical challenges of delivering integrated communities  
The evidence from the third part of this study has highlighted the difficulties involved in 
successfully integrating new developments into the existing urban grain. The analysis of the 
relationship between Ingress Park and Waterstone Park and the existing communities 
around them found limited evidence of social or physical integration between the 
communities (see map 10.1). Very few existing residents had social connections in Ingress 
or Waterstone Park, or saw the developments as intrinsic parts of the community. Only the 
primary school in Knockhall provided a reliable arena for social mixing between the two sets 
of residents.  
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Map 10.1    Relationship between Ingress Park, Waterstone Park, Knockhall & Horns Cross 
 
                             Source: Bryan Jones (2012) 
           The yellow arrows indicate the main visual interfaces between Ingress Park,  
           Waterstone Park, Knockhall and Horns Cross 
The absence of any community facilities at Ingress or Waterstone that could be used to bring 
residents together is seen as one reason for this shortage of social mixing. “A lack of social 
and community infrastructure” on Ingress is contributing to new residents’ sense of isolation, 
Penny Bernstock (2008) concluded in a report for Shelter. In future, she said, “community 
development plans should be drawn up to coincide with residents moving into new 
developments” and “developments should ensure that residents have access to adequate 
infrastructure from the outset.” If facilities aren’t provided upfront there is a risk of ending up 
with a development which is merely a collection of houses with the same post-code rather 
than a coherent community. Or as an opinion piece in Community Care, put it;  
“Not so much a community, then, more an incubator for wage slaves.... If sitting in 
solitary splendour in Ingress Park, watching your three-foot plasma TV screen, king 
of a des res castle, drawbridge up, moat in place is a glimpse of the ‘new’ community 
of the future, (the Government) should think again.” (Community Care, 2003) 
But while the provision of more facilities on site at Ingress and Waterstone would probably 
help to strengthen ties between new residents, it wouldn’t necessarily help to integrate new 
and existing communities.  By establishing every facility and service on site, there is a risk of 
turning the ‘des res castle’ into the gated community whose residents have no need of, or 
interest in, the people and communities around them. Moreover, the sense of alienation 
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expressed by many older long-term Knockhall residents when they talked about Ingress 
would, it is reasonable to suppose, have been even more pronounced had Ingress been 
given its own school, community centre and health facilities. Giving Ingress traffic priority is 
one thing; giving it its own suite of public services is quite another. It could reinforce the 
difference in “lifeworlds” between new and existing residents that is apparent at a number of 
Gateway developments along the Thames (Davidson, 2009).  
Local authority planners and developers in Kent Thameside have found it difficult to resolve 
this paradox. In the case of Eastern Quarry, Dartford Borough Council has called for the 
additional community facilities required by new development to be located in neighbouring 
Swanscombe as well as the quarry. This, the Council states, would provide an opportunity 
for the two communities to bond. Yet, as a Council Director interviewed for this study 
admitted, the policy is an unproven one, rooted more in hope, than hard evidence. It is a 
scepticism that other agencies, judging by his comments, appear to share.  
“We haven’t been able to plan with any confidence a way of seamlessly integrating 
Eastern Quarry with Swanscombe. You’ll actually see in our local plan a simple but 
very good idea that for Eastern Quarry’s immediate facilities you wouldn’t provide all 
of them within the quarry, you provide some of them within Swanscombe with good 
linkages into the quarry. This would provide some kind of framework around which 
the two communities could learn to bond. It’s a bit hokey I suppose but it’s a kind of 
start. But whenever you get into a discussion about what kind of facilities and where, 
you come up against people’s preoccupations about what won’t work.” (RSC) 
Similar frustrations were expressed by a senior Land Securities official, who was also 
interviewed for this study. He stated that the company had been surprised by Swanscombe 
and Greenhithe Town Council’s insistence on creating a ‘public space buffer’ between 
Swanscombe and Eastern Quarry. It was not the right way, he felt, of creating integration 
between the two communities.  
“In the case of Swanscombe we questioned the wish of the town council to create a 
public space buffer around Swanscombe rather than allowing better integration 
between the new and existing development; but that was the will of the town council 
and that was reflected in our proposals.” (RPY) 
In short, it appears that there is no clear consensus among local planners, developers and 
politicians as to which policy model stands the best chance of enabling the seamless 
integration between the new and the old communities that the Kent Thameside 
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Regeneration Framework envisages. Even the presence of a specially commissioned 
Swanscombe and Greenhithe Masterplan which was designed to provide a road map for 
integration (discussed below) has not delivered a way forward (EDAW Plc, 2005).  
While some of these disagreements could potentially be resolved through stronger and more 
effective leadership from key partners, they also point to problems in the underlying premise. 
It indicates that the type of large, self-sustaining community due to be created in the Eastern 
Quarry is, in practical terms, extremely difficult to integrate successfully into the existing 
urban grain. It suggests that the premise needs to be reviewed.  
10.3  The cost of achieving integration  
Delivering integrated communities is an expensive undertaking. The 2005 Swanscombe and 
Greenhithe Masterplan, commissioned in a bid to translate the regeneration partners’ 
aspiration to integrate new and existing communities into a practical programme of action, 
warned that the price of integration would be a high one. To achieve the overlapping goals of 
“improving the existing public realm to achieve the same quality as new developments” and 
“integrating Swanscombe and Greenhithe physically with its surroundings”, every available 
funding source would have to be “maximised”, it concluded (EDAW Plc, 2005). 
A small pot of funding of around £1 million had been allocated to Swanscombe in 2004 from 
the government’s Sustainable Communities Fund for community facilities and environmental 
improvements. However, the government needed to find much more funding, the Masterplan 
stated, if its proposals were to be implemented. The private sector too, it said, would need to 
find extra resources. It saw the availability of Section 106 funding from developers like Land 
Securities as a “major opportunity” to deliver benefits for the existing community. Noting that 
the developers of Ingress Park had contributed £6 million to the restoration of Ingress 
Abbey, the Masterplan called for further private funding to be levered into “a range of public 
realm, civic and infrastructure projects” across the area.  
At the time, the Masterplan’s authors were confident that infrastructure funding would 
continue to flow in Swanscombe and Greenhithe. More funding from the government, it said, 
“can be expected in the future”. Unfortunately their confidence was misplaced. Aside from a 
further grant of £105,000 from the DCLG in 2007 for Swanscombe Heritage Park, no more 
government money was allocated to the villages for urban renewal projects after 2005.  
With the annual house completion rate in Kent Thameside lagging behind the government’s 
projections, Ministers were reluctant to sanction further investment in existing communities. 
The government became “much tougher” on local authorities after the 2005 election, 
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according to a senior Dartford Council Director interviewed for this study. Only bids from 
authorities which could show tangible progress towards meeting their housing outcomes 
were considered he said. This meant that Dartford “couldn’t sustain the funding in terms of 
the community.” Another distraction for the government, a 2006 Dartford Council Cabinet 
report alleged, was the 2012 Olympics. 
 “With the Government’s focus on housing delivery and the 2012 Olympics, the 
 short-term prospects for funding Kent Thameside projects from Thames Gateway 
 spending allocations appear limited.” (Dartford Borough Council, 2006) 
Nor was the private sector able to meet the shortfall. It became apparent that the Masterplan 
had seriously over-estimated the ability and willingness of developers to fund additional 
infrastructural projects. It had acknowledged that the “high enabling costs for land raising 
and ecological treatment” of the Swanscombe Peninsula development “may substantially 
reduce” the developer’s Section 106 contribution. But it made no mention of the escalating 
cost of preparing Eastern Quarry - Kent Thameside’s largest regeneration project - for 
development. Its developer, Land Securities, had had to commit £40 million to local 
highways improvements, simply in order to unblock the Highways Agency’s objection to the 
development. This severely restricted the developer’s capacity to fund any public realm or 
infrastructural projects elsewhere. For the Swanscombe and Greenhithe Masterplan, the 
loss of this funding proved to be a near terminal blow. It still exists as a Dartford Borough 
Council Strategy, but hopes of realising its ambitious range of projects have all but 
disappeared. The financial crisis of 2008, which brought development in Kent Thameside to 
an abrupt halt, put an end to the Masterplan’s ambitions.  
The sheer cost involved in realising Kent Thameside’s various regeneration objectives was 
highlighted by a Land Securities publication in late 2009 (Land Securities, 2009). By this time 
the company had, by its own estimate, invested over £100 million in preparing Eastern 
Quarry and Ebbsfleet for development. And this was before scarcely a brick had been laid. 
At the time only around 100 of the planned 10,000 homes in the ‘Ebbsfleet Valley’ had been 
completed.  
“The investment we have made in Ebbsfleet Valley goes way beyond money. It’s true 
that over £100 million has gone into acquisition, planning, development and 
construction since 2001. But this is also about intellectual capital and emotional 
commitment. Thousands of man hours to fine-tune the masterplans and obtain the 
consents. And a serious amount of hard graft to drain old lakes and build new ones, 
and turn acres of wasteland into platforms ready for building to begin. We’ve shifted 8 
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million cubic metres of earth, created a lake 1,100 metres long, spent 30,000 
machine hours on site, installed 10,000 metres of drainage, laid 3.5 kilometres of 
access roads and planted 3,817 new trees.” 
In contrast, the company spent only £180,000 in existing communities in Kent Thameside via 
its LINK fund over the same period – a figure less than 0.2 per cent of its total project 
budget. Set up in 2004, the LINK fund allocated small grants of up to £5,000 to local 
charities and community organisations for projects promoting lifelong learning, jobs and 
cultural and community development. Among the organisations supported by the LINK fund 
was a local riding centre for the disabled, Swanscombe Tigers Football Club, a weekly lunch 
club for older people and a local children’s hospice.  
Welcome though this funding would have been to the organisations concerned, the scale of 
Land Securities’ investment fell well short of the level of private sector funding anticipated in 
the Swanscombe and Greenhithe Masterplan. Furthermore, the type of project funded by the 
company was very different to the urban renewal schemes envisaged in the Masterplan. 
While the Masterplan looked to the private sector to help deliver improvements to the public 
realm, Land Securities was more interested in making small, ‘community chest’ style funding 
awards to well known and well supported local charities and organisations. The physical 
renewal of the area’s existing communities was not a pressing priority for Land Securities. All 
the company’s available resources were being pumped into site preparation projects, and 
there was little funding left to invest in the fabric of existing communities - or, it seems, any 
desire to find any more.  
With the private sector focussed on preparing the ground for the development, and the 
government committed only to the delivery of the Kent Thameside Strategic Transport 
Programme, it is hard to see how the goal of community integration can possibly be 
achieved. A challenging ambition even before the current era of fiscal austerity, it now looks 
almost undeliverable. It suggests that if integration is to be funded, the Kent Thameside 
regeneration model will need to be substantially revised.  
10.4  Towards an integrated future: Some possible revisions to the Kent  
  Thameside regeneration model 
The previous sections have illustrated the limitations of the current Kent Thameside 
regeneration model as a vehicle for achieving the integration of new and existing 
communities: Not only is there no consensus as to how existing communities can be 
  268 
 
integrated with new brownfield communities, but the available resources to deliver 
integration are wholly inadequate, and are likely to remain so.  
In this section we will consider a number of policy proposals that could help to facilitate the 
integration of existing communities like Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross and the 
planned new developments in the Ebbsfleet Valley. For while the Ebbsfleet Valley 
development timetable has been substantially delayed, it is likely that development will 
eventually take place. A deal between the government and Land Securities in August 2012 
on the Kent Thameside Strategic Transport Programme, which allows the developer to make 
a reduced financial contribution to the programme, has now removed the main obstacle to 
development (DCLG 2012).  
However, we will also examine some alternative locations for new housing in Kent 
Thameside which could be more sustainable, popular and affordable in the long term than 
the Ebbsfleet Valley and similar such out of town brownfield sites. 
10.4.1  Build out slowly from existing communities 
With so much money and political capital already invested in developments such as Eastern 
Quarry it is almost certain that new housing will appear on the site eventually. Land 
Securities is determined to see a return on its investment and Kent County Council, anxious 
to protect its rural hinterland from development, will not allow a major urban development 
site with existing planning permissions to be abandoned. Pressure on the Government, 
meanwhile, to ‘build its way’ towards an economic recovery has already forced Ministers to 
look for ways of unblocking the infrastructural barriers to development in Eastern Quarry 
(DCLG, 2012).   
But while development on some scale is almost assured, the type of development to be 
created remains open for discussion. There is an existing overarching masterplan, but the 
development plans are still at outline stage and a builder has yet to be engaged. In fact Land 
Securities has already sought to renegotiate the scale and timing of the some of the key 
community facilities in the Ebbsfleet Valley due to the slower than anticipated pace of 
development (The Gravesend Messenger, 2010). 
The local authorities could seize the opportunity presented by the economic downturn to 
revise the terms of the Eastern Quarry planning permission to promote greater community 
integration. By asking Land Securities to build outwards slowly from southern edge of the 
residential footprint of Swanscombe and Knockhall, rather than build a self-sustaining 
community with its own distinct identity and centre, it may be possible to create a genuinely 
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cohesive and integrated community. Concentrating this development around existing 
community hubs such as the Swan Valley campus in Swanscombe would help to maximise 
this potential (see map 10.2). This campus, which contains an under-subscribed secondary 
school, a primary school, a library, a health centre and a life-long learning centre - all built in 
the last twelve years, would provide an ideal arena for new and existing residents to interact. 
It would also remove the need to create new health and education facilities in Eastern 
Quarry. Some of the money saved by doing this could then be invested in improvements in 
the fabric and facilities of Swanscombe and Knockhall – as proposed in the 2005 
Masterplan. It is a concept that would require some additional land preparation, but aside 
from this there are no other significant practical obstacles that developers would need to 
overcome.  Moreover, as most of the detailed design work has yet to be commissioned, the 
developer wouldn’t need to pay any additional design fees. 
Map 10.2    The relationship between Swanscombe, Knockhall, Eastern Quarry and  
         Ebbsfleet 
   
                                    Eastern Quarry        Swanscombe and Knockhall 
Swan Valley Campus                Ebbsfleet 
The picture includes the development layout from the current  
Eastern Quarry and Ebbsfleet Masterplans 
Source: Kent Thameside Regeneration Board (2007) 
To date, Land Securities’ marketing of the Ebbsfleet Valley has focused, unsurprisingly, on 
its proximity to Bluewater and the speed by which residents can travel to central London, 
Paris and Brussels. Potential purchasers are offered the prospect of living in a stylish, 
modern, ‘sustainable’ development with unrivalled connections within the South east and 
with northern Europe (see figure 10.1). Kent Thameside’s existing communities such as 
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Swanscombe and Knockhall, with their tired, “chimney stack” image, are conspicuous by 
their absence from the company’s marketing literature (Kent Thameside, 1995). They are 
treated as inconvenient reminders of Kent Thameside’s grey, unfashionable, heavy industrial 
past that are best ignored.  
Figure 10.1  Sales advert for the first phase of 100 houses in Ebbsfleet Valley in 2008 
 
 
A development that is focused on these existing communities would require Land Securities 
and their partners to reappraise their attitude to these existing communities. Perhaps most 
importantly, it would give them a direct vested interest in the renewal of these existing 
communities. Improvements to Swanscombe and Knockhall’s public realm, their 
infrastructure and housing stock would become a core corporate objective, rather than just a 
desirable but low priority objective.  
A policy of building out slowly from existing communities therefore could provide the catalyst 
necessary to make community integration a reality, not just an aspiration. 
10.4.2  Respect the history of the present  
If integration is to be delivered in Kent Thameside we need new development that respects 
the memories and experiences of the people that used that land in its previous incarnations.  
Material removed for copyright reasons 
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English Heritage, which has carried out a comprehensive analysis of the Gateway’s historic 
environment as part of its national characterisation programme, believes that heritage can 
help to realise sustainable growth in the Gateway. Developments that respect and enhance 
the historic environment of the Gateway are the ones most likely to succeed it argues:  
 “Understanding the area’s use and character allows for some valuable continuity  in 
 the future of the Thames Gateway. Maintaining a feeling of continuity provides 
 communities with roots in their past, stimulating a sense of belonging and pride in 
 where they live” (English Heritage, 2005, 3-4) 
In keeping with this sentiment, it recommends that the grade II listed Factory Club near 
Swanscombe, which until the 1970s was used by Blue Circle cement workers as social club, 
should be redeveloped and reopened as a community facility (English Heritage, 2005, 27).  
Michael Keith, meanwhile, writing about the Thames Gateway, has called for a regeneration 
narrative that acknowledges the ‘history of the present’ (Keith, 2009). The historical, he says, 
is an active force in the present. Existing residents are acutely conscious of past narratives 
and this affects their perception of the regeneration proposals associated with the Thames 
Gateway.  
Kent Thameside’s brownfield sites should not be seen as dead spaces that require 
activation, but as dynamic entities whose past uses not only continue to influence the 
present but are still being contested and re-interpreted by existing residents. Instead of an 
architecture which seeks to give each development an ersatz historical legitimacy, a 
regeneration strategy is needed that looks beyond the developments’ perimeters and tries to 
understand the different, and sometimes conflicting ways in which the existing community 
relate to their past, present and future uses. Reconciling these different perspectives and 
translating the result into practical action is not easy. We have seen from the case study of 
Ingress Park and Knockhall significant differences in the way existing residents relate to the 
site and its previous uses. It is necessary, nonetheless, if the idea of integrated development 
is to have any meaning or integrity in the future.  
Inevitably conflicts between the developer vision for a site, driven by a commercial 
imperative, and the views of existing residents will arise. But as Syms and Knight (2001) 
have shown, it is possible to build a consensus which respects the various ways in which the 
existing community have used the site and which developers can accept. The key, as Raco 
and Henderson (2006, 499) observe, is to ensure that brownfield sites are not seen simply 
as “blank slates’ or “problem places with limited potential other than demolition, remediation 
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or starting again” but as sites rich in historical meaning and value for the immediate 
community. It also requires the development community to show sensitivity to the existing 
uses of the site, even those which are informal or unregulated. If the site has an existing 
value as a green backdrop, or as an informal leisure space, this needs to be acknowledged 
and respected in the development plans.  
It is equally important that existing residents are seen, not simply as consultees, but as co-
owners of each brownfield site and the co-creators of their future. After all, it is their labour, 
their physical investment which has helped to create its economic value as a developable 
resource. They are entitled to a share of this value: either in the form of on-site amenities 
that they can access, or investment in the physical fabric or human capital of the existing 
community. This should, moreover, be a key, overriding consideration in each planning 
application and regeneration strategy, not simply a footnote.  
10.4.3  Concentrate more housing in existing town centres in Kent Thameside 
Given the amount of media and political attention given to Ebbsfleet Valley and Ingress Park, 
one could be forgiven for thinking that they are only sites in Kent Thameside suitable for 
major housing developments. Yet there are other sites, most notably in Kent Thameside’s 
existing town centres which have not only the capacity to absorb more housing, but are 
better suited for the purpose.  
For a start, building houses in existing town centres is likely to be cheaper than constructing 
houses in the Ebbsfleet Valley as most of the critical infrastructure is already in place. It 
would also build on the underlying economic strength of the Gateway’s existing town 
centres. A report by the property consultants, GVA Grimley, concluded that the focus on the 
Gateway’s ‘economic transformers’, such as Ebbsfleet, Stratford and Canary Wharf, has 
obscured the contribution that existing town centres will make to the Gateway’s economic 
growth (GVA Grimley, 2008). The company calculated that 60 per cent of the employment 
growth in the Gateway outside the four transformer projects would occur at the ten key town 
centres in the area; a list that included Dartford and the Medway Towns in Kent. It argued 
that “sustainable growth in the Gateway can only be achieved through the growth of local 
town centres as employment, retail, leisure and ‘destination’ locations.  
The benefits of town centre led regeneration in the Gateway were recognised by the last 
Labour Government towards the end of its period in office. The ODPM’s framework for 
delivering the Communities Plan in the Thames Gateway, published in 2003, focused 
squarely on developing new communities on brownfield sites and said little about existing 
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town centres (ODPM, 2003b). However, the Sustainable Communities plan update, 
published shortly before the 2005 election (ODPM, 2005) and the Thames Gateway Delivery 
Plan published in 2007 (DCLG, 2007) both underlined the importance of “accelerating the 
redevelopment of town centres across the Gateway”. Investment in the commercial and 
cultural facilities and housing stock in existing centres was crucial, they said, to the success 
of the Gateway. 
 “Investment in the Gateway cannot be just about more houses, big sites and  
 iconic development. We want to build places where people want to live, work  
 and visit by improving the day to day lives of local residents. This means   
 providing more homes, jobs, transport and shops in town centres” (DCLG, 2007, 47) 
This admission was overshadowed in both documents by a discussion of the progress being 
made at Ebbsfleet, Stratford, Canary Wharf and the London Gateway – the key ‘economic 
transformers’ of the Gateway. Nonetheless, Ministers did make some funding available to 
promote town centre redevelopment. They were persuaded to do so, according to a senior 
Dartford Council Director interviewed for this study, by the feedback from local authorities to 
the Communities Plan: 
 “When Prescott announced funding for the Sustainable Communities Plan he 
 invited local authorities to tell him what the money should be spent on. I think he 
 expected us to say what’s getting in  the way of new housing delivery and the 
 barriers that needed to be removed. We said that’s not what you should be doing - 
 you need to prepare the ground more broadly for development. That’s why we said 
 prioritise Dartford town centre. We were quite successful in getting money to do that.” 
 (RSC) 
In Dartford, the Government gave several million pounds in support to the ‘Northern 
Gateway’ development on the site of a former Glaxo Smith Kline production plant and the 
Lowfield Street development adjacent to the town’s Central Park. Ministers have also 
assisted the proposed redevelopment of Gravesend’s ‘Heritage Quarter’ (DCLG, 2007). 
Between them these schemes would have led to the creation of over two thousand new 
houses.  
Unfortunately, the delivery of these schemes has been slower than anticipated. The initial 
proposals for the Lowfield Street development in Dartford and the Heritage Quarter 
development in Gravesend were both rejected, by a public inquiry and Gravesham Borough 
Council respectively, after encountering fierce public opposition. In both cases the local 
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community felt that the schemes proposed were not in keeping with the character and 
appearance of the existing town centres. A proposal in the Lowfield Street scheme to drive a 
road through the town’s Central Park proved particularly unpopular. Yet few of the objectors 
to these proposals, were opposed to the principle of greater town centre development. 
Indeed, all parties present at the public inquiry into the Lowfield Street application accepted 
that new development was necessary in order to ensure that there was a critical mass of 
residents in the town centre sufficient to sustain existing services and maintain the centre’s 
economic vitality. It was the quality of development that was in question, not the need for 
development.  
Building on sites in existing town centres is not without its challenges. But the ready access 
these sites have to the town’s public transport services, shops, public services and 
employers make them the most sustainable, practical and affordable of the housing options 
available in Kent Thameside at present. As LSE Housing’s Framework for Housing in the 
London Thames Gateway commented back in 2004; “by working out from existing town 
centres, delivery can happen more quickly, more cheaply and more sensitively. It mixes old 
with new, helps integrate diverse communities, and supports mixed activities and uses” 
(Power, Richardson, Seshimo, Firth, 2004, 36). The reuse of redundant urban sites and 
buildings also helps to ensure that each new development is properly integrated into the 
existing urban landscape and is consistent with the character of the town centre. 
Every town centre in Kent Thameside and the wider Thames Gateway contains redundant or 
under-utilised sites that have potential to be developed as housing. Some sites, like the 
Heritage Quarter site in Gravesend, have already been earmarked for housing, but have 
been held up for design reasons or the reluctance of developers to put new housing stock on 
the market in the current economic climate. Other suitable sites are owned by the public 
sector but have been allocated for non housing uses in the relevant local plan and would 
have to be re-categorised as land for housing by planners. Nevertheless in most cases they 
would be easier and cheaper to develop than non town centre sites earmarked for housing. 
If policy-makers wish to unlock housing delivery in the Thames Gateway then it is to existing 
town centres that they should look.  
10.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has exposed the limitations of the Kent Thameside regeneration model. While it 
has succeeded in bringing hundreds of millions of pounds of public and private investment 
into Kent Thameside, almost none of this money has found its way into its existing 
communities. The costs of preparing the area’s brownfield sites for development and paying 
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for the necessary infrastructure have been so great that very little funding has been available 
to promote the integration of new and existing communities. Planned urban renewal 
schemes have gone unfunded and proposals aimed at blurring the boundaries between the 
new and existing areas remain unrealised. Attempts to deliver integration have not been 
helped by the economic downturn - which has slowed down the pace of development and 
depleted developers’ resources - and by a lack of consensus among planners and 
developers as to how to achieve integration.  
Nevertheless, this chapter has argued that integration could be achieved if the regeneration 
partners were to build outwards from existing centres, rather than building large, iconic 
stand-alone developments. Swanscombe, with its modern health, education and community 
facilities, and its rich industrial heritage, should be at the centre of the Eastern Quarry 
development, not on its sidelines. Similarly, Kent Thameside’s existing town centres, 
Dartford and Gravesend, have the capacity and the infrastructure to support far more new 
housing than is currently envisaged. Their historic centres, with their stock of attractive 
Victorian and Edwardian buildings, and excellent commercial, shopping and leisure facilities 
and transport connections, provide an ideal environment in which to locate new 
development. They deserve far more prominence in the regeneration plans for the Gateway 
than they have received to date. Their established infrastructure will also allow new 
development to proceed more cheaply than is the case with brownfield developments like 
Eastern Quarry.  
But whatever development is delivered, existing residents should be closely involved in the 
decision making process and are entitled to a share of the benefits from it. After all, they are 
not simply disinterested bystanders but people whose labour has - directly or indirectly - 
added to the economic value of each brownfield site. Their lives should be enhanced by the 
new development, not constrained or diminished by it.  
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Chapter 11  Conclusions 
11.1     Introduction 
This study has examined the extent to which the regeneration model pursued in the Thames 
Gateway in the 1990s and 2000s has succeeded in meeting its key regeneration goals of 
achieving the integration of new and existing communities and empowering existing 
residents to participate in the regeneration of their areas.  
To this end, this study has examined the impact of regeneration on a series of existing 
communities in Kent Thameside, a key growth area in the Thames Gateway. It has looked in 
detail at a series of measures aimed at promoting the physical integration of new and 
existing communities and encouraging social mixing between the residents of each 
community. It has also considered the impact of a number of strategies designed to 
empower existing residents to participate in the regeneration of their area and to gain from 
the opportunities it offers.  
This concluding chapter begins with an overview of what this study has added to our 
understanding of regeneration in the Thames Gateway and the UK. It will then look in more 
detail at the key lessons relating to Kent Thameside that we can take from this study.  
11.2  What has this study added to our understanding of urban regeneration in the 
 Thames Gateway and the UK? 
The type of regeneration that took place in the Thames Gateway in the 1990s and 2000s 
has often divided opinion among academic commentators. Some have described it in 
pejorative terms as a top-down, neo-liberal attempt to preserve Britain’s international 
competitiveness in the face of the diminishing social capital and skills base of our 
communities (De Angelis, 2008, Hay, 2004, Jessop, 2002). Its underlying ‘growth first’ logic 
is also seen as inimical to sustainable and socially inclusive regeneration with local actors 
having limited scope to shape their own regeneration vision (Haughton 2003, Turok, 2009, 
Lombardi, Porter, Barber, Rogers, 2011).  
Other commentators, however, have taken a more pragmatic stance. They have argued that 
good neighbourhood management, a strong planning system and local capacity building 
measures at local level can make a tangible difference to an area’s regeneration outcomes 
(Richardson, 2008, Power, 2004, Power, Richardson,  Seshimo, Firth, 2004). Kent 
Thameside, for instance, has been identified as an exemplar of social regeneration and as 
one of the few areas in the Thames Gateway where social regeneration has been pursued at 
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least as seriously as physical regeneration (Nelson, Quan, Forrester, Pound, 2005, Oxford 
Brookes, 2006).  
This study adds to this debate and our understanding of urban regeneration in the Thames 
Gateway and within the UK. The case study of Kent Thameside shows that local actors and 
local policies can have an important bearing on the ultimate shape and trajectory of an 
area’s regeneration experience. In the 1990s a powerful and well resourced regeneration 
association, led by an influential landowner, Blue Circle, ensured that Kent Thameside 
emerged as the area best placed to benefit from the Conservative government’s decision to 
make the Thames Gateway a national regeneration priority. Not only did it win the right to 
host the new international station on the channel tunnel rail link, but it succeeded in getting 
much of what it asked for in the first Thames Gateway Planning Framework launched in 
1995. And when new Labour came to power, the Kent Thameside local authorities 
succeeded, where others conspicuously failed, to win funding from both Westminster and 
Europe to try to ensure that the property led regeneration of the former cement and paper 
mills and quarries went hand in hand with the renewal of the area’s existing communities.  
However, this case study also demonstrates the limits to local autonomy. Kent Thameside’s 
initial success in securing funds for Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross was tempered 
by Ministers’ subsequent refusal to countenance further spending on social regeneration 
when the anticipated volume of new homes failed to materialise. This imperative to deliver 
houses quickly and efficiently, which largely ignored the scale of the technical and 
infrastructural challenge involved in regenerating large ex-industrial sites, severely restricted 
the Kent Thameside regeneration partners’ room for manoeuvre on the regeneration of 
existing communities. These regeneration ambitions were then dealt a further, and possibly 
fatal, blow by the banking crisis of 2008.  
Turok (2009) has asserted that the government’s approach to the regeneration in the 
Thames Gateway has tended to suppress local priorities and oblige local partnership to 
conform, in return for occasional grant funding, to a generic regeneration template that is not 
always in their interests. This study suggests that this criticism is a valid one. The prevailing 
Thames Gateway regeneration model, which is focused primarily on the large scale property 
led redevelopment of brownfield sites outside the urban footprint, is not well equipped to 
meet the regeneration needs of existing communities in an area such as Kent Thameside. 
Most of the available funding and political focus has been expended on the delivery of the 
infrastructure needed to make the area’s brownfield sites fit for development, rather than on 
meeting the needs of existing residents.  
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Nonetheless, despite the deficiencies of the Kent Thameside regeneration model, it is 
possible that the outcomes of its approach to social regeneration could have been different if 
key partners, particularly the local authorities, had had the capacity, the time and the 
experience to implement it effectively. If, for example, more time, resources and political 
capital had been invested in the community engagement phase of the Swanscombe 
Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy and Action Plan, then it is possible that the community 
would have felt a greater sense of ownership of the strategy. The strategy could then have 
been used as a springboard for identifying and implementing urban renewal schemes that 
not only had strong community support but were led by residents.  
Similarly, the Gunn Road Environmental Improvement Scheme in Swanscombe would have 
had a greater and more sustained impact if the local authority had spent time developing 
residents’ capacity to lead the scheme, and then supported them appropriately once it was 
underway. It is also clear that more could have been achieved if the value of community 
engagement had been championed more effectively at a high level within the local authority 
and efforts had been made to ensure that it was integral to council’s policy making and 
delivery processes. The decision, meanwhile, to prioritise the refurbishment of Ingress 
Abbey over the provision of community facilities that could have been shared by residents of 
both the new and existing community, undoubtedly impeded efforts to integrate Ingress Park 
into the existing community.   
The case study of Kent Thameside, therefore, has important implications for the theory and 
practice of urban regeneration and renewal in this country. It shows that the regeneration 
priorities of existing communities are unlikely to be achieved using developers’ section 106 
contributions and intermittent grants from the DCLG and local government alone. In this 
sense, we can see in the Thames Gateway regeneration model - particularly the one 
articulated in the 2003 Sustainable Communities Plan, with its demanding housing and 
commercial delivery targets and its ambitious regeneration goals for existing communities - 
signs of the same ‘irrational exuberance’ displayed by the financial markets during the dot-
com bubble of the late 1990s (Shiller, 2000).   
This case study suggests that for the integration of new and existing communities to occur, it 
needs to be a central regeneration objective rather than a supplementary one that is only 
addressed once the shape and form of the main brownfield development have been decided 
and planners have limited room for manoeuvre. Furthermore, the DCLG and other 
regeneration agencies need to work closely with the rest of government to ensure that there 
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is a co-ordinated and holistic delivery programme in place capable of addressing the needs 
of both new and old residents.  
Another key finding of wider relevance concerns the level of experience, skills, executive 
commitment and time available to the organisations delivering regeneration and renewal 
projects. As the Kent Thameside case study has shown it is difficult to deliver effective 
renewal schemes in partnership with existing residents in a climate where there is no 
discernible culture of resident participation, little high level commitment to the concept and 
limited time and resources to develop the skills and confidence of residents and also staff. 
Successful renewal and participation schemes require a long-term commitment and 
sustained resources and also a willingness to put aside the usual political imperative to 
deliver tangible outcomes quickly within the confines of the local electoral cycle. In short, 
effective delivery requires a high level political consensus that allows for long term planning 
and consistent decision making over time.  
11.3   The key lessons relating to Kent Thameside from this study 
The rationale for the regeneration of Kent Thameside has evolved substantially over 
the last thirty years 
Over the last three decades the rationale behind the regeneration of Kent Thameside has 
altered markedly. In the 1980s the regeneration of the ‘North Kent Thameside’ was primarily 
about reviving a moribund, ex industrial economy that was acting as a drag factor on the 
South East’s accelerating economic growth. By the 1990s, the focus was on maximising the 
economic potential of new Channel Tunnel Rail Link: ‘growth hubs’ such as Ebbsfleet were 
seen by Ministers as an opportunity to create jobs in the Thames Gateway’s knowledge and 
service economy which would provide valuable back office support to the City of London’s 
burgeoning financial and legal sectors. A growing awareness of the importance of 
sustainable development and the rights of existing residents had also led politicians to 
demand a more inclusive brand of regeneration than was apparent in the Thatcherite 
eighties: a call enthusiastically endorsed by the new Kent Thameside Association.  
After the millennium, Kent Thameside was at the forefront of the government’s increasingly 
urgent efforts to address the chronic shortage of ‘affordable housing’ in the South east. So 
called exemplar developments like Ingress Park were held up by Ministers as proof that it 
was possible to create attractive development in the Gateway that people from all income 
groups would be happy to live in. Affluent incomers were drawn in by the allure of high end 
shopping at Bluewater and fast rail travel to London and the continent from Ebbsfleet. 
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Existing residents, meanwhile, were told that they too would get their fair share of the 
benefits that regeneration would unlock. The regeneration partners promised that the new 
communities would be seamlessly integrated into the existing urban realm. New investment 
in infrastructure and public realm of existing communities would also be forthcoming in a bid 
to blur the boundaries between them and the new developments. 
The current economic downturn has put paid to these ambitions. A credit squeeze and a fall 
in property prices outside London has brought residential and commercial development in 
Kent Thameside to an abrupt halt. And an indebted and investment shy government has not 
had limited means to step in and kick-start the redevelopment process. Any hopes that 
existing communities had of new investment have also been firmly extinguished. The 
optimism and certainty of the last decade has now been replaced by doubt and inertia.  
Disappointingly, the opportunity afforded by the downturn to re-examine whether the current 
Kent Thameside regeneration model is capable of achieving its disparate - and expensive - 
set of goals has not been seized. All hopes appear to be pinned on the prospect of an 
eventual economic recovery strong enough to persuade developers to start building again. 
The needs of existing communities rarely feature in these debates. Their interests have 
become subordinate to the primary and apparently all-encompassing task of finding a way of 
getting development moving again. The goals of integration and inclusion, once so central to 
the Kent Thameside project, are now barely discussed at all. 
Kent Thameside’s existing communities have changed significantly since the        
disappearance of the area’s traditional heavy industries 
Kent Thameside’s existing communities still bear the imprint of their heavy industrial past. 
The pronounced skills deficit that one finds in Swanscombe and Knockhall today, for 
example, is a legacy of the villages’ reliance for over a century on the low skilled, entry level 
jobs provided by the cement and paper making industries. Yet significant changes have also 
taken place. In all three villages, for instance, the creation of new private housing over the 
last thirty years has resulted in the influx of younger and better educated residents who see 
the villages as a convenient and affordable base from which to commute to work. It is 
indicative of the villages’ gradual evolution from a homogeneous white, blue collar 
community that was heavily dependent on local employers to a more heterogeneous 
community that looks increasingly to greater London for employment and leisure 
opportunities. The economic and cultural insularity that was once a hallmark of these 
communities is now emphatically a thing of the past.  
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Generalisations about the ‘existing community’ should be avoided and the  views of 
prominent individuals or groups which purport to speak on behalf of the whole 
community should be treated with caution 
This study has argued that a detailed knowledge of the people who live in Kent Thameside’s 
existing communities - firstly in terms of how they see their own communities and secondly 
in terms of how they view the new development taking place - will enable the regeneration 
partners to respond more effectively to their needs and aspirations.  
The interviews carried out with residents in Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross in 
order to meet this objective have revealed a complex society with contrasting social 
aspirations and reactions to the new development taking place. In addition to highlighting the 
dangers of pat generalisations by policy-makers about ‘the existing community’, this process 
has also illustrated the need to be cautious when dealing with individuals and groups who 
purport to speak on behalf of the whole community. The views of community leaders need to 
be given due consideration in preparing for any regeneration related activity, but they should 
not be treated as a proxy for in-depth engagement with all residents.  
The Kent Thameside local authorities have struggled to involve residents effectively 
in the delivery of neighbourhood renewal projects 
A notable feature of the neighbourhood renewal schemes pursued by Kent Thameside local 
authorities in existing communities is their emphasis on resident participation and 
empowerment. By giving residents a central role in a pivotal role in the planning, delivery 
and management of such schemes, it is argued, existing communities will gain the skills and 
confidence they need to take advantage of the opportunities created by regeneration. Yet, in 
many cases, the authorities have struggled to engage residents in manner they had hoped. 
Looking back now, it is clear that they were trying to do too much, too quickly. Instead of 
investing in capacity building schemes and supporting residents while they developed their 
own solutions, local authorities opted for the immediate implementation of largely officer led 
schemes. In doing so they betrayed their own lack of community empowerment expertise 
and their preference, certainly at senior level, for immediate, tangible wins over more 
nebulous long-term resident capacity building projects. The failure to integrate individual 
renewal projects into a coherent, long-term, multi-agency strategy, whose goals are clearly 
understood by each partner, and prioritised by them, has also harmed their delivery.  
Lessons are beginning to be learnt, as the progress made since the launch of the Gunn 
Road Neighbourhood Agreement shows. The Friends of Swanscombe Heritage Park also 
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provide a good example of what can be achieved with the right resources and a long-term 
commitment. However, much more work needs to be done before an environment is created 
which is genuinely conducive to the emergence of resident led neighbourhood renewal 
projects in Kent Thameside.  
The Kent Thameside developers’ commitment to community engagement and social 
inclusion is shallow 
Kent Thameside developers have been adept in employing the language of social inclusion, 
partnership and community focus, but this is often borne of political expediency rather than a 
deep-seated commitment to community engagement. In most cases they have not had the 
time, the resources, the knowledge, the high level strategic commitment or the external 
support necessary to deliver on their community engagement objectives.  
Blue Circle’s failure to establish the Ebbsfleet Forum and Trust is a prime example. Not only 
did the company fail to win support for the model among key community partners, but there 
was no established culture of community participation in neighbourhood management issues 
in place on which to build. Without this foundation - which the company had neither the 
resources nor the inclination to foster - the Forum and Trust could not succeed. Ultimately it 
appears that Blue Circle was more interested in making its development application 
palatable to central and local government than it was in involving the community in the 
decision making process.  
The developers of Ingress Park and Ebbsfleet Valley, Crest Nicolson and Land Securities, 
have also both sought to engage existing communities, but this process has yielded few if 
any tangible benefits for existing residents. Less than a quarter of one per cent of Land 
Securities’ development budget to date has been invested in existing communities, while 
virtually all of Crest Nicolson’s development contribution has been ploughed into the 
restoration of Ingress Abbey. In short, developers’ rhetoric about community engagement 
has not been translated into practice.  
The Kent Thameside regeneration partners have failed to give adequate consideration 
to alternative land use scenarios suggested by existing residents 
The current Kent Thameside regeneration model has been drawn up with almost no 
reference to the residents of existing communities. True, Land Securities has assented, 
reluctantly, to Swanscombe and Greenhithe Town Council’s call for a ‘green buffer’ between 
Eastern Quarry and existing communities. But that is the extent of local involvement. Indeed, 
even the concept of the green buffer was proposed without any meaningful resident 
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consultation. Sites such as Eastern Quarry are treated as blank slates without historical or 
cultural meaning for existing communities. The regeneration partners have chosen to ignore 
these communities’ legitimate claim to seen as co-creators of these brownfield sites’ future. 
As a result alternative regeneration visions for Kent Thameside have gone unrecognised or 
unheeded. This has alienated certain groups of residents from the regeneration process. 
The failure, for example, to restore the informal, unmanaged spaces lost through quarrying 
activities and recent new development has antagonised many residents. The spate of 
criminal damage and anti-social behaviour incidents at Swanscombe Heritage Park is seen 
by some as directly attributable to the loss of informal space around the village where young 
people can meet without supervision or scrutiny. Some older people, meanwhile, who 
worked in the cement or paper making industry, feel that part of their identity has been 
stripped away by unfamiliar new developments. These episodes illustrate the need for a far 
more nuanced and more inclusive regeneration model that looks at Kent Thameside’s 
brownfield sites through a wider social lens.  
The Kent Thameside regeneration model is incapable of delivering either the 
integration of new and existing communities or the renewal of existing areas 
This study has demonstrated that the current Kent Thameside regeneration model, which is 
predicated on the creation of large, self-sustaining developments on brownfield sites outside 
the existing urban footprint, is not conducive to the creation of balanced, integrated 
communities. An analysis of the respective relationships between Ingress Park and 
Knockhall and Waterstone Park and Horns Cross found very little evidence of social or 
physical integration between the communities. Nor, it seems, is there any real consensus 
among developers and planners as to how the division between the new and existing 
communities can be successfully bridged. Some schemes designed to blur the boundaries 
between the communities have been drawn up, but they have been too expensive or too 
contentious to implement. The cost of integration, especially in an era of fiscal austerity, has 
simply been too great.  
These findings are consistent with concerns expressed about the level of integration 
between the new and existing residents in other parts of the Thames Gateway. Poynter, for 
example, has questioned how widely the regeneration impact of the Olympics will be felt in 
Stratford (Poynter, 2009). He suggests that it may lead to a growing level of social 
segregation in Stratford with newly arrived young professionals concentrated around the 
Olympic site and Stratford City and lower income groups working in the service economy 
displaced to other parts of Newham. Similarly, Davidson found almost no evidence of social 
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mixing between the residents of the Royal Artillery Quays development in Thamesmead and 
the existing community (Davidson, 2009). The ‘lifeworlds’ of the young and largely 
professional residents of these new ‘Blue Ribbon developments’ next to the Thames, bore 
little relation to those of their neighbours he found. The former worked and socialised out of 
the area and rarely used any local services or facilities while the latter were far more 
grounded in the community. The Royal Artillery Quays site, like Ingress Park in Greenhithe, 
feels physically and socially divorced from the surrounding community. The same sense 
spatial and social exclusivity has also been observed at the Britannia Village development at 
the western end of the Royal Docks in Newham. It is described by Butler and Robson as a 
“discrete, indeed hermetic, development” for young professionals with “nothing by the way of 
urban infrastructure” (Butler, Robson, 2003, 64).  
The challenge of integrating large new discrete brownfield development into the existing – 
and often lower income – communities alongside them, would appear, therefore, to be one 
that many growth areas in the Thames Gateway have struggled to meet. It confirms that an 
alternative regeneration model is required if the Gateway’s existing residents are to derive 
tangible benefits from regeneration in line with aspirations set out in the Thames Gateway 
Planning Framework of 1995 and the Sustainable Communities Plan of 2003.  
Kent Thameside’s physical regeneration delivery record compares closely to that of 
other key growth areas in the Thames Gateway 
It has been twenty years since the formation of the Kent Thameside Association. In those 
two decades many of the key projects envisaged by the Association have come to pass. 
Bluewater Shopping Centre opened in 1999 and now employs 7,000 people and attracts 
over 27 million visitors a year. Ebbsfleet International Station, offering high speed services 
into central London, and Fastrack, Kent Thameside’s rapid bus transit scheme, have also 
been successfully delivered. And almost 2,000 new homes have been created at Ingress 
Park and Waterstone Park. Yet the delivery record elsewhere has been less impressive. 
Only a handful of the thousands of promised homes in the Ebbsfleet Valley have been built 
and the much vaunted commercial development around Ebbsfleet Station remains years 
away.  
Yet the Kent Thameside experience is not unique. The record of many of the other key 
regeneration areas in the Thames Gateway has also been mixed. In Medway, over 1,000 
homes have been delivered on St Mary’s Island alongside a major new University campus. 
But the planned Rochester Riverside development, which is due to include 2,000 homes as 
well hotels, shops and offices, has failed to get underway due to the economic downturn. 
  285 
 
After witnessing three years of inactivity on the site, Medway Council - which has spent 
almost £40 million on decontamination and flood defence work at the site - dropped its 
preferred developer, Crest Nicolson, at the end of 2010. However, progress since then has 
not been much quicker.  
There are also strong parallels between the Eastern Quarry development and the proposed 
Barking Riverside development north of the Thames. Like Eastern Quarry, Barking 
Riverside, a site with capacity for over 10,000 homes, has been compromised by the 
declining property market and a failure to provide the necessary upfront transport 
infrastructure. A joint venture between Bellway Homes and the Homes and Community 
Agency (which paid for much of the decontamination work necessary to make the site 
habitable) its future was thrown into doubt at the end of 2008 by the Mayor of London’s 
decision to withdraw his support from proposed Docklands Light Railway extension to 
Dagenham. Deprived of the DLR extension and the proposed Thames Gateway Bridge 
across the Thames - another casualty of the Mayor’s cost-cutting programme - the local 
authority was obliged to radically reduce the scale of its immediate development plans for 
the site.  
The only site in the Gateway that has been largely untroubled by the effects of the downturn 
in the property market and the public sector spending squeeze has been the Olympic site in 
Stratford. In addition to the new sporting facilities in the Olympic Park and 2,800 new 
apartments, 8,000 retail jobs have been created at the Westfield Stratford City complex 
along with a new rail station on the High Speed 1 route. The Olympic Delivery Authority’s 
large contingency fund ensured that the project escaped the worst effects of the credit 
crunch in 2008 and 2009. When the banks proved unable to fund the cost of the new 
apartments in the Athlete’s Village, the ODA stepped forward with over £820 million of its 
own money and built them itself.  Indeed, some critics have suggested that the pressure to 
deliver the Olympic infrastructure on time has led to a reduction in the amount of political 
attention and public funding available to other parts of the Gateway – just at the point they 
needed it the most (Brownill, Carpenter, 2009). 
It is clear therefore that the Kent Thameside regeneration experience has been similar in 
many respects to that of its neighbours in the Thames Gateway. Kent Thameside has been 
fortunate in that its main regeneration goal, the delivery of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link and 
the new station at Ebbsfleet, was also a key national goal of the Government. Ministers 
could not afford politically for this to fail and were prepared to step in on more than one 
occasion to rescue the project. Stratford and the Olympics aside, no other Gateway area has 
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benefited from such a valuable guarantee. But aside from the rail link, Kent Thameside has 
been subject to the same economic vicissitudes, funding shortages and infrastructural 
delays as every other Gateway regeneration area.  
Although the Thames Gateway has had some strong champions in the Cabinet, government 
departments have baulked at the cost of delivering the infrastructure necessary to turn the 
Gateway’s often toxic and poorly serviced brownfield acres into the modern sustainable 
communities envisaged in the Sustainable Communities Plan. And while the private sector 
has endeavoured to plug some of the gap, it was never enough, even before the downturn to 
meet all of the Gateway’s regeneration objectives. Consequently, Eastern Quarry’s fate has 
been shared by host of other major Gateway development opportunities such as Barking 
Riverside, Silvertown Quays, Greenwich Peninsula and Rochester Riverside. 
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Appendix 1 Kent Thameside timeline 
 National 
 
Thames Gateway Kent Thameside 
1979 Conservative Government 
elected 
  
1981 Enterprise Zones and Urban 
Development Corporations 
created 
London Docklands 
Development Corporation 
established 
 
1983 Conservative Government 
re-elected 
 
 North West Kent Enterprise 
Zone created 
1986 Agreement to build a 
Channel Tunnel reached 
 
 
 
 
1987 Conservative Government 
re-elected 
Article in The Planner on 
economic potential of 
Channel Tunnel for Kent by 
Martin Simmons published  
A Strategy for Kent 
published by the Channel 
Tunnel Consultative 
Committee 
1989  The East Thames Corridor 
Study by Deloitte, Haskins 
and Sells published  
 
1990 
 
John Major replaces 
Margaret Thatcher as Prime 
Minister 
 Blue Circle gains planning 
permission for Bluewater 
Shopping Centre 
 
Blue Circle’s Swanscombe 
Cement Works closes 
1991 
 
City Challenge launched East Thames Corridor 
initiative launched  
 
Plan to route Channel 
Tunnel Rail Link through 
East Thames Corridor 
announced 
 
1992 Conservative Government 
re-elected 
  
1993 
 
 East Thames Corridor 
development capacity study 
published by the DoE 
Kent Thameside 
Association established 
 
Empire Paper Mill in 
Greenhithe closes 
1994 
 
Single Regeneration Budget 
launched 
 Ebbsfleet announced as 
location of new international 
station on the Channel 
Tunnel Rail Link 
1995 National target to develop 
50% of new housing on 
brownfield sites introduced 
Thames Gateway Planning 
Framework (RPG9a) 
published by the DoE 
Looking to the Future 
published by the KTA 
 
1996 
 
 London and Continental 
Railways (LCR) is chosen to 
build the Channel Tunnel 
Rail Link.  
Single Regeneration Budget 
funding awarded for public 
transport orientated 
development study 
Ebbsfleet Community 
Development: The first 
steps published by Blue 
Circle  
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Ebbsfleet Masterplan for 
development published by 
Blue Circle 
 
Ebbsfleet Development and 
Environment Framework 
published 
1997 Labour Government elected 
 
Social Exclusion Unit set up 
 Looking to the Future 
update published by the 
KTA 
1998 The New Deal for 
Communities programme 
launched 
 
A New Deal for Transport 
published by the DETR 
 
Channel Tunnel Rail Link 
rescued by the 
Government. LCR sells £1.6 
billion of government-
backed bonds to pay for the 
construction of section 1 
 
London Docklands 
Development Corporation 
wound up  
The Case for Kent 
Thameside published by the 
Kent Thameside Local 
Authorities team 
 
Single Regeneration Budget 
funding awarded to North 
Kent Gateway Partnership 
to promote social inclusion  
in existing communities 
1999 Towards an Urban 
Renaissance, the final 
report of the Urban Task 
Force published 
 Looking to an integrated 
future: Land use and 
transport planning in Kent 
Thameside published by the 
KTA 
2000 Delivering an Urban 
Renaissance published by 
the DETR 
Transport 2010: The 10 
Year Plan published by the 
DETR 
 
Planning Policy Guidance 
on Housing calls for urban 
densities of over 50 
dwellings per hectare 
 
The National Brownfield 
Development target 
increased to 60% of new 
housing 
Status of Thames Gateway 
as a “hub for development 
and regeneration” confirmed 
Bluewater Shopping Centre 
opens 
 
 
2001 Labour Government re-
elected 
 
The National Strategy for 
Neighbourhood Renewal 
launched  
 
Thames Gateway Review 
by Roger Tym and Partners 
published by the DETR 
 
Collapse of Railtrack forces 
further restructuring of 
Channel Tunnel Rail Link 
project 
Work on Ingress Park 
begins 
 
2002   The North Kent Area 
Investment Framework 
published by the Thames 
Gateway Kent Partnership 
 
Planning permission for 
Ebbsfleet granted 
 
Work on Waterstone Park 
begins 
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Urban II Thames Gateway 
Kent Programme launched 
to promote social inclusion 
in existing communities 
2003 Sustainable Communities: 
Building for the Future 
published by the ODPM. It 
identifies four growth areas, 
including the Thames 
Gateway. 
The first phase of the 
Channel Rail Link from 
Folkestone to Ebbsfleet 
opens 
 
Making it Happen: 
delivering growth in the 
Thames Gateway published 
by the ODPM. It sets out 
details of how the 
Sustainable Communities 
will be implemented in the 
Gateway. 
 
Relationship between 
Transport and Development 
in the Thames Gateway by 
Llewellyn Davies published 
The Kent Thameside 
Delivery Board established 
 
Towards the futureplace: A 
community strategy for Kent 
Thameside published by the 
KTS Local Strategic 
Partnership 
2004 Kate Barker’s Review of 
Housing Supply published 
 Construction of Fastrack 
begins 
2005 Labour Government re-
elected 
 
2012 Olympics awarded to 
London 
 
Creating sustainable 
communities: delivering the 
Thames Gateway published 
by the ODPM. It sets out 
plans to increase pace of 
regeneration in the 
Gateway.  
Kent Thameside 
Regeneration Framework 
published 
 
2006  
 
Thames Gateway Interim 
Plan published by the 
DCLG 
 
Thames Gateway Evidence 
Review published by the 
ODPM 
 
Thames Gateway Tsar, 
Judith Armitt, appointed  
 
2007  The second phase of the 
Channel Rail Link from 
Ebbsfleet to St Pancras 
opens 
 
The Thames Gateway: 
Laying the Foundations 
published by the National 
Audit Office 
 
Thames Gateway: the 
Delivery Plan published by 
the DCLG 
 
Ebbsfleet International 
Station opens 
 
Kent Thameside Strategic 
Transport Infrastructure 
Programme (STIP) 
established. Public sector 
and private developers 
agree £166 million 
programme. 
 
Planning permission for 
Eastern Quarry granted. 
Land Securities to invest 
£40 million in STIP 
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2008   Lafarge closes Northfleet 
Cement Works 
 
2009  High speed domestic 
services begin on the 
Channel Tunnel Rail Link 
 
The Thames Gateway Core 
Vision by Terry Farrell 
published 
 
2010 Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat Government 
takes power 
 
 
Thames Gateway Strategic 
Group, composed of local 
authority and business 
leaders, was launched 
Coalition Government 
suspends public 
contribution to STIP 
2011   Kent Thameside 
Regeneration Partnership 
wound up  
2012   Coalition Government 
renegotiates STIP in order 
to unlock development at 
Eastern Quarry 
 
Plans for creation of a 
Paramount Studios theme 
park on Swanscombe 
Peninsula announced 
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Appendix 2             Kent Thameside Residents’ Interview Schedule  
1.  Preamble read by interviewer 
 
First of all I’d like to thank you for taking the time and trouble to complete this questionnaire. 
This research project relies on the willingness of local residents to take part in it, so I really 
appreciate your co-operation. I would of course be happy to send you a summary of my 
findings once the project has been completed if you are interested. 
To make sure that I get a representative sample of views from this community, I will need to 
ask you for some personal details. All of these details will remain completely confidential and 
will not appear anywhere in the final report. If there are any questions however that you 
really don’t feel comfortable about answering then please do say so, and we will move on. 
Are there any questions that you have for me before we start? 
2.    Residents and their communities 
2.1  Personal Information 
1. How many years have you lived in your present house?   
 
2. How many years have you lived in Swanscombe / Knockhall / Stone? 
 
3. Where are / were your parents from? 
 
4. Do any other members of your family live in Swanscombe / Knockhall / Stone? 
 
5. How many bedrooms does this house have? 
 
6. How many people live in this house? 
 
7. Is your house rented or do you own it?  
 
(If renting) Do you rent your house from:  
a. Private Landlord  
b. Dartford Council   
c. Housing Association  
(eg Moat, Hyde, CDS, London & Quadrant, West Kent, Salvation Army) 
(If home owner) Do you own your house outright, or do you have a mortgage or 
shared ownership arrangement? 
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8. Which of the following best describes your life at the moment?  
 
a. I’m a full-time student        
b. I’m in full-time work       
c. I’m in part-time work       
d. I’m unemployed 
e. I’m self-employed 
f. I’m retired 
g. I’m looking after my home and/or family 
h. I can’t work because of disability or illness 
i. Other (please explain) 
j.  
(If working) What work do you do? 
9. Can you tell me what your household income is each year? 
 
a. Up to £10,000 
b. Between £10,001 - £20,000 
c. Between £20,001 - £30,000 
d. Between £30,001 - £40,000 
e. Between £40,001 - £50,000 
f. Above £50,001 
 
10. Do you get any state benefits?  
 
(If yes) Can you tell me which ones? 
11. Can you tell me how old you are? 
 
a. Between 16-21 
b. Between 22-30 
c. Between 31-40 
d. Between 41-50 
e. Between 51-60 
f. Between 61-70 
g. Between 71-80 
h. Between 81+ 
 
12. Do you belong to any of the following local groups or organisations? 
 
a. A residents’ association  
b. A political party 
c. A church or religious organisation 
d. A sports club 
e. A social club 
f. A charitable or voluntary association 
g. A drama, music or dance group 
h. A school governing body 
i. A hobby or craft club or association 
j. A pub team 
k. Other (please give details) 
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13. Do you have any of the following qualifications? 
 
a. ‘O’ level(s);  
b. CSE(s);  
c. GSCE(s);  
d. School Certificate; 
e. ‘A’ level(s);  
f. Higher School Certificate;  
g. First Degree; 
h. Higher Degree; 
i. City & Guilds; 
j. Professional or work based qualification (please specify what); 
k. NVQ level 1/2;  
l. Foundation/Intermediate GNVQ; 
m. NVQ level 3;  
n. Advanced GNVQ; 
o. NVQ levels 4 and 5;  
p. HNC;  
q. HND;  
 
2.2 Residents’ perceptions of their own communities 
14. If someone was to ask you where you live, where would you say? 
 
15. Do you like living in Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe? 
 
(If yes) What do you like about it? 
(If no) What do you dislike about it? 
16. Is there anything you would like to see done that you think would improve life in 
Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe? 
 
17. Do you know any of your neighbours? 
 
(If yes) How well do you know them? 
18. Is there a good sense of community in Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe? 
 
19. What kinds of people live in this road / street / block? 
 
20. What are the shops and services like in Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe? 
 
21. Are there good places to go in Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe if you wanted to go 
for a night out? 
 
22. Are the roads, pavements, parks and greens in Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe well 
looked after? 
 
23. What are the sport and leisure facilities like in Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe? 
 
24. Are there any good places to go in this area if you wanted to go for a walk or a cycle 
or to walk the dog? 
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25. What are the facilities for young people like in Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe? 
 
26. What are the schools and health services like in Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe? 
 
27. How well looked after would you say people’s houses and gardens are around here? 
 
28. What is the public transport like in Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe? 
 
29. What is the traffic like on the roads in this area? 
 
30. Do you think the local council does a good job in Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe? 
 
31. Have you ever considered moving out of Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe? 
 
(If yes) Is there anything preventing you from doing so? 
32. How would you describe Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe to someone who has 
never been here who wanted to know what kind of place it is? 
 
3.  Residents’ perceptions of Kent Thameside 
3.1 Residents’ knowledge of key Kent Thameside regeneration initiatives  
33. Which of the following building developments have you heard of?  
 
(Yes / No / Not certain) 
a. Ebbsfleet 
b. Eastern Quarry 
c. Swanscombe Peninsula 
d. Ingress Park 
e. Waterstone Park 
f. St James Lane Pit 
g. Crossways 
h. Bluewater 
 
(If yes) Can you tell me what you know about Ebbsfleet, Eastern Quarry…..? 
(If no or not sure, show pictures of proposed development, and ask respondent if they 
recognise it. If yes ask them what they know about it) 
34.  Have you heard of term ‘Kent Thameside’? 
 
(If yes) Can you tell me what it is? 
35. How well informed do you think Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe residents are about 
the new building developments in Dartford and Gravesham? 
 
a. Well informed 
b. Aware of only basic details 
c. Badly informed 
d. Can’t say 
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3.2  Impact of new development on existing residents 
36. What benefits do you think there will be for Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe from the 
new building developments now taking place? 
 
37. What downsides do you think there will be for Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe from 
the new building developments now taking place? 
 
38. Do you think that existing residents in Stone/Knockhall/Swanscombe will benefit as 
much as newcomers to this area from the new building development taking place? 
 
39. Do you think that the residents of the new developments will mix with the residents of 
existing communities such as Stone/Knockhall/Swanscombe? 
 
40. For each of the following things, tell me if you think they will a. get better b. stay the 
same or c. get worse as a result of the new building developments taking place in 
Dartford and Gravesham. Feel free to say ‘not sure’ if you are uncertain.  
 
a. Number of jobs in Dartford and Gravesham. 
b. Number of well paid jobs in Dartford and Gravesham with good career 
prospects 
c. Unemployment in Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe. 
d. Access of Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe residents to well paid jobs in 
Dartford and Gravesham with good career prospects.  
e. Average wage of Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe residents 
f. Public transport links between Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe and the rest 
of Dartford and Gravesham. 
g. Amount of traffic on the roads in and around Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe 
h. Access of Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe residents to good quality training 
and education opportunities in Dartford and Gravesham. 
i. Number of affordable homes in Dartford and Gravesham. 
j. Access of Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe residents to affordable housing in 
Dartford and Gravesham. 
k. Ability of young people in Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe to buy or rent their 
first property in Dartford and Gravesham.  
l. The state of schools, health centres, sport facilities and other community 
facilities in Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe. 
m. The state of the streets, pavements, parks and greens in Stone / Knockhall / 
Swanscombe.  
n. The state of housing in Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe 
 
41. Compared to neighbouring communities (ie either Stone, Knockhall, Swanscombe), 
do you think your community (ie Swanscombe/Knockhall/Stone) is getting its fair 
share of money and resources from the Council, the Government and the private 
companies building the new developments in Dartford and Gravesham? 
 
(If no) Why not? 
42. Is there anything extra you think the Council, the Government and the companies 
building the new developments should be doing to help make sure that Stone / 
Knockhall / Swanscombe residents benefit from the new development taking place? 
 
  297 
 
43. Who do you think will benefit the most from the new building developments taking 
place? Do you think the Council, the Government and the companies building the 
new developments understand the needs of Stone/Knockhall/Swanscombe 
residents? 
 
44. On balance, what do you think the impact of the new building developments now 
taking place in Dartford and Gravesham will be on Stone / Knockhall / Swanscombe? 
 
a. Very positive 
b. Overall positive 
c. Mixed; some positive and some negative issues 
d. Overall negative 
e. Very negative 
f. Not sure 
 
3.3 Extent of residents’ involvement in the regeneration of Kent Thameside 
45.  Which of the following statement(s) about the new development in Dartford and 
            Gravesham apply to you?  
a. I’ve read leaflet(s), magazine(s), or newspaper article(s) on the regeneration 
of Dartford and Gravesham. 
b. I’ve completed questionnaire(s) on the regeneration of Dartford and 
Gravesham. 
c. I’ve attended local meeting(s) or forum(s) on the regeneration of Dartford and 
Gravesham. 
d. I’ve contacted the council, a councillor or the MP about the regeneration of 
Dartford and Gravesham. 
e. I’ve taken part in other consultation exercise(s) on the regeneration of 
Dartford and Gravesham not listed above. 
f. No-one has ever asked me what I think about the regeneration of Dartford 
and Gravesham. 
 
             (If yes to a-e) Can you tell me more about it? 
46. Are you happy with the efforts that have been made by the Council, the  
Government and companies building the new developments to involve local 
residents in planning the new developments? 
47.   Is there anything else that you’d like to tell me about the issues we’ve talked  
about?  
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Appendix 3  Key characteristics of Swanscombe interviewees  
 House 
type 
House  
tenure 
Ethnicity/ 
Relation 
status/ 
Gender 
Age 
group 
Household  
Income 
Household 
composition 
Benefits Length of 
occupation 
Occupation Level of 
qualification 
 
Community 
Groups 
Local ties 
JER 1970s 3 bed 
ex-local 
authority 
terraced 
house 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Married 
Female 
51-60 £20-30K Married couple 
household with 
two non-
dependent 
children and 
one part-time 
grandchild 
 
 36 years Semi-retired. 
Caring personal 
service 
occupation: 
Runs playgroup 
Level 3 
qualification: 
NVQ level 3 
Residents 
Assoc; Local 
church 
Moved to 
Swanscombe 
39 years ago  
from Surrey; 
Husband’s 
family from 
Swanscombe 
LGA Pre-1919 3 
bed 
terraced 
house 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Married 
Female 
41-50 £20-£30K Married couple 
household with 
two dependent 
children. 
DLA  
CTC 
24 years Part-time work: 
Caring personal 
service 
occupation: 
Playgroup 
assistant 
Level 2 
qualification: 
NVQ level 2 
Local charity Moved to 
Swanscombe 
24 years ago 
from Welling; 
Husband’s  
family from 
Swanscombe 
 
SPA Pre-1919 3 
bed 
terraced 
house 
Owns 
outright 
White 
Married 
Female 
51-60 £30-£40K Married couple 
household with 
two non 
dependent 
children.  
 28 years Part-time work: 
Caring personal 
service 
occupation: 
Playgroup 
assistant and 
Primary School 
lunchtime 
assistant 
 
Level 3 
qualification: 
NVQ Level 3
  
Residents 
Assoc 
Born in 
Swanscombe. 
Father’s family 
from 
Swanscombe 
PMA Pre-1919 3 
bed 
terraced 
house 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Married 
Female 
51-60 £30-£40K Married couple 
household with 
one non 
dependent 
children.  
 22 years Part-time work: 
Admin. 
occupation 
Level 1 
qualification: 
City and 
Guilds 
qualification 
Residents 
Assoc 
Moved to 
Swanscombe 
28 years ago; 
Husband’s 
family from 
Swanscombe. 
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GBA 1950s 3 bed 
ex-local 
authority 
terrace 
Owns 
outright 
 
 
White 
Single 
Male 
41-50 £30-£40K Three person 
household with 
one child living 
with dependent 
parents  
 50 years Full-time work; 
Public Service 
Professional; 
Town Planner 
Level 5 
qualification; 
MA 
 Born in 
Swanscombe. 
Father’s family 
from 
Swanscombe 
PTU 1950s 4 bed 
semi-
detached 
house 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Married 
Male 
41-50 £30-£40K Married couple 
household with 
three  
dependent 
children. 
 
CTC 6 years Full-time work: 
Public Service 
Associate 
Professional: 
DWP officer 
Level 3 
qualification: 
A levels  
 Moved to 
Swanscombe 
14 years ago 
from Bexley. 
Wife’s family 
from 
Swanscombe. 
 
BFI 1970s 3 bed 
ex-local 
authority 
semi-
detached 
house 
 
Owns 
outright 
White 
Married 
Male 
41-50 £50K + Married couple 
household with 
two dependent 
children. 
 
 19 years Full-time work: 
Business 
Professional: 
Transport 
Consultant 
Level 4 
qualification: 
First degree 
Residents 
Assoc; Runs 
junior 
Swans. 
Tigers FC 
team; former 
Town and 
Borough 
Councillor 
 
Moved to 
Swanscombe 
19 years ago 
from Abbey 
Wood 
CLA Pre 1919 2 
bed end of 
terrace 
house 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Single 
Female 
41-50 £40-£50K Co-habiting 
couple 
household 
 17 years Full-time work: 
Public Service 
Associate 
Professional: 
Local Gov. 
Officer 
Level 3 
qualification: 
A levels 
Sports and 
leisure club 
Moved to 
Swanscombe 
17 years ago 
from 
Bexleyheath 
LCA 1950s 3 bed 
ex-local 
authority  
terraced 
house 
Owns 
outright 
 
White 
Married 
Male 
 
51-60 £20-£30K Married couple 
household with 
one non-
dependent child 
 35 years Part-time work: 
Customer 
Service 
Occupation: 
Assistant in 
ASDA’s photo-
lab. 
None Swans. 
Infants’ 
School 
Governing 
Body. 
Moved to 
Swanscombe 
41 years ago 
from 
Gravesend; 
Wife’s family 
from 
Swanscombe. 
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WBA 1950s 1 bed 
ex-local 
authority 
msonette 
 
Owns 
outright 
White 
Single 
Male 
61-70 Up to £10K Single person 
household 
ICB 20 years Long-term 
sick/disabled 
Formerly in 
Elementary 
Service 
Occupation: 
Local Authority 
Groundsman 
None  Born in 
Swanscombe. 
Father’s family 
from 
Swanscombe 
SNE Pre 1919 3 
bed 
terraced 
house 
Owns 
outright  
White 
Married 
Female 
41-50 £20-£30K Married couple 
household with 
one non-
dependent child 
 20 years Part-time work: 
Admin 
occupation: 
Branch 
administrator 
Level 1 
qualification: 
CSEs and O 
levels 
 Moved to 
Swanscombe 
20 years ago 
from Stone. 
Originally from 
Cornwall. 
RWA 1950s 2 bed 
ex-local 
authority 
msonette 
 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Married 
Male 
31-40 £20-£30K Married couple 
household 
 5 years Full-time work: 
Transport 
Driver: Works 
for Haulage 
Company in 
Crossways. 
Level 1 
qualification: 
CSEs 
 Moved to 
Swanscombe 
5 years ago 
from Swanley. 
YST Pre 1919 4 
bed 
terraced 
house 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White  
Married 
Female  
31-40 £40-£50K Married couple 
household with 
two dependent 
children 
 9 years Part-time work: 
Teaching 
Professional: 
Teacher at 
Craylands Lane 
Primary School 
Level 4 
qualification: 
Teaching 
qualification 
Swans. 
Infants 
School 
Governing 
body 
Born in 
Swanscombe.
Both parents 
from 
Swanscombe. 
MMU Pre 1919 3 
bed 
terraced 
house 
 
Owns 
outright 
White 
Married 
Male 
61-70 £20-£30K Married couple 
household with 
one non 
dependent 
children 
 
 34 years Part-time work: 
Elementary 
Service 
Occupation: 
Works in John 
Lewis goods 
storage area in 
Bluewater 
None Swans. & 
Green. Age 
Concern  
Committee 
Born in 
Swanscombe. 
Father’s family 
lived in 
Swanscombe 
since 19c. 
JMU Pre 1919 3 
bed 
terraced 
house 
 
Living rent 
free 
White 
Single 
Male 
31-40 £20-£30K Married couple 
household with 
one non 
dependent 
children 
 32 years Full-time work: 
Teaching 
Professional: 
Teacher at 
independent 
school 
Level 5 
qualification: 
PhD 
Reader at St 
Peter and St 
Pauls CE 
Church 
Born in 
Swanscombe. 
Father’s family 
lived in 
Swanscombe 
since 19c. 
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MBR Pre 1919 3 
bed 
terraced 
house 
 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White  
Married 
Male 
21-30 £30-£40K Married couple 
household with 
two dependent 
children 
 
CTC 5 years Full-time work: 
Skilled Trade 
Occupation: 
Electrician 
Level 3 
qualification: 
NVQ Level 3 
Local cricket 
club, Swans. 
Pavilion 
Social Club. 
 
Moved to 
Swanscombe 
5 years ago 
from Sutton at 
Hone: Wife 
from 
Greenhithe. 
OKA 1950s 4 bed 
semi-
detached 
house 
 
Owns with 
mortgage 
Black 
African 
Married 
Female 
41-50 £40-£50K Married couple 
household with 
four dependent 
children 
 
CTC 3 years Full-time work: 
Business 
Associate 
Professional 
Level 4 
qualification: 
First degree 
Local Sports 
Club 
Moved to 
Swanscombe 
3 years ago 
from 
Lewisham. 
PMI 1950s 3 bed 
semi-
detached 
house & 1 
bed annexe 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White  
Married 
Male 
41-50 £30-£40K Married couple 
household with 
two dependent 
children & 
spouse’s father 
 
CTC 3 years Full-time work: 
Transport 
Operative: Civil 
Service Driver 
Level 2 
qualification: 
NVQ level 2 
 Moved to 
Swanscombe 
3 years ago 
from 
Greenwich. 
Wife originally 
from 
Swanscombe 
DTR 1960s 3 bed 
local 
authority 
terraced 
house 
 
Rents from 
local 
authority 
White 
Married 
Male 
51-60 Under 
£10,000 
Married couple 
household 
JSA 20 years Unemployed 
Formerly in 
Elementary 
Admin 
Occupation: 
Worked in 
Local Authority 
Post room 
None  Born in 
Swanscombe. 
Both parents 
from 
Swanscombe 
PTR 1960s 3 bed 
local 
authority 
terraced 
house 
 
Rents from 
local 
authority 
White 
Married 
Female 
51-60 Under 
£10,000 
Married couple 
household 
 20 years Part-time work: 
Caring personal 
service 
occupation: 
Runs playgroup 
 
Level 3 
qualification: 
NVQ level 3 
 Moved to 
Swanscombe 
36 years ago 
from 
Gravesend. 
Husband from 
Swanscombe 
MCR Pre 1919 2 
bed 
terraced 
house 
Owns 
outright 
White 
Married 
Male 
61-70 £10-£20K Married couple 
household 
 30 years Retired: 
Formerly in 
skilled trade 
occupation. 
Worked for 
engineering 
firm. 
 
None Social Club Moved to 
Swanscombe 
42 years ago 
from Erith. 
Wife from 
Swanscombe.
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SWO 1960s 3 bed 
ex-local 
authority 
terraced 
house 
Owns  
outright 
White 
Married 
Female 
61-70 £10-£20K Married couple 
household 
 37 years Retired: 
Formerly in 
elementary 
service 
occupation: 
Office cleaner 
None Bowls Club Born in 
Swanscombe. 
Both Parents 
from 
Swanscombe 
KBA 1950s 3 bed 
local 
authority 
terraced 
house 
Rents from 
local 
authority 
White 
Married 
Male 
71-80 Under £10K Married couple 
household 
PC 30 years Retired: 
Formerly in 
Elementary 
Occupation: 
Blue Circle 
Quarry Worker 
 
None  Born in 
Swanscombe. 
Both parents 
from 
Swanscombe 
AWI 1950s 1 bed 
local 
authority 
msonette 
Rents from 
local 
authority 
White 
Single 
Male 
 
61-70 Under £10K Single person 
household 
ICB, HB 11 years Long-term 
sick/disabled 
Formerly in 
sales 
occupation: 
Worked for 
double glazing 
firm. 
 
Level 1 
qualification: 
Learn Direct 
vocational 
qualification 
 Moved to 
Swanscombe 
11 years ago 
from Dartford 
EHR 1970s 3 bed  
ex-local 
authority  
terraced 
house 
 
Shared 
owners: 
Moat HA 
Homebuy 
scheme 
White 
Married 
Female 
21-30 £20-30K Married couple 
household with 
two dependent 
children 
CTC 3 years Part-time work: 
Sales 
Occupation: 
Works in M&S 
at Bluewater 
Level 2 
qualification: 
GCSEs, 
NVQ Level 
2s  
 Moved to 
Swanscombe 
3 years ago. 
From Erith 
originally. 
SHR 1970s 3 bed 
ex-local 
authority  
terraced 
house 
Shared 
owners: 
Moat HA 
Homebuy 
scheme 
White 
Married 
Male 
21-30 £20-£30K Married couple 
household with 
two dependent 
children 
CTC 3 years Full-time work: 
Skilled trade 
occupation: 
Mechanic  
Level 2 
qualification: 
GCSEs, City 
and Guilds 
qualification
  
 Moved to 
Swanscombe 
3 years ago. 
From Longfield 
originally. 
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Appendix 4  Key characteristics of Knockhall interviewees 
 House 
type 
House  
tenure 
Ethnicity/ 
Relation 
status/ 
Gender 
Age 
group 
Household  
Income 
Household 
composition 
Benefits Length of 
occupation 
Occupation Level of 
qualification 
 
Community 
Groups 
Local ties 
DCA 1950s 4 bed 
semi-
detached 
house  
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Single 
Female 
41-50 £30-40K Co-habiting 
couple 
household with 
with two non 
dependent 
children, one 
dependent 
child, one 
grand-daughter 
and partner’s 
mother. 
CTC 10 years Full-time work: 
Elementary 
trade: Works in 
ASDA depot in 
Stone 
None None Moved to 
Knockhall 19 
years ago from 
Gravesend
  
AFU 1970s 3 bed 
townhouse 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Single 
Female 
51-60 £40-50K Co-habiting 
couple 
household 
 17 years Full-time work: 
Public Service 
Associate 
Professional: 
College 
Librarian 
Level 3 
qualification:  
A levels
 
None Moved to 
Knockhall17 
years ago from 
Norfolk 
CCU 1950s 3 bed 
semi-
detached 
house 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Married 
Female 
41-50 £30-40k Married couple 
household with 
one dependent 
child 
CTC 23 years Full-time work: 
Public Service 
Associate 
Professional: 
Pentecostal 
Church 
Missionary 
Level 2 
qualification: 
GCSEs; Work 
based 
qualifications 
Member of 
local charity 
Moved to 
Knockhall 23 
years ago from 
Stone. 
KWH 
 
1950s 4 bed 
semi-
detached 
house 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Married 
Male 
51-60 £50+ Married couple 
household 
 12 years Full-time work: 
Business 
Professional: IT 
consultant 
Level 4 
qualification: 
HND 
Member of 
local church 
Moved to 
Knockhall 12 
years ago from 
Crayford 
KFA Pre 1919 3 
bed 
terraced 
house 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Single 
Male 
31-40 £30-40k Co-habiting 
couple 
household with 
4 dependent 
children 
CTC 1 year Full-time work: 
Skilled Trade: 
British Gas fitter
  
Level 3 
qualification: 
NVQ level 3 
Local cubs 
group 
organiser 
Moved to 
Knockhall from 
Stone 1 year 
ago 
Appendix 4  Key characteristics of Knockhall interviewees 
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DPA 
 
1950s 3 bed 
semi-
detached 
house 
Owns 
outright 
White 
Single 
Male 
51-60 £30-40k Single person 
household 
 54 years Full-time work: 
Administrative 
occupation 
Level 2 
qualifications: 
O levels 
None Moved to 
Knockhall from 
Swanscombe 
56 years ago 
JLO 1950s 3 bed 
bungalow 
Owns 
outright 
White 
Married 
Male 
71-80 £20-30k Married couple 
household 
 7 years Retired: 
Formerly 
Transport 
operative: 
Thames 
Lighterman 
working on 
Woolwich ferry 
Level 4 
qualification: 
HNC 
Sports club Moved to 
Knockhall 7 
years ago from 
Eltham. 
PRA 1960s 3 bed 
townhouse 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Married 
Female 
41-50 £30-40k Married couple 
household 
 14 years Part-time work: 
Elementary 
trade: Works in 
ASDA depot in 
Stone 
Level 1 
qualifications: 
CSEs 
None Moved to 
Knockhall 14 
years ago from 
Welling 
MCO Pre 1919 3 
bed 
terraced 
house  
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Married 
Male 
41-50 £30-40k Married couple 
household with 
two dependent 
children 
CTC 18 years Full-time work: 
Transport 
operative: 
London bus 
driver 
Level 1 
qualifications: 
CSEs 
Local church Moved to 
Knockhall 18 
years ago from 
Sutton at Hone 
MEL 
 
1960s 3 bed 
townhouse 
Owns 
outright 
South 
Asian 
Married 
Male 
61-70 £20-30k Married couple 
household 
 31 years Full-time work: 
Health 
Associate 
Professional: 
Mental health 
nurse 
None None Moved to 
Knockhall 31 
years ago from 
Dartford 
SHA 
 
1980s 2 bed 
terraced 
house 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Single 
Female 
21-30 £40-50k Co-habiting 
couple 
household 
 3 years Full-time work: 
Administrative 
Occupation: 
Works in HR 
department of a 
charity 
Level 3 
qualification: A 
levels 
None Moved to 
Knockhall 3 
years ago from 
Welling 
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SSM 
 
Pre 1919 3 
bed 
terraced 
house 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Single 
Female 
31-40 £30-40k Co-habiting 
couple 
household with 
4 dependent  
Children 
 
CTC 10 years Looking after 
home 
Level 2 
qualification: 
GCSEs 
None Moved to 
Knockhall from 
Chatham 10 
years ago 
JPI 1960s 3 bed 
terraced 
house 
Rents from 
Local 
Authority 
White 
Single 
Female 
61-70 Up to £10k Single person 
household 
Pension 
Credit 
40 years 
(First 
Occupants) 
Retired: 
Formerly in 
Secretarial  
Occupation 
Level 1 
qualification: 
Secretarial 
qualification 
None Born in 
Knockhall 
SWH 1950s 4 bed 
semi-
detached 
house 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Married 
Female 
51-60 £50k+ Married couple 
household 
 12 years Full-time work: 
Health 
Professional: 
Community 
Nurse 
Level 4 
qualification: 
Qualified nurse 
Local church Born in 
Knockhall. 
Moved back to 
Knockhall from 
Crayford 12 
years ago 
GST Pre 1919 3 
bed 
terraced 
house 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Single 
Male 
31-40 £40-50k Co-habiting 
couple 
household 
 5 years Full-time work: 
Teaching 
Professional 
Level 4 
qualification: 
First degree; 
Professional 
Teaching 
Qualification 
Member of 
local football 
team 
Moved to 
Knockhall 5 
years ago from 
Eltham 
SED 1960s 3 bed 
terraced 
house 
Owns 
outright 
White 
Single 
female 
61-70 £10-20k Single person 
household 
 40 years 
(First 
occupants) 
Retired: 
Formerly in 
Secretarial 
Occupation 
Level 1 
qualification: 
Secretarial 
qualification 
None Born in 
Knockhall 
ABR 1980s 2 bed 
terraced 
house 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Single 
Male  
21-30 £40-£50k Co-habiting 
couple 
household 
 3 years Full-time work: 
Sales 
occupation 
Level 3 
qualification; A 
levels 
None Moved to 
Knockhall 3 
years ago from 
Welling 
TCA Pre 1919 2 
bed 
terraced 
house 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Single 
Male 
31-40 £40-£50k Single person 
household 
 17 years Full-time work: 
Public Service 
Professional: 
Works for 
Mayor of 
London 
Level 4 
qualification: 
First degree 
Member of 
Residents 
Association 
Moved to 
Knockhall 17 
years ago from 
Greenwich 
  306 
 
DFR 1950s 3 bed 
end of 
terrace 
house 
Rents from 
Local 
Authority 
White 
Married 
Male 
51-60 £20-30k Married couple 
household 
 17 years Full-time work: 
Elementary 
occupation: 
Works at 
Greene King 
Distribution 
Depot 
None Member of 
Swanscmbe 
Pavilion 
Moved to 
Knockhall from 
Swanscombe 
36 years ago 
RBA 1950s 4 bed 
detached 
house 
Living rent 
free: Tied 
housing 
White 
Married 
Male 
51-60 £20-30k Married couple 
household 
 18 years Full-time work: 
Public Service 
Professional: 
Rector of St 
Mary’s Church, 
Greenhithe  
 
Level 4 
qualification: 
First degree 
Various 
church and 
community 
organisation 
Moved to 
Knockhall 18 
years ago 
BKE Pre 1919 3 
bed end of 
terrace 
house 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Married 
Male 
51-60 £50k+ Married couple 
household with 
two dependent 
children 
 20 years Full-time work: 
Teaching 
Professional: 
Secondary 
School Teacher 
Level 4 
qualification: 
First degree 
Runs 
Greenhithe 
Community 
Market 
Garden 
Project 
Moved to 
Knockhall 20 
years ago from 
west London 
TWR 1960s 3 bed 
terraced 
house 
Owns 
outright 
White 
Married 
Male 
61-70 £20-30k Married couple 
household 
 47 years Retired: 
Formerly 
Business 
Professional: 
Part-owned and 
managed a 
company that 
produced 
Marine Pumps 
Level 3 
qualification; 
Marine 
engineering 
apprenticeship 
Local church Moved to 
Knockhall from 
Gravesend 47 
years ago 
DBL 1950s 3 bed 
semi-
detached 
house 
Owns 
outright 
White 
Married 
Male 
51-60 Up to £10k Married couple 
household 
Incapacity 
Benefit 
53 years Long-term sick: 
Formerly 
Science and 
Technology 
Professional: 
Studio engineer 
in Broadcasting 
Industry 
Level 4 
qualifications: 
HNCs 
None Born in 
Knockhall 
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JFR 1950s 3 bed 
terraced 
house 
Rents from 
Local 
Authority 
White 
Married 
Female 
51-60 £20-30k Married couple 
household 
 17 years Part-time work: 
Elementary 
service 
occupation: 
Office cleaner 
 
None Member of 
Swanscmbe 
Pavilion 
Moved to 
Knockhall from 
Swanscombe 
36 years ago 
RFA 1950s 3 bed 
semi-
detached 
house 
Owns 
outright 
White 
Single 
Male 
61-70 £20-30k Single person 
household 
 52 years Full-time work: 
Administrative 
occupation: 
Works for 
building 
services firm
  
Level 1 
qualification: 
Work based 
qualifications 
None Born in 
Knockhall 
NTI Post 2000 3 
bed 
terraced 
house 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Married 
Male 
31-40 £50-60k Married couple 
household with 
one dependent 
child 
CTC 5 years Full-time work: 
Public Service 
Professional: 
Primary School 
Teacher 
Level 4 
qualification: 
First degree 
None Moved to 
Knockhall 5 
years ago from 
Sydenham 
JHI 1970s 3 
bedroom 
townhouse 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Single 
Male 
51-60 £40-50k Cohabiting 
couple 
household 
 9 years Full-time work: 
Business 
Associate 
Professional: 
Solicitors Clerk 
Level 2 
qualifications:  
O levels 
None Moved to 
Knockhall 9 
years ago from 
SE London 
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Appendix 5  Key characteristics of Horns Cross interviewees 
 House 
type 
House  
tenure 
Ethnicity/ 
Relation 
status/ 
Gender 
Age 
group 
Household  
Income 
Household 
composition 
Benefits Length of 
occupation 
Occupation Level of 
qualification 
 
Community 
Groups 
Local ties 
RFO 1950s 3 bed 
detached 
bungalow 
Owns 
outright 
White 
Married 
Male 
61-70 £40-50k Married couple 
household 
 30 years Part-time work: 
Science and 
Technology 
Professional: 
Environmental 
Engineer 
Level 4 
qualification: 
HND 
Local church Moved to Horns 
Cross 30 years 
ago from 
Greenhithe 
PWA 1950s 3 bed 
detached 
bungalow 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Married 
Female 
61-70 £10-20k Married couple 
household with 
non dependent 
children 
 25 years Retired: Formerly 
in Secretarial 
occupation 
None None Moved to Horns 
Cross from 
Dartford 25 
years ago 
JAR 1950s 3 bed 
semi-
detached 
house 
Private 
rented 
White 
Married 
Male 
31-40 £40-50k Married couple 
household with 
three 
dependent 
children 
CTC 4 years Full-time work: 
Skilled trade 
occupation: 
Makes machine 
guards for the lift 
industry 
Level 3 
qualification: 
NVQs 
None Moved to Horns 
Cross 4 years 
ago from 
Greenhithe 
JMA Pre 1919 3 
bed 
terraced 
house 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Single 
Male 
41-50 £30-40k Lone parent 
household with 
two dependent 
children 
CTC 16 years Full-time work: 
Science and 
Technology 
Associate 
Professional: 
Database 
administrator 
Level 4 
qualification: 
First degree 
None Moved to Horns 
Cross from 
South London 
16 years ago 
DBK 1950s 3 bed 
semi-
detached 
bungalow 
 
Owns 
outright 
White 
Married 
Male 
71-80 £10-20k Married couple 
household 
Pension 
Credit 
55 years Retired: Formerly 
in Customer 
service 
occupation: NHS 
catering manager 
None None Born in Horns 
Cross 
JFO 1950s 3 bed 
detached 
bungalow 
Owns 
outright 
White 
Married 
Female 
51-60 £40-50k Married couple 
household 
 30 years Full-time work: 
Science and 
Technology 
Associate 
Professional: 
Laboratory 
Technician 
Level 3 
qualification: 
A levels 
Local church Moved to Horns 
Cross 30 years 
ago from 
Greenhithe 
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BWA 1950s 3 bed 
detached 
bungalow 
Owns with 
mortgage 
White 
Married 
Male 
61-70 £10-20k Married couple 
household with 
non dependent 
children 
 25 years Retired: Formerly 
process operative: 
Worked for Glaxo 
Smith Kline in 
Dartford 
Other work 
based 
qualification  
None Moved to Horns 
Cross from 
Dartford 25 
years ago 
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Appendix 6       Kent Thameside Key Figures Interview Schedule 
 
1.  Personal background 
 
1. Could you tell me for the record what your current job or position is? 
 
2. Could you explain to me the nature of your involvement in the regeneration of Kent 
Thameside?  
 
2. Kent Thameside regeneration objectives 
 
3. How would you describe Kent Thameside to someone who wasn’t familiar with the 
area? 
 
4. What would you say the key objectives behind the regeneration of Kent Thameside 
are? 
 
5. Would you say that these regeneration objectives you have described are shared by 
all the key Kent Thameside regeneration partners? 
 
6. What would you say residents of Kent Thameside’s existing communities want to 
achieve from this regeneration process?  
 
7. The area of North Kent now known as Kent Thameside was first identified as a 
strategic regeneration priority by SERPLAN, the Department of the Environment, 
KCC and other agencies in the mid to late 1980s. Have the regeneration priorities for 
the area set out then changed, in your opinion, in any way since then? 
 
3. Delivering Kent Thameside’s regeneration objectives 
 
8. What progress would you say has been made to date in terms of meeting the 
regeneration objectives you have described to me? 
 
What have been the main successes and failings to date would you say? 
 
9. What have been the main obstacles that have impeded the delivery of these 
regeneration objectives? 
 
10. Looking back in retrospect, is there anything that you would have liked to have seen 
done differently in terms of delivering these regeneration objectives? 
 
11. Where do you think the Kent Thameside regeneration project will be in 5 years time? 
 
4. Major developments 
 
12. For each of the following major developments, could you give me: 
 
a. an indication of what stage they have now reached; and 
b. your opinion of the main challenges and obstacles involved in delivering them 
and ensuring that they achieve their full economic and housing potential. 
 
a. Eastern Quarry 
b. Ebbsfleet Valley  
c. Swanscombe Peninsula 
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13. Delays in making sufficient funding available to improve the infrastructure of Kent 
Thameside – particularly in regard to its road network – have been blamed in some 
quarters for the slow progress being made up to now on some of Kent Thameside’s 
key development sites. 
 
Is this analysis one that you agree with? 
 
14. Do you think that we have the right system of governance in place in Kent 
Thameside to enable the successful delivery of these major development projects? 
 
5. Impact of regeneration on existing communities in Kent Thameside 
 
15. The Kent Thameside Delivery Board and before it the Kent Thameside Association 
have said that they want to “integrate” the new developments and existing 
communities such as Swanscombe in both a physical, economic and social sense in 
order to make sure that existing residents “benefit as much as newcomers to this 
area from the new building development taking place”.  
 
What in your view are the main challenges involved in achieving this objective? 
 
What action is being taken to achieve this objective? 
 
16. A shortage of suitable skills and educational qualifications is frequently cited as one 
of the main obstacles preventing the residents of Kent Thameside’s existing 
communities from benefiting fully from the opportunities presented by regeneration in 
the area.  
 
Is this analysis one that you agree with? 
 
17. What measures are being taken as part of the Kent Thameside regeneration strategy 
to improve the physical infrastructure of existing communities - ie housing, transport 
services, local amenities, health and education services? 
 
18. What measures are being taken as part of the Kent Thameside regeneration strategy 
to improve the social or ‘soft’ infrastructure of existing communities – i.e. the 
promotion of social, business and community networks and a sense of place identity? 
 
6. Engaging the residents of existing communities in Kent Thameside 
 
19. What efforts have been made to involve the residents of existing communities in Kent 
Thameside in the planning and delivery of regeneration in Kent Thameside? 
 
How successful would you say these efforts to engage existing communities in the 
regeneration process have been to date? 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
20. Are there any other comments that you would like to make with regard to the issues 
that we have talked about? 
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Appendix 7  Key characteristics of key figure interviewees 
 Organisation in 2007/08 Role in 2007/08 Role in the regeneration of Kent 
Thameside 
RSC Dartford Borough Council Regeneration Director Involved in drafting of the East Thames 
Corridor study  
By Llewelyn Davies and Roger Tym in 
1993. Joined Dartford Borough Council 
shortly afterwards. 
CSH Self-employed 
Management Consultant 
 Chief Executive of Dartford Borough 
Council, between 1989 and 2001. Closely 
involved in establishment of the Kent 
Thameside Association in 1993 
JMU Dartford Borough Council;  
 
Kent County Council 
Labour Councillor on 
Dartford Borough 
Council 
Labour spokesperson 
for regeneration, 
planning and transport 
on Kent County Council 
Leader of Dartford Borough Council 
between 1998 and 2003. Council leader 
when Ingress Park and Waterstone Park 
received planning approval. Key figure in 
the launch of the Fastrack bus network 
and the EU Urban II Thames Gateway 
Kent programme. 
MWA Kent Thameside Delivery 
Board 
Chief Executive of Kent 
Thameside Delivery 
Board 
Joined the Kent Thameside Delivery 
Board in 2006. Previously Chief Executive 
of the London Regional Development 
Agency 
NJO Swan Valley Community 
Secondary School in 
Swanscombe 
Headteacher Became Headteacher at Swan Valley in 
2003 
ATH Swanscombe Health 
Centre 
General Practitioner Became a General Practitioner in 
Swanscombe in 1980. Served as Medical 
Director of Dartford, Gravesham and 
Swanley Primary Care Trust between 
2000 and 2006 
ACH Countryside Properties 
Plc 
Chairman Chairman of the company that built  
Waterstone Park. Also served as    
Chairman of the  Kent Thameside 
Economic Board and a member of the 
Kent Thameside Delivery Board.  
RPY Land Securities Plc 
 
Head of Urban 
Community 
Development 
Responsible within Land Securities for the 
delivery of the Ebbsfleet Valley 
development. Closely involved in Kent 
Thameside since 1995. Worked first for 
Blue Circle Properties and then Whitecliff 
Properties. Also a member of the Kent 
Thameside Delivery Board 
SJO London and Continental 
Railways 
 
Managing Director of 
Stations and Property 
Division 
 
Responsible for the delivery of Ebbsfleet 
International Station. Also served as Vice 
Chair of the Kent Thameside Delivery 
Board and Chair of the Fastrack Delivery 
Executive.  
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Appendix 8  Summary table of residents featured in the typology of existing residents 
Name   
 
     Phase of    
     Lifecycle and                    
     Mosaic group 
Professional 
status
Economic status Relationship 
status 
Housing 
tenure/type 
Educational 
status 
Cars/Public 
transport use 
Local 
connections 
Community 
interactions 
External 
connections 
Group A: ‘Just passing through’ 
SHA 
 
 
Early 
adulthood 
 
New 
Homemakers 
Administrative & 
Secretarial 
occupation 
 
Household 
income of  
£40,001-£50,000 
 
Long-term 
partnership 
without children 
Owns property 
with mortgage / 
Terraced property 
Level 3 
qualifications 
Public transport 
commuter has car 
for leisure use 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
outside North 
West Kent 
Routine contacts Works outside of 
North West Kent 
and mainly 
socialises outside 
community 
TCA 
 
 
Mature young 
adulthood 
 
New 
Homemakers 
Professional 
occupation 
 
 
Household 
income of  
£40,001-£50,000 
 
Single person 
household 
Owns property 
with mortgage / 
Terraced property 
Level 4/5 
qualifications 
Public transport 
commuter has car 
for leisure use 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
outside North 
West Kent 
Routine contacts Works outside of 
North West Kent 
and mainly 
socialises outside 
community 
ABR 
 
 
Early 
adulthood 
 
New 
Homemakers 
Sales or customer 
service 
occupation 
 
Household 
income of  
£40,001-£50,000 
Long-term 
partnership 
without children 
Owns property 
with mortgage / 
Terraced property 
Level 3 
qualifications 
Public transport 
commuter has car 
for leisure use 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
outside North 
West Kent 
Routine contacts Works outside of 
North West Kent 
and mainly 
socialises outside 
community 
GST 
 
 
Mature young 
adulthood 
 
New 
Homemakers 
Professional 
occupation 
 
 
Household 
income of  
£40,001-£50,000 
 
Long-term 
partnership 
without children 
Owns property 
with mortgage / 
Terraced property 
Level 4/5 
qualifications 
Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
outside North 
West Kent 
Social contacts Works outside of 
North West Kent 
and mainly 
socialises outside 
community 
NTI 
 
 
Mature young 
adulthood 
 
Careers and 
Kids 
Professional 
occupation 
 
 
Household 
income of  
£50,000+ 
 
Married with 
dependent 
children 
Owns property 
with mortgage / 
Terraced property  
Level 4/5 
qualifications 
Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
outside North 
West Kent 
Routine contacts Works outside of 
North West Kent 
and mainly 
socialises outside 
community 
Group B: ‘Guardians of the flame’ 
SWO 
 
Early old age 
 
Claimant 
cultures 
Retired, formerly 
in elementary 
occupation 
Household 
income of  
£10,001-£20,000 
 
Married with non-
dependent 
children 
Owns property 
outright/ 
Terraced property 
No qualifications Has car but uses 
public transport 
whenever 
possible 
Born and brought 
up in the 
community 
Joining 
community 
groups 
No meaningful 
relationships 
outside of 
community. 
DTR 
 
Late middle 
age 
 
Industrial 
Heritage 
Involuntary 
economic 
inactivity, formerly 
in elementary 
occupation 
Household 
income of under 
£10,000 
 
Married with non-
dependent 
children 
Rents from Local 
Authority/ 
Terraced property 
No qualifications Non-car owning 
public transport 
user 
Born and brought 
up in the 
community 
Participating in 
community 
activities 
Limited, 
infrequent 
relationships 
outside of 
community 
SPA 
 
Late middle 
age 
 
Industrial 
Heritage 
Personal service 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£30,001-£40,000 
 
Married with non-
dependent 
children 
Owns property 
outright/ Terraced 
property 
Level 3 
qualification 
Has car but uses 
public transport 
whenever 
possible 
Born and brought 
up in the 
community 
Co-operation with 
other community 
groups 
No meaningful 
relationships 
outside of 
community. 
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KBA 
 
Later old age 
 
Claimant 
Cultures 
Retired, formerly 
in elementary 
occupation 
Household 
income of under 
£10,000 
 
Married with non-
dependent 
children 
Rents from Local 
Authority/ 
Terraced property 
No qualifications Non-car owning 
public transport 
user 
Born and brought 
up in the 
community 
 
Participating in 
community 
activities 
No meaningful 
relationships 
outside of 
community. 
WBA 
 
Early old age 
 
Terraced 
melting pot 
Involuntary 
economic 
inactivity, formerly 
in elementary 
occupation 
Household 
income of under 
£10,000 
 
Single person 
household 
Owns property 
outright/ 
Maisonette 
No qualifications Non-car owning 
public transport 
user 
Born and brought 
up in the 
community 
Participating in 
community 
activities 
No meaningful 
relationships 
outside of 
community. 
MMU 
 
Early old age 
 
Terraced 
melting pot 
Elementary 
occupation 
 
Household 
income of 
£20,001-£30,000 
 
Married with non-
dependent 
children 
Owns property 
outright/ Terraced 
property 
No qualifications Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Born and brought 
up in the 
community 
Co-operation with 
other community 
groups 
Limited, 
infrequent 
relationships 
outside of 
community 
MCR Early old age  
 
Industrial 
Heritage 
Retired, formerly 
in skilled trade 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£10,000-£20,000 
 
 
Married with non-
dependent 
children 
Owns property 
outright/Terraced 
property 
No qualifications Non-car owning 
public transport 
user 
Moved to 
community in 
early adulthood 
from elsewhere in 
North West Kent  
Participating in 
community 
activities 
No meaningful 
relationships 
outside 
community 
Group C: ‘Community crusaders’ 
BFI 
 
Early middle 
age 
 
Claimant 
cultures 
Professional 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£50,000+ 
 
Married with 
dependent 
children 
Owns property 
outright/ Semi-
detached property 
Level 4/5 
qualifications 
Public transport 
commuter has car 
for leisure use 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
outside North 
West Kent 
Owning and/or 
managing local 
facilities/ Working 
with policy-
makers 
Works outside of 
North West Kent 
and occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
RBA 
 
Late middle 
age 
 
Ex-council 
community 
Professional 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£20,001-£30,000 
 
Married with non-
dependent 
children 
Home tied to 
employment/Deta
ched property 
Level 4/5 
qualifications 
Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
outside North 
West Kent 
Owning and/or 
managing local 
facilities/ Working 
with policy-
makers 
Occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
GBA 
 
Early middle 
age 
 
Ex-council 
community 
Professional 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£30,001-£40,000 
 
Single person 
living in multi-
person household 
Owns property 
outright/ Terraced 
property 
Level 4/5 
qualifications 
Public transport 
commuter has car 
for leisure use 
Born and brought 
up in the 
community 
Working with 
policy-makers 
Works elsewhere 
in North West 
Kent and 
occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
TWR 
 
Early old age 
 
Suburban 
Mindsets 
 
Retired, formerly 
in professional 
occupation 
 
Household 
income of 
£20,001-£30,000 
 
Married with non-
dependent 
children 
Owns property 
outright/ Terraced 
property 
Level 3 
qualification 
Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
elsewhere in 
North West Kent 
Owning and/or 
managing local 
facilities/ Working 
with policy-
makers 
Occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
RFO 
 
Late middle 
age 
 
Industrial 
Heritage 
Professional 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£40,001- £50,000 
 
Married with non-
dependent 
children 
Owns property 
with mortgage/ 
Detached 
property 
Level 4/5 
qualifications 
Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
elsewhere in 
North West Kent 
Owning and/or 
managing local 
facilities 
Works outside of 
North West Kent 
and occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
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BKE 
 
Late middle 
age 
 
Ex-council 
Community 
Professional 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£50,000+ 
 
Married with 
dependent 
children 
Owns property 
with mortgage/ 
Terraced property 
Level 4/5 
qualifications 
Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
outside North 
West Kent 
Owning and/or 
managing local 
facilities/ Working 
with policy-
makers 
Works elsewhere 
in North West 
Kent and 
occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
CCU 
 
Early middle 
age 
 
Industrial 
Heritage 
Associate 
professional 
occupation 
 
Household 
income of 
£30,001-£40,000 
 
Married with 
dependent 
children 
Owns property 
with  mortgage/ 
Semi-detached 
property 
Level 2 
qualifications 
Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
elsewhere in 
North West Kent 
Owning and/or 
managing local 
facilities 
Works outside of 
North West Kent 
and occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
Group D: ‘Happy families’ 
PMI 
 
Early middle 
age 
 
Ex-council 
Community 
Personal service 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£30,001-£40,000 
 
Married with 
dependent 
children 
Owns property 
with mortgage/ 
Semi-detached 
property 
Level 2 
qualifications 
Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
outside North 
West Kent 
Involvement in 
informal networks 
Works outside of 
North West Kent 
and occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
DFR 
 
Late middle 
age 
 
Ex-council 
Community 
Elementary 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£20,001-£30,000 
 
 
Married with non-
dependent 
children 
Rents from Local 
Authority/ 
Terraced property 
No qualifications Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
elsewhere in 
North West Kent 
Involvement in 
informal networks 
Works elsewhere 
in North West 
Kent and 
occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
EHR 
 
Early 
adulthood 
 
Claimant 
cultures 
Sales or customer 
service 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£20,001-£30,000 
 
Married with 
dependent 
children 
Shared 
ownership/ 
Terraced property 
Level 2 
qualifications 
Public transport 
commuter has car 
for leisure use 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
outside North 
West Kent 
Involvement in 
informal networks 
Works elsewhere 
in North West 
Kent and 
occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
MBR 
 
Early 
adulthood 
 
Terraced 
melting pot 
Skilled trade 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£30,001-£40,000 
 
Married with 
dependent 
children 
Owns property 
with mortgage/ 
Terraced property 
Level 3 
qualification 
Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
elsewhere in 
North West Kent 
Joining 
community 
groups 
Works outside of 
North West Kent 
and occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
JFR 
 
Late middle 
age 
 
Ex-council 
community 
Elementary 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£20,001-£30,000 
 
Married with non-
dependent 
children 
Rents from Local 
Authority/ 
Terraced property 
No qualifications Public transport 
commuter has car 
for leisure use 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
elsewhere in 
North West Kent 
 
Involvement in 
informal networks 
Works elsewhere 
in North West 
Kent and 
occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
SNE 
 
Early middle 
age 
 
Terraced 
melting pot 
Administrative 
and Secretarial 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£20,001-£30,000 
 
Married with 
dependent 
children 
Owns property 
outright/ Terraced 
property 
Level 1 
qualifications 
Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
outside North 
West Kent 
Involvement in 
informal networks 
Works elsewhere 
in North West 
Kent and 
occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
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KFA 
 
Mature young 
adulthood 
 
Terraced 
melting pot 
Skilled trade 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£30,001-£40,000 
 
Long-term 
partnership with 
dependent 
children 
Owns property 
with mortgage/ 
Terraced property 
Level 3 
qualification 
Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
elsewhere in 
North West Kent 
Joining 
community 
groups 
Works elsewhere 
in North West 
Kent and 
occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
JLO 
 
Early old age 
 
Terraced 
melting pot 
Retired, formerly 
in skilled trade 
occupation  
Household 
income of 
£20,001-£30,000 
 
Married with non-
dependent 
children 
Owns property 
outright/ 
Detached 
property 
Level 4/5 
qualifications 
Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
outside North 
West Kent 
Involvement in 
informal networks 
Occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
YST 
 
Mature young 
adulthood 
 
Terraced 
melting pot 
Professional 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£40,001- £50,000 
 
Married with 
dependent 
children 
Owns property 
with mortgage/ 
Terraced property 
Level 4/5 
qualifications 
Has car but uses 
public transport 
whenever 
possible 
Born and brought 
up in the 
community 
Joining 
community 
groups 
Limited, 
infrequent 
relationships 
outside of 
community 
SSM 
 
Mature young 
adulthood 
 
Terraced 
melting pot 
Voluntary 
economic 
inactivity 
Household 
income of 
£30,001-£40,000 
 
Long-term 
partnership with 
dependent 
children 
Owns property 
with mortgage/ 
Terraced property 
Level 2 
qualification 
Public transport 
commuter has car 
for leisure use 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
elsewhere in 
North West Kent 
Involvement in 
informal networks 
Occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
SHR 
 
Early 
adulthood 
 
Claimant 
cultures 
 
Skilled trade 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£20,001-£30,000  
 
Married with 
dependent 
children 
Shared 
ownership/ 
Terraced property 
Level 2 
qualifications 
Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
outside North 
West Kent 
Involvement in 
informal networks 
Works elsewhere 
in North West 
Kent and 
occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
PTR Late middle 
age 
 
Terraced 
melting pot 
Personal service 
occupation 
Household 
income of under 
£10,000 
Married with non-
dependent 
children 
Rents from Local 
Authority/ 
Terraced Property 
Level 3 
qualifications 
Non-care owning 
public transport 
user 
Moved to 
community in 
early adulthood 
from elsewhere in 
North West Kent  
Participating in 
community 
activities 
Limited, 
infrequent 
relationships 
outside of 
community 
PMA Late middle 
age 
 
Terraced 
melting pot 
Administrative 
and Secretarial 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£30,001-£40,000 
 
Married with one 
non-dependent 
child 
Owns with 
mortgage/ 
Terraced Property 
Level 1 
qualification 
Has car but uses 
public transport 
whenever 
possible 
 
Moved to 
community in 
early adulthood 
from elsewhere in 
North West Kent  
 
Participating in 
community 
activities 
Works elsewhere 
in North West 
Kent and 
occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
PTU Early middle 
age 
 
Ex-council 
community 
Public Service 
Associate 
Professional  
 
 
Household 
income of 
£30,001-£40,000 
 
 
Married with three 
dependent 
children 
Owns with 
mortgage/ Semi-
detached property 
Level 3 
qualification  
Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
early adulthood 
from elsewhere in 
North West Kent  
 
Involvement in 
informal networks 
Works elsewhere 
in North West 
Kent and 
occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
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LGA Early middle 
age 
 
Terraced 
melting pot 
Personal Service 
Occupation 
Household 
income of 
£20,001-£30,000  
 
Married with two 
dependent 
children  
Owns with 
mortgage/ 
Terraced Property 
Level 2 
qualification 
Has car but uses 
public transport 
whenever 
possible 
 
Moved to 
community in 
early adulthood 
from elsewhere in 
North West Kent  
Joining 
community 
groups 
Limited, 
infrequent 
relationships 
outside of 
community 
DCA Early middle 
age 
 
Ex-council 
community 
Elementary 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£30,001-£40,000 
 
 
Long-term 
partnership with 
dependent 
children 
Owns with 
mortgage/ Semi-
detached property 
No qualifications  Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
early adulthood 
from elsewhere in 
North West Kent  
 
Involvement in 
informal networks 
Works elsewhere 
in North West 
Kent and 
occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
PWA Early old age 
 
 Terraced 
melting pot 
Retired, formerly 
in Administrative 
and Secretarial 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£10,000-£20,000 
 
 
Married with non 
dependent 
children 
Owns with 
mortgage / 
Detached 
bungalow 
No qualifications Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
early adulthood 
from elsewhere in 
North West Kent  
Involvement in 
informal networks 
Limited, 
infrequent 
relationships 
outside of 
community 
JAR Mature young 
adulthood  
 
Terraced 
melting pot 
 
Skilled trade 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£40,001- £50,000 
 
Married with 
dependent 
children  
Private Rented / 
Semi-detached 
property 
Level 3 
qualification 
Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
early adulthood 
from elsewhere in 
North West Kent  
 
Involvement in 
informal networks 
Works elsewhere 
in North West 
Kent and 
occasionally 
socialises outside 
community 
JER Late middle 
age 
 
Claimant 
cultures 
Semi retired, 
Personal Service 
Occupation 
Household 
income of 
£20,001-£30,000  
 
Married with non 
dependent 
children  
Owns with 
mortgage/ 
Terraced Property 
Level 3 
qualification 
Has car but uses 
public transport 
whenever 
possible 
 
Moved to 
community in 
adulthood from 
outside North 
West Kent 
Joining 
community 
groups 
Limited, 
infrequent 
relationships 
outside of 
community 
BWA Early old age 
 
Terraced 
melting pot 
Retired, formerly 
in Skilled Trade 
occupation 
Household 
income of 
£10,000-£20,000 
 
 
 
 
 
Married with non 
dependent 
children 
Owns with 
mortgage / 
Detached 
bungalow 
Other work based 
qualification 
Car owner 
occasionally uses 
public transport 
Moved to 
community in 
early adulthood 
from elsewhere in 
North West Kent  
Involvement in 
informal networks 
Limited, 
infrequent 
relationships 
outside of 
community 
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Appendix 9  Key renewal policies, strategies and programmes targeted at   
  Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross 
Date Policy  Target Areas Lead 
Agencies 
1995 
and 
1997 
Looking to the future 
This vision document envisaged the transformation of the 
river front along the Thames, from an area characterised by 
heavy industry, power generation, mineral extraction and 
derelict and under-used land to one containing a variety and 
mix of uses, overlooking the Thames in a’ quality 
environment’. Development would be centred on the 
shopping centre at Bluewater, Eastern Quarry and the 
International and Domestic Passenger Station at Ebbsfleet.  
However, the document also emphasised that the members 
of the KTA “attached the utmost importance to protecting and 
fostering the identity of existing communities within the area, 
and ensuring that existing residents benefit directly from the 
Kent Thames-side initiative”. 
 
Swanscombe, 
Knockhall, 
Horns Cross 
Kent 
Thameside 
Association 
1996 Ebbsfleet Community Development: The first steps 
This developer led framework stated that the Ebbsfleet Valley 
had the potential to “provide major opportunities to bring 
social, community and economic benefits to those currently 
living, working and doing business in the area”. It identified 
five principles that would inform Blue Circle’s strategy efforts: 
 
 Partnership: involving the community, developers, 
businesses and public agencies in working together to 
share and achieve common goals and objectives. 
 
 Participation: recognising, valuing and actively seeking 
out participation by members of the community in the 
development and implementation of initiatives. 
 
 Empowerment: encouraging appropriate responsibility, 
ownership, management and control of community 
initiatives by voluntary organisations and community 
groups in order to achieve sustainable development. 
  
 Understanding: recognising the inter-relationships and 
impact of physical development on a wide variety of 
social, community and economic interests, and planning 
accordingly to maximise overall benefits.  
 
 Opportunity: encouraging initiatives which lead to the  
integration and sharing of development benefits by all 
members of the community old and new. 
 
The framework set out plans for the creation of an Ebbsfleet 
Forum and Trust: a community body with resources to deliver 
community projects aimed at ensuring that existing residents 
benefited from the regeneration of Ebbsfleet  
 
Swanscombe Blue Circle  
1996 The Ebbsfleet Development and Environmental 
Framework 
This framework emphasised need to ensure that the 
community infrastructure created as part of the Ebbsfleet 
Swanscombe Dartford BC, 
Gravesham 
BC, Kent CC. 
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development meets the needs of the existing and new 
communities. It also highlighted the importance of involving 
the local communities as the development progressed and 
called for an “Ebbsfleet Forum” to ensure clear 
communication between the developers, the local authorities 
and the community. 
 
1998- 
2006 
Single Regeneration Budget – North Kent Gateway 
Programme 
A combined SRB round 4 and 5 programme worth £7.9 
million was delivered in Dartford, Gravesham, Swale and 
Medway LAs by the North Kent Gateway Partnership 
(NKGP), an unincorporated body of partners from the public, 
private and voluntary sectors. 
 
It was a community capacity building programme aimed at 
ensuring the communities of North Kent benefited from 
opportunities arising from economic and social growth in the 
Gateway. The programme sought to support employment and 
training, address low educational attainment and skill 
shortages, tackle crime and improve community safety and 
improve community health and well-being.  
 
In Kent Thameside the programme supported 18 projects 
with total funding of £3.1 million. Three projects directly 
affected Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross. 
 
 Under One Roof: Kent County Council 
 
This project provided day care facilities and a range 
of early years services to promote the development of 
child and parenting skills. The project was based in 
Swanscombe and also covered Gravesend and 
Northfleet.  
 
 Making Connections: North West Kent CVS 
 
A community capacity building project targeting areas 
of deprivation. It supported the Community Youth 
Association in Swanscombe and Greenhithe, a 
resource for disaffected and excluded young people 
and their families. The ‘CYA Action Station’ in 
Swanscombe was expanded to comprise a Cyber 
Café for young people, homework club and 
community advice centre. SRB capital funding was 
used to purchase computer equipment for the Action 
Station.  
 
 Community Greenspace: Groundwork Kent 
Thameside 
 
This project supported improvements in the local 
environment and the quality of life of residents 
through the creation of public open space. 
Swanscombe Heritage Park was one of the projects 
to benefit from SRB funding.  
 
Swanscombe, 
Knockhall, 
Horns Cross 
North Kent 
Gateway 
Partnership 
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2002-
2008 
Urban II Thames Gateway Kent Programme 
A European Regional Development Funding Initiative 
covering 10 wards in Dartford and Gravesham, the TGKP 
was set up in order to help these wards to “achieve social 
inclusion in line with the rest of the Thames Gateway region 
and to share in the prosperity of South East England”. 
Between 2002 and 2008 €12 million of EU funding was 
allocated to the programme and a further €20 million in match 
funding from public and private sources was generated.  
The programme had three priority themes: 
 
 achieving social inclusion;  
 community access to learning;  
 business infrastructure and regeneration.  
 
The programme aimed to “build the capacity and confidence 
of (existing) communities thereby enhancing inclusion and to 
ensure that the physical environment of the target area is 
improved to reduce the disparities with the standards set in 
the new developments, and to enable existing residents to 
benefit from urban renewal.” 
 
Swanscombe, 
Knockhall, 
Horns Cross 
Dartford BC, 
Gravesham 
BC, 
Kent CC 
2002 The Eastern Quarry Planning Brief  
This planning brief stressed that every effort should be made 
to connect the new community with the existing communities 
adjoining it. 
 
Swanscombe, 
Knockhall 
Dartford BC 
2002 North Kent Area Investment Framework  
The North Kent AIF, funded by SRB money, described the 
current conditions in the area of North Kent encompassing 
Dartford, Gravesham, Medway and Swale and set out a 
vision of where the area would be in 20 years time. The 
strategy sought to achieve “a balance between new growth 
and the development of existing communities...to ensure that 
all of the people of North Kent have access to high quality, 
jobs and surroundings”. Planned communities should be 
integrated, it said, with the existing communities and in order 
to help all residents and stakeholders benefit from new 
developments.  
 
In existing communities it called for a focus on neighbourhood 
renewal and strengthening community support infrastructure - 
including new affordable housing, improvements to the 
existing housing stock, schools, leisure services, and the 
environment. It also called for local communities to be fully 
involved in the process of environmental enhancement by 
working with them to identify local priorities and implement 
projects. Sustainable management arrangements owned and 
undertaken by the community should also be put place it said.  
 
Over the AIF period the gap between North Kent’s most 
deprived wards and affluent wards would need to be 
narrowed it stated. This levelling up process required 
community confidence building, access to learning and skills, 
targeting of jobs, community enterprise and voluntary activity 
through key partners such as churches and faith 
communities. Divisions between new and older communities 
would also need to be creatively addressed, partly by 
ensuring that older neighbourhoods were improved and made 
Swanscombe, 
Knockhall, 
Horns Cross 
TG Kent 
Partnership 
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more attractive but also by making areas as mixed as 
possible. Improvements in public transport, meanwhile, which 
was heavily used by the least well off, were also seen as a 
priority.  
 
The AIF calculated that the total gross additional public 
investment required in North Kent over the period 2002-2021, 
to achieve the objectives set out in the framework would be 
around £11.6 billion.  
 
2003 Towards the future place: A community strategy for Kent 
Thameside 
The strategy identified 5 priority communities within Dartford 
and Gravesham which were experiencing particular 
difficulties and challenges in the key domains contained in the 
Indices of Multiple Deprivation. Unless action was taken to 
tackle these challenges, the strategy stated, these existing 
neighbourhoods wouldn’t be able to share the future 
prosperity generated by the new homes and jobs being 
created in Kent Thameside. Designation as a priority 
community was intended: 
 
 to encourage members of the LSP to focus existing 
resources on the area  
 to help attract external funding  
 to involve existing residents in each area in the 
design of new interventions and  
 encourage regular evaluation of the action taken in 
each area 
 
From January 
2003:  
Swanscombe 
 
From July 
2004 
Swanscombe 
and 
Knockhall 
Kent 
Thameside 
Local 
Strategic 
Partnership 
2004 Swanscombe Neighbourhood Renewal Study & Action 
Plan 
This neighbourhood based strategy was designed to ‘enable 
stakeholders to ensure that the major threats to the 
sustainability of Swanscombe’ posed by new development in 
the area are turned into ‘substantial opportunities’ for the 
community. A series of local priorities for regeneration were 
identified by consultants through consultation with residents 
and other stakeholders.  
 
An action plan with 4 key themes - housing and the 
environment, community safety and crime, accessibility and 
transport and jobs and business - and 30 projects linked to 
these themes was then drawn up. The Action Plan aimed to 
make Swanscombe a place that: 
 
 Is attractive and in which people want to live; 
 Is safe and has visible, responsive and 
proactive policing; 
 Is comfortable and welcoming; 
  Is focused on achievement, not just  
educational attainment; 
 Provides a better future for all, economically 
and socially; 
 Has affordable housing; 
 Is confident and aspiring; 
 Takes and makes opportunities from the  
regeneration area; 
Swanscombe Dartford BC 
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 Is well integrated and ‘part of’ the 
regeneration area, not isolated; 
 Has a better range and quality of 
employment opportunities 
 Has a positive image; 
 Has good access to better local facilities; 
 Has an empowered community. 
 
2004 
 
Dartford Regeneration Strategy 
This strategy was launched by Dartford BC in order to ensure 
the co-ordination of the council’s efforts with those of its 
regeneration partners. It aimed to ensure that development 
was locally appropriate and that the existing communities of 
Dartford benefitted from the new developments, socially and 
economically. Particular emphasis was placed on community 
capacity building, business support, lifelong learning, 
improving public transport and investing in culture and 
recreation.  
 
An associated Action Plan called for: 
 The acquisition of a disused library building for the 
development of a Swanscombe ‘One Stop Shop’ and 
lifelong learning ICT facility. 
 The recruitment of consultants to undertake a 
transport study for Swanscombe and Greenhithe. 
 The creation of a Community Enterprise Hub in Horns 
Cross with workspaces for local business start-ups.  
 
Swanscombe,  
Knockhall, 
Horns Cross 
 
Dartford BC 
2004,
2005 
and 
2007  
ODPM/DCLG Sustainable Communities Plan Funding  
In June 2004 the ODPM announced that £4.5 million for a 
North Kent Environment Programme was to be made 
available from the Sustainable Communities Plan Fund. 
£370,000 was also allocated to Groundwork for 
improvements to Swanscombe Heritage Park. 
In November 2004, a further £37.5 million was made 
available to Thames Gateway Kent. In this funding round 
Dartford BC was awarded £1 million for community facilities 
and environmental improvements identified in the 
Swanscombe Action Plan and by the local councils. It was 
spent on the following projects in Swanscombe: 
 
 London Road junction improvements 
 New town council office sewer connection 
 Keary Road allotment fencing 
 Water supply to Craylands Lane future sports pavilion 
 Structural surveys of Church Rd Community hall, Old 
Swanscombe Library and the Grove Community 
Centre 
 Refurbishment design of the Grove Community 
Centre 
 Gunn Rd Estate refurbishment 
 Swanscombe street signs, litterbins and entrance 
signs 
 
 In March 2005, another £2 million was assigned to Thames 
Gateway Kent to assist the development of 5 new Vocational 
Centres – including one at Swan Valley School in 
Swanscombe. 
Swanscombe, 
Knockhall 
Dartford BC, 
Swanscombe 
and 
Greenhithe 
Town 
Council, 
Groundwork 
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 In September 2007, Kent Thameside was assigned £1.8 
million by the DCLG for green space and countryside 
improvements. Swanscombe Heritage Park received a 
further £105,000 from this fund. 
 
2005 Swanscombe Delivery Plan  
This document incorporated the outstanding Swanscombe 
Action Plan projects and other initiatives that had received 
funding from the ODPM’s Sustainable Communities Fund into 
a single delivery plan. At a later date it also incorporated 
projects identified in the Swanscombe and Greenhithe 
Masterplan. 
 
Swanscombe Dartford BC 
 
 
 
2005 Swanscombe and Greenhithe Masterplan  
The masterplan, produced by a team of external consultants, 
aimed to provide a blueprint for future development and 
investment within Swanscombe and Greenhithe. It looked at 
how the physical fabric and character of the community could 
be enhanced and also sought to identify ways in which 
Swanscombe and Greenhithe could be physically integrated 
with the new communities surrounding the villages.  
It proposed, for example, the creation of two ‘activity 
corridors’ linking key ‘facility clusters’ in Eastern Quarry, 
Swanscombe and Swanscombe Peninsula and the existing 
villages. These corridors were intended to make it easier for 
the residents of each community to take advantage of the 
employment, commercial and leisure opportunities in each 
area and prevent artificial divisions between each community 
from opening up. 
 
Swanscombe, 
Knockhall 
SEEDA,  
English 
Partnership, 
Dartford BC 
2005 Kent Thameside Regeneration Framework 
The framework built on existing plans for the area and 
identified the key project areas needed to drive forward 
regeneration. Six principal strategic objectives were identified 
including the “integration of new and existing communities”. 
The framework stated that in order to create a sustainable 
environment, the community agenda needed to be given a 
major focus within the overall regeneration framework. It 
envisaged that this would be achieved through the provision 
of new and improved community facilities and services. This 
would help to deliver a safer environment, promote health 
and healthy living and offer the range of cultural and leisure 
facilities appropriate to the area’s status as a focus for growth 
in the SE.  
 
The framework also highlighted the importance of community 
involvement in regeneration. It stated that local communities 
had to be genuinely involved in the regeneration process if 
the root causes of deprivation were to be addressed 
successfully with a lasting effect.  
Swanscombe,  
Knockhall, 
Horns Cross 
Kent 
Thameside 
Delivery 
Board 
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Appendix 10  House prices in Kent Thameside 2001-2010 
Between 2001 and the start of the economic downturn in 2008 there were marked variations 
between the average house prices in Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross. Figure 1, 
which incorporates house sale price data derived from the Land Registry via the property 
company Right Move (Right Move, 2011), shows that prices in Knockhall consistently 
outperformed those of Swanscombe and Horns Cross. The average price in Knockhall 
peaked at £196,000 in 2008 – nearly £40,000 more than the average in Horns Cross and 
£30,000 more than in Swanscombe. Knockhall’s greater proximity to Bluewater and to 
Greenhithe Station, which has faster and more regular rail services into London than Stone 
Crossing of Swanscombe Stations, may be partly responsible for these higher prices. It is 
also possible that Ingress Park, a relatively highly priced new development immediately to 
the north of Knockhall22, had a knock on, inflationary effect on house prices in Knockhall. It 
suggests that investors at the time saw Kent Thameside as a property market with 
considerable potential for future growth and were willing to invest in properties in hitherto 
unfashionable areas such as Knockhall.    
After 2008, however, the average price in Knockhall fell sharply and almost reached parity 
with Swanscombe and Knockhall in 2010. In contrast, the average price across the South 
east proved more resilient after the downturn. By 2010 the average price in the South east 
had recovered to £209,000 in 2010 – over £50,000 ahead of Knockhall. This appears to 
indicate that investors became more risk averse and were less willing to invest in emerging 
property markets such as Kent Thameside. It does not seem that the start of high speed rail 
services into London from Ebbsfleet International Station in 2009 has had any appreciable 
inflationary impact on property prices in the area. 
A more complicated picture emerges however when one looks beyond the overall average 
property prices in each area and focuses instead on the prices of each property type and the 
volumes of properties sold (see figures 2-8). This data reveals a dearth of detached house 
sales in all three villages - which has the effect of driving down the overall average property 
price in the villages. In Horns Cross, the overall average property price is further deflated by 
the fact that most sales in the village are of relatively inexpensive one and two bedroom 
flats. In Knockhall and Swanscombe, meanwhile, the market is dominated by terraced house 
sales. In fact, the average price of a terraced house in Knockhall is consistently higher than 
the South east average in most years, even after the economic downturn. And in 
                                                             
22
 In 2007 3-4 bedroom terraced houses in Ingress Park were on the market for between £350,000 -
£400,000 – a price significantly above the local average.  
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Swanscombe average terraced houses prices are only slightly behind the South east 
average. This data suggests that the Kent Thameside market is stronger and more resilient 
than the overall average price appears to indicate – although there is no evidence here 
either of an inflationary ‘Ebbsfleet effect’ on prices.  
Figure 1  Change in average house prices between 2001 and 2010 
 
 
Figure 2  Change in average flat prices between 2001 and 2010 
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Figure 3  Change in average terraced house prices between 2001 and 2010 
 
 
Figure 4  Change in average semi-detached house prices between 2001 and 2010 
 
 
Figure 5  Change in average detached house prices between 2001 and 2010 
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Figure 6  Number of houses sold in Swanscombe between 2001 and 2010 
 
Figure 7  Number of houses sold in Knockhall between 2001 and 2010 
 
Figure 8  Number of houses sold in Horns Cross between 2001 and 2010 
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Appendix 11  Distribution of dwelling types in Swanscombe, Knockhall, Horns Cross 
 
 
 
Source: © Google (2010) 
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Appendix 12 Indices of Multiple Deprivation for Swanscombe, Knockhall and   
  Horns Cross 
Figures 1 to 3 set out the position of each lower level super output area of the three villages 
in the Indices of Multiple Deprivation rankings (DCLG, 2011b).  
Although only one super output area, Swanscombe Central West23, is consistently among 
the most deprived areas in the overall IMD rankings, five areas appear at least once among 
the 20 per cent most deprived areas in the Education Skills and Training domain24 (see 
figures 4-6) .  
All four Swanscombe super output areas score poorly in this domain with Swanscombe 
Central West featuring in the 10 per cent most deprived areas in both 2004, 2007 and 2010. 
The slight improvement in these scores between 2004 and 2010 may be connected with the 
improved key stage 4 scores at the local secondary school (Swan Valley Community 
School25) and increased proportion of students remaining in education after 16.  
Map 1      The Lower Level Super Output Areas in Swanscombe, Knockhall and Horns Cross 
                               
 
 
 
 
                                                             
23
 This super output area in the south western corner of Swanscombe is largely composed of local 
authority owned housing including a number of three to four storey flat developments (see Figure 6.9) 
24
 This domain examines key stage 2-4 attainment scores and also records the proportion of young 
people who fail to stay in education after 16 as well as the proportion of adults with few or no 
qualifications. 
25
 63% of students achieved 5 A* - C GCSEs in 2010 compared to 45% in 2007 and 22% in 2004 
A  Swanscombe East    
B  Swanscombe Central North 
C  Swanscombe Central West  
D  Swanscombe Central East 
E Knockhall South   
F Knockhall North 
G Horns Cross South   
H Horns Cross North 
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Figure 1  Position of the lower level super output areas in Swanscombe, Knockhall and 
  Horns  Cross in the Indices of Multiple Deprivation rankings in 2004, 2007 
  and 2010 
 
 Among the 10% most deprived output areas (1-3249) 
 Among the 20% most deprived output areas (1-6498)  
             Among the 30% most deprived output areas (1-9747) 
 
 
Indices of Multiple Deprivation 2004 
 
Lower Level Super 
Output Area 
Overall IMD Rank Income 
Deprivation 
Domain Rank 
Employment 
Domain Rank 
Education, Skills 
and Training 
Domain Rank 
Barriers to 
Housing and  
Services Domain 
Rank 
Swanscombe  
East 
9232 
 
12111 14988 4517 5043 
Swanscombe 
Central North 
10887 
 
11288 16211 2241 6737 
Swanscombe 
Central West 
6064 
 
4911 7386 2053 3036 
Swanscombe 
Central East 
16137 
 
17680 23815 6116 10311 
Knockhall  
South 
18349 
 
18289 26491 12201 5254 
Knockhall  
North 
9085 
 
9791 13206 4513 6639 
Horns Cross  
South 
15914 
 
15638 19065 8862 4940 
Horns Cross  
North 
14308 
 
16796 20710 7913 1747 
 
Indices of Multiple Deprivation 2007 
 
Swanscombe  
East 
10432 
 
12025 16020 6816 7006 
Swanscombe 
Central North 
12024 
 
13083 14201 4027 12325 
Swanscombe 
Central West 
6643 
 
5767 6287 3125 6503 
Swanscombe 
Central East 
14344 
 
14953 17809 6732 14086 
Knockhall  
South 
21424 
 
23368 24770 14511 7779 
Knockhall  
North 
11733 
 
11518 14737 6271 8067 
Horns Cross 
South 
16388 
 
16832 19179 7336 13548 
Horns Cross  
North 
14651 
 
18538 20611 8880 2548 
 
Indices of Multiple Deprivation 2010 
 
Swanscombe  
East 
10872 
 
11537 13778 7223 12545 
Swanscombe 
Central North 
14210 
 
13147 14365 6008 18354 
Swanscombe 
Central West 
7092 
 
5403 8306 944 11450 
Swanscombe 
Central East 
12396 
 
10262 16079 5805 20788 
Knockhall  
South 
19938 
 
21576 22464 16045 9859 
Knockhall  
North 
13412 
 
12367 16159 6870 15459 
Horns Cross  
South 
17211 
 
17288 19282 6919 19656 
Horns Cross  
North 
16051 
 
18103 20703 10145 4150 
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There are a total of 32482 lower level super output areas in England. In the IMD rankings ‘1’ 
is the most deprived and ‘32482’ is the least deprived. 
 
Figure 2  Overall Indices of Multiple Deprivation rankings in 2004 
 
 
Figure 2  Overall Indices of Multiple Deprivation rankings in 2007 
 
 
Figure 3  Overall Indices of Multiple Deprivation rankings in 2010 
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Figure 4  Education, skills and training domain rankings in 2004 
 
 
Figure 5  Education, skills and training domain rankings in 2007 
 
Figure 6  Education, skills and training domain rankings in 2010 
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